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ABSTRACT
This work is an attempt to define a comprehensive contemporary model of the
causes of wars of secession, state and illustrate its gaps, and develop new
theories to accentuate and improve that model, and through comparative
case studies perform some elementary tests of their validity. My theoretical
paradigm is dependent on an assumption that the ultimate causes, as
captured under the rubric of institutions and structures, of an event involving
rational but free-willed human beings are inadequate to explaining the onset
of radical, extraordinary politics in general and wars of secession in particular.
On the contrary, proximate causes, in the form of environmental factors that
cannot be classified structural or institutional and which are either deeply
influenced by elite decisions or deeply influence elite decisions must be
brought into the theoretical chain.
Specifically I examine the case of Namibia, focusing on the East
Caprivi region where in 1999 a substantial portion of the Lozi population
attempted to secede, comparing it to the case of Botswana and another
minority, the Kalanga people who dominate the North East District. I find that
the two states are (1) structurally and institutionally similar, to the point that
were these the only causal factors involved one would assume they would
suffer similar behavioral outcomes, (2) divergent in terms of minority political
identities and degrees of mobilization, and (3) divergent in terms of a series of
internal and external environmental decision that cannot be described as
structural or institutional.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This work is intended to be a first step, a baby step in the direction of
improving our ability to predict and or explain the onset of a particular type of
violent conflagration – wars of secession. Accordingly, this process will
consist of several key points. First, I discuss the literature on the causes of
wars of secession and other related forms of violent, radical civil disputes.
This literature will specifically include a review of the major theories regarding
the causes of revolution, wars of secession, civil wars, genocide/politicide,
regime-type changes, and ethno-national wars, as well as a review of the
literature on the causes of radical religious-political movements. From this
literature I will create a model of the causal chain leading from a state of
peace to one of civil war with the aim of secession. This model will consist of
two key parts. First, one built on the existing literature regarding the causes
of wars of secession, focusing specifically on the structural and institutional
elements thereof, and second, one built on additional necessary steps that
are widely assumed to exist but which are, in contemporary literature, on
touched upon in a highly limited form. I then conduct a simple comparison of
two states, Namibia and Botswana, which are structurally and institutionally
extraordinarily similar, in order to demonstrate that structural and institutional
causes are insufficient (that is to say not entirely deterministic) to predict the
relevant behavioral outcome. Finally, I conduct a series of comparisons
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which are explicitly not structural or institutional in their theoretical grounding,
comparisons which will be drawn from the other causal links I assert are
present in the road to wars of secession.

Justification of Research
It may be argued that the causes of the Caprivi war are simple in the extreme
– the war, like all examples of radical, extraordinary politics, resulted from a
long-disenfranchised people being activated for a short time by a charismatic
leader. That said, that simple statement, like so many simple statements,
hides far more complex truths. “Long-displaced people” refers to the
structural and institutional conditions to which the people of Caprivi are
subject – the state of civil war, ethnic war, war of secession, religious war,
and revolutionary war prediction, as it exists now, focuses almost exclusively
the vectors of analysis associated with these conditions. Right now we can
predict with 60-70% accuracy which states are likely to experience a civil
conflict using only these for a period of, say, a decade – nothing to sniff at,
but nothing really to crow about either. The point that these conditions are
seized upon by a charismatic leader, while common-sense, is I believe the
key to unlocking the remaining 30-40% of the predictive process, specifically
concentrating on two points. First, I want to know why leaders decide war is
irrational on one day and rational on the next – is this a product of structural
and institutional changes or, as I believe, the product of changes in extra-
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national actors’ policies and internal actors’ polices? Second, I want to know
if there is some way to gauge the effectiveness of these charismatic leaders
at using their charisma, that is to say in terms of recruitment, not to mention
their effectiveness at mobilizing non-human resources.
In addition, I am interested in whether or not it is disenfranchisement
that matters or human awareness of said disenfranchisement. Why did the
Japanese serfs not overthrow the samurai for centuries? Why did poor
Southern whites come to believe they were disenfranchised by Northerners,
rather than rich Southern whites? Why did the Age of Revolutions in Europe
fall fast on the heels of what we might call the industrialization of mass
education? Ultimately, I believe it is because the structures and institutions
themselves, frankly, do not matter in determining the onset of radical,
extraordinary politics in general or wars of secession in particular. On the
contrary, I believe that such structures and institutions only matter if a
substantial group of people believe them to matter, and further, if a
charismatic leader both is capable of and desires to take advantage of said
perspective.
Perhaps this is a complex way of dealing with a simple question, but
often the scientific project must deal with political situations in fundamentally
different ways than policy advisors – were I of the latter ilk I would merely
recommend killing Muyongo and, if possible, “enfranchising” the Caprivi Lozi.
That said, if you asked me why, I would have to delve into the details of the
matter. I see the difference as being similar to that which exists between any
3

scientist, such as a physicist or a chemist, and the typical practitioner, for
instance a plumber or an electrician.
Structuralism and Institutionalism: Necessary But Insufficient
The vast majority of political, economic, and social scientific efforts to predict
and/or explain the onset politicide, civil war, ethnic war, wars of independence
and, of particular relevance here, wars of secession, and other radical forms
of civil disturbance whose aims include the systematic and wholesale
transformation of an entire political-economic system (radical, extraordinary
politics), have employed one of two general types of logic. On the one hand
some theorists assert that it is formal institutions and legal constitution of
states that results in either stability or upheaval. This approach is known as
the institutionalist approach and while it was a favorite in classical, prebehavioralist social science, it is once again gaining adherents, though now
with a distinctly behavioralist bent. The advocates of the other major
approach to predicting and/or explaining the onset of radical, extraordinary
politics assert that it is informal social (and political-economic) structures that
are the principal source of stability or instability. These structures, which are
in essence are simply enduring patterns of behavior that have not been
enshrined in law or treaty but which shape the rationality of persons
subsumed in those structures, and institutions are distinguished from one
another almost exclusively by their variant levels of formality or because of
the “real” nature of some structures (e.g. structure of economic geography)
4

comparative to the wholly artificial nature of all institutions (that is to say
constructed through human intention).
These traditions have accomplished one essential and absolute
scientific good. They have allowed social scientists to classify states as either
likely or unlikely to engage in radical, extraordinary politics, including wars of
secession, and have given us the beginnings of a spectrum along which to lay
different states. While efforts to fully amalgamate all the strands of radical,
extraordinary political theory into a single model are rare, a few efforts have
been made, notably the State Failure Task Force, or SFTF. The SFTF can, it
claims, “predict” around 70% of all variant forms of rebellion. What they mean
by predict, however, is assert that within a period of a decade or so a state is
likely to undergo a violent political upheaval whose goal is to radically
transform or divide society. While this is a significant and impressive
accomplishment, substantial accuracy remains to be accomplished, both in
terms of classification and in terms of precision of predicting the timing of
upheavals.
I believe that at least part of our remaining predictive and explanatory
weakness lies in our failure to successfully consider rationality in all its
dimensions. Institutional and structural approaches to the prediction of
radical, extraordinary politics are based on the fundamental premise that the
conditions human beings are in alter predictably human rational self-interest.
This being the case, if we understand the structural and institutional
conditions, we can predict those instances in which rebellion of variant types
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(specifically herein cases of wars of secession) is a rational political behavior.
This concept is at the core of all forms of human behavioral prediction, of
course.
What the institutionalist and structuralist approaches fail to do,
however, is consider the actions or logic of the disestablishmentarian elites
who ultimately will be performing the cost-benefit-risk calculations, deciding
whether or not to pursue open, violent dissent. We know that the decision
process of elites is affected by environmental factors (personal, local,
national, and international) that can be classified neither as structural nor
institutional.
Additionally, we know that elites cannot keep their rationale to
themselves and foment instances of radical, disestablishmentarian politics
such as wars of secession. Elites must transfer their logics, if in a sanitized
form, to many other people: the masses who will actually commit the acts of
violence for the elites, peer elites who must be convinced to close ranks, and
extranational actors who can serve as potential allies or resource wells. It
should be possible, in other words, for us to gain a greater sense of whether
elites have decided to pursue radical, extraordinary politics through the
analysis of disestablishmentarian elite-mass relationships, mass and resource
mobilization, and the relationships and communications between
disestablishmentarian elites and national and international elites.
In other words, my goal is to highlight the fact that there social scientist
examining the causes of violent civil disruption should be examining
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immediate or proximate causes of said disruption in conjunction with those
causes examined by virtually all orthodox theorists, specifically the ultimate
causes. This will necessarily result in more complicated models, but if this
complication is the price of improved explanation then I believe that it should
be paid.
This method will not, of course be perfect. A notable blind spot will
remain in the realm of states who exercise brinksmanship, for instance.
However, when employed in association with institutional and structural
methods, analyses over time of elite communications could improve our
ability to predict the exact timing of radical, extraordinary politics.
Institutionalist and structuralist methods will reveal to us which states are ripe
for rebellion and what type(s) of rebellion are most likely. Measurements of
transformations in public identity, transformations in the legality of the
political-economy, transformations in disestablishmentarian capabilities, and
transformations in the substance of elite communication should provide us
with the benchmarks as to when domestic upheavals, such as the war of
secession being studied here, are most likely to occur.
On a final note, it is worth stating that the orthodox application of the
structuralist and institutionalist approaches consistently bear the biases most
explicitly advocated by neo-Realists but present in a host of theoretical
traditions – the bias of state-centrism. For structuralist-institutionalists, at
least in practice, it is the statistics, legal framework, and socio-cultural
patterns at the state-level of analysis that matters. I take substantial issue
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with this, however, as it denies the fundamental nature of
disestablishmentarian movements. These movements (which I describe as
radical, extraordinary politics below), specifically are instances in which the
framework of the state is under siege – to rebel in any sense is to reject the
state and its apparatus and to begin the process of establishing a counterstate. As such we must expect that there are fundamentally important
happenings at the sub-state (and perhaps extra-state) level in the case of
every disestablishmentarian movement. My approach, while not denying the
validity of the structuralist and institutionalist approaches, tries to bring in the
necessary non-state actors into the predictive and explanatory process.

On Radical, Extraordinary Politics
Later in this work I will define at length the concept of wars of secession
relative to several other similar but distinct variants of political behavior. Prior
to this, and my literature review, I would like to define a few concepts that I
will use throughout this work to refer to the genre of political behaviors of
which wars of secession are but one species. This will consist of defining two
key spectra of behavioral variation. The first of these is the spectrum that lies
between ordinary and extraordinary politics, the second of these is the
spectrum that lies between moderate and radical politics.
Defining the nature of the first of these spectra is relatively easy.
Ordinary politics, as a term, refers to politics that take place within the
generally accepted and formal order – they are rule-based. I choose the term
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ordinary not out of any subjective or moralistic impulse but because of the
root concept underlying the term ordinary – beyond implying normalcy,
“ordinary,” which shares its origins with both the terms “ordinance” and
“order,” implies normalcy as defined by a set of rules. Normalcy, then, is
subjective – it is the orthodoxy, the reigning set of legal guidelines (no matter
how elementary) by which political and economic transactions within a
political-economy may take place. Extraordinary politics, then would be those
political-economic transactions within a political-economy that take place, as
the prefix “extra-“ implies, outside of the orthodox institutional framework.
Corruption, graft, crime, espionage, underground movements, riots, and, of
course, rebellions of all types fit this latter category.
Before moving on, it should be noted that this spectrum is one in which
contemporary theorists of international relations should feel quite comfortable.
The implication is that a society, at one extreme, that of fully ordinary politics,
experiences the full comfort of the state, whereas “states” (if they can be
called that) at the other extreme roil in Hobbesian anarchy, perfect freedom to
act with all the costs and benefits therein. In interstate relations, as interstate
regimes proliferate and complex hegemony expands, the shift in pattern is
towards that of ordinary politics – the system is becoming more, for lack of a
better word, state-like. In states wherein the orthodox political and economic
rules are virtually meaningless, such as China in the early 20th Century or
present-day Somalia, the system has become increasingly anarchic, leading
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to the development of what can only be called a microcosm of the interstate
system within a state, complete with warring pseudo-states.
Setting this spectrum aside, briefly, let the focus shift to that which lies
between moderate and radical politics. On one end of this spectrum lie those
forms political-economic behaviors and transactions whose ends are, to put it
simply, moderate in end – they seek only incremental transformation and
advantages, in particular those advantages to be gained within the
contemporaneous political-economic orthodoxy. On the other extreme are
radical politics, political-economic behaviors and transactions whose ends are
the extreme transformation of the contemporary political-economic system.
These two spectrums may seem identical at first, and indeed, they are
related, particularly as they share a similar characteristic – the defining of
political behaviors and transactions with regards to orthodoxy. But, whereas
one of the spectrums define group behaviors according to what proportion of
these behaviors are rule-abiding, the other defines them according to what
degree they seek to transform the orthodoxy and how quickly the seek to do
so.
We may see these spectrums as perpendicular to each other,
intersecting, so that all possible political behaviors and transactions may be
divided into four general categories: ordinary, moderate politics; ordinary,
radical politics; extraordinary, moderate politics; and extraordinary, radical
politics. Ordinary, moderate politics are those politics which both abide by
orthodox rules and which seek to achieve their ends within the orthodox
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political-economic institutional arrangement. Ordinary, radical politics are
those politics which abide by orthodox rules but, in doing so, seek to radically
transform the nature of the political-economic orthodoxy (e.g. one man, one
vote, one time scenarios or communist parties that focus on electoral victory
in democratic states).
Extraordinary, moderate politics are those politics which seek
immediate, limited political-economic gains through means unsanctioned or
even directly opposed by the orthodox political-economic institutions (e.g.
pirate radio, corruption, vote-rigging, and so forth). Finally, Extraordinary,
radical politics are those politics which seek radical transformations in the
political-economic orthodoxy and which use unsanctioned or forbidden
political means to accomplish these ends. It is this genre which my literature
review will focus on, and, intriguingly, it is this genre which holds, in gross
terms, the fewest instances (even if the impact of these instances is vastly
disproportionate to its frequency).
Before continuing, I should make a note on two types of political
behavior that may be considered difficult to classify, specifically coups and
pacifistic civil disobedience. The first of these presents a problem because,
like wars of secession and other types of radical disestablishmentarianism, it
is violent and extraordinary action, however the changes sought are rarely
radical in terms of reorganizing the nature of the orthodox political-economy.
Rather, coups, or what are properly called coups, are those rebellion whose
aim it is to install a new ruler or new rulers into an already extant institutional
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arrangement. Thus, more properly, coups should be classified as an
extraordinary, moderate politics – an extreme form bordering the line between
moderate and radical politics, but nonetheless functionally across that line.
With regards to peaceful resistance, as utilized by such great figures
as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, we are presented with a
different problem, indeed, and indeed, one more difficult to resolve. Here is
an instance in which organizations seek to radically transform the orthodox
political-economy through the knowing violation of the orthodox institutional
order, yet unlike most variations of extraordinary, radical politics, this variant
is explicitly non-violent, emphasizing soft power, or influence, over hard
power, or coercion. This is problematic. I would classify this unusual outlier
type of behavior as being radical, ordinary politics bordering on radical,
extraordinary politics for one particular reason. Those persons who utilize
nonviolent civil disobedience are completely aware of the reigning orthodox
rules and do not seek to overturn them. Rather, they seek to utilize
inconsistencies in the application of those rules as a means of mobilizing
support via the conscious violation of those rules, being fully prepared to
accept any consequences, be they what they may.

Variance Among Disestablishmentarianisms:
Definitions
Having described the unifying characteristics of all radical, extraordinary
politics, I would like to briefly expound on the variant natures of the different
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genre of those politics. I do this not merely as an idle exercise, but as part of
an effort to reinforce my notion of the socio-historically specific nature of each
instance of radical, extraordinary politics once the conditions have developed
that encourage them—in other words I intend to define the differences in
order to strengthen my characterization of the similarities.
Mass Socio-Political Extermination
It is possible to conceive of genocides as ethnic wars in which extreme
means are employed. Similarly, we can consider democides and mass
politicides to be particularly extreme revolutions. This possibility throws into
doubt the utility of classifying genocides and their kin as a unique genre of
radical systemic transformation. There are, however, compelling arguments to
the contrary.
In the first place, mass exterminations, for this is in effect what
genocides, democides, and mass politicides are, do not merely vary in terms
of extremity of means, they vary radically so. Mass political exterminations
utterly cast aside the concept of “non-participant,” even more so than in the
case of total interstate war or popular revolutions. Strategic targets are
indistinguishable from any other environmental element associated by the
perpetrating group or groups with the victim group or groups. The goal is not
merely to destroy the capacity to resist, but to destroy the enemy entirely. As
Harff and Gurr (1988, 360) note, “if unarmed civilians are deliberately and
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systematically killed, even if they support an opposition group (rebels), then
the event is a genocide).”
This attitudinal shift in terms of means is, however, merely a symptom
of an even more extreme shift. The ends of genocide and other forms of
mass political extermination are substantially different from other forms of
radical systemic transformation. The goal of genocidal transformation is not
conceivable in traditional terms of redistributing power or goods through either
the establishment of a new order of exploitation and control or through the
(utopian) elimination of such an order. Rather, mass political extermination
seeks to utterly and absolutely eliminate a contending faction. In some cases
this is legitimated based on a warped principle of self-defense, in others on a
principle of lebensraum and inter-societal competition, and in yet others it is
simply a question of vengeance and hatred. In all cases there is probably an
undercurrent of political-economics as well—consider that mass political
extermination leads to an immediate and observable increase in employment
opportunities as well as resource and infrastructure density per capita.
Revolutions
Revolution is usually defined in reference to the degree of penetration it
actually affects in society, polity, and economy. True revolutions are those
instances of radical systemic transformation in which the organization,
legitimacy base, identity structure, and so on of a given system are wholesale
transformed. They are totalitarian by their very nature—attempting holistic
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reform and reorganization. By their completion, in other words, the social
order and reigning social patterns should be almost wholly distinct from their
predecessor.
The State Failure Task Force’s definition of revolutions amalgamates
multiple types of radical political behavior into a single concept. Revolutions
are, in the words of the SFTF, “Episodes of sustained violent conflict between
governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the
central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region”
(Goldstone et al. 2000, V). I divide this definition into three sub-classifications
based on the different 1) socio-historical conditions prior to the initiation of the
radical, extraordinary political events, the 2) political-economic-social ends
sought by the initiating party (defined in terms of the above socio-historical
conditions and the relevant interplay of identities), and 3) the means
acceptable to the achievement of the new order.
Revolutions, then, come about when the entire political-economicsocial system is considered to be extraordinarily ineffective and/or immoral.
The result is that the conceptualization of the system as a whole is believed to
be untenable, requiring wholesale transformation. Usually this sort of change
has occurred either in response to the appearance of an entirely new ideology
which is perceived to either add an entirely new dimension to previous
conceptions of justice (e.g. the appearance of new religions, such as
Christianity or Islam, the appearance of new specifically political ideologies,
such as liberalism or Marxism, or the appearance of entirely new legitimacy
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paradigms, such as nationalism or universal human rights) or the utter failure
of the orthodox system (and its ideology) to fulfill the needs of its people when
alternative ideological paradigms are available. Therefore, to utilize the
phrasing of the SFTF, a revolution is: an episode of violent conflict between
governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the
socio-political-economic system as a whole.
I am not entirely satisfied with this definition, in large part because of
its insistence on violent conflict, on the one hand, and its insistence that the
revolutionary faction is never an element of the government. To the contrary,
low-violence and/or government(-faction)-initiated revolutionary action that is
based on the same degree of totalistic discontent and the same extremity of
ends, not only happens, but happens at a greater frequency in the modern
world than ever before.
Consider, for instance, top-down revolutions, those orchestrated
revolutions in which actors who are already members of elite classes
(sometimes single-handedly, sometimes in alliances) within a politicaleconomic-social system seek to transform the system radically. Relationships
between and among classes, values, and favored methods and technologies
are reengineered and dictated by elites in an orchestrated and methodical
fashion.
In the case of most (if not all) orchestrated revolutions, not all elite
classes need be included—many are ultimately eliminated, disenfranchised,
replaced, assimilated, or simply disempowered. Therefore clashes are not
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unlikely in top-down revolutions, consider for instance the clashes between
Black Army and the traditionalist members of the samurai class during the
Japanese Imperial Restoration and the Meiji Reformation, however such
violence tends to be limited in scope and breadth relative to that experienced
in bottom-up revolutions.
Additionally, in the instance of “silk revolutions,” elites recognize and
rationally assess their situation, one of widespread discontent and little
chance or in some instances, desire, to mobilize resistance against the
revolutionary movement and come to the conclusion that open violence will
either be unconscionable or simply unprofitable. Revolutionary
transformation then moves ahead with relatively low conflict. Of course, silk
revolutions may involve relatively low levels of violence—consider, for
instance the assassination of the ruling family of Romania during the
Revolution of 1989, or virtually no violence, as in the case of the Georgian
“Orange Revolution,” wherein the formal political structure remained intact,
but the effective political structure changed dramatically, with Russian
suzerainty being cast-off (followed immediately by the radical strengthening of
legitimate political institutions), but even in the former case the economy of
violence is tapped only sparingly, often to the point of allowing many former
elites to retain substantial formal influence, though in substantially changed
roles.
When the term revolution is bandied about, it is the popular revolution
that usually springs to the imagination. These revolutions are bottom-up,
17

meaning that the primary impetus is derived from non-elites, politicaleconomic middle- and/or lower-classes, within the systems that experience
them. By virtue of this fact, popular revolutions usually are believed to have
the greatest potential for extreme radicalism—the goal of popular revolutions,
after all, is either to elevate a new (usually large and often undereducated)
class or set of classes into power or to “level” all classes, eliminated
distinctions. The expectation is that popular revolutions are not merely a shift
in regime species, already a radical jump, but indeed in regime class—or at
least in theory. Religious states become radically secular, monarchies
become republics or democracies, slave-states become nation-states, and so
forth. Generally four revolutions are regarded as model “popular” or, as
Skocpol (1976a, 1976b, 1979) calls them, “social revolutions”: the French,
Russian, Chinese, and Iranian Revolutions.
Finally, imperialist revolutions are those revolutions that are the
product of outside conquest or threat of conquest intentionally forcing radical,
wide-ranging transformation. Granted, many imperialistic ventures are not
revolutionary—their effect on the day-to-day course of life is relatively minor.
Consider, for example, those various empires that demanded nothing more
than tribute from their subservient populations. However in order for an
imperialist power to exploit a subservient power there must be an appropriate
and adequate infrastructure (political, social, and physical) in place to
guarantee that resource acquisition and market penetration can continue
apace at acceptable cost and risk levels. This often necessitates enormous
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transformation—sometimes done through socialization and training,
sometimes through ad-campaigns, and sometimes through coercion and
even slavery.
Civil Wars
To define civil wars I return to the above-mentioned State Failure Task
Force’s definition of revolutions (Goldstone et al. 2000, V). For this second of
three sub-classifications based on, again, the different 1) socio-historical
conditions prior to the initiation of the radical, extraordinary political events,
the 2) political-economic-social ends sought by the initiating party (defined in
terms of the above socio-historical conditions and the relevant interplay of
identities), and 3) the means acceptable to the achievement of the new order,
I emphasize differences in terms of goals and depth. Civil Wars, I assume,
are those wars in which the system is not holistically and totalistically
rejected. Rather, I assume that sizable elements of that system are rejected,
necessitating either the establishment of a new government or the splitting of
governments based on pragmatic or explicitly political (as opposed to ethnocultural, economic or social means). Therefore our formal definition may be:
an episode of sustained violent conflict between governments and politically
organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government or to
seize power in one region.
Before going on to discuss civil wars at more length, I would like to
note that the contemporary definition is flawed in a similar manner to that
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previously given for revolutions. Radical civil transformation may take place
without open bloodshed or with relatively low amounts of bloodshed.
Consider, for instance, the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia—there the
political transformation was significant but there was no violent upheaval.
Continuing, civil wars may be described (Type-I) as that kind of civil
war in which most of the vertical power structure remains largely untouched
but in which a new group or coalition of groups takes over key political
positions. If successful then regime-type changes, but the immediate
implications for those outside of the former ruling group or the new ruling
group are limited. For instance, the wars for control of the Roman Empire
following the death of Julius Caesar had enormous connotations for the
nature of the political system, but non-elite Roman society and economy
would only gradually feel the impact of those wars much later—once the
nature of the Imperium had substantially evolved.
Civil wars of the second type (Type-II), in contrast, are those civil wars
in which active efforts are taken to transform some, though rarely if ever all,
vertical power structures. What separates Type-II civil wars from revolutions
is their acknowledged interest in transforming the existing social and/or
economic systems. While some transformations may occur, there is usually
not an explicit move to change any or many of the fundamental rules of
society or economy, with the key exception of the ultimate consequences
implicit in acts of political emancipation. Consider, for instance, the American
Civil War. The war’s key accomplishments were both explicitly political. On
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the one hand, the central (Federal) government’s predominance over the
various states was firmly established, beginning a Federalization snowballeffect that continues to this day. On the other hand the concept of slavery
was abolished and Americans of African decent were made full citizens of the
Union. Yet capitalism remained the dominant paradigm, as did American
individualist democratic-republicanism—even the overall economic patterns of
the American South remained largely unchanged for nearly a century—
economic emancipation for minorities in the United States was slow to evolve.
I will spend little time on wars of independence—virtually any definition
I could give would be tautological—beyond saying that these wars are
attempts to establish a new political system while retaining substantial
elements of the economic and social culture. Indeed, in many wars of
independence literally the same basic type of government may be adopted by
the new state (assuming it successfully becomes independent).
Revolutionary wars of independence, that is to say wars that are both
autonomous and totalistically radical, I consider simply revolutions—the
radical nature of revolutions may easily allow separatism as a key, ideological
concept—especially in those revolutions which are nationalistic in nature.
Another variant of radical, extraordinary politics is simple imperialism.
While revolutionary imperialism seeks to radically transform the sociopolitical-economic landscape of the exploited people, simple imperialism
instead seeks only to gain profit from the exploited people at the lowest
possible cost and risk. The existing political structure, for instance, may be
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kept in toto, for instance, adding merely an additional level of oversight or tax
collection. On the other hand, the government may be replaced, but with a
structure that affects the lives of average people in virtually the same fashion
as the previous government.
Ethno-National War
I am hesitant to classify ethno-national warfare in its own genre, but I bow to
the literature’s emphasis on a particular trait of this type of domestic
upheaval. Ethno-national conflicts are explicitly about gaining goods, political,
economic, or social, for a group (or depriving a group of them) based entirely
on identity. Sambanis (2001, 261) provides a utilitarian definition built on the
work of Max Weber, Horowitz (1985), and Kaufmann (1996), stating that he
understands, “ethnic war as war among communities (ethnicities) that are in
conflict over the power relationship that exists between those communities
and the state.”

Alternatively, the SFTF asserts that “ethnic wars” are,

“episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or
other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in
status,” (Goldstone et al. 2000, V) usually meaning they are seeking 1) a
change in the degree of enfranchisement and/or access to the economic
system, 2) increased cultural freedoms, 3) autonomy, or 4) independence.
My personal problem with this conceptualization is that it demonstrates
an unwillingness to deal with issues of identity and ideology without cultural
bias. I believe that the secular bias of modern (and post-modern) behavioral,
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social, and psychological scientists has led them to believe there is a radical
break between identities which are humanistic, nationalistic, and or
universalistic on the one hand (that is to say secular and modern) and those
which are religious or ethno-nationalistic on the other. Yet the similarities
between those ideologies that lay claim to “philosophical” bases and those
which claim “theological” or “natural” bases are manifest. In both instances
most people accept the principles of their identities and their normative
systems on faith, not based on personal consideration or analysis.
Furthermore, secular humanist ideologies tend to employ concepts and
symbols that are totemistic and traditionalistic regardless of their claims—
consider how akin to religious furor is the camaraderie of Communists, the
indignation of Fascists, and the adoration of principles among liberals. The
rights, morals, and conceptions of justice and injustice in these modern
systems of thought have no more basis in fact than do religious or naturalistic
systems. They are, in essence, the same.
My doubt as to whether ethno-national violence deserves its own
categories, rather then simple recognition as one set of lines/identities along
which fractionalization is likely to occur, as in the case of secular ideologies,
is built on two premises.

First, ethno-national and religious conflicts are

capable of the entire range of policy options that other ideologies are—
revolution, civil war, and mass extermination.

Second, the distinction

between ethno-national and non-ethno-national versions of these events at
the theoretic level is, ultimately, only this: ethno-national conflicts are ethno23

national. In other words, the division between ethno-national and non-ethnonational conflict is (scientific) ideological bias, not empirically-derived
rationale—to

say

ethno-national

violence

is

the

product

of

ethnic

discrimination and not ideological discrimination is only to explain why one
identity is the favored rallying point.
Where Are All the Wars of Secession?
Having developed this taxonomy, the reader will be left with a significant
conundrum – where are wars of secession? This is a conundrum, the product
the weaknesses inherent in any taxonomy. Some radical systemic
transformations deny easy classification, either because they do not fit into
any general category or because they straddle the lines between two or more
taxonomic groups, sharing functional characteristics among them. Consider
the American Revolution, for instance. Alternatively known as the American
War of Independence, it exhibits characteristics of a revolution and an ethnonationalist secessionist movement. I suspect that on closer examination
many, if not most, instances of radical, extraordinary politics are equally
problematic.
When we speak of wars of secession, therefore, we must assume that
elements of at least two taxonomic categories of radical, extraordinary politics
are present in the conflagration. First, wars of secession are necessarily
revolutions – independence radically alters political-economic relationships,
concentrating power into fewer hands, and often into hands that previously
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had little or no power. Second, wars of secession are necessarily ethnonationalist in that they hinge on issues of identity (regardless of whether or
not ideology is a formal legitimizing concern).
In a final note, I had earlier mentioned that the SFTF definition of
revolutionary war (Goldstone et al. 2000, V) should be subdivided into three
sub-classifications, and I went on to discuss two of those. The third, which I
have not included, is the concept of the coup (read “Episodes of sustained
violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers
that seek to . . . replace its leaders . . .” [V]). The concept of coup, or at least
what one might call a “simple coup,” has been left out of this categorization
intentionally. Simple coups do not attempt to change the social order, nor do
they attempt to displace one type of leader for another type of leader. They
do not involve the transformation of values, identities, beliefs, or even
methods. In other words, simple coups do not change regime types—rather,
simple coups replace likes with likes (Brinton 1952, 3-4; Blanksten 1962, 72;
Tanter and Midlarsky 1962, 265). Kings are replaced with kings, emperors
with emperors, and dictators with dictators. This state of affairs is,
theoretically speaking, roughly similar to the standard circumstances
prevailing in functioning democracies or through planned accession in
autocracies—regime type remains the same, the contemporary bureaucratic
structure remains intact, and the lives of the average resident of the state
remains largely unaffected by elite machinations in both cases. Thus coups
are not radical, extraordinary politics – they are moderate, extraordinary
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politics – surprising, perhaps, but rational. Also, this definition indicates that
the popular use of coup as a synonym for civil war and revolution (which
themselves are not synonymous) is a gross misnomer.

Case Study: The Caprivi Lozi
I have chosen to center this research project on the Caprivi Lozi of Namibia
and their attempted secession in 1999. While I will review their history in
detail below I would like to briefly review the reasons I have decided to study
this particular people and incident.
(1) There has been little, if any, formal political science research on
either the Caprivi Lozi or their 1999 rebellion. Simply entering the facts
surrounding this event into the formal literature has scientific warrant.
(2) The experiences of the Caprivi Lozi mirror one of the most common
forms of violence in the post-colonial world, sub-Saharan African or
otherwise. Ethno-cultural groups that once were politically independent were
forced into a nation-state system in which they are divided and/or
permanently confined to minority-hood – a problem in developed, liberal
states, but often a serious threat in illiberal developing states. They crave
political independence or autonomy and re-alliance with now disparate kith
and kin, and in the face of discriminatory and unsuccessful politicaleconomies, the prospect of fighting to accomplish these goals seems
acceptable if for no other reason than the (relatively) low risks.
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(3) The Lozi people, while themselves not an English-speaking people,
reside primarily in either the former British Empire or the former holdings of
South Africa – in all of these states English, while not the dominant language,
is fairly common and growing more so. This presents a distinct advantage to
the contemporary researcher as it means that substantial numbers of texts,
including mass media sources, are readily available, especially through
internet sources.
(4) Namibia (and Botswana) is among those states to which social
scientists, both academic and from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
are flocking as they become more open following the series of revolutions,
some peaceful, some less so, that rocked the world from 1989 through the
1990s. This means that the 1999 rebellion is one of the first to take place in
the post-Cold War period – a point that makes it a potential lodestone for
coming events.
History
The story of the East Caprivian war of secession, or rather their
attempted secession, begins in the centuries before Europeans began
integrating interior sub-Saharan Africa into their world-system during the 19th
Century. Prior to this point a people known as the Lozi ruled a wide area in
southern Africa, centering around the Zambezi River basin and those rivers
feeding it. The Lozi, it should be noted, carried numerous markers which
made them candidates for a rapid transition from a traditional political system
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into a national system had they not been colonized – their system of
government included a monarchy, they shared a common language (though
dialect differences among different tribes were significant, the dialects
remained mutually intelligible), and though they lacked highly defined borders,
their territories had fairly well defined frontiers, though of course most local
and regional authority was vested in tribal leaders (chiefs) who had their own
military capabilities. The Lozi leaders, however, did not have the opportunity
to adapt to Western advances since their initial contact with them led almost
immediately to conquest (as opposed to more successful reactions, such as
those of Japan, Thailand, or Ethiopia), and so the Lozi kingdom, known to
Westerners as Barotseland and the Lozi themselves as Itenege, quickly lost
their autonomy.
This situation would have been inflammatory enough for the Lozi had
they been conquered by a single Western power, yet even this was not the
case. The lion’s share of Lozi population and territory was originally annexed
by the United Kingdom in the region of Northern Rhodesia which now
composes Zambia, though some were also found in the territory now known
as Botswana, formerly known as Bechuanaland. Other Lozi were isolated in
the eastern territories of then Portuguese Angola and in the western regions
of Southern Rhodesia, now known as Zimbabwe. Southeast of the annexed
territories was the region of South-West Africa (Deutsch-Südwestafrika), a
German colony annexed during the period 1883 to 1884. In 1890 German
diplomats, seeking easy access to the Zambezi River and their eastern
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territories conferred with the British and annexed what was later known as the
Caprivi Strip, a peninsula of territory that extends for over 400 kilometers from
the northwest corner of what may be described as mainland Namibia,
touching \the westernmost point of Zimbabwe (they ceded, in exchange, a
small island in the North Sea and rights to the island of Zanzibar to the
British). The western region of Caprivi was and remains populated mainly by
Khoi/San peoples, popularly known as bushmen, whose low level of
technology and minimalist political-economy (based on hunting, gathering,
and some herding) allowed them to be displaced first by black African
émigrés from central Africa and ultimately by white Europeans in all but the
most hostile (and undesirable for settled agrarians) environments. Eastern
Caprivi, on the other hand, was populated by herding, village-based Lozispeaker.
The division of the Lozi people was to become more complicated only
a generation later with the First World War. During the course of this war
South Africa came to possess South West Africa. After the war South West
Africa was granted as a protectorate to South Africa – this remained the
status quo until 1946 when South Africa asserted that South West Africa was
henceforth an inseparable part of South Africa against international protests.
This move was essential because it removed any pretense of South West
African autonomy, including self rule of any type by Germans, Ovambo, Lozi,
Herero, or San peoples. The South African government began instituting the
policies of apartheid throughout the region eventually to become Namibia,
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including its rigid form of racial discrimination and the establishment of
homelands into which out of favor ethnic groups were isolated.
By the late 1950s a movement known as the Ovamboland Peoples
Congress (OPC) had emerged in Cape Town, South Africa among Ovambo
peoples (who constitute the majority in Namibia) who had sought education or
work in city. This movement, which originally sought to negotiate Namibian
independence, soon became dominated by individuals who felt independence
would come only through violent resistance and in 1960 the OPC morphed
into SWAPO (the South West Africa Peoples Organization). SWAPO’s
leaders consciously began developing a para-government and substantial
military capabilities under the tutelage and with the support of the major
Communist powers. SWAPO was not the only paramilitary organization
emerging in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A similar, if smaller movement
had already begun emerging among Caprivi Lozi named the Caprivi African
National Union (CANU) – in 1964 this movement merged with SWAPO under,
at least as the Caprivi Lozi leadership understood it, the principle that
independence for Namibia meant independence for the Lozi. Lozi support
was apparently seen as essential because soon after SWAPO began openly
opposing South African forces in South West Africa former CANU leader
Mishake Muyongo became vice-president of the organization and a trusted
confidant of Sam Nujoma, later the first president of Namibia.
SWAPO’s resistance to South Africa was limited for most of the 1960s
and early 1970s – its lack of any territory to fall back upon and use as a stable
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base of operations is usually given as the reason for its limited impact during
this period. That said, in 1974 the situation changed dramatically, much to
the advantage of SWAPO insurgents. Specifically, the Portuguese lost
control of their African territories in this year, leading the collapse of any
semblance order in Angola, which of course shares a several hundred mile
border with South West Africa/Namibia (much of which includes the Caprivi
Strip). The re-intensification of the Namibian war of independence leads the
United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice to
reiterate previous calls for South Africa to respect the rights of the Namibian
people and grant independence to the region. In 1977 South Africa agreed in
principle to Namibia’s right to independence, but also began attacking
SWAPO forces from their positions in Angola, again without United Nations
mandate, and SWAPO’s resistance again became largely oriented towards
mere survival.
In the meantime a new party had emerged in Namibia, the Democratic
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). This organization also sought independence for
Namibia from South Africa, but advocated doing so in a conservative, nonviolent fashion and with Western, rather than Communist, support. Soon
thereafter, citing ethnic discrimination in SWAPO (favoritism for Ovambo over
other ethnicities) Muyongo and the leadership of CANU split with SWAPO
and join the DTA as members of the Caprivi Alliance Party (CAP). Some
Caprivi Lozi continue to support Sam Nujoma and SWAPO at the time, but by
the conclusion of the early 1980s, however, most remaining Caprivi members
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of SWAPO either defected to the DTA or have sought amnesty with the South
West African government, again citing discrimination among the Ovambo
leadership of the larger body. Eventually, in 1985, the CAP and CANU are
completely merged into a single body, the United Democratic Party, which
remains allied with the DTA and under the leadership of Muyongo.
In the late 1980s two key transnational events occur which radically
alter the interstate situation. (1) First, United States helps broker a peace
agreement in Angola, setting a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops
from the region. (2) Secondly, the government of South Africa finally
concedes to international demands for Namibian independence and a
timetable is established for the withdrawal of their forces from the region, as
well as the establishment of elections. No specific concessions are made to
the interests of Caprivi Lozi.
In the first elections that preceded amibian independence SWAPO
won, though with less than 2/3rds of the vote, requiring they bring in other
parties in the construction of the constitution. The DTA joins the negotiations,
but DTA supporters still participate in limited political violence throughout the
country. Ultimately, however, a relatively stable democracy is established by
1991, though at no point since have Caprivi (or other minorities) ceased to
assert that SWAPO, which has further consolidated power since, is fair in its
distributive policies.
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SWAPO, the CLA, and Post-Colonial Africa
The 1990s were a time of relative stability in Namibia as the new government
was consolidated and democratic practices began to proliferate throughout
the state. Most reports on East Caprivi note it only as a place with relatively
higher crime than the majority of Namibia. The Minorities at Risk Project
(MAR) does note that the Namibian organization the National Society for
Human Rights released a report in 1997 stating that the government did
discriminate against minorities of Namibia, including the San and Lozispeaking people of Caprivi, but this stands out as an exceptional report.
Truth be told, the Caprivi Lozi people barely appear in news reports until the
very late 1990s.
1998, however, that was to be a watershed year for the Caprivi Lozi.
First, the UDP withdraws from the DTA because Muyongo is ousted without
the consultation of UDP leaders. The effect is to render Muyongo both more
defensive and more free to pursue his ultimate goal – independence for the
Caprivi Lozi from Namibia. The DTA’s move seems to be a product of its
discovery that Muyongo and his chief ally, Mafwe Chief Boniface Mamili, have
been pursuing several policies designed to support Caprivi independence
with or without Namibian support, including meeting with South African
supporters, meeting with Zambian Lozi (of the Barotse Patriotic Front or
BPF), recruiting member to a potential rebel government and army, and
building weapons caches. This specifically contradicted both the DTA’s goals
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of gaining concessions for minorities through peaceful means and retaining
the territorial integrity of Namibia. Of course, as soon as the DTA ejected
Muyongo from its ranks his activities became the focus of national attention.
President Nujoma immediately rejected any possibility of negotiation and
Muyongo, Mamili, and their allies to be enemies of the state, leading to an
exodus of somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 Caprivi Lozi into Botswana
which, after holding the partisan leadership for only a few days released them
into loosely monitored refugee camps where they continued their recruitment
until migrating to Zambia and/or Angola for training and further arming. While
the Mafwe supported the movement elites from the other Caprivi Lozi
provided little support, insisting they had not been consulted by Muyongo.
Soon thereafter the Batswana state and the UNHCR jointly decided to
try to defuse the situation in East Caprivi by sending the major leaders of the
rebellion to a third-party state – Denmark volunteers to provide sanctuary for
some of these leaders – but this will prove ineffective at preventing the
outbreak of violence (even if it probably does substantially decrease Caprivi
morale and strategic and tactical capabilities – in other words, it did not
decrease the odds of war, but it did decrease the odds of victory).
In the meantime the Namibian government has declared Mamili’s
throne vacant and decides to enthrone a friendly commoner. This action is
opposed by most Caprivi Lozi and most especially those of the Mafwe tribe,
reinforcing in their eyes the justice of Muyongo and Mamili’s efforts. Nujoma
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also uncategorically denies that at any point it was SWAPO policy to
guarantee Caprivi independence upon Namibian independence.
In the meantime UNITA, which had abandoned the 1994 Lusaka peace
accords in 1998 (citing violations of the accord by People’s Movement for the
Liberation of Angola), had begun lending its support to Caprivi secessionists
who, rather than falling back on the old CANU have formed the CLA, or
Caprivi Liberation Army. UNITA provides training but, even more importantly,
armaments, to CLA rebels. The CLA leadership, however, recognizes that its
resources are relatively small. It knows it will need to capture key strategic
goods (notably communications, transportation, and military/police centers)
extremely quickly or it will lack the capabilities necessary to keep their
rebellion going long enough to (1) gain international attention and (2)
convince Lozi both within and without Caprivi that the risk of participation is
worth acting upon, in other words, that the conflict is winnable.
The East Caprivi Rebellion
This of course did not happen, but had the police and military stations of
Katima Mulilo fallen in the first few hours of the conflict the CLA’s other
strategic targets would have almost definitely fallen. That being the case, the
odds then that UNITA and the BPF would have taken a more active part in
the conflict and that recruitment among Caprivi Lozi would have increased
substantially would. This potentially could have resulted in one of several
domino effects:
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(1) The conflict may have spread to Zambia and parts of
Botswana and Angola, leading to a transnational war that
probably would have linked up with other intrastate movements,
most notably in Angola and the Congo region. This would have
probably spread the tremendous instability of western and
central Africa into southern Africa, potentially sparking ethnic
wars across the region (as minorities recognized an opportunity
to rebel in strength and took advantage of the influx of weapons
into states’ interiors – most likely this would have occurred in
Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, and possibly Zimbabwe),
widespread refugee movements, and possibly civil wars
(especially in already unstable Zimbabwe).
(2) The Namibian government would have had to prepare a far
more substantial assault, resulting in either international outcry
or far more death and general destruction (through massive
assault, extreme refugee movements, or prolonged siege).
In both of these scenarios, two key points stand in common, both of which
have similar consequences. First, had the Caprivi rebels succeeded in
accomplishing their initial goals, then the conflict would have lasted longer
temporally and second, had they so succeeded then the conflict would have
been more evenly matched and therefore more intense. Both of these
outcomes would lead in turn to greater international attention (probably
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ultimately to the benefit of the Caprivi Lozi) and a greater chance that the
Caprivi Lozi would be able to accomplish their goal – independence.
The impact of independence for the Caprivi Lozi should be understood
as regional and not merely local or national. In the first order, other Lozi
would then have a base of operations and support from which to draw in
pursuit of their own self-governance. In the second order, minorities in
Namibia would have a modeled behavior that would undermine the central
government’s control, possibly leading to numerous other ethnic conflicts – of
course, this effect would also likely extend to other states in the region as well
–most notably Zambia and Botswana. In the third order, this could reiterate
the point made by Eritrea earlier in the decade – that the standing rule since
the end of European colonialism, “thou shall not change the colonial borders”
is no longer the standing rule in Africa. Each violation of this principle has the
potential to egg on ethnic dissent and violence, of course, given that virtually
every African state is both multinational and has ethnicities that are
transnational. The fear is that a single well-organized ethnic rebellion in subSaharan Africa could inspire wave after wave of separatism, ravaging the
continent and leaving behind hundreds of tiny states incapable of sustaining
sovereignty – a transnational revolution on the scale of the Revolution of 1989
without the “happy ending.”
If we were to ask ourselves for a further justification of this
conflagration is worth studying, then, we would find ourselves asking two key
points. First, this situation demonstrates the importance of understanding the
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conditions preceding the onset of an event from the perspective prior to the
event, rather than the outcome of the event. To rephrase, the precipitation of
an event is the product of perceived possible outcomes (which generally must
be substantial) rather than the actual outcome. Sadly, our ability to predict
the onset of violence is usually colored by the bias of outcome, which is of
course a substantially different vector – we tend to limit our cases under
analysis in terms of scope or scale at the conclusion of the event, which
ultimately is arbitrary if our goal is to explain the onset of violence, rather than
the ultimate outcome of violence.
Summary
The last century and a half of the Caprivi Lozi’s history have been
characterized by four periods: independence, conquest and division, South
African dominion, and minority status in a modern, post-colonial nation-state.
The vast majority of this time the Lozi people have been a subject people of
sorts, either explicitly (as under German colonialism and South African
apartheid) or functionally (as a can-never-win-a-majority minority). As a
product of this and East Caprivi’s strategic location (with particular regard to
its geographic proximity to Angola and the Zambezi basin) it has long been
the subject of both intentional and unintentional structural, and often “real,”
violence. That said, the structural violence originally led to a sort of fidelity
between the majority Ovambo and minority Lozi as both sought the overthrow
of South African overlordship throughout the Twentieth Century, with Lozi
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winning numerous elite positions in both the socialist SWAPO and more
Western-oriented groups, such as the DTA. It was not until the independence
was achieved for Namibia and Lozi elite expectations of some level of selfrule were denied that Lozi leaders finally decried cooperation with the
Ovambo and began to seek to the means to force such concessions – a
period at which attempted violent secession did not become inevitable, but
certainly became probable, and it is at this period that structures and
institutions cease to provide us with extraordinary utility and at which we must
begin searching for proximate causes that do not fit within the structuralinstitutional rubric.

Case Study: The Kalanga
I have chosen to employ the Kalanga as a control group here for several
specific reasons:
(1) The Batswana Kalanga, like the Namibian Lozi, have a welldefined homeland, despite decades of out-migration
(particularly, in both cases, to the surrounding territories and
their respective national capitals), that has highly defined
boundaries that were recognized first under colonial
administrators and later under their respective independent
states.
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(2) Both the Batswana Kalanga and Namibian Lozi have
populations which are both relative and absolute minorities (the
former constituting around 9.6% of the Batswana population, the
latter around 1.2% of the Namibian population) (Gordon 2005).
(3) The Batswana Kalanga and Namibian Lozi were both parts
of independent states (respectively Mambo and
Intege/Barotseland) prior to the colonial depredations of the late
19th Century (Economist 1999A).
(4) Both the Batswana Kalanga and the Namibian Lozi are
minorities in their countries who share cross-border ties to
ethnically similar peoples who are also minorities in their states,
but whose populations far outweigh those of the Batswana
Kalanga and the Namibian Lozi. In the case of the Batswana
Kalanga, their peer group are the Kalanga of Zimbabwe,
whereas in the case of the Namibian Lozi, their peer group are
the Lozi of Zambia.
In essence, I do this for two reasons. First, I hope to have, whenever
possible, counter examples that either strengthen or effectively dismiss my
hypotheses. Secondly, I believe that a key flaw underlying the structural and
institutional approaches, as utilized most frequently, lies in their emphasis on
the state-level of analysis to the exclusion not only of the individual level of
analysis, but further the level of analysis of intrastate actors – most relevant
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here, of course, being the disestablishmentarian organizations and the
relevant identity groups at large.

Methodology
I will employ a relatively simple methodology throughout this research.
Specifically, I will be testing my hypothesis that there are noninstitutional/structural proximate causes that, though currently ignored in most
of the contemporary social, economic, and political scientific literature, are
empirically observable and measurable. While later studies might employ a
multinational statistical or semi-statistical analysis on a global or regional
scale, I have decided to focus instead on developing a multi-stage, mostsimilar-states comparative case study for my initial study. I do this not as
much out of a desire for simplicity as much as in recognition of the
tremendous scope of comparison necessary to demonstrate that the states
are structurally and institutionally as similar as is realistically conceivable – I
compare for similarity traits that span the entire arc of the social scientific
kingdom.
More precisely, the research to follow may be categorized in the
following way:
(1) A description of the contemporary, orthodox model with
regards to the genesis of radical, extraordinary politics with
specific reference to wars of secession;
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(2) A further development of the theoretical model by bringing in
research on mobilization and non-structural/institutional choice
limiting boundaries;
(3) Elaboration on the state-level structural and institutional
similarity of Namibia and Botswana, demonstrating that there
are empirical reasons to expect that the model requires
methodological improvement;
(4) A series of comparisons of Namibia and Botswana with
emphasis on resource and personnel mobilization as a
precursor to secession;
(5) A series of comparisons of Namibia and Botswana with
emphasis on non-structural/institutional environmental factors
that affect the likelihood non-dominant identity groups of those
states will attempt secession;
(6) A conclusion in which I will suggest further development of
the subject matter, both in terms of case studies and
quantification (if possible) of the research, as well as the
possible practical implications of this research in particular and
its possible intellectual descendents.
My approach is partly inspired by the work of Hedström and Swedberg (1996)
who take great pains to demonstrate that over dependence on easily
quantifiable vectors has led social scientists to seek correlations first, rather
than conducting theory-driven work, which has resulted in a theoretical
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paucity. In the case of radical, extraordinary politics, including the wars of
secession which are here my focus, this has led to a sort of theoretical
myopia. At one end of the orthodox spectrum like structural and institutional
determinists, their theories largely derived from Marxist, Malthusian, and NeoRealist premises, and at the other lie those theories which acknowledge the
methodological individualism and agree that humans, particularly elites, do
have a genuine causal role to play in the determining whether radical,
extraordinary politics occur or not, but who practically do not consider nonstructural or institutional vectors. What I hope to do is to bolster our
theoretical and practical knowledge through the application of non-institutional
and non-structural measures, most of which are derived theories on the role
of elites in conflict genesis.
Operationalizations
In this study I have almost uniformly employed relatively simple forms of
comparison – generally simple statistical comparisons (when possible with
Chi-Squared tests for strength of similarity/divergence), but also simple
comparisons of the legal framework of the two states and some basic sociohistorical comparisons. The sources of my research material are all readily
available to anyone who wishes to confirm their validity with access to an
internet connection at home or through a library. With regards to my statistical
research, the lion’s share was derived from the United States Central
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook, regarded as one of the most
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reliable sources of statistical data on a transnational scale, and the
Afrobarometer survey project, a relatively young but incredibly extensive and
intensive project that aims at recreating the success of the Eurobarometer
project in sub-Saharan Africa. Overwhelmingly I employed CIA World
Factbook when I sought political or economic data and the Afrobarometer
when I sought opinion data or data on the quality and availability of
infrastructure and services.
Of course, these were not the only quantitative resources I employed.
These include:
(1) For the Gini Index data I consulted the United Nations’ (UN)
2005 Development Program Report;
(2) For information on the depth and scale of urbanization in the
studied states I consulted the UN 2001 World Urbanization
Prospects report, the Socioeconomic Data and Applications
Center’s Gridded Population of the World and Global RuralUrban Mapping Project, and Frayne and Pendleton’s 2002
paper “Mobile Namibia: Migration Trends and Attitudes”;
(3) For ethnolinguistic data I consulted the UN 2004 Common
Country Assessment, Gordon’s Ethnologue project, and the
Center for International Development and Conflict
Management’s (CIDCM) Minorities at Risk (MAR) project;
(4) For data on international trade I also turned to the “Building
the Capacity of ACP Countries in Trade Policy Formulation,
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Negotiations and Implementation” project, more commonly
known as the “Hub-and-Spoke Project,” and a joint project of the
European Commission (EC), the Commonwealth Secretariat
(ComSec), the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
(OIF), and the Africa, Caribbean, Pacific Group (ACP);
(5) For data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) I took data
from the Correlates of War (COW) project;
(6) finally, for information on displaced persons and refugees I
turned to the Statistical Yearbooks of the United Nations High
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) and the 2001 “Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices” published by the United
States Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor).
My analysis of the political institutional arrangement was almost
entirely derived from legal and functional comparisons of the constitutions of
Namibia and Botswana (see Appendices I and II). I did use a few other
sources to add roundness to my analysis, particularly in the realm of civil
rights – notably data from the United States Department of State’s Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (CRHRP), the Polity IV project, the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA), and figures on the level of
female equality from the UN Development Programme.
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My socio-historical comparisons was built on two major genre of
sources. On the one hand, I researched major regional and international
English-language newspapers. This entailed three major phases of research.
First, I reviewed every article from 1997 to 1999 in The Namibian (the major,
independent English-language newspaper of that state) in which the Caprivi
region was mentioned, using an embedded Google search engine to review
the archives. Second, I used Lexis-Nexis to review every article which
mentioned the Caprivi region over the same period of time in the major
newspapers of Southern Africa, specifically The Post of Zambia, The Sunday
Times, The Times of Zambia, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Zimbabwe
Standard. Third, I used Lexis-Nexis to review several international news
sources/services, specifically the Associated Press, the Cable News Network
(CNN), The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Gannett Service, the
Inter Press Service The New York Times, and Xinhua News Agency.
My other major source of socio-historical work, particularly with regards
to the Kalanga of Botswana, was the research literature of the anthropological
and sociological fields – in particular Richard Werbner’s work in (2002, 2004)
“Cosmopolitan Ethnicity, Entrepreneurship and the Nation: Minority Elites in
Botswana” and the groundbreaking Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in
Botswana: The Public Anthropology of Kalanga Elites, but secondarily van
Binsbergen’s (1994) “Minority language, ethnicity and the state in two African
situations: the Nkoya of Zambia and the Kalanga of Botswana” in African
Languages, Development and the State.
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Specifically, my comparisons sought to demonstrate a two key points.
First, Botswana and Namibia are so structurally and institutionally similar that,
according to the orthodox theories to be discussed at much length below,
their behavioral outcomes should be identical (specifically that if one has
experienced the onset of radical, extraordinary politics in the form of a
minority-driven attempted war of secession, both should have). That is to say
that the ultimate causal environment and history of the two states, specifically
in terms of their structural and institutional characteristics, while not identical
(an impossibility) are highly similar and regular. Secondly, that the proximate
causes of the war of secession are substantially divergent that it may be
inferred that the variation between Namibia and Botswana’s relevant
minorities (specifically the Lozi and Kalanga) is the product of said variations.
By proximate causes I mean several vectors of analysis gleaned identity
theory and several theories of elite roles in the onset of wars of secession. In
particular I will be comparing for divergence of symptoms of both alienation
and elite mobilization including self-identification (value and identity entropy
and re-identification), mobilization of personnel and resources, and the
development of alternative political-economies, as well as for non-structural,
non-institutional environmental factors that I hypothesize would directly affect
the rational calculus of minority elites, specifically changes in interstate
support, the appearance of valid exit strategies in the event of secession
failure, and bounds set by internal, establishment elites.
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On Identities and Loyalties
The first question I will consider is, simply, are members of the relevant
identity group shifting their personal identity and loyalties towards a
disestablishmentarian identity relative to the orthodox/dominant identity? The
validity of this principle is manifest and requires little discussion. Consider the
American Revolution, for instance. This war of secession was largely fought
by three parties, two of which were allied. On the one hand was the dominant
power, the British forces from Britain. Allied with there were North American
colonists who continued to identify themselves as British. And, of course,
opposing these two groups, who believed (rightly or wrongly) that they
constituted a single, valid new identity were those North American colonists
who had become convinced they were Americans, or more obliquely, not
British. Wars of secession, whether ethnic or not, necessarily require both a
reiteration of the rebelling group’s identity in and of itself and relative to the
dominant/ruling group’s identity.
While there are several potential methods of operationalizing this
vector of analysis, two extremely straightforward methods exists in this case.
First, data on self-identity from the Afrobarometer surveys of Namibia can be
compared to that on Botswana. In essence, Afrobarometer asks those
persons it surveys whether they identify themselves primarily as members of
the nation-state in which they reside or whether they primarily utilize a
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different identifier – for instance a minority ethnicity or a religious identity
when conceptualizing their group-of-first-allegiance.
Comparisons of this data can be made on two levels. First, I will use
the same source to determine if there is a divergence between the degree to
which identity and value entropy have pervaded the system, or more
accurately, the consciousness of the people of the state in particular.
Secondly, on the state level, in which we can compare the frequency of
“Namibianism” to the frequency of “Batswanaism” to determine if, following
the state-level orientation of structuralists and institutionalists, variation exists
at a high-level. Secondly, and perhaps more tellingly, using cross-referenced
Afrobarometer data we should be able to isolate data from Caprivi
(specifically, data acquired from persons surveyed in Caprivi) and compare it
to data from the Kalanga-dominated North East District of Botswana.
On the Genesis of an Alternative, Unsanctioned Political-Economy
Are members of the relevant identity group being weaned off of the orthodox
political-economy as an alternative political-economy is developed? This is
my second question. Specifically, this is constituted by the development of
effective black and gray economies and polities. Black and gray economies
are central because they deprive the state of resources which could be used
to continue to dominate the relevant identity group, as well as allow the state
a key capacity: the ability to withhold those resources and/or services. Black
and gray polities are central because they not only deprive the state of
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essential legitimacy, but furthermore decrease the costs and risks of rebellion
for participants or passive supporters.
This operationalization presents one obvious and key problem – it
seeks to uncover evidence of political and economic systems whose
members explicitly seek to remain hidden from formal authorities. The logical
assumption, then, is that if the supporters of black and gray economies and
polities are at all effective (and we can assume they were in Namibia at the
time, given that they managed to allow the acquisition of adequate material to
allow for the development of the Caprivian revolt), they will remain largely
hidden from public purview.
Our goal, then, should not to seek open admissions of the existence of
such systems – if they exist, they will likely originate from authorities who are
biased against their targets and will like as not have a vested interest in either
underestimating or overestimating the size of said markets. What we can do,
however, is look for secondary markers that such systems exist.
Another marker should be the level of corruption in a state. From this
perspective, corruption plays a different role than that generally supposed by
structuralists and institutionalists. For them, corruption is a sign of injustice
and of the unequal distribution of resources, and therefore destabilizing by
supporting widening and deepening resentment and alienation, wealth
concentration, and political mismanagement – all of which are valid
assertions. However, at this stage in the causal chain, corruption plays an
additional role – it provides disestablishmentarian elites with additional
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“doors”, means and methods of moving personnel, hiding, acquiring and
selling resources, and so forth. Disestablishmentarian elites will often seek to
either support or harness corruption in the bureaucracy and government of
the state in order to create room for the development of their alternative
political economy. Thus, we would expect to see in Namibia in general, or at
least in Caprivi, higher levels than in Botswana (or in the Central District).
There are numerous potential resources for this data, including Transparency
International and the Internet Center for Corruption Research’s Corruption
Perceptions Index, and again Afrobarometer. I have elected to favor the
Afrobarometer survey here for a few key reasons, however. First, while
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is well respected
and has the advantage of allowing non-natives to survey the states, the
number of persons surveyed for Third-World states is extraordinarily small –
only four for Botswana and three for Namibia in 1999 – calling into serious
doubt the validity of those findings. Secondly, Afrobarometer survey has a
particularly high utility in this regard, specifically because its surveys are not
limited to the state-level. Quantitative comparisons would be expected to
reveal that Namibia’s level of corruption is higher and therefore its black and
gray political-economy is more robust, providing the Caprivi rebels with a
substantially increased capacity.
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On Personnel Mobilization
Another question which remains to be asked is, simply, are members of the
relevant identity group being recruited into political and/or military positions?
In most cases, including the Namibian experience, this realm of
analysis will be necessarily limited to post-violence explanation – prediction is
highly unlikely for academics because to acquire this information is likely to
necessitate powerful and effective intelligence resources. This said, I intend
to review major regional and local newspapers (English-language, with
particular emphasis on The Namibian) for references both to the number of
recruits and the primary occupations of those recruits. While the gross data
may give us some information (on the proportion of Caprivi who were willing
to engage in the act of rebellion), data on the rebels’ occupations will provide
likely explanations of the recruitment patterns. By this I mean, specifically,
what groups of people were recruited early and which later by the original
cadre. This inquiry is, of course, necessarily one-dimensional – since no
such rebellion has taken place in Botswana we cannot hope to find relevant
data on the recruitment therein.
On Resource Mobilization
Beyond recruitment and personnel mobilization, which we have addressed
above, another, question we might ask is whether or not
disestablishmentarian political elite, at minimum, are acquiring the physical
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resources necessary for warfare? Most explicitly this refers to weapons, but
ultimately this sort of analysis might also include other such infrastructure,
including communications, transportation, and field medical equipment.
This operationalization, is again, a difficult one since again it is rational
to assume that disestablishmentarians will attempt to hide their progress.
This limits us, by and large, to a historical (explanatory but not predictive)
review of journalistic communications, with the possible exception of captured
material, for instance if weapons caches are captured or if shipments are
interdicted. While this measure is imperfect, frequent interdiction and capture
of material will like as not hint at very high levels of resource development
acquisition, given that relatively poor states with highly porous borders are
simply incapable of very of high levels of interdiction relative to the total
quantity of contraband available – if one doubts this, consider the size of illicit
interstate arms and drug markets in developed states with similar democratic
restraints. Of course, in order to establish comparability, similar frequency
searches will be conducted for both the Caprivi and Kalanga peoples.
Interstate Support for Secession
First, does it appear that international support, diplomatic and/or material, for
secession will be forthcoming? If the international community engages in
actions and/or communications which make them believe that support for
their cause is forthcoming then they will likely recalculate the costs, benefits,
and risks involved in rebellion in such a way that such action is more likely
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than otherwise. This is dependent on two key factors. On the one hand, the
contemporary interstate system is built at least partially on humanistic
concerns. Rebels may believe that they can manipulate this impulse in such
a way that, in order to decrease the suffering of their own relevant population,
interstate actors will support independence over the maintenance of the
contemporary interstate order and identities. On the other hand, in a far more
realpolitick vein, there are, in every state system, states which recognize that
by supporting such movements they have the ability, on occasion, to change
their own position in the interstate system.
Specifically, I intend to construct a history of Caprivi rebels in the
period immediately preceding the revolution with specific reference to both
their relationship with other states and intergovernmental organizations, as
well as relevant extra-territorial non-state actors with political, military, or
economic capabilities of consequence. I will specifically be looking for
indications that real support (in terms of material, arms, territory, troops, and
so forth) has been offered and/or given or that rhetorical support has been
offered and/or given. International communications which frame the Caprivi
situation in a favorable light, particularly from other Lozi-speaking groups,
sub-Saharan African states, the United Nations, the African Union, or the
great powers are of particular significance.
Additionally I intend to perform a wide review of the history of the postCold War reactions of the international system to similar situations to
determine if the Caprivi leadership may have been led to expect a radically
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different international response to their rebellion, particularly if the Namibian
state’s response had not been as powerful, single-minded, and frankly
effective.
On Risk Alleviation: Exit-Strategies
Second, do the elites have a valid exit strategy should they fail? This measure
may seem to be in dialectic opposition with the earlier assumption that the
state has ultimately backed rebels into a corner, guaranteeing that they no
longer have any ability to pursue, via official, peaceful means, the ends of
political independence or increased self-rule, but that is not the case. The
former speaks to the inability of disestablishmentarian elites to acquire more
power without risk, whereas this vector speaks of the ability of elites to pursue
more power while decreasing (personal) risk. The difference is perhaps
subtle, but real.
I intend to determine, using journalistic and academic resources, if
interstate bodies and governments made offers (rhetorical or practical) of
sanctuary to disestablishmentarian elites (and, if possible, the masses to
whom they cater) prior to the onset of the Caprivi war of secession. I have no
particular expectations as to whether or not such offers will be manifest prior
in publications prior to the onset of the war, since this again is information
which is likely to be held in confidence by disestablishmentarians, however
we may see a pattern useful for simple explanation in publications from after
the war.
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On Internal Bounds Set by Establishment Elites
Third, has the dominant system excluded beyond redemption the elites of the
disestablishmentarian movement from restitution and redemption within the
contemporary system?
Political and military theorists dating as far back as Sun Zi
(alternatively Tzu or Tsu) have discussed the implications of relatively
powerful belligerents limiting the available options to the their weaker
antagonists. Specifically, the odds that the weaker belligerent will engage in
violence (rather than opting for a strategic retreat of one type or another,
including surrender) increases as the available avenues of retreat decrease.
A logical and inevitable extension of this premise, noted by Sun Zi himself, is
that weak belligerents will inevitably choose to fight if no avenue of retreat
remains, and will often fight all the more viciously as a result. In both
interstate and intrastate warfare examples of this principle abound – perhaps
the most famous of the Twentieth Century being the American refusal to allow
the Japanese any type of surrender other than unconditional, extending the
war for at least several months (until, of course, the United States
demonstrated its nuclear capabilities in Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
The principle here is simply that the state, or rather the state’s
establishment and orthodox elites, have publicly and actively intimated that
reform, negotiation, and mutual accommodation is an impossibility. The
effect of cutting off all debate and discussion on the logic of elites is clear – it
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eliminates virtually all key arguments for accepting a nonviolent resolution to
reigning disputes. This principle is active in the structuralist and
institutionalist theories at one level – democracy, capitalism, and so forth
allow dominated parties access to the system, the possibility of affecting
transformation. This increases systemic stability. Here, however, the
principle is more nuanced. If in Namibia the democratically elected
government made hardline demands and took steps that would, without
undermining structural and institutional integrity, eliminate the possibility of
accommodation with minority parties demanding more self-rule and/or
independence, the odds are that structuralists and institutionalists would
foresee no increase in the likelihood of a secession movement. On the other
hand, elite theorists would likely assert that such demands substantially
transform the logic of elites, increasing the attractiveness of radical action.
To operationalize this I intend to review both academic and journalistic
literature and construct a general history of both Namibia’s central
government’s (and the elites thereof) relationship to the Caprivi
disestablishmentarians and, for comparison, a similar general history of
Botswana’s state towards the Kalanga. I assume that the Namibian state will
have taken both substantial and rhetorical steps that constrained the options
of the Caprivi elite in such a way as to make outright rebellion an rational
political behavior, with special reference to the interests and/or needs of the
Caprivi disestablishmentarian elites.
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Findings
Before enumerating my findings, I would like to point out, as I did at the onset
of this dissertation, that this study has been an exploratory study of sorts. Its
goal has been, explicitly, to determine if there was just cause for expanding
upon the orthodox methodology for predicting the onset of wars of secession
by adding in additional non-institutional and non-structural dimensions of
analysis. While I will discuss in the implications the possibility that future
inquiries into the same subject matter might confirm certain generalizations,
this study was conducted with an eye for detail for one particular reason – to
determine if, in a case barely remembered outside of the state it occurred in,
data emerged prior to the conflict that might have allowed us to predict it with
some accuracy had we been looking for the indicators I emphasized in
addition to those usually utilized by projects like the SFTF.
Structural-Institutional Causes
What I found in my exhaustive study of the structural and institutional
attributes of Namibia and Botswana was essentially what I expected to find.
The states were structurally and institutionally very similar. The most
pronounced differences lay in their physical geographies, the nature of
international instability along their border areas, in the length of their period of
independence, in the length of time in which the regions were administered
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with racially discriminatory policies, and in the continued existence of formal
institutional discrimination in one, but not the other, state.
In Table 1.1 I outline those structural and institutional indicators
theoretically predicted to affect a state’s likelihood to experience the onset of
radical, extraordinary politics, such as wars of secession. Whereas my
review of these (and several other) indicators focused on the similarity
between Namibia and Botswana’s institutional and structural conditions, this
chart focuses on the broad picture of just how similar they are. Specifically, it
delineates the points at which pressures on the two states can be expected to
diverge or converge, either underscoring or eliminating instability. The picture
here is a simple one. In terms of trade balance and religious composition
Botswana is the more stable state, while in terms of economic composition
Namibia is the more stable state. Given that the favorable trade balance of
Botswana is dependent on a single key resource (gemstones) that
disproportionately favors a very small proportion of Batswana, it is easily
argued that this point of variance does not actually constitute a stable point
for Botswana.
What is the implication of this? While Namibia and Botswana are not
identical (it would be unrealistic to expect them to be so as my detailed
discussion of the variances between the states makes very clear), a tallying of
whether or not they are unstable on the theoretically relevant dimensions
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Table 1.1: Comparison of Structural and Institutional Indicators of Namibia
and Botswana
Namibia
Unstable
GNP
GNP per capita
Consumer Price
Inflation
Gini Index
Economic
Composition
Labor Force
Composition
Transportation
Infrastructure
Development
Rate
Communication
Infrastructure
Development
Rate
Economic
Prospects
AIDS
Fertility Rate
Religious
Composition
Ethno-Linguistic
Composition
Transnational
Minorities
Institutionalized
Discrimination
Competition for
Political Office
Polity IV
Corruption
Gender Equity
Trade Balance
Dependence
Interstate
Cooperation
Neighborhood
Stability

Namibia
Stable
X
X
X

X

Botswana
Unstable

Botswana
Stable
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

60

makes it clear that they are functionally similar enough for us to expect them
to have both experienced the genesis of radical, extraordinary politics
sometime in the post-Cold War period if structural and institutional variables
constituted the only necessary variables. Since they did not experience
similar behavioral outcomes we can say with some confidence that some
other variables are also necessary to complete our causal equation.
Identity Change as an Indicator
I predicted, unconsciously mirroring Galtung (1968), that there would be two
processes of identity transformation that preceded the onset of war of
secession in Namibia among the Lozi people of East Caprivi, but absent
among the Kalanga of Botswana. First, I expected alienation and anomie
(what Galtung called “disintegration” and what I refer to in my theoretical
portion as “identity and value entropy”) to be higher in East Caprivi in relation
to Namibia and that a reintegration of sorts would be occurring as Lozi
nationalists recruited substantial proportions of their ethnic group to national
awareness, leading to higher levels of self-identification among Namibian Lozi
as Lozi comparative to Batswana Kalanga as Kalanga.
At the state level of analysis, what I found was quite different than what
I expected. Consistently in Namibia and Botswana the differences in terms of
state legitimacy and systemic legitimacy, in terms of performance,
expectations, and method of acquiring power, are virtually indistinguishable,
and when they are distinguishable, it is the state which did not experience the
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onset of radical, extraordinary politics (Botswana) that usually experienced
the lower levels of legitimacy. While this matches the assumptions neither of
common wisdom nor the formal hypothesis expostulated by this paper, it
remains an important point of order, inferring that we require other methods of
legitimacy measurement or that the role of disestablishmentarian elites may
be greater than had previously been considered.
Looking at the ethnic homelands of the Caprivi Lozi and Kalanga, on
the other hand, what I found was quite different. While Kalanga and Caprivi
both have relatively high levels of disdain for the contemporary system and its
ability to solve problems, the Caprivi Lozi actually felt in 1999 that an
alternative political system could constitute a viable alternative to the
contemporary system. This nuance was not expected, but it does make
sense – disintegration may be of a simple type, engendering only
dissatisfaction and alienation or it may be more complex, engendering both a
sense of dissatisfaction and alienation and a sense that a viable alternatives
exist.
My findings on whether or not the Caprivi Lozi self-identified as Lozi (or
as Silozi, Itenge, or Barotse) at a higher rate than Batswana Kalanga fell
farther from my expectations, however. Kalanga self-identified at a very high
rate despite their fears of recriminations in terms of access to jobs and
education, while Lozi-speakers of East Caprivi tended to identify themselves
according to their economic position in society, either according to class or,
far more frequently, according to their occupation (most were farmers). While
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this might have been expected in the case of a Marxist revolution, it was far
from expected in the case of a war of secession defined along ethno-linguistic
terms.
There are two possible explanations for this. First, it may simply be
that the East Caprivi people while holding disintegrated identities and being
highly alienated, and indeed, believe that an alternative political-economic
system might be the cure for their ills, they have not been overwhelming
convinced that this systemic change should take the form of ethno-national
radicalism. The second option, which need not exclude the first, is that those
Caprivi Lozi who were willing to take the perceived risks of self-identifying as
Caprivi or Lozi rather than Namibian had already fled Namibia, following
Muyongo into Botswana, leaving behind those who were merely deeply
entropic with regards to their identity.
Mobilization as an Indicator
I define in this study mobilization as the process by which human beings and
resources, particularly weapons, are prepared to resist the orthodox system,
in this case through attempting a war of secession. My assumption, at the
outset, was that the Caprivi Lozi would exhibit readily observable
characteristics that indicated they were (1) developing an alternative politicaleconomy to fund their war of secession and/or as a shadow political-economy
to be put into place upon independence, were (2) developing a military, and
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were (3) arming their military. In the same vein, I hypothesized that the
Kalanga of Botswana would demonstrate no similar precursors of violence.
In the case of an alternative political-economy, I focused my efforts on
a search for black or gray political markets and comparisons of perceived
levels of corruption in East Caprivi, Namibia and the North East District,
Botswana respectively. In my review of the journalistic or academic literature
on the regions/peoples, I found virtually no explicit evidence of black or gray
market, leading me to believe at the time that this was utterly a dead end, and
my research on corruption indicated that it was believed to be more pervasive
by Kalanga than Lozi, though this may be because of the nature of the
surveyed people’s opinions on the legitimacy of the leadership more than the
actual level of corruption in those states.
Yet there was an unexpected source of hope that this indicator still had
some potential. In my study of mobilization of personnel what I found was
that recruitment patterns by the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) focused on the
development of a shadow state, composed of persons with military, political,
bureaucratic, and educational experience. Furthermore, the transnational
CLA network of relationships essentially functioned as an alternative politicaleconomy without fostering internal corruption – probably a wise decision if it
had led to a successful war of secession.
When I was discussing my findings with a friend and former student of
mine at the University of Tennessee, one Justin Smith who is a senior at the
University this year in anthropology, he suggested that interstate networks
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might be essential in this case, citing Carolyn Nordstrom’s (2004) Shadows of
War. In this work Nordstrom examines the “shadow” political-economies that
develop in states engulfed in internal crisis – her focus is Mozambique - and
how developed states such as the United States and United Kingdom exploit
these shadow political-economies to cheaply extract valuable unrefined
goods.
This is relevant here because it brings up the simple fact that shadow
political-economies are built on the extraction of luxury goods to exchange for
essential goods lower down on the hierarchy of values, such as food,
medicine, armaments, and other finished goods. Great powers can exploit
these at will, of course, because of their tremendous wealth, but small
powers, or disestablishmentarians in those powers, might also be able to
exploit these states assuming they are both spatially near the shadow
political-economies and have desirable goods. Earlier, for instance, I noted
that Caprivi Lozi were able to purchase assault rifles in exchange for relatively
small amounts of grain. Where did these rifles originate from? They
originated from southern Angola where until 2001 the Angolan civil war raged
between the Angolan state and UNITA. Perhaps no obvious signs of a black
market existed in East Caprivi because the leaders therein exploited the
instability of southern Angola, limited state control of southwest Zambia, and
the humanitarian efforts of the UNHCR and Botswana in such a way that
these bodies took over the functions of a black market in this case.
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As to my research with regards to whether or not there was evidence
that the Caprivi Lozi were both mobilizing, training, and arming a military force
prior to the onset of violence, the only answer must be yes, and further, that
no similar behavioral markers existed in Botswana among the Kalanga. This
constitutes a simple point. The Caprivi Lozi not only decided that force might
be a necessary option to accomplish their goals, they took practical steps to
prepare for it. This is far from saying that the attempted Lozi secession was
inevitable – it was not. What it is to say is that a scholar, asked whether
Namibia was more likely to experience an ethnic war of secession than was
Botswana, could have stated absolutely based on a relatively simple inquiry
that is easily replicable, though perhaps not in quantifiable terms. What this
demands, however, is that the scholar (1) probe deeper than the state-level of
analysis favored by contemporary structuralists and institutionalists and (2)
invest the rebels with agency separate from the state of which they are a part
in practical terms.
Discrete Policies and Conditions as Causes
Above I described structuralist and institutionalist conditions and their
apparent roles in Namibia and Botswana. I described them as “causes”
because they are necessary to the onset of wars of secession and their kin. I
also asserted that, while necessary, they are not sufficient.
I ascribe a similar role to discrete policy decisions that cannot be
described as institutions or structures because their effect is (1) immediate,
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rather than long-term and (2) would not register as changes in either the
institutional arrangement or the structural patterns of a given system. I
identified three of these discrete conditions as likely having particular
salience. First, I asserted that if extra-territorial actors lend moral or real
support to radical disestablishmentarians, aiding them in their cause, we
could expect the odds that a war of secession would occur would increase
substantially since such assistance would either lower costs, lower risks, or
lower increase the apparent value of the benefits. Second, I asserted that if a
mobilizing identity group had access to an exit strategy or a series of exit
strategies, the risks entailed in attempting to secede would decrease, thereby
making the odds that they would attempt secession increase. Third, I
asserted that if leaders of the establishment ended any possibility of legal
recourse to secession (or other sovereignty acquisition options) and/or
criminalized the leadership of the disestablishmentarians – both of which
constitute limitations to discourse – then the costs entailed in rebellion would
decrease and the benefits increase, especially to elites – therefore the odds
that a war of secession would increase.
What I found matched my expectations quite well. The Caprivi Lozi had
access to international support of several types, some clearly intended to
support rebellion, some intended to be humanitarian, while the Batswana
Kalanga neither had access to such support nor, and this point can easily be
looked over, did their elite seek it. The Caprivi Lozi had access to numerous
exit strategies, while the Batswana Kalanga had no such access – their only
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escape route would be into a state in which their repression would be far
worse. Finally, Namibian President Sam Nujoma consciously and finally
ended any discussion of the possibility of East Caprivi independence and
declared Mishake Muyongo and his peers to be enemies of the state, forcing
them to flee and leaving them no option other than discard their dream of
independence or use violence. In Botswana, however, even as the Kalanga
continue to be excluded from office, prevented from using their language in
formal situations, and are experiencing increasing discrimination in the
acquisition of higher office and educational opportunities, there is no question
that the government remained open to Kalanga protests, entreaties, and
demands even if they never responded satisfactorily.

Summary of Work to Follow
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first consists of an
introduction to and summary of the research bound in this text. The second
consists of a review of the major theories on the causes civil wars,
revolutions, ethno-national wars, genocides, and radical religious
fundamentalism. The third chapter is an effort to integrate the general
theories presented by the orthodox approach with a second level of causal
factors which are ultimately derived from elite theory. The fourth chapter is an
attempt to establish the structural and institutional equivalency of Namibia
and Botswana, specifically to illustrate the limitations of the orthodox
approach alone in the prediction of radical, extraordinary politics.
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The fifth chapter consists of a study of identity and value changes as
well as mobilization (and the lack thereof) in Namibia and Botswana and the
sixth consists of the effects of divergent internal and external environmental
affects in and on Namibia and Botswana. These chapters are intended to
illustrate the utility of the second stage of analysis which I posit in the third
chapter. The seventh and final chapter is a conclusion in which I review the
findings, discuss their implications, and possible implications for future
research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Wars of secession are, as mentioned above, are merely one species of a
genre of interrelated forms of domestic strife, vaguely differentiated and often
overlapping. Before delimiting a causal model in which the causal chain
leading to wars of secession is fully developed, it would perhaps behoove us
to review the basic literature for the whole of the genre, surveying it for any
and all factors that we might consider in this dissertation’s original research.

Classical and Neoclassical Theories of Radical,
Extraordinary Politics
Virtually all contemporary theories of revolution and other types of radical
extraordinary politics assert that the root of radical change lies primarily in
socioeconomic causes. High socioeconomic inequity, sudden jumps in
socioeconomic inequity brought on by changes in the market or changes of
technology, or sustained economic failure, especially in terms of subsistence,
are the most popular guises that the economic explanation of system
collapse.
Classical and early modern precedents to our understanding of
extraordinary politics abound. Both Plato and Aristotle, two thinkers known
best for their disagreements, concurred that revolution had its roots in poverty
(Tanter and Midlarsky 1967: 269). Tacitus understood regime change in
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republics and democracies to be the result of a series of rational decisions in
which citizens accept the transfer of their power to an authoritarian center in
exchange for guarantees of security and standard-of-living guarantees.
Classical Chinese thinkers, including Kung Fuzi (Confucius), held to the
notion of the Mandate of Heaven, assuming that if the Emperor and his
bureaucrats failed to govern effectively or morally the people would rightly
overthrow the throne and a new emperor would be ‘chosen’ by Heaven (Tian)
to restore good government. Later Thomas Hobbes would argue fiercely that
while revolution is never conscionable, it can inevitably be expected when
rulers becomes overtly tyrannical. Early liberal thinkers such as Locke would
insist that revolution was justifiable not only on grounds of deprivation of life
and liberty, but also of property (both real and potential).
It is with the work of Thomas Malthus, however, that we begin to see
the first attempt to create a systematic understanding of the sources of
conflict as a product of socioeconomic processes and arrangements. Malthus
asserted that when a population increases in size in the absence of natural
mechanisms for restraint (for instance, predatory animals) then that
population ultimately exceeds the natural carrying capacity of the territory that
population exists upon. Under such conditions there are a limited number of
possible outcomes. A first option is that the society will not increase in
inequity, but will rather ration food and key resources—the result being that
the entire population will be weakened in its responsive power, precipitating
an unbounded die-off in the event of any serious unpredicted crisis, be it
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plague, natural disaster, invasion, and so on. Such disasters, it should be
noted, may become more likely in the instance of overpopulation/resource
underdevelopment because of increased population density, lower resource
availability for behaviors and infrastructure that are not immediately
necessary, the higher environmental damage that accompanies
overpopulation/resource underdevelopment, and the weakened station of the
state vis-à-vis its neighbors. Second, the population can attempt to acquire
more of the necessary resources by force, either colonizing new territories
(i.e. moving significant portions of the population into those territories, thus
relieving population pressures) or exploiting them. Third, and most relevant to
the discussion here, elements of the population may attempt to guarantee
their access to resources while depriving others of their full share—in other
words, inequity will increase. The result will be either a die-off of those
without adequate resources or civil conflict in an attempt to force a
redistribution of resources, conflict that ultimately decreases population
pressures. Of particular interest here is that conflict is a product of politically
constructed socioeconomic inequality, a concept that later becomes a
hallmark in the work of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels.
Specifically, Engels and Marx assert that technological changes serve
as catalysts for systemic change. As human beings develop new
technologies, physical and social, different socioeconomic classes are able to
gain greater wealth and power relative to the other classes. Dominating
classes, which have vested socioeconomic and political interests and powers
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in the system as it contemporarily exists, perceive their interests as
threatened by upstart classes. Rationally, these dominant classes react by
attempting to suppress the upstart classes, thereby creating conditions that
mirror those found in the third response to Malthusian crisis listed above. The
result is that, in most cases, extraordinary and often violent political means
are necessary to readjust the political and socioeconomic arrangements of
society. Even if the initial efforts to suppress change are successful, a
socioeconomic/political system cannot survive without adjusting to the new
technological realities (and the new relational arrangements dictated by these
technologies). Either the system will be forcibly changed from the outside by
systems that did readjust—a key point of Lenin’s work—or inevitably the
resources available to the upstart class will allow them, at some point, to take
power, integrating the best parts of the former system with those of the new
system. Progress and revolution may therefore be considered inevitable and
inexorably linked not merely to socioeconomic change but to socioeconomic
inequity and competition.

Modern Theories of Radical, Extraordinary Politics
and Relevant Contemporary International Relations
Theories
The key unifying element in the work of most Twentieth Century theorists on
revolution, regardless of their ideological/metatheoretical bent is their general
agreement that revolution is a response to socioeconomic inequality, creating
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scarcity among particular classes and subpopulations. These include Russett
(1964), Paige (1975), Tanter and Midlarsky (1967), Disch (1979), Skocpol
(1976, 1979a, 1979b), Somers and Goldfrank (1979), and Midlarsky (1982)—
all of whom emphasize land inequality in particular. This emphasis on land
inequality reflects the fact that most large-scale “social” revolutions (populist,
bottom-up) have occurred in states that had not yet modernized.
Furthermore, at least heretofore, most developed states have proven
themselves more than capable of sustaining the fundamental needs of most
of their population as pointed out by Inglehart et al. (2004: 5). Key exceptions
include those domestic radical, extraordinary political events transpiring
during the First World War, the Great Depression, and the Second World,
series of events that facilitated the collapse of democracy in several states.
Whether or not this will remain the case remains to be seen, especially if
market economies ultimately decline or collapse, resulting in adequately
significant poverty and/or income inequality to spark a revolution, as
Habermas (1975) and Lindblom (1977) suggest is possible.
Brinton (1952) suggests that the key uniformity among most
revolutions is that immediately preceding a revolution the quality of the
socioeconomic system surges upward, while Davies (1962) states that that
revolution results from a sharp decline in quality of life immediately following a
long-term improvement in the socioeconomic system. This in turn leads us to
the work of Tanter and Midlarsky (1967: 271) who state that the key element
in revolution formation is not simply poor circumstances, but rather a
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“legitimacy gap.” Revolution, thus, is a behavior that results from a rational
assessment of the variance by a key sector or key sectors of society between
that sector’s socioeconomic aspirations and its and its expected or real
socioeconomic receipts.
Sakata and Hall (1956) added a three-point theory to the literature on
the underlying causes of radical, top-down extraordinary politics. Specifically,
their work was based on the conditions that allowed and drove certain
Japanese elites, specifically members of the growing bourgeoisie, the
Imperial bureaucracy, and the petit samurai, to participate in the Restoration
and the Meiji Reformation. First, Sakata and Hall assert that throughout the
Nineteenth Century the dominant elements of the Imperial state had gradually
slid into stagnation as the result of an obsession with ceremony, precedence,
and heredity to such a degree that the lower echelon of the bureaucracy on
the one hand became alienated from the upper reaches of the state and on
the other gradually accumulated most of the state’s real power. In other
words, the empowerment of a bureaucracy whose interests are notably
different from those in which formal legitimacy is vested is a key potential
precedent of top-down revolutions. Secondly, the late-Tokugawa period was
plagued with economic weakness—a hallmark of radical, extraordinary
politics as theorized by virtually every major theorist. Finally, the Shogunate
was plagued with the threat of Western invasion and, due to the former two
conditions, proved entirely ill-equipped to respond to that threat—again, a key
element motivating many instances of dissent in the work of latter writers.
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In his Growth as a Destablizing Force (1963), Mancur Olson, Jr.
asserts that contrary to what traditional theorists and policy-makers have
believed, as indicated in their work or implied in their policies, rapid economic
growth is in and of itself not a stabilizing force. To the contrary, Olson notes
that those people most likely to become involved in radical movements,
whether leftist or rightist in slant¸ are simultaneously those people who are
most alienated from any typical identification, be it familial, professional, or
social. The significance is that economic status per say is not responsible for
alienation, then. That said, however, rapid -economic growth tends to lead to
substantial increases in the number of socially unaffiliated person, that is to
say people without class identity or déclassé. The relative growth in the
number of déclassé in societies experiencing rapid economic growth is the
product of two simultaneous processes that accompany rapid economic
growth. On the one hand, the economic disruptions and transformations
disrupt traditional class and group structures, tearing apart pre-growth social
patterns and alienating large numbers of people. On the other hand,
economic growth allows members of lower classes to climb in the political,
economic, and social hierarchy. These newly affluent and influential groups
also become alienated, in part due to their removal from social patterns for
which their upbringing prepared them, in part because ‘old money’ members
with similar class status rarely accept them and often try to sabotage their rise
of influence.
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Olson, building on the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, also asserts that
rapid economic growth has the potential to lead to a “revolution of rising
expectations” (541). When men and women are forced to live under an
economically and or politically repressive system, then new burdens are
taken in stride—suffering is taken as a constant, unavoidable part of life. On
the other hand, should the burden of life be relieved, be it through political
decision or rapid economic growth, then instability will grow. This instability is
the product of two things: on the one hand, the fact that now the oppressed
know their situation can be improved, and on the other the fact that the
remaining points of oppression are highlighted by the absence of those now
past.
Tilly (1973, 1975, 1978) builds on these earlier paradigms, but
emphasizes the political causes of revolution as preeminent. This is not to
infer that socioeconomic concerns are not involved in the causal chain that
leads to revolution, but merely that the ultimate causes of revolution are in
fact political. Specifically, Tilly refers to the contemporary structure of power,
alternative conceptions of justice, the organization and use of coercion,
conduct in war, the formation of coalitions, and failure in the legitimacy of the
state as the prime causes of revolution. That said, the first three of these can
be seen as simple causes of delegitimization and, concordantly, the formation
of anti-establishment coalitions.
Skocpol, one of the most renowned theorists of revolution (and an
ardent defender of the strict theoretical segregation of bottom-up “social
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revolutions” such as the French and Chinese revolutions from other sociopolitical upheavals) adds to the relevant literature in two key ways. Granted,
like so many other theorists of revolution, Skocpol agrees that illegitimate
regimes/systems are at the core of revolutions, emphasizing in particular, “the
collapse or incapacitation of central administrative and military machineries”
and “widespread peasant rebellions” (1976a: 178) and that “[v]irtually
everyone who writes about social revolutions recognizes that they begin with
overtly political crises” (1979a) which slam the door shut on already
illegitimate and/or ineffective systems. That said, Skocpol makes two key
distinctions that here warrant attention.
To begin with, Skocpol insists that “marginal elite political movements”
are key in founding revolutionary regimes—that is to say that elite expertise is
often essential in helping disaffected persons to manage and ostensibly
reform the political-social-economic system (1976a: 178). Additionally,
Skocpol insists that considering the international political-economic system in
tandem with the domestic system is essential for three reasons. First,
Skocpol asserts that international pressures are key in the process of
‘incapacitation’ mentioned above. On the one hand, Skocpol claims that
revolutions are in part the product of international politics. Military overdeployment and over-participation, both of which expend essential resources
and alienate key elites and restrain possible domestic policy choices
(including reforms that might lead to regime legitimization) are key in
grievance formation (1976a, 182; 1976b 299-300). Of course, a state
78

attempting to defend itself against the predations of fully developed states
must devote enormous resources just to have an adequate deterrence to
outside interference and invasion—the result being virtually the same as
active warfare (1976a, 184). Finally, dependency, in the form of extreme
foreign debt and trade imbalance, for instance, may also be seen as stripping
domestic political systems of key resources, resources which otherwise could
have been diverted to improving political-economic circumstances (1976a,
183).
Skocpol (1976b) also asserts that revolution, being the product of
unjust systems whose means of domination were stressed to the breaking
point by foreign pressures, is not the product of any of the intentions and/or
intended actions of the actors who later take advantage of it. Quite the
contrary, the failure of the state merely creates literal and ideological chaos,
chaos that then is exploited by disestablishmentarian radicals who knit
together a new social, political, economic order from the tatters remaining.
Skocpol, in other words, asserts that the only actors who are meaningfully
involved in the process of dissolving a political system are those who formerly
controlled it, and their effect is wholly unintentional.
Midlarsky (1982) builds on the work of Skocpol even while critiquing
her work. Specifically, Midlarsky asserts that the essential element in
predicting revolution is not simply the condition of ‘modernizing agricultural
states.’ Rather, Midlarsky asserts that modernizing, agricultural states
embody a set of attributes that are conducive to revolution from below—
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attributes that he feels are likely to appear in other socio-historical
circumstances. Specifically, Midlarsky asserts that the two primary structural
conditions that underlie revolution are 1) key-resource scarcity and 2) political
economic inequality. The relationship between these structural causes,
asserts Midlarsky, is a reflexive one—resource scarcity tends to heighten
political and economic inequalities, while preexisting political and economic
inequalities tend to predetermine who will have the most access to scarce
resources. When these conditions exist simultaneously the only option for
disenfranchised and exploited classes is extraordinary political behavior.
Dix (1984) finds that closed, corrupt, personalistic states are far more
likely breeding grounds for violent revolt than are either open/liberal states or
states ruled by military regimes, what some scholars might call bureaucraticauthoritarian regimes. Liberal societies may be expected to be unlikely
candidates for revolt not only due to their apparent lack of norms of
domination but also due to the fact that liberal regimes tend to remain
legitimate in part because they become what the population wants. Liberal
states, in other words, facilitate rule-change through rule-based behaviors.
They offer alternatives to violent and/or radical systemic transformation that
are readily available to virtually all elements of society (save the most
severely disenfranchised who are rarely in a capacity to resist the orthodox
system anyway, being obliged to concentrate all their efforts on the process of
subsistence).
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Davidheiser (1992) states simply that, “states which penetrate and
transform society but which allow little penetration by societal interests are
more likely to fall to revolution” (464). His effort is an attempt to refute
Skocpol whose work infers that only weak states experience revolution.
Davidheiser instead insists it is the very fact that states are strong that brings
about their demise—strong states coerce people into particular politicaleconomic circumstances, making responsibility for outcomes entirely statedependent. Therefore, if the state fails in its policies (for instance, in the effort
to modernize), then the state bears all the costs in terms of legitimacy. The
key protest to this work, however, might be that the failure of the state infers a
kind of weakness in and of itself—the state demonstrates its incapability
accomplish goals—leading to the predominance of non-state actors.
Ronald A. Francisco (1993) emphasizes the importance of contagion
as a cause of civil war and revolution, using the transnational Revolution of
1989 that swept the Eastern Bloc. Specifically, what Francisco notes is that
when the Soviet Union failed to respond to the protests that swept East
Germany and Poland that year, citizens of other regional states recognized
an opportunity to revolt as well. This is not only because the East Germans
and Poles had demonstrated that protest against the ruling regime, and
ultimately regime change, was possible, but further that the regional hegemon
was either incapable or unwilling to use force to prevent them from doing so.
Essentially, then, we may speak of contagion not so much as a wholly
independent variable so much as 1) a means by which state weakness may
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be highlighted and 2) as a means of creating a an entirely new set of
expectations which necessarily hinge on the overthrow of the contemporary
system.
The notion that liberalism is conducive to interstate (that is to say
between and/or among states) peace has been reinforced by a host of other
studies, some that emphasize the pacifying effects of democracy as a regimetype, the pacifying effects of variants of capitalism, and the pacifying effects of
institutionally and structurally egalitarian societies. In the first part, theorists
have begun to demonstrate the linkage between domestic political
arrangements, socio-economic groups, and the foreign policies and
international behavior of the states they constitute. Two categories of these
theories have yielded particularly valuable results, relevant here in terms of
their utility as a basis for further theoretical development.
Advocates of the “democratic peace thesis” insist either that
democracies are extremely unlikely to enter into military conflict with other
democracies (Chan 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Mousseau 2003;
Rousseau et al.1996). This is the “weak” thesis. Others have argued that
democracies are generally more pacifistic than states that are not democratic
(Benoit 1996; Chan 1997). This is the “strong” thesis. Supporters of these
theses, and particularly supporters of the “weak” democracy/democracy
thesis point to a literature that has systematically failed to disprove the thesis
in rigorous test after test, resulting in the claim that the democratic peace
thesis is closest device to a law that political science has produced.
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While the democratic peace thesis emphasizes peace as a by-product
of a particular set of political arrangements, norms, and institutions, other
liberal theorists insist that it is not free political competition but rather free
economic competition, or capitalism, that is associated with peace (Lektzian
and Souva 2003; Polacheck, Robst, and Chang 1999). This thesis is based
on the notion that it is the linkages of capitalist exchange in terms the flow of
goods and services and the interdependence which accompanies such
linkages as well as the norms associated with modern capitalism that produce
the conditions necessary for extended interstate peace.
Concurrent with this body of literature is that of internal structural
inequality (Caprioli 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Caprioli and
Trumbore 2003; Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999; Tessler and Warriner
1997). This literature, an amalgam of ethno-national, feminist, and Marxist
theory and inquiry, is based on a single general premise: the greater the
structural and institutional inequality within a state, the more likely the norms
associated with structural inequality and domination are likely to manifest
themselves in interstate behavior (Benoit 1996; Bonta 1996; Bremer 1992;
Brown 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Caprioli 2000; Caprioli
and Boyer 2001; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003; Gledisch and Hegre 1997;
Greenfeld 1992; Oneal and Russet 1997; Ray 1995; Rummel 1995; Snyder
1993; Van Evera 1997). The result, which several studies have found
probabilistic evidence of (see especially Caprioli 2000, 2003), is a greater
propensity to engage in militarized interstate disputes and wars.
83

To simplify, systems that discriminate and are legalistically,
institutionally, or structurally unequal are likely to produce norms of
domination among elites. Internationally this leads to an unwillingness to
negotiate or to accept compromise. We can assume that, similarly, on the
domestic level attitudes of domination reinforce notions of entitlement for
dominating classes and disenfranchisement for dominated classes. The
result is that the dominated classes come to perceive the system as
fundamentally unjust and illegitimate while both dominators and dominated
come to perceive negotiation and moderation as unpalatable, unacceptable,
and/or impossible. Thus when conditions for the dominated classes become
adequately unacceptable as to compel political response, radical systemic
transformation in the form of a coup, civil war, or revolution is the most likely
outcome.
Summarizing, it is generally believed that radical systemic
transformation is the product of discriminatory or generally impoverishing
structural and institutional conditions. These conditions are hypothesized
usually to be the end result of either socioeconomic competition between
classes reinforced and/or created through political action. Further, the form of
the system is legitimated in the orthodox culture—when perceived inequality
or poverty become too great, or when certain classes are believed to be
breaking key clauses of the social contract, or when the system is perceived
as being fundamentally imperiled by outside political, economic, or social
forces then systemic legitimacy breaks down. Injustice, it would seem, has its
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limits. This decline in legitimacy allows organizations with alternative political,
social, and/or economic visions to gain adherents and ultimately challenge
the status quo—a process that frequently results in revolutions, coups or civil
war.

Theories of Ethno-National War and Genocide
I segregate the literature on ethno-national warfare and genocide from the
literature on other forms of extraordinary politics not out of any personal
inclination, but in recognition that this branch of research into political
upheaval has evolved partially, though not wholly, alienated from the literature
on civil wars and regime changes, much less from the international relations
literature reviewed above and, secondarily, to demonstrate the similarities
that have emerged between the various fields. 1
Before continuing, however, I would like to add a simple note. I reject
outright racial and pseudo-biological arguments for political violence and
upheaval. Do I recognize that human beings tend to defend those they care
for most first? Of course. And I recognize that this trait evolved in large part
to maintain families and tribes of biologically linked individuals—the individual
was and is sometimes sacrificed to protect the greater genetic heritage.
Beyond that, however, we must recognize that human group identity is

1

Sambanis (2002: 234) points out that there is no consensus in the literature on the
theoretical validity and empirical utility of dividing ethnic and revolutionary wars, though in an
earlier article (2001), dedicated to the determining this point, he asserts that ethnic wars tend
to be based on political grievances, rather than socioeconomic.
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constructed from experience and cultural influence—human allegiances and
loyalties are not biologically determined. Primordialism is a myth.
My review of this literature begins with the 1944 work of J.S. Furnivall
and the 1969 work of M.G. Smith. On a vaguely Madisonian note, these two
authors asserted that pluralistic democracies, that is to say democracies in
which politics tend to be organized in terms of ethnic interests, are
fundamentally predisposed to violence. Specifically, they assume that those
states whose institutions encourage or allow ethnic competition to become
the focal point of political activity are fundamentally flawed. The nature of
competition in these states, they assume, is fragmenting, ultimately
undermining state legitimacy, identity, and stability. While Donald L.
Horowitz (1985), Helen Fein (1995), and Peter Uvin (1999) do not comment
on this particular element of democracy, they do assert that the process of
democratization exacerbates tensions between ethnic groups in most
states—specifically, democratization threatens the security of elites already in
power with a loss of that power, therefore those who have the most to lose
have a tendency to take whatever steps are necessary, including the use of
extraordinary violence, to protect it. If this includes a shift away from
democracy without violence, it is entirely possible that the group or groups
that believed themselves to have made substantial relative gains will
themselves initiate violence.
Deutsch (1953), on the other hand, contends that ethno-national
warfare is a product of political-economic-social mobilization outpacing
86

political-economic-social assimilation. In other words, Deutsch believes that
in instances when powerful political-economic centers effectively spread their
system into outlying areas that, previously, have been isolated and which
retain distinctive systemic patterns and behaviors, several problems emerge.
For instance, political and economic efficacy is likely to decline given that the
system is integrating what are, effectively, two different types of polities and
economies. Furthermore, exploitation previously required middlemen—with
the establishment of center control over outlying regions, the role of the
center (i.e. the dominating ethnic group) becomes more manifest.
Regardless, since assimilation has not kept up with the expansion of center
power, the result is that difference between the center and peripheral
regions/groups becomes obvious and the advantages demonstrated by the
dominate group(s) seem to (and indeed, may in fact) grow relative to
exploited groups. The result is that discontent increases as does the rational
utility of rebellion.
Walter Connor’s (1967, 1973a, 1973b) work further emphasizes the
role of modernization by detailing four effects of the process of modernization
likely to exacerbate sentiments of discontent. First, modernization decreases
autonomy, depriving former leaders (social, political, and economic) of their
power, wealth, and prestige and, in many cases, removing people who
understand local conditions from offices that would determine the proper
responses to those same conditions. Second, Connor notes that the process
of modernization, with its double-punch of advanced communication and
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transportation technologies, strengthens (or even creates) intra-group identity.
Tribes, clans, families, towns, and even regions that had previously not
recognized their similarity or their similar interests are suddenly confronted
with their sameness, even if this sameness is contrived. The result is an
upsurge in nationalist sentiments. Third, modernization disseminates
nationalist ideals using the very same technologies that unite previously
disunited groups, often concurrently. Finally, the process of modernization
subjects states and their minorities to the constraints of a neo-imperial, as
opposed to imperial, global system—outright domination is, in other words, no
longer valued as a policy option of first choice by great powers, therefore
great powers are less likely to sanction extreme acts by dominant groups in
solidifying their power over dominated groups (these sorts of acts, after all,
make effected areas less capable of producing necessary commodities and
less capable of absorbing finished products produced by core states.
Unquestionably this final premise held under during the Cold War, but its
relevance in the post-Cold War period seems to be even greater.
Two authors, Daniel Lerner (1967) and Samuel P. Huntington (1968)
add that the process of gaining independence from another state creates a
social psychology that is vulnerable to radicalization along ethno-national
lines. In essence, Lerner and Huntington suggest that the general
populations of states gaining their independence from imperial powers tend to
have extremely high expectations as to the effects said independence will
have on their lives. These high expectations are, however, rarely rewarded
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with rapid political-economic improvements. Consider that upon
independence most states experience a flight of formally trained bureaucrats,
scientists, technicians, lawyers, doctors, and other elites. Consider that often
for decades, occasionally for centuries, these states have been formally
exploited, used for the explicit purpose of enriching people other than their
inhabitants, leaving them with social and physical infrastructure designed
primarily to help deprive them of capital rather than develop it. Combine this
with the tendency of colonial powers to “divide and conquer” the inhabitants of
their holdings and their propensity to leave a trail of strongmen and corruption
in their wake and the most likely outcome is disappointment and discontent.
This discontent convinces ethno-nationalist groups that their interests would
be better served by a state of their choosing, as opposed to a state of the
dominant ethnic group and/or the former colonial power’s choosing. Robert
Kaplan (1993), as well as Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly (2006) build
on the assumptions of Lerner and Huntington, asserting that the absence of
great power interest (global or regional) in retaining stability in a particular
region—due to a lack of strategic significance—allows ethnic tensions that
might have been forcibly submerged to rise to the surface unabated and
deprives states of essential international aid. In both of the above theories,
then, the absence of strong powers as organizers and sponsors in a region
allows minor actors to destabilize political, economic, and social regimes.
Stein Rokkan (1970) identifies three key conditional indicators that an
ethnic group is likely to engage in rebellion. The first among these is a
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combination of geographic concentration and isolation—both of which will
help not only solidify the identity of an ethnic group and give it a sense that it
has a defined homeland to defend/claim, but which also improves said
group’s ability to develop a meaningful logistical base from which to press this
claim. Secondly, the group should not only be geographically distinct and/or
isolated from the dominant group(s), but furthermore it should be socially
isolated, maintaining distinct cultural and/or linguistic patterns from the
dominate group which make distinction among groups both easy and salient.
Finally, Rokkan asserts that ethnic groups which exist in (or have previously
existed in) economic isolation from the dominate group(s) in a state are more
likely to assert claims to independence or autonomy, undoubtedly since
integration into the mainstream is likely to not only tear apart traditional
economic patterns but further to lead to substantial economic costs. The
implication here is, of course, that elites from the dominant ethnicity are
attempting to force the dominated ethnicity to integrate—otherwise these
factors would have little significance. Modernization (or other cases of
effective expansion of central state power and the orthodox economy
inflames identity concerns (and power-preservation concerns) among
previously autonomous groups.
Myron Weiner (1971) states that in those instances where a “status
quo state” with a particular minority borders another state in which the
dominate ethnic group composes the dominant class, then the likelihood of
ethno-nationalist conflict in the status quo state increases exponentially. This
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is in part due to the fact that the revisionist state is likely to become obsessed
with border modification (to its strategic advantage, of course). The most
likely reaction to this by the status quo state is likely to become border
maintenance. The result is an ideological runaway event in which nationalism
and militarism spike in both nations, including among the minority in the
status quo state. Escalation, be it into international war (with expansion as
the key end the revisionist power), into intranational war (in which the minority
of the status quo state is armed, trained, and supported by the revisionist
state), or a complicated, Balkanized blend of both, increases as an option
when ethnic identities are transnational.
Michael Hetcher (1975) follows the work of Lenin and Gramsci,
asserting that the cultural division of labor and exploitation found in many
multiethnic states often exacerbates tensions between these groups while
also leading to a sense of community and joint purpose. The outcome of this
exploitation is that oppressed groups are likely to mobilize politically and, at
times, militarily. That said, Hetcher presages Heraclides (see below) by
asserting that he feels that while this may be a necessary condition for ethnonational discontent and upheaval, it is not a sufficient one—pointing
specifically to ethno-national movements of wealthy, relatively equitable
states.
Johan Galtung’s 1990 article “Cultural Violence” attempts to create a
sociological explanation of the process of violence legitimization—that is to
say how it is that people come to accept and engage in violence on a cultural
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level. His theory ultimately comes to two conclusions. First, many, if not
most, cultures inculcate a sense of who is and is not a member of
“acceptable” society. To be a member of the society is to be fully human and
entitled to rights. To be excluded, in contrast, is to not only not be entitled to
societies rights, but further to a threat to those who are so entitled. Second,
though distinctly related, most cultures inculcate a sense of hierarchy based
on one’s closeness to an ideal of some kind; God, for instance, in cultures
where religion remains the dominant social element, technological/economic
sophistication among secular, modern societies, or even depth and breadth of
democracy in liberal societies. Outsiders are judged by insiders in relation to
their place on the contemporarily held hierarchy.

Both of these cultural

elements have two possible implications for warfare, ethno-national or
otherwise—to be different is to be unequal, and to be culturally unequal is to
legitimate political and economic inequality.

Thus, tensions between

dominated and dominating elements in multicultural societies are high (setting
the stage for violence), but further a more eclectic justification is already built
into the structural precursors of violence.
In his The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics
Alexis Heraclides (1991) outlines the developmental approach to the politics
of ethno-nationalism. Heraclides asserts that identity, be it ethnic or
otherwise, forms the essential independent variable that leads to both political
activity and militaristic secessionism. He further adds that this is the case
regardless of inequality of dominance within polity, economy, or society. His
92

work captures a key conundrum—discontent with the contemporary
arrangement in multicultural communities often arises in fairly egalitarian and
just societies. Consider the secessionist and autonomist movements
currently active in the North Irish, Scottish, and Welsh kingdoms of the United
Kingdom, among the Quebecois in Canada, among Bretons in France,
among virtually all regional minorities of Spain, and in Sicily and the North of
Italy. Identity, asserts Heraclides, is key in defining one’s sense of right and
wrong, not actual conditions. Whether or not he presses his claim too far (I
believe most of the theorists considered in this essay would agree he has), it
does make a key point—identity defines conflict, specifically in the ethnonational conflict, but alternatively in other situations (e.g. religious identity in
the Wars of Religion and ideological identity in the Cold War).
Heraclides, building on Gurr (1970b) and later seconded by Brass
(1991), and Snow (1993), also asserted that ethno-nationalist conflict may be
further aggravated by perceived relative deprivation. Should the members of
a non-elite ethnic group perceive themselves as in a politically or
economically disadvantaged situation vis-à-vis the dominate group(s), the
members of said ethnic group are more likely to reject the contemporary
order.
Both Rummel (1994) and Krain (1997) assert that as the concentration
of political power in a state increases, the odds of politicide and/or genocide
increase concurrently. Totalitarian states then are extremely prone to
genocide (all other factors being the same). Alternatively, stable, enduring
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democracy and free political, economic, and social competition tend to
undermine the tensions that lead to genocide (Rummel 1983; Bremer 1992).
Along the same lines, McNitt (1995) discovered a causal chain that he asserts
might lead to greater ethno-national repression. As international pressures
and/or conflicts increase, so to does the pressure on a state’s rulers to
engage in repressive political activities (e.g. torture and detention). The result
is a greater propensity among repressed groups to rebel and, as the threat
they present to the state increases, a greater likelihood that state elites will
consider genocide an acceptable means of eliminating a serious threat to
their power, thereby eliminating in a sweep an entire front from the strategic
concerns of those elites. Repression, then, may not so much be a cycle as
much as it is a near-irreversible spiral. Krain (1997) concurs that the
strongest and most consistent predictor of the onset of genocide or politicide
are political opportunities. These opportunities are afforded primarily by the
onset of other crises, crises that attenuate tensions and that afford effective
cover for genocidal activities (due to the withdrawal of international
observers). Civil wars, sudden regime changes, and the so forth are key
examples.
Before diving into the particulars of his recent contributions to the
theory of intrastate upheaval, a few moments need to be spent clarifying the
key points of Samuel P. Huntington’s most recent, significant theory of
interstate violence. Huntington’s (1993a, 1993b, 1996) “Clash of Civilizations”
hypothesis constitutes a giant among culturalist work. Huntington points out
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that previous to the decline of the Cold War the nation-state has been the de
facto locus of conflict for a long period of time. In this Huntington is wholly
correct—during the Cold War two alliances of nation-states battled for
ideological supremacy, whereas before the Cold War the world was
enveloped, literally, by the political, economic, and military might of the first
true nation-states. The result was that conflict was globally framed within the
context of Western political philosophical assumptions. Yet with the fall of the
Soviet Union these circumstances changed. There appeared, as Fukuyama
(1992) would laud, to be nothing more to fight about, at least in terms of
ideas. The liberal West had won.
Yet the end of the Cold War also, in the eyes of many observers,
signaled the failure of modernization. Modernization not only threatened the
traditional values of non-Westerners (and traditionalist or fundamentalist
Westerners), but it failed to improve the lives and livelihoods of most nonWesterners. Cultural identities began to reassert themselves. Huntington
posits that culture will become the new line in the dirt, the defining fracture
along which conflict will continue. Furthermore, Huntington asserts that this
conflict will not be contained in simple national terms, along national cultural
lines, but rather will develop transnationally, uniting civilization against
civilization—shifting relevant identities away from nationalism’s lowest
common denominator rationale towards the highest common denominator,
the largest group of people with shared identities other than the species as a
whole.
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Interestingly, Huntington’s work says less about the behavior of
particular civilizations in terms of their propensity to belligerence than it does
about the behavior of dyads of civilizations—the fundamental assumptions of
neo-realism remain almost wholly intact, save that the key entity is the
civilization, defined largely in terms of religious identity, rather than the nationstate.
While several studies since have called into question the utility of
Huntington’s work for the scholars of interstate relations (see in particular
Henderson and Tucker 2001), its utility for defining the most likely geography
of civil conflict has received a warmer welcome. This is not, however, to say
that Huntington himself did not recognize this potential. Huntington notes that
several types of states are likely to experience an upsurge (probabilistically)
of culturally-defined conflict. In fact, he dedicates several pages in Clash
(1996) to developing a typology of states most likely to incur negative effects
from the apparently inevitable clash of civilizations.
First, Huntington establishes that there are lone countries (136-137)
that do not fit neatly (or even messily) into civilizational categories.
Huntington specifically mentions Haiti, Ethiopia, and Japan as examples,
though the substantial degree of Westernization in the third of these may call
it into question. The others, however, represent an interesting politicaleconomic conundrum. These states are unlikely to be viewed as ‘kin’ by any
other state or set of states—they are in, Huntington’s words, “the neighbor
nobody wants” (136). Furthermore, we can expect that the sheer uniqueness
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of these states deprives them of viable models for development and
complicates their integration into the world order, or a regional order for that
matter, thus slowing their development and decreasing their overall
effectiveness as states. These states are less likely to have effective
interstate support networks (strategically and developmentally), than are
other, politically-economically comparable states, and therefore may be
considered more prone to state failure than average.
Secondly, Huntington identifies cleft countries. While Huntington notes
that multicultural states of the same civilization are capable of deep division, it
is cleft states, or states wherein there are relatively large groups of different
civilizations, that are most prone to political-economic division along sociocultural lines. Huntington notes that cleft countries that are territorially
adjacent to both of the civilizations they are comprised of are most likely to be
prone to political stability difficulties, an assertion which is entirely logical
given the increased logistical ease in terms of transferring aid, assistance,
and advice to autonomist, revolutionary, and secessionist groups. Of course,
Huntington asserts that these tensions are profoundly more likely to gain
significance contemporarily given that the Cold War, with its over-shadowing
ideological dichotomy, has receded (don’t mention that, of course, to the
Nepalese Maoists or Hugo Chavez).
Finally, Huntington describes torn countries, those states wherein
certain leaders, usually the dominant elite, seek to transform the state,
gravitating it from one civilization to another (138). This phenomenon, as one
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might imagine, is largely defined contemporarily by non-Western states
seeking to Westernize and modernize, e.g. Ataturk’s Turkey, though
Huntington asserts that Australia may be an exception as it leans towards
Asia (though there is some question of the cultural validity of this statement,
as the author himself admits, given, for instance, Australia’s Occicentric
immigration policies). The potential for conflict in these states is largely
reactionary at one of three levels. Elites may reject transcivilizational reform
out of a fear, often rightly, that they will lose substantial wealth, power, and/or
honor in the exchange, while the masses may reject efforts to force their
abandonment of traditional patterns of behavior either out of fear of
displacement. Of course both may also harbor genuine sentiment for the
orthodox system and traditions. Finally, the civilization the torn state is
attempting to join may reject it (think of the difficulties, for instance, Turkey
has had trying to gain admission to certain Western intergovernmental
organizations), resulting in a substantial backlash (and delegitimating the
reforming regime).
Few authors on the subject of ethno-nationalist conflict even begin to
approach the output of Ted Robert Gurr—his work is far and away the most
influential since the end of the Second World War. While in his earlier works
Gurr is primarily (though by no means exclusively) a theorist, his later works
are intensive, extensive tests of the prevailing theories of domestic political
upheaval, with particular (though again not exclusive) emphasis on ethnonational politics.
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In one of his early works, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,”
Gurr (1968) develops a set of “propositions” that are meant to provide a
framework for the prediction of radical, extraordinary politics and the
magnitude of said events when they occur.
Proposition I.1: The occurrence of civil violence presupposes
the likelihood of relative deprivation among substantial numbers of
individuals in a society; concomitantly, the more severe is relative
deprivation, the greater are the likelihood and intensity of civil violence.
(254)
Presaging his Why Men Rebel (see below for more detail), Gurr asserts that
the ultimate cause of radical, extraordinary politics lies in either the failure of
the political-economic-social system to fulfill its perceived obligations (or the
apparent future failure to do so) and/or the failure of the state to provide or
maintain political, economic, and/or cultural equity when it is believed to be
inevitable either because it has been promised or because such equity has
been withdrawn.
Proposition I.2: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with
the intensity of commitment to the goal or condition with regard to
which deprivation is suffered or anticipated.
I.2a: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with the degree
of effort previously invested in the attainment or maintenance of the
goal or condition.
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I.2b: The intensity of commitment to a goal or condition tends to
vary inversely with its perceived closeness. (259)
Put simply, these propositions inform us that the degree of discontent
(Gurr uses the term “anger”) among a group or set of groups who are
experiencing relative deprivation increases as previous loyalty to the system
as well as total effort exerted increases. In turn, as this discontent increases
the probability of radical, extraordinary politics breaking out increases
proportionally.
Proposition I.3: The strength of anger tends to vary inversely
with the extent to which deprivation is held to be legitimate. (260)
Here Gurr notes that if a system is legitimate and/or the causes of
deprivation are comprehensible the reaction to that deprivation will be
moderated. This is most likely when the state is liberal and/or the deprivation
is part of an obvious and necessary effort of the state to improve its people’s
long-term quality-of-life (consider, for instance, the shortages that
accompanied American and British participation in the First and Second
World Wars).
Proposition I.4: The strength of anger tends to vary as a power
function of the perceived distance between the value position sought
and the attainable or residual value position. (261)
Proposition I.5: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with
the proportion of all available opportunities for value attainment with
which interference is experienced or anticipated. (263)
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Put simply, these propositions assert that the greater the difficulty
presupposed by the discontent in terms of achieving their desired goals then
the greater the likelihood those same discontented will assume that ordinary
politics are not an acceptable means of attempting to accomplish their goals
and alleviating relative deprivation. Extraordinary politics, then, are a product
of human beings believing they will not be able to achieve goals important to
them through ordinary means. The implication is that politically, socially, and
economically liberal systems, which allow ordinary people to engage in open,
rule-based competition, are less prone to political upheaval than other types
of systems.
Proposition M.1: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence
tend to vary curvilinearly with the amount of physical or social
retribution anticipated as a consequence of participation in it, with
likelihood and magnitude greatest at medium levels of retribution.
Proposition M.1a: Any decrease in the perceived likelihood of
retribution tends to increase the likelihood and magnitude of civil
violence. (265)
These propositions are ultimately assertions that state strength matters
in predicting the likelihood of radical, extraordinary politics. In particular, 1) if
the military, intelligence, and/or police establishments side with the
discontented, then we may assume radical, extraordinary politics to be more
likely, 2) if the leaders of the state, including in the above mentioned groups
seem unwilling to crush resistance and this becomes apparent, then radical,
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extraordinary politics become more likely, and 3) as the expected retribution
expands in terms of depth and breadth, then radical, extraordinary politics
becomes less likely. Unmentioned by Gurr but implicit nonetheless is another
point—the more radical, extraordinary politics are perceived to be likely to
succeed, the more likely those same politics will be taken up.
Proposition M.2: Inhibition of civil violence by fear of external
retribution tends in the short run to increase the strength of anger but
in the long run to reduce it.
M.2a: The duration of increased anger under conditions of
inhibition tends to vary with the intensity of commitment to the value
with respect to which deprivation is suffered. (267)
Put simple, Gurr here argues that frustration at inhibited potential for
action inflames discontent for the short-term, but as time passes this
discontent tends to molder into ambivalence and defeatism. In other words,
the more long-term and stable the repression, the more the odds that radical,
extraordinary politics will develop decrease.
Proposition M.3: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence
tend to vary inversely with the availability of institutional mechanisms
that permit the expression of nonviolent hostility. (269)
Liberality, in other words, decreases the odds of radical, extraordinary
politics. This is not only because, as mentioned above in Proposition I.4,
liberal institutions permit the relatively deprived masses from perceiving
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themselves as having no other viable options, but further because liberal
institutions actually allow for solutions to be developed.
Proposition M.4: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence
tend to vary directly with the availability of common experiences and
beliefs that sanction violent responses to anger.
M.4a: Given the availability of alternative experiences and
beliefs, the likelihood that the more aggressive of them will prevail
tends to vary with the strength of anger. (271)
Here Gurr takes into account cultural/psychological elements—
specifically, he assumes that in those instances where a mythology and/or a
social psychology in which violence is acceptable exists, then the elites of the
discontented masses will be able to justify open physical violence more
easily. These identities, values, and so forth are not the direct causes of
radical, extraordinary politics in Gurr’s eyes. However they do facilitate and
structure responses to relative deprivation (and, we may assume in many
cases, the actual form of the relative deprivation itself).
Proposition M.5: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence
tend to vary directly with the extent to which the deprived occupy
organization and/or ecological settings that provide (1) normative
support through high levels of interaction, (2) apparent protection from
retribution, and (3) congruent models for violent behavior. (274)
What Gurr hypothesizes here is that certain types of organizational
arrangements are more suited for radical, extraordinary politics. This in and
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of itself is not the point however—the fact that the members of these
organizations are rational beings capable of understanding their advantages
(and/or weaknesses) and calculate them into their overall decision-making
equation infers that like any other advantage or disadvantage, these will affect
the likelihood that radical, extraordinary politics will be employed.2
Arguably his masterwork, Gurr’s 1970(b) Why Men Rebel defends the
principle of relative deprivation (also see “Sources of Rebellion in Western
Societies: Some Quantitative Evidence, 1970a). This work is built around one
principle idea—that human beings engage in radical, extraordinary politics
when the gap between their expected benefits and their real benefits
becomes too great. This is most likely to happen after a period of extended
economic development and concurrent political liberalization—when a crisis
occurs or when the elites fear that their preeminence is on the verge of
dissolving and economic and/or political quality-of-life drops for a substantial
portion of society.

2

Note; I do not include Gurr’s final proposition in the main body of the work because it
informs Gurr’s interest in predicting the intensity of radical, extraordinary politics, rather than
the likelihood said politics will occur, which is of course the interest of this work. For those
interested, however, the final proposition is:

Proposition F.1: The characteristic form of civil violence tends to vary with the differential
incidence of relative deprivation among elite aspirants and masses: (1) mass deprivation
alone tends to be manifested in large-scale civil violence with minimal organization and low
intensity; (2) elite-aspirant deprivation tends to be manifested in highly organized civil
violence of high intensity.
F.1a: Whether organized and intense civil violence is large-scale or small-scale is a joint
function of the extent of mass deprivation and the strategic access of deprived elite aspirants
to the incumbent political elite.
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The year 1974 saw Gurr’s “Persistence and Change in Political
Systems, 1800-1971.” In this work Gurr makes one of his most interesting
associations. First, he points out that, contrary to much of the contemporary
literature, several authoritarian, unequal political-economic systems have
survived for extended periods of time—he specifically mentions the Russian
Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Manchu Dynasty of the Chinese
Empire. This leads him to question whether it is regime-type that matters or
whether regime-type is in fact covering another, more significant variable.
Gurr comes to believe that, in fact, regime-type is not the most significant
element in predicting whether a state will be experience radical, extraordinary
politics. Rather, it is the directness with which states deal with their
problems—states that survive socioeconomic change and/or disruption do so
through managing it. States, on the other hand, that take a more laissez-faire
attitude towards such crises, on the other hand, fare far worse, experiencing
radicalism and violence at a much higher rate.
In 1985 Gurr published “On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and
Economic Decline.” In this piece, built in large part on the work of Tilly
(1978), Gurr established that, “the greater the relative increases in scarcity,
and the more rapid its onset, the greater are its negative political
consequences” (54). Increases in scarcity, and in particular exceptionally
rapid increases in scarcity, increase the odds of systemic upheaval due to
three consequences. First, material inequalities tend to exacerbate scarcity,
given that those already powerful and wealthy are more capable of acquiring
105

scarce resources than those who are relatively disenfranchised and/or
exploited. Second, scarcity has a tendency to compel individuals to
cooperate communally in an effort to acquire necessary but scare resource—
therefore we might expect tensions between communities within a state
experiencing scarcity to increase radically. Finally, scarcity tends to
undermine democratic states, especially fragile ones, because democracies
in times of scarcity tend to become pluralistic, undermining their ability to
accomplish goods and necessitating radical politics. Rapid increases in
scarcity tend to make scarcity worse since it undermines the state’s (and
other institutions’) ability to deal with the scarcity crisis and because scarcity
seems worse when it cannot be eased into, preventing people from adjusting
and causing greater psychic damage.
Gurr (1985, 70) also notes that scarcity and other forms of weakness
tend to motivate top-down brands of revolution (he mentions Peru, Japan,
Turkey, and Egypt as examples). In these instances certain members of the
ruling elite fear the loss of their personal power (and often the state’s
sovereignty in general). They are therefore motivated to radically alter
political, social, and economic structures and institutions (as well as the
accompanying power, wealth, and honor patterns), even if it requires the
sacrifice of 1) certain elites or even entire subgroups of the elite and/or 2)
certain political, economic, and/or social privileges. This, in other words, is
not so much an instance of relative deprivation as a rational prediction of
future relative deprivation.
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Gurr’s 1993 work Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical
Conflicts is also rife with quantitatively generated generalizations. First, Gurr
asserts that political inequalities are easier to dispel than economic
inequalities—put differently institutional discrimination is more easily dispelled
than structural discrimination. Secondly, Gurr concurs with Connor (see
above) insisting that political, economic, and socio-cultural differences (what
Gurr calls “differentials”) are exacerbated by modernization bringing
disadvantaged groups into closer contact with dominant groups. Third, Gurr
insists that a gulf between dominant culture and dominated culture is more
likely to manifest itself in the form of economic disparity than in the form of
political disparity. Fourth, Gurr found that, “no global or regional correlation
between severity of discrimination and intensity of separatist sentiments”
exists (79). This test strongly supports the work of Heraclides (see above)
and his assertion that identity and perceived discrimination (as opposed to
real discrimination) is the most significant factor in predicting the emergence
of ethno-national conflict. Fifth, Gurr finds that indigenous classes tend to be
most concerned about economic inequalities, militant religious sects tend to
be most concerned about social rights, and true ethno-nationalists tend to be
predominately concerned with the institutions and structures of the politicaleconomy. Sixth, the most common predictor of autonomism, asserts Gurr, is if
the group in question believes that it has formerly been autonomous and this
autonomy was unjustly taken away. Finally, Gurr insists that environmental
stress, demographic stress, and degree of cultural differences all exacerbate
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desires for autonomy—the first because they underline the effectiveness and,
in some cases, inequity of the political-economy, the latter because cultural
difference highlights identity differences.
Under the sponsorship of the Center for International Development and
Conflict Management, Marshall and Gurr (2005) have produced a number of
works on the structural precursors of civil violence of virtually every type. On
of the best known of these is the report “Peace and Conflict, 2005: A Global
Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy.”
While on the whole the work’s utility lies in its strong defense of the orthodox
theoretical line that predominates the literature of civil war, revolution, and the
such, there are some additions to said literature of quality. Key among these
is their assertion that anocracies, that is to say states which have mixed
attributes of both democracies and autocracies, are far more likely to engage
in radical, extraordinary politics than either democracies or autocracies (six
times more likely than the former, and two and one-half times more than the
latter (17). Additionally, Marshall and Gurr find that one of the most effective
means of preventing the outbreak of open political violence, in particular in
terms of secessionist movements, is political transparency (27).
Transparency, it would seem, undermines the ability of actors to initiate
violence without fear of international repercussions. Finally, Marshall and
Gurr develop a six-point model of the structural conditions in which genocide
and politicide are most likely: 1) when prior instances of genocide and/or
politicide have occurred between the relevant groups, 2) when political
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upheaval (ethnic or revolutionary war or regime crisis) has occurred within the
last 15 years, 3) when the ruling elite are members of a minority communal
group, 4) when the ruling elite identify some principle or purpose that justifies
the oppression of or elimination of other groups, 5) when the dominant regime
is autocratic, and 6) when international trade is low (demonstrating minimum
interest in maintaining rule of law or fair economic practices) (58).
Uvin (1999) asserts that there are three main causes of genocide and
civil war, or as he puts it, reasons that “ordinary people kill ordinary people”
(263). First, people who have long experienced bouts of violence with each
other, physical or otherwise, fear each other. War and mass-killings, then,
may be attempts to end this fear. Second, Uvin asserts that people who have
long antagonized one another tend to be prejudiced against one another. In
the light of this prejudice interaction without rules to achieve one’s goals is
morally acceptable. Third, people have a tendency to employ violence
against one another as an act of revenge—an attempt to get back at one
another for past (perceived or real) crimes that have gone largely unpunished.
In a situation of fear and prejudice, we can only imagine that reasons for
revenge are prolific. Uvin also adds that there are a two other motives that,
while less significant, may play part: 1) killing presents an opportunity to
improve one’s political or economic status and 2) killing is a way for ordinary
people to demonstrate their obedience either to the group or to particular
elites.
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Collier and Hoeffler (2000) present an economic theory of the causes
of ethno-nationalist war. They assert that in order for ethnic groups to
develop a strategic base of resources (both labor and capital) they must have
a relatively high population vis-à-vis the total population of the state in which
they reside. As ethnolinguistic fractionalization increases, Collier and Hoeffler
assert, the relative capacity of minorities to resist the system decreases—
their internal and external sources for capital and labor shrink rapidly as
fractionalism increases. Therefore, we can assume, claim Collier and
Hoeffler, that as ethnic diversity increases, propensity for radical,
extraordinary politics decreases. Whether this perspective will borne out in
the long-term, however, is questionable—consider the cases of Indonesia,
Bolivia, Russia, India, Burma, and the Democratic Republic of Congo just to
name a few.
I began this review of the literature on ethno-national conflict with an
explicit emphasis on the unscientific nature of the primordialist approach to
the study of war, that is to say those hypotheses that infer that 1) identity is
biologically constructed and 2) that Darwinian impulses naturally compel and
require conflict over limited resources between people of various biologically
constructed identities. I would like to conclude by noting that this myth itself
can have influence on the behavioral patterns of individuals within particular
states. Prunier (1970) and Uvin (1999) note that groups will frequently
develop myths that villainize one another in an effort to either justify their
dominance or to explain their failures. Ultimately, the tensions between
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groups, exacerbated by social, political, and economic inequities (which are
often reinforced by the aforementioned myths) lead one or both groups to
actually participate in open violence against one another. Once violence is
routinized and all groups have begun to completely discount the others as
peers (a sort of “social death”—see Uvin 1999, 253), then the killing of
members of said group on a wide-scale presents little moral conundrum. In
other words, mythological violence (a manifestation of indirect violence)
ultimately legitimates efforts to engage in open, direct violence.

The State Failure Task Force
Evolving out of a project begun in 1994, the State Failure Task Force (SFTF),
now the Political Instability Task Force, has assimilated an enormous number
of databases into a single, incredibly in-depth analysis of extraordinary,
radical political events—in particular revolutions, ethnic wars, adverse regime
changes, and genocides/politicides (Goldstone et al. 2000, V). The SFTF’s
work has concentrated on testing structural effects, rather than psychological,
rational choice, or other effects, though it has addressed some cultural
issues. These, however, have been addressed largely in terms of culture as
a static condition, rather than as a changing, dynamic structure. The quality
of the SFTF ‘s data is among the highest available as well—they have
correctly “classified” (on the global scale) 70- to 80-percent of all states (with
regards to predicting whether they are failure-prone or not failure-prone (V).
While this is impressive, it is also important to note that 1) there remains a
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30% to 20% margin for improvement and 2) classification is not the same as
powerful, real-time prediction.
The important, general findings of the SFTF are varied. First, all forms
of radical, extraordinary politics tend to beget other types of extraordinary
politics—chaos, it would seem, begets more chaos. This is probably because
the opening of hostilities tends to exacerbate rather than relieve tensions and
discontent, and because the cruelties that tend to accompany such upheavals
tend to radicalize identities and mythologies (6). Additionally, the SFTF has
found that while the Revolution of 1989 that ended the Cold War led to a short
period of disorder and upheaval, in the long-term the fundamental
relationships that produce radical, extraordinary politics have remained
largely unchanged (6). The SFTF also confirmed that poverty (as measured
in infant mortality) and regime type are powerful predictors of tendency to
radicalization of politics (14). The effects of regime type, however, are not
what one would necessarily expect. Autocracies and democracies fail, shows
the SFTF, at almost exactly the same rate. Contrarily, anocracies, that is to
say states which elements of democracies and autocracies, fail at seven
times the rate of either democracies or autocracies. This is probably because
anocracies fail to provide the legitimacy of democracies and, unlike
authoritarian states tend to be unable or unwilling to crush resistance. That
said, authoritarianism was a key structural condition present in states that
experienced genocide, as was low trade openness (45), both of which are
indicators of both low systemic equality and low interstate oversight.
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Additional structural conditions associated with genocide are ethnic and
ideological propensities among elites that legitimate violence, a low degree of
religious diversity, and a history of previous violent upheaval (45)—all of
which mirror the work of other theorists of genocide and ethnic warfare (see
above).

Theories on the Genesis of Radical Religious
Fundamentalism
The literature of religious fundamentalism, largely though by no means
exclusively a sociological or anthropological literature, is a relevant addition
here for a number of reasons. First, it is explicitly a literature on why human
beings reject their contemporary political, economic, and social system in
favor of a reinterpretation of previous one. Secondly, it is one of the most
significant political movements of the last several hundred years—arguably as
significant as the rise of the nation-state and Marxist states and potentially as
significant as the Protestant reformation. Fundamentalist movements are,
after all, transnational, transcultural, and present in literally every country on
Earth. Third, while modernist and ethno-nationalist ideologies are well
captured in the above literature, religious fundamentalism is somewhat
neglected—in order to insure that it is not a blind spot, I include it as well.
Finally, it is worth adding an obvious addition to the broader literature on
domestic upheaval if for no other reason than to acknowledge religion’s
potential significance—after all, as Hall (2003, 360) notes, “until recently,
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scholars studying violence tended to ignore cultural dimensions altogether
(Theda Skocpol on revolution is an iconic case).”
Before beginning this survey, it is worth noting that no useful
contemporary social science approaches to religion and culture are
deterministic (Lindsay 2000). Culturalist explanations that work on the
approximate logic of “China behaves the way it does because it is Chinese”
are tautological—they explain everything and therefore nothing. Rather,
culture must be considered as an element of human society, constantly
mutating and amalgamated with politics, economics, and the wide savanna of
human endeavor. The approach taken in this paper will emphasize this,
emphasizing culture and cultural structures as manifestations of human
rationality, and most importantly here, transformations of human rationality on
a large-scale.
An additional point deals with the term fundamentalism.
Fundamentalism, which originally referred to a brand of American, Protestant
Christian religious reformation in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, is
generally taken to describe any religious movement which states that the
current orthodoxy is incorrect or warped and that serious reform of the
socioeconomic system, via political intervention, is necessary. In other
words, fundamentalism is simply neotraditionalism that emphasizes religious
elements. Otherwise, fundamentalist movements are virtually the same as
other neotraditionalist movements on the definitional level—all such
movements attempt to reform the contemporary system by returning to
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certain ‘fundamental’ roots of a previous period in space and time. This
reinterpretation, of course, is never the same as the original, emulated
ideology or way-of-life. Rather, it is a constructed imitation that emphasizes
certain points, usually to the advantage of the political elites leading any given
movement, while ignoring others. Furthermore, fundamentalism, like most
neotraditionalist movements, be they rationalist or romantic, makes the most
of contemporaneously available technologies. The result is that all efforts to
reform, whether they are ostensibly modernist or revivalist, secular or
religious, remain firmly rooted in the circumstances of their time—thus all
modern ideological movements are modern.
There

is

almost

universal

agreement

among

theorists

of

fundamentalism and most other modern brands of religious revivalism that
these religious movements are a response to modernity, or rather to
consequences of modernity (An-Na’im 1999; Demerath 2003; Esposito 1998;
Fox and Sandler 2004; Haynes 1994; Jurgensmeyer 1993, 1996; Lewis 2004;
Marty and Appleby 1991; Mendelsohn 1993; Mittleman 1996; Pasha 2004;
Pasha and Samatar 1996; Rist 1997; Sahliyeh 1990; Soros 2002; Stiglitz
2002; Tehranian 1993;Tétreault 2004; Thomas 2000; Uvin 1998; Waterbury
1994; Zubaida 1993). As in any serious systemic reformation, modernization
displaces and alienates certain groups while improving the lots of other
groups—even under the best of conditions. Displacement and alienation then
breed 1) an overly picturesque vision of past socioeconomic-political
conditions and 2) a desire to return to this former condition.
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This effect,

logically, is magnified in those instances where modernization has failed to
improve the security, stability, quality-of-life, and so on in a given society.
We may rightly say, then, that in states where modernity has failed the
population has effectively been propelled directly from a relatively stable premodern state-of-affairs into a desperate search for validity and proper action,
a sort of political post-modernism (Hall 2003, 374; Juergensmeyer 2000,
227). Additionally, Marty (2005) adds that this reaction is further exacerbated
by the depth and breadth of modernization’s ability to penetrate the lives of
those who wish to avoid it—modern communication and transportation
technologies

make

modernization

virtually

unavoidable.

Religious

fundamentalism, at least as it currently exists, is a shift from rebellion through
self-imposed isolation (away from the temptations of the world) towards
rebellion through converting the political system (thereby eliminating many of
the world’s temptations). Marty notes that:
Leaders

like

Falwell

rationalized

their

about-face

[from

advocating political, social, and economic isolation], repeatedly
explaining that earlier the leaders [of fundamentalist Christianity]
thought they could keep the world of strangers at a distance.
Thus the excluded could not easily contaminate, pollute, ore
beguile the faithful.

Now, however, mass media such as

television made it impossible for anyone to block the signals of
the world. Somehow the children of even the most disciplined
families would find access to such signals, or the signals would
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them. These held such enthralling power to shape outlooks on
life that by the time parents tried to set examples or to instruct
their own children, it was too late: they had been preformed and
perverted by the alien influence.

For that reason, such

fundamentalists reacted. They had to react. Our studies show
that the concept of reaction in response to the threat of the
stranger was the most decisive element in turn classic
conservatives, the orthodox, or traditionalists, into modern
fundamentalists (Marty 2005, 15-16).
Modernization, then, may not merely transform by alienating, but
further by threatening traditional identities and values with accessible
alternatives.
An-Na’im (1999) adds that this discontent is then strengthened by the,
“common perception of Western bias and bad faith,” in modernizing (and
specifically Islamic for An-Na’im, though surely this holds among other
cultures as well) states. Regardless, the normal state of affairs is that the
orthodox system generally attempts, in politically illiberal systems, to
undermine or repress these movements—the down shot of which is that if
these efforts of repression are not properly conducted they actually enhance
the legitimacy of fundamentalist or neotraditional movements (Hall, 2003,
378; Adas 1979).
There are two similar but slightly different perspectives on what
conditions are most conducive to the appearance of fundamentalist
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movements. On the one hand Demerath (2003: 231) asserts that
fundamentalism is a reaction to sustained inequity pointing to Poland and
Latin America as examples. This sustained inequity is hypothesized by other
students of radical, extraordinary politics to originate from two sources. In the
first case, state oppression and authoritarianism produce discontent
especially in corrupt, personalistic regimes (Goldberg 1992; Halliday 2000;
Juergensmeyer 1994; Tétreault 2004), a hypothesis that mirrors the liberal
peace theories. Secondly, Ali (2002), Esposito (2002), and Tétreault (2004)
associate fundamentalism with the presence of imperialism, be it perceived or
real. The potential of imperialism as an aggravator seems rational for a
number of reasons. First, if a system is in the throes of another it generally
becomes a gross loser economically and politically—independence becomes,
at best, a mere formality. Secondly, imperialism is explicitly counter to all
conceptions of legitimate government currently held, including all variations
on nationalism and social contract theory. In formally or informally colonized
countries, sovereignty is not only not held by “the people,” it is not even held
by a monarch, dictator, or politburo that pretend thereto. Third and finally,
imperialism, real or perceived, holds the threat of cultural transformation and
the extinction of traditional political offices, economic structures, languages,
artistic styles, and forms of religious expression.
Denemark (2004), Roberts (1994), and Tétreault (2004) insist that
fundamentalist movements are usually a response to rapid socioeconomic
change. Both theories blame systemic failure, however the former infers that
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fundamentalism is a response to gradual recognition and the gradual
collectivization of dissatisfaction, while the latter emphasizes instability and
the sudden appearance of a legitimacy gap. Both seem credible and both
have precedents in the literature of revolution above. Again, there is a
correlation here with the literature of revolution, specifically with regards to the
work of Brinton (1952), Davies (1962), and Tanter and Midlarsky (1967: 271)
and theories of “legitimacy gap.”
Hall (2003), building on the cumulative work of Sorel (1906), Jenkins
(1975), Scott (1985), Basu (1995), Eisenstadt (1999), McVeigh (1999),
Juergensmeyer (2000), and Jackman (2001) posits that religious violence is
indeed a response to all of the above issues. That said, he states that the
above conditions, not to mention the explicit repressions of certain systems,
constitute not merely an inconvenience but further a form of violence. This
violence may be physical, socio-economic, or even symbolic in nature, but the
key is that perception of violence legitimates acts of retributive violence in the
eyes of radicals. In other words, Hall asserts that perceived injustice on a
large enough scale over a large enough period of time legitimates radical
fundamentalist politics.
Like other radical movements, radical religious movements, regardless
of their origins, are attempts to revolutionize the social and economic
circumstances within a particular system through the explicit mobilization
and/or replacement of the political system (Reuveny 2004; Rubin 1995). All
radical ideological movements, radical religious movements are explicitly
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political (Boyer 1992; Hall 2003; Pasha 2004; Roy 1994; Roth 1975; Tétreault
2004; Weber 1925), that is to say they are explicitly politically reformist (and
arguably reactionary). This has two consequences. First, because they are a
challenge to the contemporary authority, they ultimately tend to necessitate
political violence (Boyer and Nissenbaum 1974; Fredericksen 1999; Goldberg
1992; Tétreault 2004), even when certain elites are sympathizers with the
reformation process (Stegemann and Stegemann 1995). Radical religious
revolutions, like social revolutions, are therefore (hypothetically) destined to
violence using virtually the same logic of as both classical and neoMarxians—no one gives up what they have without a fight. Second, if radical
religious efforts to transform the system in which they appear hope to gain
success then they must secure their legitimacy through standard, mundane
political activities. Fox and Sandler (2004) and Gopin (2000) note that in
successful efforts to gain support, fundamentalists have emphasized the
development of health, education, and welfare programs, not to mention
engaging in wealth reform—activities which parallel directly the historical
experiences

of

undeveloped

states

experiencing

social

revolutions.

Furthermore, radical religious movements cannot hope to establish a state
capable surviving competition with modern secular states, states with a
vested interest in undermining and overthrowing these new religious states,
without utilizing modern political tools. Thus modern propaganda techniques,
modern militaries and bureaucracies, and other modern technologies and
techniques (including the mobilization of nationalist sentiments) must be and
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are utilized just as much in religious revolutions and their products as in
secular revolutions and their products (Shupe 1990: 22; Juergensmeyer
1995: 388).
With regards to the relative importance of identity, An-Na’im (1999)
builds on the work of Tarrow (1994, 5), and echoed by Hall (2003, 363) noting
that the recognition of common interests among discontented individuals is
not enough to allow for communal religious disestablishmentarian. Rather,
“deeper-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity [must be tapped].” (An-Na’im
1999, 110) It is imagined ties such as religion (or nationalism or ethnicity)
that allow for “common devotion” to amalgamate around shared interests, and
we must assume, shared symbols.
To summarize—the literature on religious revivalism and
fundamentalism indicates that causes of these socioeconomic/political
movements are, at their root, reactions to virtually the same conditions which
theorists of revolution assert lead to the appearance of their subject of inquiry
(al-Azmeh 1996; Demerath 2003; Habermas 1991; Jurgensmeyer 1995;
Shupe 1990; Tétreault 2004). There are two possible implications. On the
one hand, religious movements such as fundamentalism have virtually the
same roots as revolution and other large-scale systemic changes, yet these
transformations are alienated from one another, an example of convergent
political evolution. On the other hand these two transformations are part and
parcel of the same process. As Demerath (2003) points out, the stimuli that
lead students and college graduates to support radical anarchist and
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communist movements are virtually the same as those that lead individuals of
the same class to become fundamentalists—the different parties have simply
been enticed by different ideologies promising the same general outcome—a
moral, just socioeconomic and political system that succeeds in providing its
participants with the best possible standard of living. This latter hypothesis is
significantly more persuasive—even more so if we assume that religious
transformation and movement are merely part of a broader ideological and
value reorganization and it certainly fits the mindset of Arendt (1963) and
Tanter and Midlarsky (1967), both of whom insist that all revolutions are
attempts not to innovate radically new understandings of the world, but
ultimately to restore former liberties, privileges, and/or security.

The Role of Elites in the Genesis of Radical,
Extraordinary Politics
Machiavelli felt that all states must ultimately collapse, if not from outside
interference or from unpredictable calamity (the ills of Fortuna), then from
natural internal degeneration of the state in question. Essential here is an
understanding of what Machiavelli means in his use of the term “state.” A
state is a government, the individual or individuals, or bodies of individuals in
whom the sovereignty over a people and a country/territory is vested.
Therefore to say a state degenerates is to say that the individuals in whom
political power is vested, regardless of how they came to be vested with that
power, become incapable of effectively wielding power. Therefore the
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degeneration may originate from the adoption of ideologies, philosophies,
and/or religions that are not viably applicable to statecraft. Just as likely,
however, is the case of what Machiavelli would call “effeminization” and what
I shall call political inebriation. In this case the sovereigns become
complacent and unresponsive, increasingly disinterested and incompetent
with regards to matters of state. Political inebriation is ultimately the result of
the sovereign(s) spending too much time enjoying the yields of their success
and inadequate time concentrating on the maintenance and continued
expansion of their particular power and stability. As Machiavelli states in The
Prince:
Thus, on the other hand, if Heaven be so benevolent that it [a
state] never has to wage war, the idleness would result in
making it either effeminate or divided; these two things together,
or each one in itself, would be the cause of its ruin. (Bondanella
and Musa 1979, 192)
Put contrarily, when establishment leaders become obsessed with ends that
are not relevant to the maintenance political stability, regardless of whether
those ends are economic, social, artistic, or such have you, then they have
begun the process of acting incompetently and thereby opening the window
to effective political resistance. Machiavelli emphasizes the ability of warfare
to delay such inebriation precisely because warfare emphasizes a rationale of
stability and political-centeredness, not to mention providing a steady flow of
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statesmen with the virtues and experiences, strategic and tactical, of
seasoned veterans.
On the other hand, if disestablishmentarian elites become obsessed
with non-practical ends, for instance allowing themselves to become bogged
down in ideological purity prior to the acquisition of power or the “art” of
revolution, then they are most likely to be ineffective. College and university
coffeehouses are flooded with the flotsam and jetsam of “revolutionaries” who
are eternally writing essays, painting, writing poetry, and spouting ideals but
have never been willing to sacrifice these niceties to form a cell, study
bureaucracy, or develop a cellular organization mechanism.
This sentiment is present in the work of China’s first realist political
philosopher of note, Han Fei Zi (or Han Fei Tzu). Han Fei writes at some
length about the dangers elites of the ruling regime risk when they allow
themselves to become obsessed with the pleasures of their office, or even
with the minor issues thereof, at the expense of strategic and tactical
concerns. He gives the example of a ruler who sent beautiful musicians and
dancers, as well as fine horses, to his rival, knowing that once he did, his rival
would become bored with state affairs and ignore the maintenance of his
defenses, allowing for invasion and/or rebellion (Watson 1964).
To return to Machiavelli briefly, it should be noted that Machiavelli also
discussed whether or not the leaders of states should seek to be feared or
loved. Ideally, posits Machiavelli, the great leader will be both loved and
feared – awe combined with a worshipful sentiment is the highest pinnacle of
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influence. Yet, this state of affairs is rarely possible considering the
conflicting concerns of statesmen. Thus Machiavelli, following the assertions
of the Athenians in Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War (specifically the
Melian Dialogue), asserts that fear is the superior of the two emotions to
culture – love fades as soon as the tide turns, but fear is remembered for a
very, very long time. Where Machiavelli nuances his premise, as compared
to Thucydides’ Athenians, is that he explicitly differentiates between fear and
hate. Fear is simply a cost/benefit/risk ratio. Hate, on the other hand, implies
that the person experiencing the emotion may be willing to sacrifice
disproportionate amounts in order to accomplish their goals. Hate is
obsessive, it is patient, and it is easily transmitted from generation to
generation. Therefore, elites have only two options when dealing with serious
grievances, regardless of the cause of these grievances or the vertical or
horizontal orientation of the grievance formation. First, and usually less
expensively, these grievances may be addressed and undermined.
Alternatively, the aggrieved must be utterly destroyed. Note that Machiavelli
does not use terms such as disempower – he assumes that great emotions
such as hate will motivate the disempowered to seek out new resources, new
vectors of power. Rather, Machiavelli asserts that the aggrieved must be
wiped out – he recommends wiping out their families as well.
Troubling as this is, it is moderated by the fact that Machiavelli
assumes that political grievances are usually understood, formulated, and
disseminated by elites – if this is the case then the many may be controlled by
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dominated and, in the worst case, destroying, a very few people. Further, this
is part of his justification for the institution of the republic – republics, which
are representative bodies, are usually moderate in their form and function,
and therefore less likely to create the kind of enemies who necessitate such
violence, and they are more likely to choose to placate demands rather than
crush dissent.
Thomas Hobbes, who, as mentioned earlier, wrote of the indivisibility
of the state and sovereignty, regardless of the rhetoric employed by
“democracies” and other representative forms of government, asserted that
revolution was largely the product of orthodox elites forgetting that they had
achieved their power by entering into a social contract, whether explicit or
implicit. As long as elites maintain the quality of life for the average citizen
and do not waste resources or lives in frivolous activities, elites are likely to
remain unchallenged. If their success results in demands of social, political,
and/or economic concessions, the leader is wise to either crush these or give
in. Why? Because even though Hobbes does not believe that elites are ever
morally obliged to hand over their power, violation of what the common
people believe to be theirs (for instance, freedom of religion, the ability to
practice their trade and enrich themselves, and so forth) will inevitably result
in violent reprisal.
Early liberal theorists, including Locke and Rousseau, primarily discuss
elites in terms of the bounds of their legitimate action and the sources of their
legitimacy. With regards to warfare, this specifically implies that acting in a
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method or manner that violates the social contract naturally leads to
revolution. This is not to infer that individual disestablishmentarian elites are
not seen as taking part in both the foment of revolution or in the determination
of said revolution’s outcomes. Rather, liberal thinkers have tended to assert
that disestablishmentarian elites will inevitably appear to enforce ‘justice’
when it is denied. Burke does not entirely dismiss this paradigm, but he does
attempt to explicitly limit it, asserting that revolution is a symptom of bad
government, but it is not necessarily a cure for bad government. His
perspective is sometimes overstated, however, with some conservative
liberals asserting that violence is never an effective more morally justifiable
method of acquiring justice – after all, Burke did support the American
Revolution. What troubles Burke the most is when radical
disestablishmentarianism goes to excess, intentionally transforming not only
the polity, but society and economy as well.
Traditional Marxians tend to assert that the elite role in revolution is,
simply put, to play the role of elites. Elites who side with revolutionaries fulfill
key political, military, ideological, and economic roles, and, and this is
particularly essential, establish what Theda Skocpol calls “marginal elite
political movements,” that is to say they establish the ideological and
infrastructural arrangements and materials necessary to mobilize other
sectors of society, allowing for recruitment as well as preparing for the
practical concerns of radical, extraordinary politics (1976a: 178).

Implied in

this process, in particular, is that marginal elites are largely responsible for the
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formation of revolutionary ideologies and for drawing the lines of revolutionary
schisms.
On the other hand, Leon Trotsky (1937a, 1937b) varied from this
ideological hard-line, but not in a particularly dramatic fashion. Trotsky
insisted that elites were not responsible, per say, for the fomenting of
revolutions, following the classical Marxist line to the letter, but varies by
asserting that the moral qualities and particular skills of elites, the
revolutionary vanguard, affected the behavioral goals and outcomes of
revolutions. That said, he feels that these personalities become significant
only when, as Gottschalk (1938: 339) notes, they embody fundamental
necessities of historical, objective necessity.
Gottschalk (1938) frames the importance of this Trotskyian belief
structure by noting that while everyone will admit that all revolutions share at
least some traits in common with one another, there are necessarily
differences between revolutions, with particular reference to the conduct of
the revolutionaries both during and after the revolution. These differences,
Gottschalk insists, Trotsky assigns largely to differences among revolutionary
elite – if there are “cultural” differences in the evolution of political-economies,
these are either insignificant or the product of said society’s contemporary
technology/political-economic hierarchy – they are, in other words, effects, not
causes.
Intriguingly, and perhaps even contrary to his other assertions, Trotsky
(1937a) also recognizes that elites play an essential role in determining the
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timing of revolutions – Gottschalk (1938: 343) quotes him as noting that had
Lenin not acted decisively when he did, the Russian Revolution may not have
occurred. This implies that elites do not merely play a historically determined
role, but rather play an essential role – elites must recognize (or define) a
particular moment as the moment for revolutionary action. In Trotsky’s eyes
this does not confer upon them the title of “cause”, but to non-Marxian
scientists, this implication is undeniable.
In his 1968 article, “Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa,” J.M.
Lonsdale asserts that in studying the rise of nationalist movements we must
assume that in each society there are two “classes.” One of these, which
consists of the vast majority of the population, are what he refers to as the
unconscious element – the popular element whose latent strength and
support is essential to the exercise of power. Alternatively is the conscious
element, the political elite - in the case of colonial east Africa this element
consisted of those elites who support the exploitive colonial structure and
those who advocated a transfer of power to native elites, as well as traditional
“communicators” – tribal elites whose power was largely founded in their
official capacity as intermediaries between colonial governors and native
peoples. Lonsdale goes on to point out that a key indicator, post facto, of
course, that the east African states were developing anti-colonial movements
was the growing influence of non-traditional elites over the general
population, elites who the colonial government resisted awarding influence.
This holds two implications – first, shifting influence of elites who are not the
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prime elites, the elites with control over the military and police forces, may
foretell changes in the nature of politics (from ordinary politics to radical
politics, or even radical, extraordinary politics). Secondarily, Londsdale is
highlighting a key area in which orthodox elites may successfully undermine
the development of counter-orthodox political-economic movements. Had the
colonial rulers allowed non-traditional native elites greater influence over their
affairs, it is possible that independence may have been staved off, or even
wholly denied – non-traditional elites would have had more too lose and less
to gain by opposing the present state of affairs.
There is a second implication in Lonsdale’s work, though it is less
clearly enunciated. Lonsdale assumes that the only way for the native
Africans to throw off the chains of European colonialism was to develop
domestic institutions of similar strength and scale, what Londsdale (1968:
142) specifically calls the, “shift in mass concerns from a political focus that
was diffuse or local to one that was central.” In other words, had tribalism
remained the dominant political ideology, there would have been no means or
method of developing a meaningful resistance to the nation-states of Europe.
Nationalism was the product of native elites, frequently educated in European
states intentionally creating national identities (through schools, propaganda,
writing native histories, and so forth), as well as the standardizing of national
experiences (through the colonial economy, migration, and the influx of worldreligions). Both of these processes are essential – the erosion of classical
political-economic structures through the latter processes only takes on
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conscious strength, the method to employ along with the means, through the
effort of, in this case, nationalist elites. The socio-historical circumstances
may create the appropriate political-economy for radical, extraordinary politics
and the adoption of new institutions and structure, but the it is elites who give
meaning to those circumstances, who interpret them and give the masses a
set of goals and justifications for those goals. Today virtually the same
process could be seen as being at work in numerous states, though religious,
fundamentalist elites are as active as various ethnic minorities.
Barbara G. Myerhoff (1971) asserts that elites play an essential role in
all forms of radical politics by resolving the contradiction essential to all
revolutions – the conflict between ideal, even utopian goals and practical
political-economic concerns. Elites, in other words, must be able to convince
substantial masses of the moral imperative and potential improvements in
quality-of-life that will ultimately accompany radical transformation while
simultaneously advocating strict discipline in the face of immediate losses in
quality-of-life. Inevitably, one of these concerns must give, asserts Myerhoff,
and the question only remains which. The difference between quality elites
and inferior elites lies in their ability, or lack thereof, to convince the general
population of the necessity of risks and sacrifice in the quest for long-term
good. The inability to resolve the contradictions between practical and
idealist imperatives yields only defeat.
All this said, a question of relevance remains – what does this point
mean for those of us interested in predicting the onset of, rather than the
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outcome of, radical, extraordinary politics. I would assert that this principle is
just as relevant prior to the event as it is after the event. Consider – if
counterorthodox elites are unable to resolve the practical problems
associated with developing forces, arming, and training them, they are
unlikely to even attempt extraordinary politics – radical ordinary politics,
perhaps, but not radical, extraordinary politics. If sacrifice cannot be, for lack
of a better word, “sold,” by what means will revolutionaries and their ilk
acquire resources (human included) to accomplish their goals? And, indeed,
if the ideals cannot be sold, then the trying to sell sacrifice is simply moot.
In his discussion of the causes underlying the development of the
American Revolution, Joseph D. Reid, Jr. (1978: 99-100) reiterates, with a
twist, a theme that numerous other theorists (Fox and Sandler 2004; Gopin
2000; Shupe 1990; Juergensmeyer 1995) touch on in a much more general
form:
But if the constitutional rhetoric of the Revolution little swayed
sentiments or loyalty on either side of the Atlantic, it did identify
an important subset of colonists—colonists willing to coordinate
and police protests and later to plan battles. By building and
then occupying the organs of an alternative colonial
government, the first rebels disproportionately bore the costs of
a public good, government, and thereby lowered the cost of
revolt to the mass of colonists. Thus, the constitutional
rhetoricians facilitated the Revolution by deeds, not words.
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While many theorists note that potential revolutionaries, in order to gain
adequate public support for their venture, seek to establish an alternative
source or set of sources for essential services usually provided by the state.
What Reid adds to this principle are two inferences. First, that these services
not only are useful in terms of their utility as recruitment tools, but further in
that they ultimately lower the costs of opposing the orthodox state. Elite
actions, thus, can increase the odds of an onset of radical, extraordinary
politics by simply lowering the costs and risks relative to the potential benefits.
Secondly, Reid’s analysis points out that the establishment of this
alternative state structure, as well as the formal promulgation of revolutionary
rhetoric and symbolic statements, identifies those leaders most equipped to
incite rebellion, not to mention those leaders most willing to accept the
inherent costs and risks of such ventures. What one may additionally imply
from this principle is that these activities not only presage the state, but
prepare the radical elite for more complex tasks – specifically an explicit and
violent contest with the state.
In his 1986 piece “Gramsci and the Legitimization of the State: The
Case of the Senegalese Passive Revolution,” Robert Fatton, Jr. adeptly
summarizes Gramsci’s principle of “passive revolution,” a concept which is
roughly conincident with other authors’ (1971) principle of top-down
revolution, or revolutions which are instigated by the elite, or key sectors of
the elite, of a particular state. Using a Marxian framework, Gramsci and
Fatton assume that passive revolutions are in fact counter-revolutionary
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actions, intended in their whole person not to improve society (which may be
an incidental product of such revolutions) but to guarantee that the politicaleconomic structure is renovated to such a point as to prevent the ruling elite
from losing their influence and power sum whole. Whether one accepts their
premise that revolution can be conservative or whether one assumes that it is
merely a different form of radicalism, one that entails its own set of costs and
risk (even if these are less substantial), the general principle remains fairly
sound.
Ultimately, passive revolutions are the product of an “organic” elite
developing a rhetoric and program of reform which co-opts large parts of their
radical opposition’s (or potential radical opposition’s) rhetoric or program or
which provides an alternative and more attractive (perception of lower
cost/risk, high potential benefit) rhetoric and/or program. Fatton employs an
intriguing term for this process – defusion. In the case of a passive
revolution, the goal of the orthodox elite is to defuse the organic crisis, that is
to say the full-scale crisis in legitimacy of the socio-political-economic system,
by step-by-step addressing the points of exploitation (real and perceived) in
their state. By doing so, they manage to hold on to some, and in many cases
most, of their political and economic power even though substantial amounts
of power have been allotted to exploited peoples. This term also implies that
there is a necessary effort to undermine the depiction of the crisis as a single
problem – the goal is to portray it as a series of discrete problems, a process
which makes the situation less useful to radical rhetoricians and which allows
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such elites to sacrifice a few “guilty” of their own number without accepting
that the system as a whole deserves some sort of condemnation.
Of particular interest in recent work is also the question of “greed”
versus “grievance” – specifically, are human beings more likely to seek to
engage in radical, extraordinary politics in search of “loot” (a product of
relative inequity in the distribution of natural resources – thus, these theories
fall largely in the bounds of Malthusian theory) or in search of redress for
previous or standing injustices (see de Soysa 2002 for an overview of the
literature dividing contemporary work into these two camps)? While the
literature has produced mixed findings – some authors supporting one
hypothesis and other the other, an intriguing potential role for elites is
highlighted here. Specifically, in those instances wherein the primary
motivation might be “greed”-oriented, it is elites who actively create
grievances. The unequal distribution of natural resources, for instance, may
simply be an accident of meteorology or geology – hardly a justification for
bloodshed. But elites are capable of creating social explanations for the
imbalance and then utilize this rhetoric to justify the establishment of an
alternative political-economy. Indeed, they are likely to use the shared
experience of lacking access to the said resource or resources as a basis for
the identity of the counter-orthodox group. This premise, it should be noted,
should hold in both the prediction of domestic and international political
violence.
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Indra de Soysa (2002), as part of her review of the “greed” versus
“grievance” literature specifically considers the work of Samuel Huntington
and his various theories on the role of civilizations in conflict development,
both internationally and domestically. While her work, on the whole, refutes
Huntington’s own, she does specifically find that two of Huntington’s
civilizations are far more disposed to conflict than all others – specifically the
Islamic Umma and the Roman Catholic world. She explains this by noting
that:
. . . conflict is likelier in societies where church and state are
driving competing authorities and possibly emasculating political
institutions that mediate between state and society. Moreover,
institutional factors that give the Catholic church and the
mosque and organizational advantage for mobilizing people
possibly allow greater degrees of conflict through communal
polarization than through hatred of any defined other. (411)
De Soysa then goes on to note that pluralism seems to negate the ability of
Roman Catholicism and Islam to mobilize their populations, thereby
increasing the stability of the state as a whole, particularly in terms of creedrelated conflicts (less so, however, in the case of resource-related conflicts)
(413).
In his 2002 review of the quantitative literature of civil war studies,
Sambanis discusses three key findings on the role of elites in the formation of
radical, extraordinary politics. First among these is the work of Gates (2002),
136

who asserts simply that, all other things being equal, in the competition for
allegiance that is taking place constantly between orthodox elite and
disestablishmentarian elite, disestablishmentarian radicals will be able to
recruit more effectively the closer their metaphorical distance between
potential rebels and leaders. In other words, the more ethnically, religiously,
socioeconomically, etc. similar potential rebels and elites are, the more likely
said elites are to be able to successfully recruit.
Second among these is the work of Brown (1996), who finds that the
most proximate cause of war is “bad leaders”, that is to say leaders who are
more interested in wealth accumulation than normal, or leaders who seek to
mobilize sub-groups in such a fashion as to both reinforce identities and
cleavages between groups.
Third, Sambanis discusses the work of De Figueiredo and Weingast
(1999) finds that elites whose power is rapidly declining have a strong
incentive to manipulate their people’s sentiments in such a manner as to
encourage radicalism. Specifically, they do this by portraying their own loss
of power as increasing the odds that the masses will be victimized – this fear
of structural and/or institutional violence then leads them to preemptively
strike and thus reinforce their (and coincidently, their elites) relative power in
society.
Robert Blanton, T. David Mason, and Brian Athow (2001) posit that
variance in the policies of the two most expansive colonial empires in Africa,
those of France and Britain, explain in part the different propensities of their
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heir states to experience radical, extraordinary politics. While the former
colonies of both empires are constituted of numerous ethnicities stratified
horizontally, only one of these empires employed a stratified ranking of all
ethnicities.
The British Empire, on the one hand, employed a system in which
local, traditional leaders were largely left unmolested so long as they
continued to pay their taxes and contribute what was required of them. In
each state there was, of course, an exception – one of the smaller ethnic
groups was inevitably elected by the British to serve as both the colony’s civil
service and military. These received advanced modern training, either in the
form of extensive modern educations and/or in the form of advanced military
training. This ethnicity existed almost solely to act as the “communicators”
(which of course sometimes involved full-scale warfare) between London and
traditional leaders. Otherwise, traditional systems of political organization
(though not necessarily economic organization) were left largely untouched.
Contrast this to French organizational methods. The French goal was
not merely to rule, but to fully assimilate conquered peoples into a “Greater
France.” The colonial governments conducted all work in the French
language and strongly encouraged all commerce to be conducted using the
same language. Virtually all political power lay in the hands of either officials
in Paris or the French governors appointed by from and by Paris. Indigenous
local elites were given no discretion. Core cities were established in each
colony in which the vast majority of political and economic power was
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concentrated, and if local elites hoped to take advantage of these resources
then they had to assimilate to the French culture – political, economic, and
otherwise.
Both Britain and France sought to control their populations in part by
the manipulation of traditional elite, but in profoundly different ways. The
French sought to obliterate traditional community ties and the power of
traditional elite, not to mention all incentives for maintaining traditions. The
British sought to employ a divide-and-conquer system, one which actually
accentuated the power of traditional elites. The former system eroded tribal
and other traditional loyalties, and with them grievances, whereas the latter at
minimum did nothing to weaken them and may have actually strengthened
them by accentuating grievances.
Put simply, Blanton et al. assert that in those former colonial states
where, prior to nationhood, the colonial power failed to effectively destroy the
bases of traditional leaders’ power through means of assimilation, ethnic
warfare is likely, in part because traditional grievances survive, but in part
because traditional leaders are still capable of exploiting former and
contemporary grievances (and, frankly, are still capable of existing). Also, as
in the French system, states in which there is an explicit hierarchy of
ethnicities tend to be more effective at repressing minorities – thus, even if
traditional identities survive, they are less likely to able to acquire the means
of resistance.

139

To summarize, let us identify the various theoretical threads that unite
these various traditions. We can begin with classical realist theories, which
inform us as to why elites of the state and other elements of the orthodox
system fail to anticipate the onset of radical, extraordinary politics. In the first
part, some elites are simply bad at what they do, becoming overly absorbed
in, as the American musical group Cake put it in their song “Commissioning a
Symphony in C”:
So you’ll be an Austrian nobleman, commissioning a symphony
in C, which defies all earthly descriptions. With money you
squeezed from the peasants, to your nephew you can give it as
a present, this magnificent symphony in C, you’ll be
commissioning a symphony in C.
Alternatively, realists insist that ruling elite frequently forget that there are a
number of tools-of-state, and that elites often forsake the development of the
state-as-a-whole (in terms of economic health, employment, development of
infrastructure, and so forth) in favor of immediate gains in hard power
(specifically military, intelligence, and police capabilities) – a process which
not only alienates sectors of the general population but furthermore
decreases long-term capabilities, including flexibility in times of crisis. Of
course this secondary assertion is echoed, though often in far more
sentimental terms and with infusions of philosophical claims about the nature
of political justice, among liberal theorists.
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Rational choice theory, in the politics of war in particular, tends to
ascribe to political elites an identity that is essentially indistinguishable from
that of the state – one thinks of the ultimate monarchist declaration by Louis
XIV, “I am the state.” In this regard, we may consider the role of
disestablishmentarian elites to be, frankly, the threefold. It is the elites who
lead said movements who are largely responsible for making the decision to
form what is, essentially, another social contract. Secondarily, it is the
disestablishmentarian elite who are responsible for making most of the key
decisions for this alternative social contract body once it has come into being.
Finally, these elites are responsible for convincing the non-elite members
already recruited, as well as those they are trying to recruit (not to mention
foreign bodies whose support they seek) that they not only have the right to
exercise power, but that they in point of fact do exercise power. In other
words, disestablishmentarian elites must not only calculate the costs, risks,
and benefits of engaging in radical, disestablishmentarian politics, but
furthermore must consciously manipulate the rational choice processes of
both their client population and other relevant populations.
In particular, rational choice has improved our ability to understand the
method by which elites are capable of making experiences of radical,
extraordinary politics both possible and effective – through the transformation
of the cost/risk/benefit calculus via the establishment of services and
economic processes that potential rebels would otherwise depend on the
orthodox political-economy in order to access. By using their wealth, power,
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and organizational skills, disestablishmentarian elites are able to make variant
forms of rebellion rational for their potential sources of support.
Much of the literature on the role of leaders in fomenting radical,
extraordinary politics derives in whole or in part from the constructivist
tradition, much of which is founded in the work of classical Marxist theorists,
that is to say the tradition of political inquiry which asserts that the process by
which ethnic, religious, national, and other identities are constructed affects
the behavioral processes of those persons holding said identities (and/or
having said identities transformed). Elites of different groups, notably military
or police leaders, civilian governmental leaders, religious leaders, educators,
traditional leaders, and mass communicators (artists, artisans, actors,
musicians, those who operate television and radio stations, and so forth) have
access to different methods and means of identifying and manipulating
identities, obviously, yet this remains true of them all. This, of course,
specifically includes the creation of vectors of victimization, real or otherwise.
Essential to the constructivist points is their ability to predict what type
of radical, extraordinary politics is likely to ensue in a particular context, not
merely by discussing the nature of grievance and discrimination (and so forth)
horizontally and vertically, but furthermore by identifying what the relevant
units within societies are and, essentially, whether or not these groups merely
have identities or are identities accompanied by hierarchies and elite
structures and/or institutions – the potential seeds of an alternative sociopolitical-economic system.
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Also, constructivist theorists also demonstrate that the key powers in
fomenting radical, extraordinary politics are those elites who compose the role
of communicators, that is to say those persons who are primarily responsible
for maintaining the political and economic relationships between the ruling
elite and masses who already share a common identity. These
communicators not only have special knowledge about both relevant parties
(rulers and the ruled) but additionally have access to high levels of legitimacy
and are in and of themselves symbols of their particular party’s difference.
In conclusion, I would like to note two key points. On the one hand,
none of these theories can be called institutionalist or structuralist – quite the
contrary, they are all largely concerned with the ends and means of
individuals seeking to manipulate and/or transform institutions and structures.
That said, they do not inherently contradict the findings of institutionalist or
structuralist lines of inquiry – quite the contrary, they complement it in a fully
reflexive fashion. Elites and their inner working psychologies, are both active
participants in the development, evolution, and replacement of institutions and
structures, just as institutions and structures not only define who becomes an
elite in the first place, but furthermore delimit the formative experiences said
elites can have and the environment in which they operate, regardless of
whether said elites are orthodox or disestablishmentarian in their rational
operation. This is reflexivity at its core – the series of interacting causes and
effects is so complex and constant that establishing first or final causes is
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both unnecessary and impractical. Correlation must be our goal, save in the
most explicit of cases.
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CHAPTER III
THE UNITY OF DISESTABLISHMENTARIANISMS:
A MODEL OF THE GENESIS OF
RADICAL, EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS
Having discussed at length the most significant theories on the causes of
extraordinary domestic politics, we may be able to develop a general theory
that incorporates virtually all of these into a relatively simple and practical
form—a causal chain which explicitly elaborates the conditions and events
that precede virtually all cases of extraordinary politics. These are 1) the
preconditions which make a political-economic-social system ripe for or prone
to movements advocating extraordinary politics, 2) the transitional events that
allow disestablishmentarian groups to radically increase the scale and
intensity of resistance/reform, and 3) the immediate causes of violence that
precede the final breakdown of any lingering rule-based behavior.
This chapter, it should be said, constitutes a substantive addition. I not
only assimilate in a fundamentally new way a host of previously alienated
theories and hypotheses, but furthermore distinguish between those
conditions which are ultimate (structural and institutional) and those which are
immediate or proximate (which are not structural or institutional). It therefore
establishes the basis for the two-stage method of analysis I will later use –
specifically one which establishes that a state is “ripe” for the onset of radical,
extraordinary politics (the ultimate causes are present) and distinguishes that
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condition from that of that of a state in which the proximate conditions are
present.
The reason such an innovation is necessary is fairly straightforward.
The structuralist-institutionalist utilitarian framework that underlies most
previous theoretical and empirical work in the field of political upheaval
presents a definitive set of biases, and with them limitations. These theories,
when taken alone, are by their nature deterministic, a point that many
structural, institutional, constructivist, and functionalist theorists openly avow
(consider Skocpol’s famous quip, “revolutions are not made, they come”).
When political-economic-social systems are illiberal, repressive, and/or
ineffective, goes the general consensus, those systems will experience some
sort of attempted radical systemic transformation. Few authors attempt to
push beyond this premise, and many outright deny the possibility of doing so
(Laitin and Warner 1992). Certainly empirical tests bear out the significance
of structures and institutions—political-economic-social systems that
experience revolution, civil war, attempted political secession, and other types
of upheaval are almost universally non-competitive and/or ineffective.
However too often has recent work emphasized these as the ultimate causes
rather than as part of a longer causal chain in which structures and
institutions are merely the easiest elements to study.
The problem with emphasizing the structural-institutional approach at
the expense of other approaches rather than in coordination with them, lies in
the simple fact that most political-economic-social systems meet one or all of
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the above, key conditions most of the time and many of those that have
succumbed to radical, extraordinary politics survived for very long periods of
time (Taylor 1989; Foran 1993).

If all (or most) systems are destined to

radical transformation by their very nature, yet radical change is, in fact,
radical, then we find ourselves immersed in a fundamentally contradictory or
at least incomplete understanding of the nature of radical systemic
transformation. Radical change is extraordinary. Yet theories that assert that
the rate of political transformation is determined by the structural and
institutional arrangement infer that radical transformations should be
themselves be ordinary rather than extraordinary.
Now, this is not to say that regime-type does not matter—states with
certain structural and institutional arrangements and/or conditions are more
likely to experience radical systemic change than are other arrangements. All
this means, however, is that certain structural-institutional arrangements are
fertile ground for the development of the forces that do cause radical systemic
transformation—thus structures and institutions may be regarded as ultimate
causes, but not final or proximate causes.
To use a metaphor, deterministic structural-institutionalist theorists
have advanced our knowledge as far as foresters who are capable of pointing
out that forest fires 1) tend to occur in forests, 2) tend to occur in periods of
drought, desiccation, or the autumn, and 3) are more likely among conifer
forests than in cycad or broadleaf forests. This knowledge is useful, but not
as useful as being able to cross-reference this material with additional
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knowledge about, for instance, where and when lightning storms are
developing in a fire-prone area. Structural-institutionalism, in other words,
lets us know when areas are prone to extraordinary politics; we require
additional data to increase our predictive capability.
The work of Thomas Malthus may be used as inspiration for the
improvement of the above structural-institutional theories. In Malthusian
political-economics, systemic stability, that is to say everyday politicaleconomics, may be undermined by structural constraints (both geographic
and political-economic in his case), but these tensions that are the product of
structural-institutional conditions are not ‘resolved’ by the mere existence of
these conditions. Rather, unexpected internal and/or external calamities are
necessary to eliminate excess population. Sometimes this is the incursion of
outside actors, sometimes this is the eruption of civil war, sometimes this is
the appearance of a plague, and sometimes this is the appearance of a
pestilence.
Similarly, the structural and institutional conditions that most
contemporary theorists of political upheaval view as preeminent cannot be
expected to resolve themselves—revolution does not come, it is the result of
outside and/or internal actors responding to and taking advantage of those
conditions – proximate causes. Granted, most of the theorists discussed
above mention the role of human initiative and efforts to recruit. However
most of these same theorists also deny the significance of this, if not in
principle than at least in practice. Further, scientists testing these theories
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have almost uniformly demonstrated no interest in the human factor—
concentrating instead on legal or economic concerns. Feminist theorists are
a key exception, however, emphasizing the role of systemic inequality as a
factor in determining both individual and group proclivities for violence. Yet
they fall into the same deterministic trap as do other structuralists and
institutionalists, simply from a different angle.
Put more simply, by mapping the transformation of identities and
ideologies, we are able to determine when stresses are reaching their peak
and when an unpredicted political, social, and/or economic catastrophe might
have the maximum effect, leading to a run-away collapse of ordinary politics.
If discontent is “the” immediate cause of all violence, which Gurr (1970a) as
much as admits, then we should be studying it whenever possible, regardless
of the difficulties (which are what seem to persuade Gurr to shift from his
early interest in social psychology to structuralist/institutionalist work). To
return to our earlier forestry metaphor, the forester seeking to prevent forest
fires employing meteorology and basic social geography radically improves
the precision of his predictions of fire location and time of occurrence without
dismissing his or her earlier generalizations—so it is with the kind of fire we
are attempting to predict.
Overcoming the deterministic trap and simultaneously improving our
ability to predict the onset of extraordinary politics depends on our ability to
predict two further links in the causal chain, which, while often mentioned
have rarely been employed: (1) the collapse and reformulation of the value
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system among the relevant cultural-political-economic classes/groups and (2)
the occurrence of “trigger events” that are interpreted by members of either
the establishment or disestablishment as the moment-of-no-return, that point
where open radicalization becomes a necessity rather than one policy option
among others.

Ultimate Causes and Conditions of Radical,
Extraordinary Politics
The preconditions for the open utilization of radical, extraordinary politics by
disestablishmentarians, including those seeking the establishment of a new
state through means of secession, depend upon two fundamental premises.
First, the orthodox system must be perceived as illegitimate. Zhong (1996)
provides what I believe to be the best available definition of legitimacy, stating
that, “[p]olitical legitimacy can be defined in simple terms as the degree of
justifiability of the claim of a particular regime or government in staying in
power.” This legitimacy may be based on any number of accomplishments,
philosophically or theologically derived ‘rights’, charisma, legality (in terms of
both accession to office and behavior in office) and so on, but in every case
legitimacy is about perceived right to wield power and perceived right action
with power. Secondarily, the orthodox system must be either unwilling or
incapable of crushing resistance to its will. Apparent weakness is to politics
as blood is in the ocean: both draw and agitate sharks. If a state is weak it
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must compensate for this through legitimacy; if a state is illegitimate it must
respond with effective counterreformation.
Real and Perceived Institutional and/or Structural Inequality: Illiberal Polities
and Perceived Relative Deprivation

The implications of a politically, culturally, and/or economically discriminatory
system can perhaps be best viewed from two perspectives, both of which are
useful for understanding why this pattern of behavior tends to precede
instances of extraordinary politics. On the hand of the dominating and/or
discriminatory class(es) or group(s), that is to say the elite class(es) or
group(s), institutions, laws, and norms of inequality and disenfranchisement
are both practically and psychologically advantageous. They are practically
advantageous because they reinforce these classes’/groups’ power, wealth,
and security and, conversely, they are psychologically advantageous because
they reinforce their sense of superiority and honor. Furthermore, these
institutions and laws are inseparable from norms (this goes without saying for
informal, structural modes of disenfranchisement), due in large part to the
reflexive relationship between formal political-economic and informal socioeconomic modes of prejudice. The result is that members of elite classes
tend to develop a sense of entitlement—elites in prejudiced systems fail to
see their position as one politically gained, nor as one of exploitation, but as
right and inherent to their personage(s) (see Table 3.1 for a list of authors
who assert that illiberal political, economic, or social structural institutional
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Table 3.1: Theorists Who Assert That Illiberal Political, Economic, or Social
Structural or Institutional Arrangements Increase a State’s Propensity to
Experience Radical, Extraordinary Politics
Author
Sorel
Brinton
Deutsch
Sakata and Hall
Davies
Olson
Russett
Tanter and Midlarsky
Gurr
Tilly
Hatcher
Jenkins
Paige
Skocpol
Disch
Somers and
Goldfrank
Midlarsky
Dix
Scott
Galtung
Brass
Heraclides
Davidheiser
Goldberg
Snow
Juergensmeyer
Rummel
Basu
Krian
An-Na’im
Eisenstadt
McVeigh
Halliday
Jackman
Demerath
Hall
Tétreault
Marshall and Gurr

Year
1906
1952
1953
1956
1962
1963
1964
1967
1968, 1970a, 1970b, 1985, 1993
1973, 1975, 1978
1975
1975
1975
1976, 1979a, 1979b
1979
1979
1982
1984
1985
1990
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1994, 2000
1994
1995
1997
1999
1999
1999
2000
2001
2003
2003
2004
2005
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arrangements increase a state’s propensity to experience radical,
extraordinary politics and Table 3.2 for a list of authors who assert that liberal
institutions have a pacifying behavioral effect).
The combination of these two elements, that is to say the rational
understanding of the circumstances of exploitation by elites as the
emotional/psychological products thereof (what one might call ‘autolegitimization’) yields certain behavioral patterns. First, elites fear that
concessions will lead to a decline in power and influence, and therefore
affluence. Secondly, most elites probably assume, as did the Athenians in
dealing with the Melians and as do the Russians in dealing with the
Chechens, that making any concession will lead to a gross decline in their
ability to maintain their remaining, unconceded power. After all, Hobbes does
instruct us that to appear weak is to be weak; therefore to make concessions
is to begin a snowball effect that ends only once said state either crushes
resistance or transforms from a dominating into a dominated power. Finally,
in order to dominate other classes, elites must feel they have a right to rule, a
sense that they are in some way superior to the ruled classes. If this is the
case, it is unlikely that any elite will willingly abdicate power—to do so is to
admit equality, or at least declining superiority.
The implication of all the above effects of unequal systems on elite
rationality (and ego) is this: systems with high inequality are unlikely to reform
in the absence of extraordinary politics.

Contrarily, in fundamentally unequal

political, economic, and cultural systems, the disenfranchised are likely to see
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Table 3.2: Liberal Peace Theorists (International Relations)
Author

Year

Bremer

1992

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman

1992

Greenfeld

1992

Brown

1993

Maoz and Russet

1993

Snyder

1993

Ray

1995

Rummel

1995

Benoit

1996

Bonta

1996

Rousseau et al.

1996

Chan

1997

Gledisch and Hegre

1997

Oneal and Russet

1997

Tessler and Warriner

1997

Van Evera

1997

Polacheck, Robst, and Chang

1999

Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant

1999

Caprioli

2000, 2003

Caprioli and Boyer

2001

Caprioli and Trumbore

2003

Lektzian and Souna

2003

Mousseau

2003
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their circumstances for what they are: oppressive. If entire classes of people
are objectified, if they exist only to strengthen and enrich others, they will, like
as not, become alienated from that system, divesting themselves of any
sense of stake in said system. Whether or not the average human being has
the political philosophical background to conceptualize a social contract is
beside the point; the average human being still is capable of determining if a
system is wholly exploitive or not. Further, in such a system oppressed
groups and classes are unlikely to conceive of the rules of the system as
allowing for change through moderate, ordinary means—if change is to be
possible and/or perceived fundamental ends are to be accomplished then
rule-violation becomes a practical necessity. The inclination towards
accepting extraordinary politics is also less of a jump than many would
imagine sitting in the comfort of core political-economic centers—after all, if
you are prevented from engaging in free political, economic, or social
enterprise then the only way to grow more powerful or wealthy, or to
accomplish your cultural goals, is to engage in extraordinary variants of dayto-day activities—black markets, illegal religious expression, underground
newspapers, and the like. Norms of rule-violation, in other words, are
inculcated by the experience of tyranny and exploitation. Tyrannies train their
own worst enemies.
It should be said that oppression, disenfranchisement, and the like are
in large part perceptual concepts—they are, in other words, less a product of
the real world and more a product of individual and collective interpretations
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of that world. Therefore the key to making this measure of a state’s
propensity to experience extraordinary politics lies in our ability to understand
the degree to which 1) oppressed persons perceive themselves as oppressed
and 2) the difference between their expected returns from the system vary
from their real returns.
Modernization likely exacerbates the problems of institutionalized and
structuralized inequality in a few key ways. First, the modernization process
is normally oversold by its acolytes, not necessarily in terms of long-term gain
so much as the quality of modernization’s effects in the short-term.
Subjects/citizens in modernizing states frequently have very high
expectations of modernization that it simply cannot fulfill in a short period of
time. This lag between expectations and benefits undermines the
system/regime. Additionally, the fact that modernization displaces substantial
numbers of people, disrupting their lives and undermining beliefs and
behavioral patterns—ranging from subsistence farmers to pre-modern
elites—tends to further complicate the process of modernization (not to
mention increasing the already mentioned gap between hypothesized
expectations and real outcomes). Finally, modernity, to use the language of
geographers, conquers time and space. Traditional realms of autonomy
and/or privacy begin to be eroded under the assault of communications and
transportation technologies. Not only do these technologies allow elites to
more efficiently exploit unassimilated classes and groups, they also allow
exploited classes to better understand their condition, increasing tensions
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already heightened by growing state burdens and behavioral changes. The
rare exception to this latter element comes into play, however, when the state
is capable of effectively controlling access to communications and
transportation technology, allowing it to monopolize information and thereby
manipulate sentiments (though as disharmonies arise between official and
real conditions the legitimacy of the orthodox system will further degrade).

The Perceived Failure of the State to Meet Fundamental Needs

Under certain conditions, the quality-of-life for a given group or groups within
a society is threatened by the parasitism of other groups in that same society
and/or by political mismanagement and/or corruption and/or unpredictable
disaster and/or scarcity and/or the disruption of rapid change. The state, in
other words, is perceived (often rightly) as having failed to provide
fundamental goods such as security, stability, and equity to certain classes or
groups under its rubric.
There is and can only be two possible responses to this perceived
failure. If the failure is perceived as a failure of a particular individual, set of
individuals, rule, set of rules, agency, agencies, or other relatively discrete
parts of the state, then the system may not be perceived as responsible as a
whole—rule-based reform is therefore considered a viable and legitimate
response among the discontent. Sometimes, however, the failure is
perceived as wholesale. This is often the case when multiple, widespread,
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cataclysms occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously—the result is that
key sectors of said system, principally, though not exclusively, members of
the effected class or classes (or region/regions) perceive the system as a
whole to have failed. Under these latter circumstances, the only (perceived)
viable alternative to the given ‘rottenness’ of the systems is to radically, and
often totalistically transform or replace it—to engage in extraordinary politics.
It should be noted that systemic inefficacy may be perceived, rightly or
wrongly, to be caused or exacerbated by institutional and structural inequity.
This being the case, we may conclude that the system’s traits may not only
be viewed by dissenters as ineffective, a fairly mundane label with little
inflammatory content, but furthermore as unjust, adding fuel to the fire, so to
speak. Furthermore, if a state is undergoing a transformation, for instance
the modernization process (be it liberal, fascist, Marxist, or otherwise)
mentioned above, then the process is likely to be condemned with the
contemporary state—the result is most likely to be a neo-traditional
movement such as ethno-nationalism and/or religious fundamentalism (see
Table 3.3 for a list of theorists who assert that perceived state failure
increases a state’s propensity to experience radical, extraordinary politics).
The “Weak” State
The term weak used here is intended to refer to a number of things, any of
which alone will intensify any other conditions substantially and will do so
geometrically in force. A weak state is one that is incapable of fulfilling the
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Table 3.3: Theorists Who Assert That Perceived State Failure Increases a
State’s Propensity to Experience Radical, Extraordinary Politics
Author
Sakata and Hall
Lerner
Huntington
Gurr
Midlarsky
Sahliyeh
Marty and Appleby
Jurgensmeyer
Mendelsohn
Tehranian
Zubaida
Haynes
Roberts
Waterbury
Mittleman
Pasha and Samatar
Rist
Esposito
Uvin
An-Na’im
Thomas
Soros
Stiglitz
Demerath
Denemark
Fox and Sandler
Lewis
Pasha
Tétreault
Marshal and Gurr

Year
1956
1967
1968
1968, 1985, 1993
1982
1990
1991
1993, 1996
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1996
1996
1997
1998
1998
1999
2000
2002
2002
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2005
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basic obligations any state has to its subjects and/or citizens, namely the
ability to protect them, to guarantee their basic needs, and to maintain the
sovereign authority of the state vis-à-vis other states. To actually do so is, of
course, not enough—further, the state must demonstrate that it is doing so as
well. Additionally, weak states are those states that are incapable of crushing
unorthodox behavior, that is to say are unable to root out the kinds of
behaviors among exploited and exploiting classes/groups, including those
alien to the system, which undermine the states’ ability to control key
resources and the interpretation of key political, economic, and cultural
symbols and beliefs. It should be noted that developed liberal states tend to
be weak in the latter sense (though not the former), though this constitutes an
issue of less consequence for them than for non-liberal states given that they
tend to rule by consent and/or consensus, allow dissent without fear of
reprobation, and guarantee, in most instances, very high levels of cultural and
political equity, not to mention relatively high levels of economic equity. One
does not need blatant strength if one is effective. If, however, a state is both
tyrannical and weak it invites the use of widespread extraordinary politics—a
point that is unsurprising given that this condition is virtually the same as
anarchy. Contrarily, as Machiavelli notes, the most stable states are those
that are simultaneously strong and capable of instilling a fear of punishment in
the event of unsanctioned behavior and are loved, that is to say legitimate
(also see Zhong 1996 for a discussion on how durable authoritarian regimes
necessarily culture both the capability to coerce and to convince; see Table
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3.4 for a list of theorists who assert that weak states have a higher propensity
to engage in radical, extraordinary politics than do strong/stable states).
Three conditions are most frequently associated with weakness in the
literature. First, the condition of anocracy, that is to say states that
simultaneously embody elements of autocracy and democracy, are notorious
for their inability to effectively act—specifically because by their very nature
anocracies tend to amalgamate the chief weaknesses associated with
democracy and autocracy. Anocracies are dependent on legitimacy yet lack
the command structure to guarantee political efficacy. Anocracies are
ostensibly built on meritocratic and democratic bases, but tend to favor
certain elite groups, lending credence to arguments that they increase relative
deprivation. Anocracies claim to serve the populace at general yet generally
take steps to undermine that quality-of-life of that populace. They are, in
other words, weak and tyrannical.
Another condition mentioned in the literature is that of pluralistic, rather
than individualistic, democracy. States that depend on group identification for
the articulation of interests are feeding the very forces that tend to undermine
the stability of those states. While this tends to be emphasized in the
literature of ethno-national studies, the premise is ultimately built on
Madison’s analysis of pluralism in The Federalist Papers. Specifically,
Madison feared that the enormous complexity of the United States,
religiously, regional-economically, culturally, and politically, could lead to a
fractionalization of the system. He therefore advocated institutional
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Table 3.4: Theorists Who Assert That Weak States (Including Anocracies and
Transitional States) Have a Higher Propensity to Engage in Radical,
Extraordinary Politics Than Do Strong States
Author

Year

Furnivall

1944

Gurr

1968, 1974

Smith

1969

Dix

1984

Horowitz

1985

Davidheiser

1992

Fein

1995

Uvin

1999

Goldstone et al.

2005
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arrangements that would force ‘factions’ to cooperate or risk political
inefficacy—resulting in moderate political policies that would improve the
likelihood liberalism in the Union would survive. The strength of factions,
then, would be undermined by forcing the creation of multi-factional parties
that necessarily must moderate the policy goals of any one faction within
them, essentially rendering pluralistic factionalism a weak force.
Finally, the literature emphasizes that states in institutional transition
are prone to radical, extraordinary politics. In this condition elites from the
prior system see themselves as still capable of reasserting their power,
radicals see the opportunity to seize power, and state effectiveness and
efficiency tend to be low. The combination results in a high propensity for
minor events to snowball into radical events, “proving” the beliefs of radicals
to be just and correct.
Appropriate Outside Forces
Regardless of social scientists’ tendency to divide domestic and interstate
politics in separate categories, their mutual affect is observable to anyone
willing to observe. The place of any given state in its relevant world-system
has wide-ranging implications for its ability to avoid becoming embroiled in
domestic extraordinary politics (see table 3.5 for a list of theorists who assert
that international structures and institutions affect the propensity of states to
engage in radical, extraordinary politics).
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Table 3.5: Theorists Who Assert That International Conditions (Including
Great Power Attention/Inattention, Contagion Effect, and Sponsorship) Affect
the Propensity of States to Engage in Radical, Extraordinary Politics
Authors
Sakata and Hall
Weiner
Skocpol
Francisco
Kaplan
Collier and Hoeffler
Ali
Esposito
Tétreault
Marshall and Gurr
Taras and Ganguly

Year
1956
1971
1976a, 1976b,
1979
1993
1993
2000
2002
2002
2004
2005
2006
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If discontented members of a system perceive nearby (temporally,
culturally, or spatially) systems as possible models for action (consider the
domino effects involved in the transnational Revolution of 1989, the fascist
revolutions of the 1930s following Mussolini’s efforts, or the Latin American
and European nationalist movements that followed the American and French
Revolutions), then these discontented persons are likely to consider said
model a potential, viable alternative to the failing system. More specifically,
this contagion effect may affect discontented persons’ rationale concerning
viable ends of radical, extraordinary politics as well as viable means to
accomplish those ends (with specific reference to when upheaval initiation is
likely to succeed).
If a great power is exploiting a lesser power, be it imperialistically or
neo-imperialistically, then that power may employ a divide-and-conquer
strategy. If this is the case, then tensions and inequalities between internal
actors are likely to be exacerbated or even artificially created. The result is
that upon independence the political unit is likely to 1) function in an unequal
and internally exploitive fashion and 2) embody two or more mutually
antagonist groups from the outset. The result of both or either is an increase
in systemic tendency towards extraordinary politics.
If a system appears to be the subject of another system, or just such
subjugation seems imminent, the state will simultaneously appear weak and
unjust. This is particularly the case (though by no means exclusively so) in
the instance of the state being independent or autonomous (or being
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perceived as such) historically. Furthermore, said ‘interstate’ domination or
the threat thereof will likely accelerate the process of alienation—exploitation
and disenfranchisement are highlighted as threats under these conditions, as
is the specter of socio-cultural imperialism. The heightened (perceived)
inequality and deprivation that accompanies imperialism and neo-imperialism,
then, accelerates and aggravates systemic delegitimization.
If outside powers throw their support, be it financial, logistical, military,
or merely moral, behind discontented groups or classes then extraordinary
politics again becomes statistically more likely. This is in part the product of
increased capability altering the cost-benefit-risk formula of potential
disestablishmentarians. Furthermore, it lends credibility and legitimacy to
demands for transformation. Internal actors can point to external actors’
support and claim simply, ‘we are not alone,’ providing them with culpability,
especially if this actor either 1) shares key cultural, ideological, and/or
systemic attributes or 2) is a ‘great’ power (globally or regionally) with
simultaneous claims to both international leadership and an effective
developmental model.
Finally, in the absence of a global or regional hegemon enforcing
stability to maximize its own benefit, state and sub-state actors are capable of
greater autonomy. In this sort of environment, especially absent liberal
institutions and structural patterns, exploitation, disenfranchisement, and
cultural discrimination are likely to flourish. Discontented classes and groups
are then more likely to emerge and the conditions for extraordinary politics
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improve. Functionally, it should be noted, that this same condition may
emerge when, in its fervor to acquire the loyalty of a vassal in foreign affairs,
a great power guarantees the ruling elite protections over domestic
autonomy.
Spikes in Transportation and Communications Capabilities
Modernization theorists seem to have hit on a key influence on the
appearance of radical, extraordinary politics. They assume that perceived
relative deprivation is not merely the result of increased social, economic,
and/or political inequity, but further of an increased capacity to learn about
said inequity. Additionally, other theorists assert that the likelihood of radical,
extraordinary politics increases when the political system temporarily allows
more freedom and/or participation, again along political, economic, and/or
social lines, and then suddenly withdraws these gains as elites begin to
perceive that they may have unleashed forces beyond their control. Again,
this not only throws the relative deprivation into sharp highlight, but
furthermore has left the oppressed with a generally better sense of their place
in the world and with residual communication networks that facilitate a “gray”
or “black” communication and information market (see Table 3.6 for a list of
authors who assert that spikes in communication and/or transportation
infrastructure may result in a higher propensity for radical, extraordinary
politics).
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Table 3.6: Theorists Who Assert That Increases in Communication and/or
Transportation Capabilities May Result in a Temporary and/or Permanent
Higher Propensity to Experience Radical, Extraordinary Politics (Due to
Increased Mutual Identification, Increased Perceptions of Relative
Deprivation, and Increased Center Ability to Oppress)
Author
Deutsch
Connor
Rokkan
Horowitz
Sahliyeh
Marty and Appleby
Gurr
Jurgensmeyer
Mendelsohn
Tehranian
Zubaida
Haynes
Waterbury
Fein
Mittleman
Pasha and Samatar
Rist
Esposito
Uvin
An-Na’im
Thomas
Soros
Stiglitz
Demerath
Fox and Sandler
Lewis
Pasha
Tétreault

Year
1953
1967, 1973a, 1973b
1970
1985
1990
1991
1993
1993, 1996
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1995
1996
1996
1997
1998
1998, 1999
1999
2000
2002
2002
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
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Therefore, it is entirely rational to assert that as communications and
transportation technologies become more prevalent or when political
conditions facilitate a rapid increase in available data, the odds of a shift from
ordinary to radical, extraordinary politics increases substantially.
On the Role of Identity

Primordialists assume that identity is the ultimate cause of all political
conflict—communities of related individuals, recognizing scarcity, fight to
control those resources, case-closed. While this view is dated in that it
essentially asserts that difference is the cause of violence, it does highlight a
key concept—identity is involved in the process of “choosing sides.”
Specifically, identity is significant in the study of intrastate extraordinary
politics for two reasons (for a list of non-primoridialist theorists who assert that
identity affects the nature and lines of fractionalization of radical,
extraordinary political conflict see Table 3.7). First, identity, whether it is
ideological, ethnic, or otherwise, determines the boundaries of illiberalism,
specifically, who is allowed to participate in politics and the economy and at
what levels. This in turn leads substantially to determining what groups are
likely to be establishmentarian and what groups are likely to be conducive to
disestablishmentarianism, in other words, identity determines which groups
are most likely to be candidates for recruitment and mobilization and which
are likely to resist reform.
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Table 3.7: Theorists Who Assert That Identity Affects the Nature and Lines of
Fractionalization of Conflict
Author
Year
Gurr
1968, 1993
Prunier
1970
Rokkan
1970
Tilly
1973, 1975, 1978
Galtung
1990
Heraclides
1991
Huntington
1993a, 1993b, 1996
Tarrow
1994
An-Na’im
1999
Uvin
1999
Juergensmeyer 2000
Hall
2003
Marty
2005
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Secondarily, identity is usually bundled with political-cultural
assumptions—specifically, identity and the culture that accompanies it allow
individuals to make decisions without employing their individual rationalities.
This is important because if identity does become bundled with notions of,
say, ethnic or ideological discrimination, then it is likely to legitimate violence.
This is not to say that certain identities are predestined to violence by any
means. It does, however, mean that individuals with certain identities are
more easily swayed to violence—they are provided from birth with automatic
response logics. Given that most political violence tends to occur in states in
which information is at a premium and political decisions are frequently made
with only limited data, the role of cultural logics are significant, and their
capability to be utilized by elites is high (the Devil, after all, quotes scripture).

The Popularization of Radical, Extraordinary Politics
All of the preceding causes are, according to my framework, ultimate causes
– they constitute those conditions under which a state may be considered
unstable (or, as the case may be, stable). The following stages involve
proximate causes, that is to say those causes which transform a politicaleconomy from a state of instability to a state of outright rebellion. Specifically
each of these causes involves, to a lesser or greater degree, elite
disestablishmentarians. Specifically, elite disestablishmentarians must seize
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the moment and take advantage of the instability in order to mobilize
populations, not to mention make a rational evaluation of their circumstance
to determine whether or not rebellion (including secession) is a valid and
feasible action. This latter vector may seem dependent wholly on structural
and institutional conditions, but as I make clear below, there are a number of
environmental conditions that are by definition neither structural or
institutional and yet still have substantial impact on elite decision-making.
Value Entropy and Reformulation

In order to predict extraordinary politics whose aim is radical systemic
transformation, we must assume that the elite leadership of such a movement
are rational actors whose end is to establish a new political-economic-social
order, whether for themselves or for other (including former) members of their
society. These factions select strategies, strategies for victory (in order to win
power) and strategies in victory (determining how to use power if it is seized).
These, essentially, are the determinants of any given radical systemic
transformation’s form and severity—not those variables that led to the value
entropy. Regardless, if this is the case, then we can assume such
individuals are unlikely to engage in radical activities if they do no believe they
are in a position to actually accomplish some or all of their goals in the longterm. It would be irrational to begin any variant of insurrection if one did not
believe that one was in a position of at least some strategic sustainability.
Therefore we can assume that disestablishmentarian movements will be
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covertly active for an extended period of time once the above discussed
preconditions appear, emerging openly only after they believe their capability
to be adequately high. Their activities, concurrent with the failings, injustices,
and errors of the orthodox, ruling system will result in at least one if not two of
the following prior to the outbreak of violence.
In the first place we can expect the strategically key classes to
demonstrate signs of value entropy, that is to say concern that the
contemporary system is incapable of redressing problems—it is incompetent
or unjust beyond reprieve. At this stage, however, we can expect relevant
classes and groups to be expressing only sentiments of what is wrong, what
they have ceased to believe in and identify with, not viable alternatives to the
status quo. In other words, we can expect an entropy of sorts in the value
structures of these classes’/groups’ senses of identity, their political-economic
values, and their perception of the orthodox system’s legitimacy. Indeed, the
work of George M. Wilson (1983) infers that value entropy is likely to occur
across substantial elements of a population immediately preceding all types
of radical, extraordinary politics, including orchestrated, top-down revolutions
Secondarily, if disestablishmentarian movements have the will and
capability, value entropy will begin to transform—identities, values, and
conceptualizations will trend away from mere alienation and towards a
particular ideological bent—one concurrent in part or in whole with that of a
particular set of disestablishmentarians. This occurs, of course, because the
state of normative and identity entropy brought about by an unjust and/or
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ineffective political-economy and/or society creates an ideal circumstance for
recruitment—conversion of any type rarely occurs among content persons
who feel their system or their place in it is just and unproblematic, after all.
I would like to clarify—the implication of all this is that identities and
values in and of themselves are not responsible for radicalization and
extraordinary politics. Rather, identities and values change in response to
conditions and politically opportunistic utilization of these conditions. That
said, identities in particular might determine the form and breadth of inequity,
discrimination, or disenfranchisement. Therefore, we can speak of unjust
political systems as having a reflexive relationship between undesirable
social-political-economic outcomes and policies and identities (and their
accompanying values).
This ideological transformation will be buttressed, whenever possible,
by the establishment of viable alternatives to the mechanisms of state,
culture, and economy that 1) undermine the effectiveness of extant orthodox
institutions and 2) fill in gaps where the orthodox system has entirely
neglected to operate. This activity is particularly essential in agrarian politicaleconomies where the goal is to establish bottom-up, populist revolution or an
elite, populist revolution, and less so in the event of an elite, top-down radical
reformation.
Additionally, as Eckstein (1988, 796) notes, “[C]ultural entropy can
never be complete.” Systemic upheaval tends to strengthen certain, surviving
elements of the prior state of affairs (for instance families). And, additionally, if
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a system is to be reformulated, certain behaviors, patterns, symbols, and
ideals which were already utilized in the prior system must be utilized, if in an
altered form and/or for an altered function. Otherwise, the collective would be
so disoriented that the process of cumulative social learning necessary for
reform would be unimaginable. Furthermore, in every culture there are
certain institutions and structures that are recognizable as useful in an
universally utilitarian fashion (Eckstein mentions bureaucracies)—these are
also likely to survive for lack of an alternative arrangement. Regardless, the
point is clear—alternative movements are necessarily founded in the sociohistorical conditions they hope to overturn and their offered system will
necessarily share attributes in common with the system they hope to replace.
Simplified, the above discussed stage may be regarded as little more
than the collapse of legitimacy structure of the state and the scavenging
process by disestablishmentarian elite among the alienated and
disenfranchised of the classes or groups those disestablishmentarian elites
hope to recruit and mobilize.
Flashpoints/Trigger Events

Once mobilization and recruitment have reached such levels that the
disestablishmentarian elite consider themselves to have a viable means of
challenging the orthodox, status quo system, a trigger event is necessary to
propel the movement from covert to overt extraordinary political behavior.
Whereas the transformation of identity and norms may be measured readily
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(assuming access to the relevant populations is possible) predicting
flashpoints is a somewhat more difficult task, at least at the theoretical level of
analysis. To return to the Malthus again, we may consider a simple model of
unrestrained population growth. Assume an island in which there are a
limited number of resources and on which there is only one government that
does not enforce any restrictions on childbirth or family size. Imagine further,
following Hardin’s (1968) particular lead, that the only source of food was
intensive, subsistive agriculture. Imagine as each family’s total number of
children increases, so to does the output of food available per person until the
carrying capacity of the island is achieved. After this point a die-off is a near
inevitability—population density over and beyond carrying capacity decreases
sanitation quality, decreases calories available per person, and facilitates
disease transmission. The question is, how (and when) will this die-off occur?
We can say 1) with the onset of a plague, 2) with the onset of a natural
disaster, 3) or with the onset of civil conflict either between groups for
resources or between elites and exploited groups intent on replacing the
failed state.
We can predict plague according to the movement of animals in and
out of the population; we can predict meteorological disaster according to
historic and meteorological records (though we cannot necessarily predict
geological disasters); and we can predict that either of the others might
precipitate the third. Additionally, we can assume the discovery of hoarding
among elites (or other groups), politically unwise actions or rhetoric (“let them
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eat cake”), and/or the sheer will and rhetorical abilities of
disestablishmentarians could serve to deliver the spark that ignites the rapid
die-off. Our degree of predictability, then, is limited, though we can create a
classification system of likely trigger events that will inform our predictions.
Similarly, in any state experiencing the above preconditions, we can
expect that both establishmentarians and disestablishmentarians will be
taking all possible steps to prepare for control over another limited
commodity—power. Ultimately tensions will reach a point (which again, as
mentioned above, usually sparked by either a natural disaster or a set of
internal or foreign policies) wherein we can predict that any serious event will
make conflict between orthodox and reformist forces a near inevitability.
Some of these events we can predict, others we can say, “if they happen,
they will upset the system and force the shift to overt extraordinary politics of
a type determined by 1) the orthodox system, 2) the ends of the
disestablishmentarians, 3) the desired means as limited by the capabilities of
the disestablishmentarians.” In other words, we will know when a storm is
coming, but, at least at present, we will be unable to predict the drop in
barometric pressure. To reiterate, that this stage will occur is a theoretically
sound statement—that said, our ability to predict the exact nature of this
stage in any particular event is likely to remain relatively low.
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Summary
Having expounded a detailed model of the stages of transformation that
precede the overt use of extraordinary political behavior to transform radically
a political-economic-social system, I would like to briefly summarize the
model for clarity before continuing. First, we can assume that widespread
discontent not only with a system’s particular elements and policies, but with
the system itself precedes radical systemic transformation. This discontent is
the product of elements of the population coming to believe that the system is
utterly unjust (i.e. a product of perceived structural and/or institutional
inequality, be it politically, economically, and/or culturally) and cannot be
repaired through rule-observing behavior and/or the system is intractably
flawed and must be replaced totalistically. These conditions are theoretically
observable and have been the focus of most predictive and explanatory
studies of radical politics.
Second, the discontent created by these structural and institutional
conditions is itself measurable—specifically, the measurement of this
discontent can and will tell us the degree to which 1) the system has lost
legitimacy and 2) the breadth and depth of this loss. The degree to which this
change has occurred should be identifiable in terms of value entropy, that is
to say the degree to which identities and key ideological norms have shifted
from a stable, orthodox position into entropy and ambivalence.
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This entropy and ambivalence is the proper condition for
disestablishmentarian movements to engage targeted groups and or classes
(either at the populist or the elite level) for recruitment and mobilization. Often
times this will be accomplished by establishing a counter-state and/or a
counter-economy (see Thaxton, 1977 for the Chinese example). This stage
is not, however, an inevitable step following value entropy, alienation, and
delegitimization. Rather, it is dependent on 1) an assessment of the state
that assumes it is weak enough to be challenged, 2) the existence of an
individual or, more likely, a set of individuals who are both willing to and
capable of forming a disestablishmentarian elite capable of establishing a
counter-culture, and 3) the existence of an alternative systemic arrangement
which has not been discredited in the eyes of the relevant population. In
other words, value entropy creates a space for recruitment and mobilization—
human individuals exploit it or do not, and states undermine recruitment or
not.
Third, when the above three conditions are met, one or more
disestablishmentarian movements are usually established and begin to
spread. The result should be an observable transformation in values and
identity among the relevant population(s). This stage immediately presages
open conflict between orthodox and heretical systemic elites and their
supporters, assuming the state does not effectively crush the heretical
movement in its infancy.
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Once the system has reached a very high level of tension, the product
of a relatively high level of power among disestablishmentarians vis-à-vis the
orthodox system, any event of extreme significance, domestic or international,
may be capable of inciting active revolt or a too-little-too-late effort by the
state to repress the disestablishmentarians resulting in open war, genocide,
or politicide. At this point a classification of events may be developed for
determining when focus should be placed on the region to determine if
smolder will become flame.
Finally, the ends and means of any disestablishmentarian movement
are highly particularistic, determined by the socio-historical circumstances
surrounding their development and their place in the contemporary politicaleconomy. More specifically, we may say that ends and means of
disestablishmentarians are the product of five elements: 1) who is discontent,
2) what are they discontent about, 3) what is the current systemic form, 4)
what are the available, credible alternatives, and 5) what interstate or
transnational actors are capable of and willing to aid the
disestablishmentarians. Obviously the possibility for variance is enormous.
That said, this unified predictive model, which it may be argued is a new
meta-theory of radical, extraordinary politics, is in many ways an improvement
on prior models in that it forces us to abandon our assumptions that different
types of ideological transformation are caused by fundamentally different
conceptions, it allows us to transcend our own ideological and historical
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biases, and most importantly, it forces us to accept a level of investigation
that will help improve our predictive and explanatory powers.
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CHAPTER IV
ESTABLISHING THE STRUCTURAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL EQUIVALENCY OF
NAMIBIA AND BOTSWANA
Namibia and Botswana are incredibly similar in structural and institutional
terms. Both southern African states have economies that are largely based
on natural resources exploitation and agriculture, both are predominately
Christian, both have environments dominated by extensive steppes and some
northern jungles. Both states are host to numerous ethnicities, most of which
have ties with kin-groups across national boundaries. In both states there are
definite “in” and “out” ethnicities, that is to say that there are ethnic groups
which are relatively disadvantaged in terms of access to and gains from the
dominant legal political-economic system. Additionally, both Namibia and
Botswana share long borders with the region’s greatest power, South Africa,
though Namibia has had a traditionally more problematic northern border, the
vast majority of which it shares with Angola.
Arguably the most fundamental difference between Namibia and
Botswana lies in their access to the sea (or lack thereof)—the entire western
border of the former lies on the Atlantic Ocean, whereas the latter is entirely
landlocked. In way of compensation, however, Botswana has superior
mineral wealth – including some of the world’s most productive diamond
mines. The other fundamental difference between Namibia and Botswana lies
in their period of independence – while Namibia has only been independence
182

since the early 1990s (one of the latest states in Africa afforded this
condition), Botswana gained its independence in the late 1960s.
Concurrently, while Botswana was never directly administered by its southern
neighbor, Namibia spent most of the Twentieth Century as a colony not of
Britain, but of South Africa, itself a former colony of Great Britain, though the
differences in experience are notable. Specifically, the variance in race
relations up to the point of Namibian independence, then, constitutes the
largest remaining variation.

Economic Comparison
There are a number of key economic indices that may be compared at the
structural level. Specifically I will compare gross domestic products, gross
domestic products per capita, relative spending power, unemployment
figures, a number of health and welfare and infrastructural development
indices and figures, and the perceived economic prospects of the citizenry of
the studied states.
Gross National Product
In terms of the most popular measure of economic comparison, the gross
national product (GNP), there is no question that a general parity exists
between Namibia and Botswana (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). In both states
there are patterns of growth that are both steady and congruent with one
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Table 4.1: Gross National Product (adjusted for Power of Purchasing Parity,
in Billions US$)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
1.54
1.87

1991
1.8
3.1

1992
2
3.6

1993
2
3.6

1994
3.85
6

1995
5.8
4.3

1996
5.8
4.5

1997
6.2
4.6

1998
6.2
5

1999
6.6
5.25

2000
7.1
5.7

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)

Gross National Product (Adjusted for Power of
Purchasing Parity)

Billions (US$)

8
6
4
2
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Namibia

Figure 4.1: Gross National Product
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Botswana

Table 4.2: Gross National Product Per Capita
Namibia
Botswana

1990
1245
1600

1991
1240
2500

1992
1400
2800

1993
1300
2450

1994
2500
4500

1995
3600
3130

1996
3600
3200

1997
3700
3100

1998
3700
3300

1999
4100
3600

2000
4300
3900

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)

Gross National Product Per Capita
5000

US$

4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Namibia

Figure 4.2: Gross National Product Per Capita
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Botswana

another with only one state for one year posting a decrease in GNP,
Botswana in 1994. Both states, in other words, experienced similarly vigorous
economies throughout the decade with, at the time of the East Caprivian
event in 1999, no real decrease in economic gains nor any real evidence for
anticipating decreasing economic gains.
Gross National Product Per Capita
In a near mirror image of the above GDP patterns, Table 4.2 and
Figure 4.2 make plainly clear that the only substantial difference between the
Namibian and Batswana GNP per capitas during the period studied is early in
the decade, and then the variance narrows radically. This holds not only in
relative terms but indeed in absolute terms, doubly emphasizing the economic
parity between these states. Again, both states experienced similarly
vigorous economies throughout the decade with, at the time of the East
Caprivian event in 1999, no real or perceived decrease in economic gains or
anticipated gains.
Consumer Price Inflation
Though figures for Namibia are spottier than those for Botswana (Table 4.3
and Figure 4.3), we can nonetheless see a pattern of general parity in terms
of consumer price inflation (CPI) for the period discussed. Granted, the early
part of the decade (prior to 1995) seems to have greater pattern parity than
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Table 4.3: Rate of Consumer Price Inflation as a Proportion of the Gross
National Product
Namibia
Botswana

1990
15.1
11.45

1991
15.1
12

1992
17
12.6

1993
10
16.5

1994
17.9
14

1995
11
10

1996
11
10

1997
8
9.8

1998
8
10

1999
7
9

2000
8.5
7.7

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)

Rate of Consumer
Price Inflation as a
Proportion of the Total
GDP

Consumer Price Inflation
20
15
10
5
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Namibia

Figure 4.3: Consumer Price Inflation
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Botswana

the latter half, but even then the pattern is one of gradual convergence (after
a single, substantial drop in CPI) rather than divergence.
Income Inequality
Corrado Gini’s Gini Index, developed in his 1912 paper “Variability and
Mutability,” is one of the most commonly used measures of income inequality,
with 0 representing a state of perfect equality and 1 representing a state of
perfect wealth agglomeration (one person controls all available wealth). That
said, calculating the nature of income inequality in undeveloped and
underdeveloped states is an extremely difficult task, in no small part by virtue
of the high proportion of people who continue to make their living from
subsistence farming and herding and due to the high proportion of people
who are not officially monitored by the state. This is, of course, the case in
both Namibia and Botswana, so Gini indices are not calculated by
international bodies for these state with any frequency. That said, the United
Nations Development Program Report (2005, 270), lists Namibia as having
the most unequal income distribution in the entire world, with an index score
of 70.7. As tremendous as this degree of income inequality is, Botswana is
not far behind, having a Gini index of 63, the third highest in the world.
What do these scores mean? Well, this depends on one’s theoretical
disposition. On the one hand, some theorists would assert that the degree of
income inequality increases the odds of conflict by making the differences
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between economic classes (which are often times, particularly in Africa,
correlated with ethnic and/or religious differences) more manifest, whereas
other theorists would assert that the radical degree of inequality prevents the
general population from even having the capacity of developing any
significant resistance to the orthodox political-economy. Those merely
subsisting simply lack the time and resources, these theorists would assert, to
resist. Therefore, the overall meaning of their scores lies in contention – but
their relative parity, in relation to the rest of humanity, is fairly obvious. That
said, the nearly 8 point difference in their scores is not insignificant – yet, in
light of the theoretical uncertainty there is some question as to what such a
difference would make and whether or not, at the point of inequality present in
these states, the difference is one of declining significance with regards to
political outcomes And finally, it should be noted that the most recent income
survey in the two states, the survey that the United Nations drew their data
from, was completed in 1993. Namibia was still involved in recovering from
their recent independence from South Africa, a state which, even as a
colonial power, still was the eighth most unequal political economy according
to the Development Program Report, and their most recent survey was far
more recent: 2000.
Composition and Modernity of Economy
The economies of both Namibia and Botswana are both overwhelmingly
dependent on unfinished goods – specifically, in both states, on raw mineral
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wealth and agricultural goods. Economic composition matters for one key
reason in particular – a political-economy dependent on a very few key items,
especially unfinished goods, tends to be a highly inegalitarian state, and
therefore a state in which resource competition and grievance formation are
high.
Of course, an additional subject of consideration is the newness of the
contemporary political-economic conditions – is the system in a period of
relatively stability, with steady but low percentage growth, is the system in a
period of extraordinarily rapid growth, is the system in a period of gradual
decline, or is the system in a recession or depression following an experience
of steady or radical growth? Declining growth, of course, has the potential to
lead to disaffection, resource competition, and grievance development, and
rapid growth leads to displacement and an explosion of relative knowledge,
as well as increases in elites’ abilities to communicate with and influence their
underlings. But it is unquestionably the sudden shift from one pattern of
growth to a pattern of sudden decline that leads to the most disruption.
The relevance of economic composition lies in the fact that changes in
economic composition present a sort of metaphorical map of general
economic evolution from a different dimension – each technology bundle, a
concept implied in Kondratieff’s work (1984), that dominates a given political
economy, be it a subsistence agriculture, profit-oriented agriculture,
mining/refining, heavy or light industrial, or service-based system, bears with
it a different arrangement of both labor and capital placement. By mapping
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labor and capital placement and then looking at changes in the area of said
placement, we can develop a sense of how changes in the economy are
actually affecting particular sectors of people. Our working assumption can
then be that the state with the greatest level of disruption, with particular
emphasis on disruption with simultaneously declining prospects, is the state
most likely to experience an onset of radical, extraordinary politics.
We can begin by discussing the percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) occupied in each particular state by each sector. If we
consider Table 4.4, built on data drawn from the CIA World Factbook, we can
see a few interesting points. First, Namibia’s GDP is far more dependent on
agriculture than is Botswana’s – over 8% more, in fact. Immediately this
would seem to indicate that Namibia’s economy is the less mature of the two,
but before discussing the validity of such a statement, let’s consider the
remaining sectors. On the one hand both states have very large service
sectors which are, over time, shrinking in their relative importance. Why
should this be the case? This is difficult to say – save that it is probably more
the industrial sector’s relative significance than it is of any real decline in the
service sector, especially given the rate of urbanization in both states.
Moving on to the industrial sector – we can see that both states have
seen rapid relative growth here – 3% in Botswana, but a huge 10% in
Namibia. The CIA explicitly points out that of Botswana’s industrial strength,
the majority of this is actually in the mining sector – most of which, it is fair to
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Table 4.4: Relative Size of Economic Sectors in Namibia and Botswana
1995
1997
1998
Namibia
agriculture: 15%
n/a
agriculture: 12%
industry: 20%
industry: 30%
services: 65%
services: 58%
Botswana
agriculture: 4%
agriculture: 4%
agriculture: 4%
industry: 43%
industry: 45%
industry: 46%
services : 53%
(including 35%
(including 36%
mining)
mining)
services: 51%
services: 50%
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Table 4.5: Labor Force Distribution of Namibia and Botswana
1990
n/a

1992
n/a

1994
agriculture 49%,
industry and
commerce 25%,
services 5%,
government
18%,
mining 3%

1995
n/a

1999
agricultur
e 47%,
industry
25%,
services
28%

Namibia
Workforce

n/a

n/a

500,000

n/a

500,000

Namibia
Population

1,452,951

1,574,927

1,595,567

1,651,545

1,771,327

Botswana
Workforce
by Sector

198,500
formal
sector
employees,
most others
are
engaged in
cattle
raising and
subsistence
agriculture
(1990 est.);
14,600

220,000 formal
sector
employees,
most others are
engaged in
cattle
raising
and subsistence
agriculture
(1992 est.);
14,300 are
employed in
various mines in
South Africa

n/a

n/a

Botswana
Workforce
Botswana
Population

400,000

428,000

n/a

235,000
formal sector
employees
(1995)
by
occupation:
100,000
public sector;
135,000
private sector,
including
14,300 who
are employed
in various
mines in
South Africa;
most others
engaged in
cattle raising
and
subsistence
agriculture
n/a

n/a

1,224,527

1,292,210

1,359,352

1,392,414

1,464,167

Namibia
Workforce
by Sector

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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say, is probably concentrated in the diamond sector which has been a
massive source of income of the state. Sadly, the CIA fails to provide us with
similar data for Namibia, though the United Nations Namibia Common
Country Assessment for 2004 asserts that mining composed some 10.4% of
the Namibian economy in 1994 separate from the industrial sector (listed as
13.1%). The vast majority of mining wealth in both countries, of course, is in
the form of diamonds, which are mined on a vast scale.
Turning to the statistics on employment by sector (Table 4.5), we see a
substantially different picture. Despite the fact that most of the formal wealth,
that is to say wealth that could be accessed and assessed by the government
using formal, modern means of taxation, is concentrated in non-agricultural
sectors, in both Botswana and Namibia labor is overwhelmingly concentrated
in the agricultural sector – over 50% of both populations are formally coded
as such by their respective governments, but given the disparity between
formal workforces and total populations, we can assume that subsistence
agriculture is much higher, approaching 80 to 90% in both states. This
speaks to several key points. First, the general population is probably highly
independent of government services but simultaneously lacks the resources
to mobilize against a modern military and police forces (in the absence of a
full-scale, nationwide revolution, at least). Furthermore, the high proportion of
subsistence farmers indicates a high proportion of people who risk their lives
doubly in proportion to their participation in any sort of radical, extraordinary
politics – they risk death at the hands of the government and through
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inattention to their own landholdings. This, to a large extent, may help
explain Namibia and Botswana’s overall stability.
A key difference in the workforces of the two states lies in the
difference in the size of their public and private sectors. Botswana’s
government sector composes almost half of that state’s formal workforce,
whereas in Namibia, a state ruled since independence by a party which
justified their pre-independence efforts in socialist ideological terms, the
formal workforce is only 18% governmental in structure. This is, frankly, a
huge difference. What are the implications of this? Well, this is difficult to
say. Theoretically it may simply mean that a higher proportion of Botswana’s
population is relatively less likely to rebel given their economic dependence
on the contemporary system, but how much less likely to rebel is highly
questionable, and as the transnational Revolution of 1989 made very clear,
high governmental employment is by no means an overly stabilizing force.
So the question remains – how similar, or dissimilar –are the sectoral
differences between Namibia and Botswana? In the overall picture of the
labor force, we can say very similar – both are utterly dominated by
agriculture, specifically subsistence agriculture. With regards to the labor of
non-agriculture sectors, we can say that the labor economy of Botswana is,
however, quite different from that of its peer, being dominated by mining and
government concerns rather than a more balanced arrangement of light and
heavy industry, government, and service sectors. In this regard I would be
inclined to say that Botswana’s lack of diversification relative to Namibia
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makes it less stable economically (as indicated by slowing growth when the
diamond market fell in the mid-1990s), making it the more prone to radical,
extraordinary politics following the structural-institutional method. On the other
hand, in terms of capital distribution (as indicated by GDP produced by each
sector), a similar picture seems to appear. Granted, the CIA data does not
break down the statistics for Namibia well enough to be definitely sure, but we
can say that given the nature of hirings in Namibia, most of the rapid industrial
growth seems to be in light and heavy industry, that is to say finished goods,
rather than in unfinished goods. While this definitely indicates a more
developed economy, the importance of this these facts are not simple. First,
the rapid growth of new sectors means that all the bogeys predicted the
modernization-as-a-destablizer theorists have a definite bone to gnaw.
Alternatively, the growth seems to be balanced, shielding the economy from
the kinds of ups and downs which Botswana is far less effective at dealing
with. Thus, I would argue that, on this indicator set, Namibia and Botswana
are relatively close to parity, with Botswana being slightly more likely to
experience radical, extraordinary politics.
Urbanization
When considered alone, urbanization is a relatively innocuous structural
pattern. Some states with high urbanization are highly stable, while some
with high urbanization are wracked with terrorism and/or warfare. What
seems to matter, however, is whether or not states are highly urbanized and
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have the essential diversified, modern economies capable of sustaining
modern and uncorrupt civil services, police, and essential public goods,
notably water, sewage, housing, and electricity.
States experiencing rapid urbanization, it should be said, are probably
overall relatively more likely to experience radical, extraordinary politics given
that these states are usually also experiencing rapid economic
transformation. When agriculture is shifting from subsistence- to profitoriented, when desertification or dessication have begun to occur, or when
new labor-saving technologies (e.g. mechanization or fertilization) are being
employed, people formerly capable of earning their livelihoods from
agriculture tend to be freed in large numbers. These economically
disenfranchised peoples seek employment where they can (often spurring the
appearance of urbanization), but just as often are unable to find employment.
These freemen are, then, ready recruits for disestablishmentarian elites –
they are both disaffected and have few political-economic to their previous
lives.
In their 2002 paper “Mobile Namibia: Migration Trends and Attitudes,”
Frayne and Pendleton summarize the state of urbanization in Namibia during
the 1990s. They point out how international migration had been severely
limited under South African sovereignty, limited, essentially to forced
migration for people not of European descent. Immediately following
independence, however, internal migration increased substantially. Frayne
and Pendleton describe this phenomena, noting that:
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Since independence in 1990 there has been a substantial
increase in rural-urban migration, which has resulted in
significant urban growth. For example, the 1991 Population
Census urban percentage of population was about 32% and the
estimated 1996 urban population was 40%. Given the recent
increases in the population of major towns, this percentage is
even higher. (7)
An eight percent difference in only five years is, to understate things,
substantially.
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), on the other hand, reports that,
“Botswana has seen rapid urbanization, the urban population increasing from
18% in 1981 to 52% in 2000 according to (broadly defined) government
estimates, although the UN reports a 28% urbanization rate.” This rate of
change, like that of Namibia, can only be described as substantial - a change
of 32% by the highest estimates and 8% by the lowest over a ten-year period.
It should be noted that the Socioeconomic Data and Applications
Center gives substantially different figures for Namibia’s degree of
urbanization (gleaned from the United Nations’ World Urbanization Prospects
report of 2001), asserting that Botswana is 18% more urbanized than is
Namibia (using a threshold of percentage of people living in communities with
populations of more than 5,000). This is a substantial difference – just under
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half of Botswana’s people live in towns or cities, while only about a third of
Namibians live in societies larger than 5000.
All this said, it remains difficult to say which state is urbanizing at a
higher rate – there is little agreement on what constitutes urbanization and
even less accurate data on migration patterns – problems which are not
entirely unexpected for nation-states of Namibia and Botswana’s level of
development. What can be said, however, is that in both states we can
readily assume that the rate of urbanization is high enough to destabilize
political systems somewhat, denigrating state control in urban areas in
particular, but also is symptomatic of other destabilizing events, including
modernization and failing rural socio-economic systems.
In a final note, I would like to make an observation on the social
geography of urbanization in the two states. Specifically, according to the
Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center’s Gridded Population of the
World and Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project, the proportion of land
dedicated to urban activities remains trivial in both Botswana and Namibia –
under 1% in both states. Thus, though both states are urbanizing at very
rapid rates, in both states the vast majority of the spatial area remains in a
state of either wilderness, in a state of natural resource harvesting, or
dedicated to agricultural or pastoral activities.

199

Popular Access to Modern, Essential Infrastructure
The Afrobarometer surveys of 1999 included questions on the general
populations’ of the surveyed states access to key forms of
infrastructure/services that are generally regarded as essential elements of
modern political-economies. Specifically, the surveys asked if citizens of
Namibia and Botswana had access to electricity and water in their homes and
whether or not an affordable school was close enough to their homes that
their children were able to attend. These particular items are essential not
just in terms of their impact on individuals’ quality of life, but furthermore in
relation to the relevant nation-states’ success in the realms of modernization
and interstate competition.
The first key measure, whether or not people had electrical hook-ups in
their home (Table 4.6) yields a difference between the states that is not
enormous, yet nor is it negligible. Specifically, there is a five percent gap in
the proportion of people with such access between the two states, with
Namibia’s development being more advanced than its peer. On the other
hand, in terms of plumbing infrastructure, Botswana has gained a definite,
massive relative advantage, providing access to indoor plumbing to almost
20% more of its people than Namibia (Table 4.7).
The importance of these variations is difficult to decipher. While clean
water, of course, is an essential building block of any modern, high-population
nation-state, it may be readily achieved either through a modern public water
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Table 4.6: Do You Have Electricity in Your Home?
Namibia

Botswana

Yes
No
Don't Know

390 (34%)
760 (66%)
1

338 (29%)
833 (71%)
5

Degrees of freedom: 2 ; Chi-square = 9.46 ; p is less than or equal to 0.01 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 4.7: Do You Have Running Water in Your Home?
Namibia

Botswana

Yes
No
Don't Know

461
690
3

693
487
3

Degrees of freedom: 2 ; Chi-square = 81.31 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 4.8: Is Affordable Education Available Nearby?
Namibia

Botswana

Yes
No
Don't Know

926
244
3

1083
103
1

Degrees of freedom: 2 ; Chi-square = 70.48 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant.
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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system (as in the case of most fully developed states) or through mass
implementation of boiling practices (as in the case of China). Of course, the
degree to which boiling is used in either state is impossible (without further
survey efforts, at least) to know, and cannot be directly linked to electricity.
That said, a modern water infrastructure has several other key advantages,
most importantly being that it frees up enormous amounts of time and labor
for other purposes for the average person. As to electricity, while it has many
uses it may logically be assumed that increases in electrical infrastructure
yield almost immediate increases in mass communication, both in terms of
person-to-person and in terms of mass media – the degree to which this is
important according to the orthodox theories of revolution and other forms of
radical, extraordinary politics, however, is in direct reference to the rapidity
with which such infrastructure is developed and, without earlier similar data
that is difficult to determine – luckily some limited earlier data is available on
specific communications and transportation infrastructure (see below) which
may yield more conclusive and useful information.
With regards to variance between available school infrastructure, 91%
of surveyed families in Botswana have easy access to affordable schools,
while the same figure for Namibia is only 79% (see Table 4.8), a difference of
some 12%. This difference, again substantial, represents another theoretical
conundrum. While it should be said that, since we do not know just how
rapidly school systems have developed in either state, we have a distinct
blind spot in terms of understanding just how modernization of this form of
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both personal improvement and mass indoctrination are likely to have
impacted people’s values and so forth. That said, it must be assumed that
knowledge of public education is fairly widespread in most instances and
persons not having access to this amenity are quite likely to see it as a failure
of the system to provide an essential good.
Transportation Infrastructure
We may describe Namibian and Batswana transportation infrastructure as
relating to one another in two basic patterns: on the one hand, heavy
transportation infrastructure, that is to say rail and air infrastructure, and on
the other roadway infrastructure.
As we can see from Tables 4.9 and 4.10 and Figure 4.4 and 4.5, both
rail and air infrastructure in Namibia are far more developed than in
Botswana, a legacy of the South African regime’s occupation of the former.
That said, given that modernization theories of destablization infer that it is
not the presence or absence of transportation (or communication)
infrastructure that leads to regime destablization and collapse, but rather
rapid changes in said infrastructure, we can rule out this particular variation
as theoretically significant. What is, however, theoretically significant, is the
similarity that exists between patterns of development between both states –
in both growth (or the lack thereof) seems to be timed almost exactly. With
regards to proportion, however, Botswana, not Namibia must be ruled the
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Table 4.9: Total Length of Railroads (KM)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
2341
712

1991
2341
712

1992
2341
712

1993
2341
712

1994
2341
712

1995
2341
888

1996
2382
888

1997
2382
971

1998
2382
971

1999
2382
971

2000
2382
971

1996
108
100

1997
111
80

1998
133
92

1999
133
92

2000
135
92

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)

Table 4.10: Total Number of Usable Airports
Namibia
Botswana

1990
123
87

1991
123
87

1992
112
87

1993
112
87

1994
109
90

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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1995
135
100
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Figure 4.4: Total Length of Railroads
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)

Usable Airports
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Usable Airports
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Figure 4.5: Usable Airports
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Botswana

Table 4.11: Total Length of Usable Roads (KM)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
54500
11514

1991
54500
11514

1992
54500
11514

1993
54500
11514

1994
54500
11514

1995
54500
11514

1996
54186
11514

1998
64799
18482

1999
64799
18482

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)

Total Length of Usable
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Chart 4.6: Total Length of Usable Roads
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Botswana

2000
63258
18482

theoretically more likely state to experience radical, extraordinary politics.
This is due not to transformations in air infrastructure, but in rail infrastructure,
where Namibia experiences virtually no significant changes during this period
but Botswana experiences relatively substantial growth, an increase of over
35%.
With regards to highway/road growth, on the other hand, we can see
that both Namibia and Botswana have, during the period studied, both
experienced radical increases in the total number of roadways (Table 4.11
and Figure 4.6). That said, the relative growth of roadways in Botswana
vastly outpaces that of Namibia – the total length of roadways in Botswana
nearly doubles, while Namibia’s considerable growth is only (if that is the
proper word for such substantial growth) about 20% during that time. Thus it
may be argued that while both states could be predicted to experience
radical, extraordinary politics during this period, it is again Botswana which
seems to match the orthodox theoretical model more strictly, not Namibia.
Communication Infrastructure
The spottiest communication technology, in terms of accurate data, is
that of the total number of telephones in each state during the period
examined (see Tables 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 for communications data) That
said, enormous growth in this sector is not entirely balanced – specifically,
Namibia’s growth in total number of available phones from the period
between 1990 and 2000
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Table 4.12: Total Number of Telephones
Namibia
Botswana

1990
62800
17900

1991

1992
89722
26000

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

78000

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
Table 4.13: Total Number of FM Stations
Namibia
Botswana

1990
40
3

1991
40
3

1992
40
13

1993
40
13

1994
40
13

1995
40
13

1996
40
13

1997
40
13

1998
34
13

1999
34
15

2000
34
15

1995
3
0

1996
3
0

1997
8
0

1998
8
0

1999
8
0

2000
8
0

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
Table 4.14: Total Number of TV Stations
Namibia
Botswana

1990
3
0

1991
3
1

1992
3
0

1993
3
0

1994
3
0

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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nearly doubled, but between 1990 and 1998, a two-year shorter period,
Botswana’s total number of available telephones more than quadrupled.
In terms of radio infrastructure (Tables 4.13), a few interesting differences
appear. In the first place, Namibia inherited a substantially more developed
radio infrastructure set from South Africa upon independence – Botswana, on
the other hand, entered the 1990s with very little radio infrastructure and then
experienced a boom in terms of radio infrastructure development in the early
part of the decade – leaving it with substantially more AM stations than
Namibia by the end of the decade but far fewer FM stations.
Finally, in terms of television infrastructure (Table 4.14), Namibia’s
infrastructure is hardly even comparable to Botswana’s – not only does
Namibia enter the decade with three stations to Botswana’s zero, it
experiences substantial expansion in total available channels during the
1990s while, with the exception of an early 1990s “burp,” Botswana
experiences no growth in this sector.
The question remains, in terms of transformations in communication
infrastructure, that is to say the modernization of communication
infrastructure, which state experienced transformations more likely to
destabilize them? In terms of telephones, both states experienced growth so
rapid as to fit modernization-as-a-cause-of-destablization hypotheses, though
Botswana’s comparatively enormous growth in this sector puts it in the place
of “clear winner.” On the other hand, in terms of radio infrastructure
Botswana’s growth pattern seems to make it the better candidate for
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destablization, whereas in the case of television Namibia’s growth pushes it
into the forefront.
The question of structural parity is, then, somewhat problematic in this
category. Though Botswana seems to have actually experienced more
destabilizing growth of communications infrastructure than Namibia during the
studied period, one must ask whether or not television has a potential for
destabilization greater than that of the other two sets of infrastructure either
individually or even together. Regardless, substantial doubt has been
constructed as to whether or not Namibia can, in this regard, be considered
more unstable than Botswana in terms of communications development prior
to the East Caprivian incidents.
Economic Prospects
Theories on revolution and other forms of radical, extraordinary politics do
not, however, limit themselves to asserting that the transformation of the
system from a state of ordinary politics to extraordinary politics is the product
of the economic situation. Rather, they assert that it is declining perceived
benefits as well as perceived potential for future benefits. For information on
this matter we may consult survey data taken from Afrobarometer studies.
First, if we consider Tables 4.15 and 4.16 we can see immediately that
Namibia had both lower levels of general dissatisfaction with the state of the
economy and higher levels of satisfaction with the economy over time, that is
to say higher perceived benefits from the economy, than Botswana. This is
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Table 4.15: Satisfaction With Current Economic Conditions
Namibia

Botswana

Very Dissatified
Dissatisfied
Neither Dissatisfied or
Satisfied
Satisfied
Very Satisfied
Don't Know

83
270

174
468

190
404
77
109

112
309
70
43

Degrees of freedom: 5 ; Chi-square = 146.39 ; p is less than or equal to
0.001; The distribution is significant.
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 4.16: Satisfaction With Current Economic Conditions Compared to the
Previous Year
Namibia

Botswana

Very Dissatified
Dissatisfied
Neither Dissatisfied or
Satisfied
Satisfied
Very Satisfied
Don't Know

46
182

96
262

299
385
83
131

445
250
59
67

Degrees of freedom: 5 ; Chi-square = 112.96 ; p is less than or equal to
0.001; The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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not to say that Namibia does not still have significant economic
dissatisfaction, nor is it to say that Namibia does not have a significant
number of people who felt like their economic condition was neither improving
or actually getting worse – it is, however, to say that relative to Botswana
economic satisfaction was, in the eyes of the general theory, less likely to
lead to radical, extraordinary politics.
This point is further supported when we consider another
Afrobarometer survey question – specifically, “in twelve months time? Do you
expect economic conditions in Namibia [or Botswana] to be worse, the same,
or better than they are now?” Here again, as we see in Table 4.17, the
people of Botswana consistently see their economic situation in a more
pessimistic light than those of Namibia – 47% of Namibians predicted
improvement in their situation while only 32% of Batswana did the same, and
26% of Batswana believed their economic situation was likely to decline in
quality in the near future, whereas only 16% of Namibians did.

Socio-Cultural Comparison
Several socio-cultural comparisons are theoretically relevant. Specifically
these include statistics on fertility, migration, and average lifespan.
Additionally, comparative overviews of the ethno-cultural and religious makeups of both states, with specific emphasis on the degrees of fractionalization
and cross-border/interstate ties, may turn out to be relevant. Finally, basic
measures of attitudes towards gender-relations and ethnic relations, with
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Table 4.17: Prospects for Economic Conditions in the Coming Year
Namibia

Botswana

Very Dissatified
Dissatisfied
Neither Dissatisfied or
Satisfied
Satisfied
Very Satisfied
Don't Know

38
149

95
207

214
370
154
204

316
286
91
181

Degrees of freedom: 5 ; Chi-square = 80.91 ;p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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specific emphasis on the presence (or absence) of egalitarianism are highly
relevant.
Total Population
The total populations of Namibia and Botswana are roughly the same and
have been so for a substantial period of time (Table 4.18 and Figure 4.7).
They can be said to be in rough parity with one another and, indeed,
converging in absolute terms as time progresses (for population growth, see
below).
Lifespan
Consider Tables 4.19 and 4.20 and Figures 4.8 and 4.9; the implications are
obvious: both Namibia and Botswana are experiencing population affecting
phenomena that are virtually parallel. The sudden drops in expected lifespan
for both men and women in these states in the latter half of the 1990s in both
of these states, with Botswana’s experience occurring slightly before
Namibia’s, infers a political, economic, and social experience that is highly
similar and, in both cases, probably the result of the AIDS epidemic. The
inference is that both states, rather than just Namibia, might be expected to
experience a higher chance of radical, extraordinary politics during the period
studied as the expected gains from the orthodox system in both countries
drops precipitously in arguably the most salient possible category for the
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Table 4.18: Total Population (In Millions)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
1.452
1.225

1991
1.52
1.258

1992
1.575
1.292

1993
1.541
1.326

1994
1.596
1.359

1995
1.652
1.392

1996
1.677
1.478

1997
1.727
1.501

1998
1.622
1.448

1999
1.648
1.464

2000
1.771
1.577

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
Total Population
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Figure 4.7: Total Population
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Botswana

Table 4.19: Median Expected Age of Death for Males
Namibia
Botswana

1990
57
58

1991
58
59

1992
58
59

1993
58.6
59.5

1994
58.97
60

1995
59.4
60.5

1996
62.8
44.9

1997
63.23
43.5

1998
41.73
39.5

1999
41.6
39.4

2000
42.5
38.6

1998
41.24
40.8

1999
40.9
40.4

2000
40.5
39.9

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
Table 4.20: Median Expected Age of Death for Females
Namibia
Botswana

1990
63
64

1991
63
65

1992
63
65

1993
63.9
65.7

1994
64.4
66

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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1995
64.9
66.7

1996
66.7
47.1

1997
66.6
45.6

Median Expected Age
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Male Average Life Expectancy
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Figure 4.8: Male Life Expectancy
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)

Median Expected Age
of Death for Women

Female Life Expectancy
80
60
40
20
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Namibia

Figure 4.9: Female Life Expectancy
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Botswana

average person. That said, there is no question that in this category these
nation-states are in a state of manifest parity.
Fertility Rates and Population Growth
In mapping fertility rates in both Namibia and Botswana, we see that both
states, during the period studied, experienced gradually declining rates
overall throughout the period observed (Table 4.21 and Figure 4.10). The rate
of change difference is over 1 child difference for only one year (1995) and for
all but two years is less than .1 child, indicating that feminization (women
taking on non-traditional roles) and a general modernization of family political
economics are continuing at very similar rates in both countries – the AIDS
crisis may also contribute this phenomenon. Indeed, though Botswana’s
fertility rate at the beginning of the decade is nearly two children per woman
less than Namibia’s, the two states seem to be converging rapidly in this
regard, inferring that the two states, experiencing similar patterns of change,
are additionally, gradually, becoming more alike in absolute terms as well in
this regard.
This picture is only further emphasized when we consider the changing
rates of population growth in both countries (Table 4.22 and Figure 4.11).
Both states are experiencing rapid declines in the rate of population growth
throughout the period studied – Namibia begins the period with declines that
are more dramatic, but ultimately their rate of decline falls more into line with
patterns present in Botswana. All of the earlier potential explanations for
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Table 4.21: Total Fertility Rate (Median Number of Children Expected Per
Woman)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
6.6
4.8

1991
6.6
4.6

1992
6.5
4.4

1993
6.46
4.25

1994
6.4
4.06

1995
6.34
3.86

1996
5.1
4.26

1997
5.05
4.14

1998
4.99
4.03

1999
4.94
3.91

2000
4.89
3.8

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Figure 4.10: Total Fertility Rate
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Table 4.22: Growth as a Percentage of Population
Namibia
Botswana

1990
5.6
2.8

1991
3.6
2.7

1992
3.5
2.6

1993
3.46
2.53

1994
3.45
2.45

1995
3.44
2.36

1996
2.93
1.63

1997
2.94
1.48

1998
1.6
1.11

1999
1.57
1.05

2000
1.57
0.76

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
Figure 4.11: Population Growth as a Percentage of Total Population
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transformations in fertility rates remain valid, of course, as does the key point
here - that their changes remain roughly in parity with one another.
Infant Mortality Rates
If we compare the infant mortality rates (IMR) of Namibia and Botswana
(Table 4.23 and Figure 4.12) we can see that the general patterns of both
states are relatively similar – in both states we see a gradual decline in the
overall IMR through the mid-1990s, troughing out in 1995 for Botswana and
1997 for Namibia. Then we see a substantial increase in the IMRs of both
states leading into the period of the East Caprivian rebellion. Thus, in terms
of overall pattern, we can say that both states have experienced obvious
overall parity.
There remains, however, a question of relative deprivation here.
During the 1990s Namibia’s IMR experience may be described as a period of
sudden, dramatic benefit which evaporates as quickly as it came into an IMR
that is virtually the same as a decade before. Alternatively, Botswana’s
experience was one of steady gradually improving IMRs throughout recent
years and then, towards the end of the decade, a radical reversal of fortunes,
undoubtedly related to the HIV/AIDS crisis that is currently ravaging the
nation. The question here is, simply put, which scenario had the greatest
psychological impact – one of brief hopes undermined or one of relative
normalcy over decades disappearing rapidly. Arguments can be made for
both of these as being the most damaging, yet it is hard to conceive that the
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Table 4.23: Net Migration Rate (Number of Immigrants Per 1000 Residents)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
20
0

1991
0
0

1992
0
0

1993
0
0

1994
0
0

1995
0
0

1996
0
0

1997
0
0

1998
0
0

1999
0
0

2000
0
0

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Figure 4.12: Net Migration Rate
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Namibian experience in this matter is truly substantially more destabilizing
than that of the Batswana ordeal.
Migration Rates
With the end of South African occupation of Namibia at the beginning of the
decade, Namibia and Botswana’s respective migration rates converge in
absolute terms – Namibia, in other words, approaches near-zero migration
rates, converging with Botswana’s long-standing near-zero migration rates
(Table 4.24). The inference would be that both states are experiencing
political, social, and economic circumstances in the time studied that neither
compel disadvantaged persons to flee on a large-scale nor impel the
disadvantaged persons of other nation-states to seek refuge in these states.
There is, in other words, relative parity between these states with regards to
this figure.
Religious Make-Up
According to figures taken from the CIA World Factbook, one of the key
differences between Botswana and Namibia lies in the relative importance of
Christianity in the two states. Botswana is only about half Christian, the other
half of its population adhering to traditional religions, whereas Namibia is
around 90% Christian, of which about half of which are Lutheran (a product of
the early German colonization of the region).
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Religious composition may matter in one of two ways. On the one
hand, previous research has found that two of the major religious divisions,
specifically states dominated by Roman Catholics and states dominated by
Muslims, are more like to experience radical, extraordinary politics. Thus
examining the religious composition of a state has the potential to yield
substantive data on whether or not said state is likely to experience radical,
extraordinary politics.
With response to this point, it seems that there is parity between the
states – neither state has a substantial Islamic population and the Christian
populations of both states are predominately protestant.
Secondarily, as with other identity-related factors, we can look at the
level of religious fragmentation. The more fragmented the religious identity of
a state, the less likely said state is to experience the onset of radical,
extraordinary politics (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Goldstone et al. 2000).
Additionally, in states that have only slightly fractionalized states, that is to
say states that have only a few substantive divisions, these divisions tend to
take on great significance. This point seems counter-intuitive, perhaps
because when highly fractionalized states do collapse their wars tend to be so
violent that they remain highlighted in our memory.
By this model we can say that, in general terms, both Botswana and
Namibia have relatively little religious diversity in terms of total number of
groups but in which one state has a minority group of size (Namibia), whereas
in the other state the two significant groups are virtually equal in size
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(Botswana). Namibia, then, is the more likely state to experience religionoriented political dissatisfaction as it has a religious minority large enough to
be dangerous but small enough that it is unlikely to acquire substantive power
through democratic means. Thus, while Botswana is no more diverse in
terms of total number of religions, the comparative strength of traditionalism in
said state makes its practitioners far more capable of moderating Christian
machinations, thus making it less likely to experience radical, extraordinary
politics.
A point remains, however – since both states are functioning
democracies with relatively free exercise of both democratic principles and
guarantees of religious rights, the significance of this predictor is somewhat
(though by no means entirely) dampened.
Diversity and Identity Composition
Before going into the structural characteristics of diversity in Botswana and
Namibia, I would first like to outline them in socio-historical terms.
Religious Composition
According to figures taken from the CIA World Factbook, one of the key
differences between Botswana and Namibia lies in the relative importance of
Christianity in the two states. Botswana is only about half Christian, the other
half of its population adhering to traditional religions, whereas Namibia is
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around 90% Christian, of which about half of which are Lutheran (a product of
the early German colonization of the region).
Both Botswana and Namibia have relatively little religious diversity in
terms of total number of groups but in which one state has a minority group of
size (Namibia), whereas in the other state the two significant groups are
virtually equal in size (Botswana). Namibia has a religious minority large
enough to be dangerous but small enough that it is unlikely to acquire
substantive power through democratic means, and while Botswana is no
more diverse in terms of total number of religions, the comparative strength of
traditionalism in said state makes its practitioners far more capable of
moderating Christian machinations than in Namibia.
Ethnic Composition
Specific ethnic definitions do exist for both states. According to the CIA World
Factbook, about 50% of Namibia’s population belongs to the Ovambo tribe
and 9% to the Kavangos tribe; other ethnic groups include the Herero at 7%,
the Damara at 7%, the Nama at 5%, the Caprivians at 4%, Khoi-San
Bushmen at 3%, the Baster peoples at 2%, and the Tswana at 0.5%.
Additionally, approximately some 6% of the people are of European descent,
predominately German and English, while about 6.5% of the population is of
mixed race but not Baster – that is to say people of both African and
European descent, in whichi their African descendants were not Khoi-San.
Alternatively, Botswana’s dominant ethnic group, the Tswana (or Setswana)
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make up some 79% of the population, leaving 11% being Kalanga, 3% being
Basarwa, and those of Khoi-San, Kgalagadi and European descent
composing some 7% of the population.
The United Nations Common Country Assessment (2004) summarizes
the linguistic situation in Namibia, noting:
Namibia has 24 indigenous languages and major dialects,
including Oshiwambo, Rukavango, Otjiherero, Damara, Nama,
Silozi, Khoisan and Setswana, and three prominent languages
of European origin: Afrikaans, German and English. Although
English is Namibia’s official language, only 2% of households
use it as their main language. Afrikaans remains the lingua
franca in most of the southern four-fifths of the nation, while two
dialects of Oshiwambo—Oshindonga and Oshikwanyama—are
taught in some schools.
Now, this is an essential point. First, there are two lingua francas – English,
the official language of government (and the primary second language being
taught in the nation’s schools currently), and Afrikaans, the de facto language
of most commerce and day-to-day governmental activities. Secondly (UN
Common Namibia Country Assessment, 2004) there is substantial diversity of
language distribution in terms of languages spoken at home – Oshiwambo
constitutes the largest group, with almost 50% of the population, but two
groups, Nama/Damara speakers and Afrikaans speakers, constitute another
11% each, while Kavango speakers constitute almost 10% of the population,
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while Otjihereo speakers constitute almost 8% of the population and Caprivi
speakers some 5% of the population. Additionally, four other ethnic groups
make up between 2% and 1% of the population.
Alternatively, Ethnologue (Gordon 2005) describes the linguistic
situation in Botswana. Specifically, Tswana-speakers constitute around 75%
of Botswana’s population, speakers of Kalanga around 10%, and Kgalagadi
speakers around 3%. Only five of the remaining ethnic groups constitute
more than 1% of the total population (Birwa, Herero, Mbukushu, Nambaya,
and Yeyi) – the remaining population is constituted primarily of, though not
exclusively, of Khoisan.
General Structure of Diversity
The role of diversity in conflict development remains a point of contention.
There are two primary lines of logic. On the one hand is a Madisonian sort of
hypothesis. Some theorists, most notably Collier and Hoeffler (2000), assert
that very high levels of diversity decreases the ability of any particular group
to violently oppose the orthodox political-economy – resources are too widely
dispersed outside of the ruling coalition to result in outright radical,
extraordinary politics. The primary cause of radical, extraordinary politics, in
this perspective, lies in the agglomeration of power in too few hands, all of
whom believe they have the capability of grabbing all remaining power.
On the other hand, however, are those theorists that assert that
political instability tends to increase as ethnic and linguistic diversity
228

increases, as described in the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Alesina
(1994), Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1997), Easterly and Levin (1997).
These theorists, largely political economists and economists, hold that as
ethnic diversity increases bureaucratic and institutional efficiency decrease
and corruption increases, leading to greater levels of political instability and
slowing the rate of economic development. Specifically, these theorists
assert that
A logistic problem in discussing the concept of diversity lies in the
problem of quantifying it, or at least making a measure that is truly
transnational. Primordialists might adhere to the notion of discussing
biological diversity or race, but most theorists assert that the key concern is
actually identity. Language has usually been utilized as the primary measure
of diversity with regards to diversity, but as Okediji (2005) asserts, this fails to
take into account key variations of identity, or, more specifically, identity
variations that are non-linguistic. While, according to Okediji (2005), Soviet
social theorists were attempting to develop measures of identity
fractionalization that took into account both linguistic and non-linguistic
elements as early as 1964, the key Western works on the subject were
published first by Taylor and Hudson in 1972 and Mauro in 1995. The
indices they developed are known as ELF, or Ethno-Linguistic
Fractionalization, indices. Specifically, these indices measure the probability
that two randomly selected persons in a country will not belong to the same
ethno-linguistic group. While these early measures depend largely on explicit
229

ethnic divisions as defined by linguistic differences, Okediji (2005) seeks to
improve on the ELF including religious, racial, and what he calls primordial
and I call non-linguistic identities. He assimilates this data into what he calls
the SDI, or Social Diversity Index. This index ranges from 1, in which any
single member of a state would have a 100% chance that any person they
interacted with would be a member of another ethnic, linguistic, religious, or
racial group, to 0 in which the odds are 0%.
Among Okediji’s findings is that Botswana and Namibia have similar,
but by no means perfectly symmetric, SDIs. Botswana’s score is 0.9715, an
extremely diverse score, whereas Namibia’s score is .8753, also very diverse
(and still in the second highest quartile), but still obviously less diverse than
Botswana. To rephrase, Botswana is the 35th most diverse state on Earth
(out of the 133 analyzed by Okediji), whereas Namibia is the 59th.
The question remains, what does this mean? First, we can say that
there is a rough parity between Namibia and Botswana, with a small but
meaningful lean towards one state or the other. Yet, which way this lean
functions remains in question. If the neo-Madisonian theorists are correct,
this lean would be towards Namibia – being slightly less diverse, it would be
the state most likely to allow a minority group to acquire enough power to
rationalize the use of force in acquiring goods. Alternatively, if the
developmental theorists are correct, then Botswana is the state more likely to
have experienced radical, extraordinary politics.
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I will accept the latter of these two lines of theoretical work, based on
two points. First, if we look at Okediji’s SDI we can see that those states
which are both stable and diverse, by and large, are products of either
Northern Europe (British or Germanic) or Chinese political traditions. The
vast majority of other political systems that are diverse are not politically
stable or economically developed – inferring that they have developed unique
social technologies to soften the impact of diversity on their polities (in the
case of the Northern European traditions one thinks of the effects of the
Protestant Reformation, in the Chinese tradition the effects of thousands of
years of the simultaneous coexistence between Taoist, Confucian, and
Buddhist traditions, not to mention the traditions of rulers from the Mongolian
and Manchurian steppes).
Secondly, while the Madisonian approach is wholly rational, it is
dependent (in a manner which Collier and his peers seem to miss) on an
appropriate institutional arrangement – fractionalization in and of itself does
not bring about stability unless it is funneled through an appropriate
arrangement of laws and institutions – institutions like those usually employed
by the Northern European states (since the Enlightenment) and Chinese
states.
This is a key point, however, in explaining why Botswana and Namibia
have experienced only a single period of radical, extraordinary politics
between the two of them in the fifty-odd combined years of independence
between the two states. Both states employ political institutions that, in
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function and name, largely imitate those of Northern European states, which
is to be expected given that both states are former colonies of just such
states. While these institutions are young and definitely imperfect, they still
have performed their avowed purposes with a relatively high level of
respectability given their states’ respectively high levels of diversity.
All this said, we also must be concerned with the number of ethnic
groups in each state who share their ethno-linguistic identities with persons in
neighboring states, a factor demonstrated to increase the odds said group will
seek to engage in radical, extraordinary politics (Weiner 1971). The interstate
implications of such a situation are well-known – few students of the social
sciences or history have forgotten the power of Hitler’s call for Anschluss.
Specifically, what I am comparing here is not only the presence of
substantial transnational populations, but furthermore the presence of
substantial transnational populations that are geographically adjacent –
specifically, I seek to determine which state has transnational populations in
the greater number that consider the reorganization of boundaries (or even
the creation of an independent state) to be a favorable and feasible outcome.
As mentioned above, Namibia is home to 24 ethnolinguistic groups, whereas
Botswana is home to 28 ethnolinguistic groups (Gordon 2005) – relatively
close to one another, though with a significant difference. Of these language
groups, the homelands of 18 in Botswana and 17 in Namibia border other
states (Angola, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the case of Namibia,
Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the case of Botswana).
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Immediately what we see in this instance is that parity actually increases,
though again Botswana has the slight advanatage in terms of destabilizing
border ethnolinguistic groups.
This is the not our final dimension here, however. Specifically, we
need to determine how many of these ethnolinguistic groups are actually
transnational, that is to say have substantial populations on both sides of the
border. If we determine this by assuming that the group has at least 1,000
members sharing a common ethnolinguistic identity across state borders and
that these members are not geographically isolated deep in their host state’s
hinterland, then we can say that both Botswana and Namibia have seventeen
such groups, in other words perfect parity. Indeed, if we consider the total
proportion of the population of these states whose ethnolinguistic identity can
be considered transnational, it is essential to note that virtually the entire
populations of both states fall into this category. This holds even for the
largest ethnolinguistic identities in both states. Botswana’s largest
ethnolinguistic identity, the Tswana, share their identity with almost 3.5 million
other men and women in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (around three
times as many Tswana as actually reside in Botswana), while Namibia’s
largest ethnolinguistic group, the Kwanyama, share their identity with around
421,000 residents of Angola (about 4/7ths the population of Kwanyama in
Namibia).
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Minorities at Risk
The Minorities at Risk project (MAR), a product of the University of Maryland’s
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, is probably
best described in the words of its editors:
MAR tracks 284 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the
world from 1945 to the present -- identifying where they are,
what they do, and what happens to them. MAR focuses
specifically on ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal
groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary
world because of their status and political actions. Political
significance is determined by the following two criteria: the
group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic
discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society
[and/or] the group is the basis for political mobilization and
collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined
interests.
This definition immediately alerts us to one of the limitations of the MAR data.
The project is specifically limited to minorities which are politically active. This
means that groups which have, for one reason or another, developed their
political infrastructure to a modern level, establishing for instance political
parties, rather than retaining traditional political infrastructures, for instance
tribes or clans, are far more likely to draw the attention of the MAR.
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Alienation and withdrawal from the state do not qualify a group for
consideration under this purview. This is not an entirely hampering trait,
however. Political activism, it may be argued, infers that the oppressed group
does not accept its condition – these groups, then, seem to be the most likely
candidates for engaging in political violence. A protest against this
perspective, however, might be simply that alienation allows for the
development of space and true independence from the state.
MAR has noted that there are four ethnic groups that warrant some
concern in Namibia. Two of these, the Europeans (who, under the South
African regime, controlled the vast majority of political power and economic
power, and still continue to own most of the nation-state’s means of
production), and the Basters, are formally privileged groups who still retain
significant benefits from their former roles – Europeans their wealth, Basters
their local autonomy. The MAR notes that these groups are highly unlikely to
revolt, specifically because their current positions remain largely privileged,
and this will likely remain the case as long as these groups are not injured as
substantially as similar groups were in the process of land reform, as in the
cases of South Africa and Zimbabwe.
The remaining two groups are the Khoi-San “bushmen” who live mostly
in the Kalahari Desert in the state’s northeast and the East Caprivian peoples,
the Mafwe, Subiya and Mayeye. The San are considered to have a stake in
the current government, being partially represented in numerous major
organizations, including the SWAPO party, and are currently in negotiations
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with the central government for concessions, particularly in terms of land
reform. These reforms are seen as essential, given that the San are a
transnational people who are beginning to develop political and resource
networks throughout southern Africa, including in most of Namibia’s
neighbors.
The East Caprivian peoples, however, did revolt and are still
considered a potential source of future rebellion. The MAR project states
that:
The Caprivians have several of the factors that increase the
likelihood of future rebellion: 1) territorial concentration; 2)
recent government repression; and 3) lack of support by the
government or transnational groups for reform. However, there
are other factors that favor the containment of rebellion: 1)
Namibia is a stable democracy; 2) the group is not very well
organized or mobilized; and 3) past protest has been fairly
limited. Although the group does not encounter significant
political or cultural restrictions often associated with protest,
repression against the group might contribute to future group
protest.
Of particular note for the 1999 rebellion are the issues of territorial
concentration and lack of support for reform – the government repression
mentioned was actually a part of the swift and, it should be noted, highly
effective government response to East Caprivian violence. MAR notes
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additionally that the Mafwe, Subiya and Mayeye peoples are Lozi/Barotse
peoples who share common cultures and languages with the Lozi of Zambia
and Botswana, and that the area remains heavily militarized, in large part out
of concern for the instability of western and central Africa, especially in
Angola, and was one of the areas substantially effected by both the Angolan
civil war and the Namibia war of independence during the Cold War.
An additional essential piece of data lies in the following quote:
In 1998, a secessionist movement developed amongst the
group, led by Mishake Muyongo and Chief Boniface Mamili.
The impetus for secession was a promise supposedly made
by Sam Nujoma, the leader of SWAPO, to Muyongo during
the years of their alliance from 1964 to 1980. Years after the
alliance was over, Muyongo claimed that Nujoma had
promised independence for Caprivi when Namibia gained
independence from South Africa. When Namibia gained
independence in 1990, this did not come to fruition, and
Nujoma has denied ever making such a promise.
Here we see something key, and furthermore, a harbinger of this
dissertation’s second major inquiry, specifically the elite role in grievance
creation. I will discuss this point at more length below, after addressing the
Batswana instance of an MAR.
The only MAR the MAR Project names are the Khoi-San peoples,
culturally similar to those already mentioned. The project considers these
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San to engender a moderate likelihood of rebellion, given a number of factors.
First, they share and identity with the Khoi-San of the entire region; like the
East Caprivians, the Batswana San are at risk of any spillovers from Angola
and their homeland is a major security concern of the central government.;
third, they have been forcibly resettled by the state recently and deprived
utterly of access to their traditional means of subsistence, rendering them
utterly at the behest of the state.; and fourth, the Batswana government
substantially restricts the San’s ability to express their cultural and political
concerns. These factors are in part mitigated, however, by the fact that even
if the San have relatively little influence on the government of Botswana, at
least one transnational organization and the government of the United
Kingdom are both putting heavy pressure on the Batswana government for
reform, not to mention the fact that the San have virtually no history of protest
or formal anti-state activities in Botswana.
What differentiates the only minority at risk in Botswana, considered
only a moderate threat for inciting radical, extraordinary politics, from the
peoples of East Caprivia, who in 1999 openly attacked the forces of the
Namibian state? Not transnational ethnic linkages – both groups have them.
Not a concentrated geographic homeland – both groups have them, even if
they have been dictated by outside powers. Not the fact that both have been
the site of their respective states’ efforts to deal with the instability of western
and central Africa in general and Angola in particular. In point of fact, the only
major difference observable in these reports is the difference in the behaviors
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of elites with regards to the circumstances these groups found themselves in.
Elites in Namibia, among the Lozi/Barotse peoples, actively developed a
rhetoric of grievance and, apparently, command networks.
But, back to the question at hand, which state’s minority risk structures
represented the greatest threat of rebellion prior to 1999. We would have to
say, using the data available at MAR, that Namibia did by mere reason of the
total number of MAR groups – structural and institutional arrangements
enveloping the MARs, however, can hardly be said to be more conducive to
rebellion in Namibia than in Botswana, unless we consider the Batswana
actions of isolating the Khoi peoples and removing their ability to support
themselves independent of the state to have been a highly effective
Machiavellian move, utterly depriving the group of any capacity for
independent action – a point which is, of course, highly valid.

Political Comparison
Comparisons at the political level may be conducted along several other
dimensions. Specifically, one may compare the institutions and legal systems
of the two states at the formal level, the degree of functional democratization
between the two states (or, for that matter authoritarianism or anocracy), the
prevalence of endemic political corruption, the presence of formal and
informal political discrimination (with specific emphasis on religious, genderbased, and racial/ethnic discrimination), and the degree of political
participation.
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Political Centralization
In the first part, both Namibia and Botswana are unitary states, that is to say
states in which the subordinate units of governance are only administrative
units and exist only at the behest of the central state and be dissolved when
said central state feels appropriate. This point, in the case of Namibia, is
made explicitly in Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Namibian
constitution and again in Chapter XII, Article 102. In the case of Botswana,
however, the proof of this is notable in the virtual absence of any real mention
of sub-units, save in Chapter 65, in which the creation of voting districts is
discussed. In other words, both states’ regional subunits have been created
since independence through simple majoritarian legislation.
Institutional Arrangement of the Branches of Government and the Legislative
Process
Contrasting and comparing any two states’ formal institutional arrangements
is a problematic task in the contemporary age – the American constitutional
model, with its complex system of checks and balances has made its mark on
the institutional systems of many states hoping to avoid slipping from republic
or democracy into tyranny. Namibia and Botswana are, as shall shortly be
made clear, no exception to this rule. In order to deal with the inherent
complications in this task, I have divided this section of my study into three
subsections. First, I will review the formal institutional arrangements of
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Namibia. Second, I will review the formal institutional arrangements of
Botswana. Finally I will list and explain the fundamental differences between
the two, commenting on the theoretical implications of each.
Also, in an additional note, for the first two subsections below, citations
are to the relevant elements of the various nation-states’ respective
constitutions.
Namibia
Namibia’s political system is divided into three independent branches whose
relation to one another is very similar to that of the United States of America.
One corner of the Namibian political pyramid, that of the executive branch, is
built around a president. (Chapter V, Article 27, Paragraph 1). The president
attains office through direct election by at least 50% of the voting population –
failure to achieve 50% in the final vote necessitates additional, succeeding
ballots (Chapter V, Article 28, Paragraph 2, Sections a, b, and d). The
president’s term of office is five years (Chapter V, Article 29, Paragraph 1) –
originally there was a two-term limit, but recently the National Assembly
amended the Constitution to allow a third term (First Amendment). The
president of Namibia is ineligible for prosecution during office, but if
impeached by the National Assembly (Chapter V, Article 31) is eligible for
criminal (but not civil) charges with regards to the basis of the impeachment.
Namibia’s president has a number of key responsibilities. Not only is
the president the commander-in-chief of the Namibian military and police
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forces, he or she is additionally the head of government, that is to say the
head of the bureaucracy. He or she is also responsible for reporting the state
of the nation at least once a year to the parliament, specifically during the
budgetary process. On the international front the president also has the
power to accredit (or fail to accredit) diplomatic personnel and is responsible
for negotiating and signing (though not ratifying) interstate agreements. The
president also has the ability to establish new agencies and appoints the
Prime Minister (the chief of parliamentary procedure in the cabinet), the
various ministers and deputy-ministers (that is to say the administrators of the
various ministries and members of the Cabinet), the Attorney-General, and so
on, as well as the members of the various courts and other commissions
(including the heads of the military and police forces and prison system)
(Chapter V, Article 32).
Aside from the ability to write and submit new legislation to the
parliament, the president has two other key legislative powers. First, he or
she can nominate up to six ex officio members of the National Assembly and,
quite significantly, has the right to propose legislation to the parliament
directly (Chapter V, Article 32, Section c and Chapter VII, Article 46,
Paragraph 1). Second, and far more significantly, the president has the ability
to veto (that is to say “withhold assent”) any piece of legislation passed by the
National Assembly by less than two-thirds of its full membership (Chapter VII,
Article 56). An interesting alternative to this, in some cases at least, is the
president’s ability to send the legislation to the High Court (discussed below),
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for consideration in terms of constitutionality (Chapter VII, Article 64,
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4) – the effect is definitely not an abject veto, but
potentially a way around the 2/3rds override rule in at least some cases.
The cabinet, it should be noted, beyond merely being an advisory and
administrative tool, also has the power to initiate bills for submission to the
National Assembly (Chapter VI, Article 40) – though the significance of this
point in light of the president’s similar power is easy to overstate.
The National Assembly of Namibia constitutes that nation’s legislative
branch and primary budgetary-approval organ (Chapter VII, Article 63,
Paragraph 1). Specifically, it is a unicameral body made up of seventy-two
members whose membership is elected directly by the public using a
proportional system (Chapter VII, Article 44 and 46, Paragraph 1 and Article
50). Voting in this body is done, for everything save constitutional
amendments, using a simple majoritarian method (Chapter VII, Article 67).
Members of the National Assembly can only be removed from office either
due to unfitness or through a sentence or commission of guilt in a felony
case, or if they take a conflicting position in another assembly or body of
government, if they miss sittings of the Assembly for ten consecutive days
without having received special leave, or, of course, if they are voted out.
The chief of parliamentary procedure in this house is a speaker chosen from
among their numbers (Chapter VII, Article 51).
In the face of Namibia’s strong presidency some, though limited,
checks were established in the Constitution. For instance, any person or
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persons appointed to any position in the government and/or Cabinet may be
terminated from their office by a 2/3rds vote of parliament (Chapter V, Article
39). Also, the National Assembly has the right review, consider, and criticize
any action of the president if 1/3rd of representatives desire to do so, and
further they have the right to overturn any action of the president that is
otherwise within his or her prerogative with a 2/3rds vote (Chapter V, Article
32, Paragraph 9). The National Assembly furthermore has the power to ratify
(or fail to ratify) any international agreement negotiated and signed by the
president (Chapter VII, Article 63, Paragraph 2, Section d).
One of the most interesting elements of the Namibian political
arrangement is the ability of the president to dissolve parliament, ostensibly
on the advice of the cabinet (Chapter VII, Article 56). This constitutes a sort
of executive no-confidence vote. In essence this process allows the president
to, potentially, take advantage of changing political circumstances, but not
without consequence to his or her person – should the president dissolve
parliament, his or her term comes effectively to an end and the president
must, along with parliament, stand for reelection immediately. While this
principle is relatively common among traditional parliamentary systems, it is
far less common among presidential systems in which the legislative body is,
as in this case, more than a mere rubber stamp.
The Namibian judiciary is a fully independent judiciary composed of
three key levels – the Supreme Court (which has original jurisdiction on
constitutional matters and is composed of a Chief Justice and at least three
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other presiding justices – the number of presiding justices may change over
time and in response to unique necessities), a High Court (which is, in
essence, a sort of national appeals court and which consists of a JudgePresident and an indeterminate number of other presiding justices), and the
\various lower courts of Namibia which are nothing more than simple districtbased courts (Chapter IX, Article 78). As discussed above, justices are
appointed by the president of Namibia and may be prevented from attaining
or remaining in office through a 2/3rds vote of parliament.
The boundaries of regional and local governments in Namibia (again, a
unitary state) are delimited by a body known as the Delimitation Council, an
inter-branch organization consisting of a judge from either the Supreme or
High Court and two presidential appointees. Each region is then afforded a
regional council whose composition is determined by election (one
representative per constituency in the region, with each region being made up
of no less than six and no more than twelve constituencies). Each regional
and local government has the right to both raise revenue and exercise
whatever powers are designated to them by congress and the members of
these various units are elected democratically by their inhabitants (Chapter
XII).
Namibia also has an interesting consultative body known as the
National Council that acts as a go-between agent between regional and
national organs of government. Members of the National Council are
appointed by the various regional councils for a period of six years – a
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Chairperson, elected from within their numbers is their head of parliamentary
procedure (Chapter VIII, Article 71, Paragraph 2 and Article 73). This body
has four primary functions. First, it reviews all legislation passed by the
National Assembly and comments on it before it is formally provided to the
presidency. Second, it reports on the conditions and opinions of the various
regions as bodies to the National Assembly. Third, it has the power to
recommend legislation to the National Assembly, and, finally, the National
Council may conduct research and investigative efforts if so empowered by
the National Assembly (Chapter VIII, Article 74). In the process of reviewing
legislation, it may recommend to the president that said legislation is
unconstitutional or should be vetoed and, alternatively, it may send the
legislation back to the National Assembly with one or more amendments
recommended.
Botswana
The executive power of Botswana lies in the president and his or her cabinet.
Rather than, as in the case of most presidential systems, being elected by the
general population, the president of Botswana is elected by the National
Assembly (the lower house of the Batswana legislature) (Chapter IV, Part I
and III). The president, it should be noted, may serve no longer than an
aggregate of ten years and, should any circumstance arise that would make
him or her no longer a valid candidate for parliamentary service, must
withdraw from office. Also, in the event that parliament dissolves for any
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reason, the president must stand for reelection at the hands of the new
parliament (Article 34, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3).
All this said, in the exercise of power, the president is functionally
independent of the parliament which appoints him (Article 47, Paragraph 2) –
though, it should be said, parliament may transfer any executive powers it
wishes to other offices (Article 47, Paragraph 3). Two key and fundamental
exceptions to this parliamentary prerogative, however, exist. One is the
president’s exclusive right to the supreme command of Botswana’s military
forces (Article 48). The other is the president’s exclusive right to introduce
bills having to do with taxation, revenue creating, budgetary payments, and
debt (Article 88, Paragraph 1). The president of Botswana also has the
“prerogative of mercy”, that is to say the right to pardon criminal offenses
and/or to substitute a less severe form of punishment than that imposed by
the criminal process (Article 53).
Of course, the Batswana president cannot be presented with criminal
while serving in office, yet upon the cessation of his or her office, the
president may be charged accordingly with crimes of which he or she is
accused of committing during the period of his or her tenure (Article 41,
Paragraphs 1 and 2).
Botswana’s presidential veto power is particularly unusual – it exists
not to prevent the passage of legislation so much as to force legislators to
reconsider legislation. In the event a particular item is passed, the president
may withhold his assent. Should parliament not revisit and once more pass
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the bill within six months, the bill fails, but if parliament passes the bill once
more during that time and the president does not, within 21 days, dissolve
parliament, the bill passes (Article 87).
The ministers of the various cabinet-ministries are appointed by the
president (with National Assembly approval) from members of the parliament
in general, though the president has the right to nominate up to four ministers
who are not members of parliament who have skills or qualifications uniquely
preparing them for the position (Part II, Article 42). The cabinet’s functions
are, simply put, to advise the president with respect to policy matter and to
further fulfill the will and orders legislated in the National Assembly – that
said, the powers of the ministers are to be specifically detailed by each
president (Article 50).
The Batswana legislature is, at least ostensibly, bicameral in form,
though the vast majority of power resides in the lower house, that is to say in
the Parliament. Parliament is composed of 57 publicly elected members who
constitute the National Assembly, four “specially” elected members (chosen
by the parliament itself), the President, and the Attorney-General (who is ex
officio)(Article 58). The head of parliamentary procedure for the body is the
Speaker of the National Assembly, an individual elected for this purpose by
the National Assembly either from among its members or, if it so chooses,
from among qualified persons outside that body (Article 59). Each member of
the National Assembly is elected from a constituency that is delimited and
defined by the Delimitation Commission, that is to say through direct district
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elections (Article 62). The Delimitation Commission is composed of a high
member of the judicial branch (who is chair) and a series of other persons
chosen by the National Assembly who are not (and have not been for at least
five years) involved in politics in either an electoral or appointed fashion
(including running for but failing to acquire office)(Article 63). Members of the
National Assembly must stand for reelection if Parliament is dissolved for any
reason (Article 68).
The president may dissolve the parliament whenever he or she wishes
and, in the event the president does not dissolve parliament, the members of
parliament must stand for reelection at least once every five years (Article
91). The key exception to this rule is that, during periods of declared war the
parliament may delay elections for periods of a year at time, though they may
do this no more than five times. In the instance of a dissolution the president
himself or herself will stand for election by that body again. Alternatively, the
parliament may at any time, with a simple majority vote, declare that it has no
confidence in the president and his or her government (cabinet), forcing just
such a reelection process. That said, four days after a no-confidence vote
parliament itself is dissolved and must stand for reelection (Article 92).
The upper house of the Batswana legislature is the House of Chiefs.
The House is composed of fifteen members: the eight Chiefs of the primary
Tsowana tribes (who serve ex officio), the four sub-chiefs of Chobe, the North
East, Ghanzi, and Kgalagdi, and three persons elected by the other twelve
members who, it should be noted, have not been active in politics for at least
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five years (Part III, Articles 77, 78, and 79). If parliament dissolves, the
House also dissolves, though upon reconstitution only the Specially Elected
Members are necessarily up for reelection. The other chiefs are up for
election according to schedules set up among the various peoples and/or
districts the represent, and therefore are not considered in the constitution.
The function of the House of Chiefs is elementary enough. It exists,
primarily, to consider bills on the powers of Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs, and
Headmen; the powers and organization of traditional courts; and the
organization and/or communal property of the various tribes. The House then
develops resolutions that either support, protest, or recommend amendments
to legislation on these matters and provide these to the National Assembly for
consideration before their final votes. Additional responsibilities of this body
include to advise any ministers who might seek its opinion with regards to any
subject and to discuss the implications of any executive or legislative activity
in terms of its possible effects on any of the tribes or the tribal system as a
whole. In other words, the House of Chiefs exists only to guarantee that the
government is not ignorant of the implications of these particularly influential
and powerful interest groups (Article 83).
Aside from this “presidential” system that is really a variation of the
parliamentary system, one finds that Botswana has a fully independent
judiciary. The judicial system of this state is composed of a High Court and
Court of Appeal which, intriguingly, seem to be nearly coequal in many
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regards, and those various lower courts which parliament deems necessary
to for the execution of justice.
The High Court is the supreme court of the land and has original
jurisdiction over literally any case it cares to accept (Chapter VI, Article 95).
The head of the court’s parliamentary procedure is the Chief Justice who has
the power not only to determine where the court shall sit, but further the rules
by which the court shall operate, though with the advise of an advisory
committee. The president of Botswana appoints the Chief Justice and other
members of the High Court, under advice of the Judicial Service Commission
from among persons who have already held some other judgeship or position
as an attorney or magistrate, or is a professor of law (Article 96). Judges of
the High Court may only be removed by the president upon the
recommendation of a tribunal of at least three members, all of high judicial
office (current or previous), in which they are found either incapable or
unsuitable (Article 97). Additionally, in questions of whether or not any
election or appointment has been properly conducted, the High Court has the
power to adjudicate the matter (Article 69).
The Court of Appeal is also chaired by the Chief Justice; all other
justices are appointed or duly removed in a manner indistinguishable from
those listed above for the High Court (Articles 99,100, and 101). It exists,
specifically, as a high court, though not the court of final appeal, to rehear
cases in which there is compelling evidence that error may have been made
at a lower court. The constitution, interestingly, asserts that the Court of
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Appeal may hear cases from the High Court dealing with constitutionality,
save in the instance of the constitution question dealing with the election of
members of parliament (Article 105) – this in spite of earlier constitutional
assertions that the High Court is the supreme court.
The constitution of Botswana makes little or not mention of the nature
by which local or regional governments are established. Rather, the form and
function of local and regional governmental bodies are dictated by the
National Assembly, often through the guise of the Ministry of Local
Government (formerly part of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing).
In general, local governments are democratically elected or are the product of
traditional mechanisms of election, districts are administered by central
government appointees, the Ministry and its various organs coordinate
between these levels.
Institutional Variations and Similarities
To begin our summation of the institutional differences between Namibia and
Botswana, I would like to discuss the key point that both states are unitary in
nature. Despite the fact that both states are multicultural, multinational, and
ethnically diverse and despite the fact that both states are geographically
large and diverse in terms of regional specialization, founding elites in both
chose the unitary model – their concern, in other words, was more about
retaining political stability and territorial integrity than it was about
guaranteeing representation of minorities and ethnic or regional interests.
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Furthermore, both states have dealt with this inevitable concern through the
construction of constitutionally mandated bodies – the National Council in the
case of Namibia and the House of Chiefs in the case of Botswana – that have
sweeping consultative powers, but virtually no ability to legislate in and of
themselves. Though the former draws its membership in a geographic
fashion and the latter directly from tribal elites, the effect is the same – to
allow regional and ethnic interests (given that minorities in both states tend to
live not only alongside majorities in municipalities but also have their own
rural, ethnic enclaves) to be heard. In other words, both states guarantee the
power of particular political-economic-cultural interests without a meaningful
power of veto from minority political-economic-cultural interests, but with a
built-in valve for allowing these minority interests to vent themselves.
As to the legislative bodies, regardless of the claims of Botswana, both
states are functionally unicameral – their primary difference lies in the method
by which their constituent members are chosen. Namibia’s proportional
representation, on the one hand, and Botswana’s direct election system on
the other, while having the potential to yield substantial policy variances,
probably, in all likelihood, have not due in large part to the fact that neither
state has truly competitive elections. This is not to say that the elections are
flawed, but rather that both states’ legislatures have, since their inception, had
only one majority party (in both cases with overwhelming majorities) –
SWAPO in Namibia and the BDP in Botswana. Variance in behavior, thus,
may largely, at least unto this point, be described more as a product of
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variance between these parties than variance between their states’ legislative
institutions.
With regards to executive power, the situation is simple: Namibia has
relatively strong, independent presidency; Botswana a parliamentary system
in which the head of government has the title “president” and is, in effect, is a
slightly stronger than usual prime minister. Institutionally this is the most
important variance between the two states. Most specifically, this is
highlighted by Namibia’s president’s strong veto power and Botswana’s
presidents relatively weak veto power and the direct election of the Namibian
president virtually the “election” of the Batswana president from the National
Assembly. Of course, in both states the president is both head of state and
head of government, not to mention commander-in-chief, and in both the
president has the ability to dissolve the legislature and has sweeping powers
of appointment, both in the bureaucracy and the judiciary. Also, presidents in
both states are immune to prosecution during their presidencies. Ultimately,
then, we must state that the fundamental variance between the power of the
two executives lies in the ability of their legislatures to see them off – if the
Namibian National Assembly dissolves the government, the president has a
good chance of returning by popular acclaim. If the Batswana National
Assembly does the same, the odds that the president will return are slim to
none (without a substantial change in that same body’s make-up).
Beyond some relatively minor variances in terms of appellate
jurisdiction, the institutional arrangements of Botswana and Namibia’s fully
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independent judiciaries in both states, with fluid membership structures are
virtually indistinguishable. Both are founded definitively in the English-Dutch
legal tradition, utilizing both common law precedent and Roman code style
law (though Botswana’s constitution explicitly forbids the use of common law
on capital cases). Also, both states employ relatively fluid judicial institutions,
assuming that special instances will inevitably arrive and unique judicial
solutions should be available for dealing with these situations.
And of course both states afford both the parliament and the president
the right to dissolve the elected/appointed state, though only at the cost of
their own position. The result is a system in which both branches of
government have a powerful threat to wave at the other, but an equally
powerful reason to use this power only in the most significant of
circumstances.
Official Language
In the cases of both Namibia and Botswana, the official language of
government is English (see Chapter 1, Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Namibian
constitution and Chapter 61, Paragraph d and Chapter 79, Article 4,
Paragraph c of the Batswana constitution). Namibia takes pains to assert that
the official language need not restrict the use of other languages for
pedagogy (Chapter 1, Article 3, Paragraph 2) and asserts that the state may,
at some future time, add other official languages (Chapter 1, Article 3,
Paragraph 3). On the other hand, the Batswana constitution, (Chapter 32,
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Article 3, Paragraph c) specifically sets out voting procedures that allow for
the use of symbols and colors, rather than the written word of any language,
English included, for candidate selection. Additionally, in the instance of court
cases, Botswana provides that publicly subsidized interpreters will be
provided to the defendant(s) if he or she cannot understand the language in
which the trial is being carried out (Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 1,
Section f).
Civil Rights
Both Namibia and Botswana provide extensively for the protection of civil
rights in their constitutions. Table 4.25 illustrates the formal, constitutional
protections of civil rights in both states – at this level, at least, little real
differentiation can be described between the two, save for two key points.
First, while Namibia has banned execution as a legal punishment for high
crimes, Botswana has no such injunction. In practice, however, the Batswana
government uses this right relatively rarely, having executed only about 20
people between its independence and the close of the Twentieth Century
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Table 4.24: Comparison of Civil Rights Guarantees
Namibia

Botswana
Banning of Death Penalty
Chapter III, Article 6
Not Banned (see Chapter II, Article 4
Banning of Slavery and Forced Labor (Among Civilians, Non-Prisoners)
Chapter III, Article 9
Chapter II, Article 5
Chapter II, Article 6
Banning of Torture and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Chapter III, Article 8
Chapter II, Article 7
Guarantee of Equality Under the Law Regardless of Gender, Race, Color, Ethnicity, Religion,
Creed, Social Status, or Economic Status
Chapter III, Article 10
Chapter II, Article 3
Chapter III, Article 14
Chapter II, Article 15
Chapter III, Article 23, Paragraph 1
Freedom of Speech, Expression, Religion, Cultural Practices, Association, and Assembly
Chapter III, Article 19
Chapter II, Article 3
Chapter III, Article 21, Paragraph 1, Sections Chapter II, Article 11
a, b, c, d, e, & f
Chapter II, Article 12
Chapter II, Article 13
Freedom of Movement and to Select Profession
Chapter III, Article 21, Paragraph 1, Sections Chapter II, Article 14
g, h, i, & j
Freedom to Acquire and Be Compensated for Property
Chapter III, Article 16
Chapter II, Article 8
Habeas Corpus Rights
Chapter III, Article 7
Chapter II, Article 5
Chapter III, Article 11, Paragraphs 1 & 3
Chapter II, Article 14, Paragraph 1
Chapter II, Article 16
Right to Be Accused of One’s Suspected Crime
Chapter II, Article 11
Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 2, Section b
Chapter II, Article 16, Paragraph 2, Section a
Right to a Fair, Public, and Speedy Trial
Chapter II, Article 12, Paragraph 1
Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraphs 9 and 10
Right to Legal Counsel
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 1, Section
Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 2, Sections
e
c and d
Chapter II, Article 16, Paragraph 2, Section d
Note: Botswana does not provide lawyers if
the defendant cannot afford one
Double Jeopardy Banned
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 2
Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 5
Self-Incrimination Banned
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 1, Section f Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 7
No Ex Post Facto Prosecutions
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 3
Chapter II, Article 10, Paragraph 4
Right to Call Witnesses in One’s Defense
Chapter III, Article 12, Paragraph 1, Section
Chapter II, Article 10 Paragraph 1, Section e
d
Search Warrant/Probable Cause Rights (Privacy Rights)
Chapter III, Article 13
Chapter II, Article 3
Chapter II, Article 9
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(see the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1999 and 2000).
Secondly, while the Namibian constitution guarantees that all
defendants will have access to an attorney (or equivalent representation), that
of Botswana provides no such guarantee. Rather, Botswana guarantees the
defendant only 1) the right to defend himself or herself and 2) the right to use
an attorney if the defendant can afford and pay for one. The key exception to
this former point is that, for capital cases, the government will afford
defendants attorneys. As a product, the vast majority of rural court cases
involve no trained legal defense, resulting in the widespread undermining of
defendant’s rights.
Having considered the formal differences, the practical differences in
human rights practices between the two nation-states remain to be
considered. While there are many possible resources for acquiring this data,
among the most comprehensive and systematic is the United States
Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
began to release reports on every state in the world’s human rights practices
in the 1999 (publicly released in February of 2000 as the Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, or CRHRP) – these reports detail every known
violation and/or pattern of violation in the considered states throughout not
only the immediately preceding year, but furthermore during the generally
preceding period (reviewing, generally, the decade before).
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The CRHRP, for instance, notes that both states, while generally
having good relations between different ethnic groups, do have some
instances of racial and ethnic discrimination, particularly against people of the
San (Bushmen) ethnicity – though in Namibia virtually every other significant
minority is represented in the National Assembly. Additionally, members of
minority ethnicities generally charged that they were underrepresented in the
legislatures of both Namibia and Botswana and whites had distinct economic
and political advantages vis-à-vis other ethnicities. The key difference in
terms of the two states’ problems with ethnic and racial discrimination lay in
the institution of the House of Chiefs (see above) in which only members of
the Tswana (majority) ethnic group’s eight principal tribes have voting
membership. That said, neither state’s urban areas are substantially
segregated and in neither country is ethnicity correlated with income among
those of African descent.
In terms of gender relations, however, according to the CRHRP,
Namibia is substantially more developed than Botswana. Granted, both
states experience some widespread abuse of women, including rape,
however 3 out of 5 women in Botswana will be physically or sexually abused
or assaulted at some point in their lives. Additionally, Namibia’s laws, if not
their full enforcement, are staunchly feminist, whereas in Botswana husbands
have the right to “chastise” their wives physically and, in the case of traditional
marriages, have full rights to all of their wife or wives’ property.
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The CRHRP reports that both states are fully functioning democracies
in which competitive elections are held. That said, some limited vote-rigging
is reported to have occurred in both Namibia and Botswana and both states
have been dominated by single parties, SWAPO in the case of Namibia and
the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), since their respective moments of
political independence.
In both Botswana and Namibia, prior to the 1999 East Caprivi incident,
both states experienced some limited police and military abuses. Largely
these were limited to abuses against refugees and illegal immigrants and
prisoners whose detainment was legal. Botswana, however, allows its police
to beat prisoners in the pursuit of evidence, despite its constitutional ban on
torture, and admits evidence found as a product of such actions – though it
does not allow confessions of guilt acquired under such actions to be
admitted in court. That said, such measures are usually rare. Also,
traditional courts in Botswana frequently impose corporeal punishment in the
forms of lashings or floggings to the buttocks – recent attempts by traditional
leaders to acquire the right to administer these floggings to the back were
denied by the central government.
While both states’ constitutions allow the government to suspend
constitutional rights during periods of national (or regional) emergency, such
emergency has only been declared in Namibia, during the period of 1999
East Caprivi incident. Following the lapse of the period of emergency, some
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three weeks, full rights were restored and the operation of government
returned to its ordinary operational mode.
The CRHRP notes that in both states the rights of freedom of
assembly and speech are generally respected. Key exceptions in Namibia
include the occasional incidence of SWAPO supporters assaulting
assembling minority party supporters (usually by pelting stones) and the
governments efforts to force all protests and marches to register with police
prior to assembling. Alternatively, while collective bargaining is largely
unrestricted in and of itself, the right to strike is curtailed nearly to the point of
making it impossible – though it still remains technically legal.
Both Botswana and Namibia, due to their underdeveloped legal and
law education programs, sometimes undermine their accused prisoners (or
bailed prisoners) the right to speedy trials, not out of any intention, but out
necessity: both states have substantial backlogged caseloads.
Though both Namibia and Botswana’s leaders are highly critical of
their press establishments and, in both states, state-owned press and media
have a tendency to self-censor on provocative subjects, generally freedom of
speech is respected. Also, in both states vigorous and critical media outlets
have begun to emerge, internet access is both growing and unhampered by
censorship, and international media, easily received by satellite, is
uncensored. Namibia does, however, require that foreign reporters register
with the government at least one month prior to entering the state. There also
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seems to be little or not restriction of academic freedom in either Namibia or
Botswana.
The only “restriction” on religion, if it can in fact be called that, in either
state is the Batswana requirement that religious groups formally register with
the government through a simple, short process.
In brief, on most points both Namibia and Botswana are reported as
adhering closing to their own constitutional assertions. Instances of slavery
and human trafficking were absent in both states, according to the CRHRP,
though occasionally farmers in rural areas have restricted the movement of
their employees. Neither Namibia nor Botswana use forced exile as
punishments. In neither Namibia nor Botswana are political leaders known to
intentionally undermine their independent judiciaries. Neither state is
reported to hold political prisoners. Both states generally respect their
citizens’ rights to privacy in terms of search and seizure.
To summarize, we can speak of both states as being in rough parity
with one another in terms of their recognition of civil rights. Where there are
possible deviations from this, they usually have occurred on the Batswana
side of the border. The key exception to this is the brief suspension of some
rights in the East Caprivia region after the onset of radical, extraordinary
politics – a suspension that was both temporary and is irrelevant here given
that it occurred after the event of concern.
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Polity IV and the Depth and Breadth of Democracy
The most recent update of the Polity IV project classifies both Namibia and
Botswana as functioning democracies, however, while Botswana receives a
coding of 8 until 1997, and a 9 since, Namibia is riding the line with a coding
of 6 (a code of 10 represents a “perfect” democracy, -10 a perfectly
authoritarian state, and codes less than 6 but greater than -6 an anocracy,
that is to say a regime type that shares aspects of both democracy and
autocracy) . In and of itself, this carries a very specific theoretical connotation
– Namibia, which shares more attributes with anocracies, should be the state
more likely to experience and onset of radical, extraordinary politics. There
are several key points, however, which might dispose us to classify these
states as in relative parity with a “lean” towards Namibia being the more likely
of the two to experience this state of affairs.
First, the Polity IV system frequently backdates its ratings as new data
is assimilated – this includes, for instance, backdating when it becomes
obvious that early electoral events were not, in fact, flukes. At the time of the
latest Polity IV update on these states, Namibia had only had the chance to
experience a single election and, soon thereafter, Namibia carried out another
successful, relatively free and fair election – we can assume that it is very
likely that with the next Polity IV update Namibia will probably be back-coded
to a higher democracy rating.
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The other major concern of the Polity IV coders was the constitutional
amendment which allowed the president of Namibia to serve two terms,
rather than just one. The fear, which was entirely justified given the
experience of so many developing states, was that the system would either
evolve into a single-party autocracy or a sultanistic monarchy. That said, at
the end of President Nujoma’s second term, he stepped down from office and
a full transition in person occurred. Undoubtedly this will lead to further
reevaluation of Namibia’s coding.
An additional reason to doubt the significance of the Polity IV variance
lies in the virtually identical figures with regards to the free and fairness of
elections in the two states (see Figures 4.13 and 4.14). Even if, to some
Western observers, Botswana seems more democratic than Namibia (based
largely on the age of the state and the greater executive strength present in
Namibia versus Botswana), observers within these states simply don’t share
the sentiment – implying, in other words, that they are unlikely to make
decisions with regards to state legitimacy and so forth in fundamentally
different ways, assuming the validity of the orthodox theories.
Corruption
The Afrobarometer surveys extensively explore questions of corruption. In
the first place, as demonstrated in Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, and
4.20, we can see that in both Namibia and Botswana incidents in which the
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surveyed citizenry feel as if they have been the victims of political corruption
are surprisingly low for undeveloped states.
All that said, of course, a key point does remain – despite its relatively
low level of corruption, Namibia remains, of our two compared states, the
state experiencing the highest level of corruption, though in only one case
(that of housing) does the proportion of Namibians who have experienced
discrimination often reach a rate of even 3%, reason enough for avoiding
overemphasis of this factor.
Political Discrimination
We may speak of political discrimination along two primary dimensions. First,
how much and what kinds of political discrimination exists along genderbased lines? Second, how much and what kinds of political discrimination
exists along identity-based lines (religious, ethnic, etc.)?
The primary theoretical corpus on which this subsection of analysis is
based is the feminist literature on civil war. Specifically, discrimination, be it
structural or institutional, is an act of violence perpetrated consciously or
unconsciously, that by its mere existence stratifies and radicalizes relations
between groups. Specifically, if one discriminates (i.e. engages in structural
violence) against others, then justifying explicit forms of violence is easier and
if elites are discriminators, they develop ethical and rational patterns that
make decrease the psychic and emotional costs of perpetrating explicit acts
of violence. Additionally, we may assert that the existence of structural or
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institutional patterns of discrimination in a state creates rationales of counterexploitation among the exploited – they will seek gains, even if they involve
violence, whenever they can, because their potential loses are so low and
their tolerance of violence has been increased by prior experience. Put
simply – norms of discrimination reinforce norms of violence.
In Table 4.26 I outline three key indicators of gender equality, all used
by the United Nations as indicators in their Development Programme. First
among these is the Gender Parity Index, or GPI, for education enrollment.
The GPI is a fairly simple measure, computed by dividing the gross female
enrollment in a state by the gross male enrollment. Should the index equal a
score of 1, then perfect parity between the genders exists. The more above 1
the index rises, the greater the disparity in favor of females, the less below 1
the index drops, the greater the disparity in favor of males. In the case of
Namibia and Botswana, we see that the gender disparity in both states favors
women in primary and secondary education, a result which is surprising at
first, at least until one considers that the highly agrarian nature of both states
probably requires the enlistment of males at a higher rate then women for
childhood labor, a relatively common condition. The biggest difference
between the states seems to lie in the realm of tertiary education, in which
Namibia generally maintains a more gender-equal system, even if it does
begin to favor males, but even then the differences seems to be decreasing
over time.
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Table 4.25: Gender Parity in Education and Employment
1990
1991
1999
Namibia Gender Parity Index in
1.05
1.02
Primary Level Enrollment
Namibia Gender Parity Index in
1.24
1.13
Secondary Level Enrollment
Namibia Gender Parity Index in
1.79
Tertiary Level Enrollment

2000
1.02
1.14

0.85
(*2001
)
1.00
.99

Botswana Gender Parity Index in
1.07
1.00
Primary Level Enrollment
Botswana Gender Parity Index in
1.18
1.07
1.06
Secondary Level Enrollment
Botswana Gender Parity Index in
0.72
0.79
0.74
Tertiary Level Enrollment
Namibia Women to Men Parity
1.04
Index, as ratio of literacy rates,
15-24 years old
Botswana Women to Men Parity
1.10
Index, as ratio of literacy rates,
15-24 years old
Namibia Share of women in wage
48.8
employment in the nonagricultural sector
Botswana Share of women in
33.5
33.4
40.5
40.2
wage employment in the nonagricultural sector
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Millennium Development Goals Indicators
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2004

1.05
0.85
1.03
1.04

43.0

The next major index, calculated in the same fashion, is the Women to
Men Parity Index, as ratio of literacy rates, for children and adults 15-24 years
old. Here again we see a situation very, very close to parity. Where this parity
doesn’t play out, however, is in the share of women in wage employment in
the non-agricultural sector. Even though we don’t have time-series data for
Namibia, we can see that Namibia was definitively more egalitarian in this
period – though, and this is important, Botswana was rapidly progressing in
its efforts to make the non-agriculture workforce more gender unbiased.
As for other indicators of the role and status of women in society, we
can also look at fertility as an indicator. Specifically, in states with very high
birth rates we can expect a similarly high level of gender-based
discrimination, whether through intention or through social expectation
(women are expected to be mothers, thereby limiting their socioeconomic
and, ultimately political, freedom). In both Namibia and Botswana, as we see
in our earlier discussion of the subject, fertility rates remain quite high, though
Namibia’s fertility rate is slightly higher than Botswana’s. Furthermore, we
can see that in both states fertility rates are declining apace. What we can
glean from this, then, is that Namibia may be said to have slightly less gender
equality than Botswana, though in both states gender equity is improving.
On a darker note, however, violence against women, in particular
beatings and rapes, remained widespread at the time of the Caprivian revolt
in both Namibia and Botswana according to the United States Department of
State Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s 1999 Country
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Reports on Human Rights Practices. In practice, most such abuse seems to
occur in rural areas, thus urbanization in both states seems to be correlated
with improving conditions for women.
Both states are also experiencing improvements in the gross number
of women represented in major state offices – Botswana’s legislature of 44, at
the time of Caprivian revolt, had just more than doubled its female
membership from eight to sixteen, while in Namibia women hold 15 of 98
parliamentary seats, but around 40% of seats in local legislatures and
councils. Thus the picture here remains muddled, but with surprising inroads
being made by women in both states.
In terms of religious discrimination, the United States Department of
State’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom from 1999, the first year of the report, states
that neither Namibia nor Botswana has serious endemic problems, social or
political, with freedom of religious expression or recruitment or with
discrimination in terms of access to the political system on the basis of
religious identity.
With regards to ethnic discrimination, according to the United States
Department of State Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s 1999
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices there remains glaring
discrimination and marginalization of certain groups in both states, usually
minorities, though in Namibia citizens of European descent, especially
German and British, usually have highly disproportionate resources. Both
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states are making efforts to redress this discrimination. In both states the
ethnic group most discriminated against are the Khoi-San, the tribal bushman
who were the earliest inhabitants of both states (prior, in other words, to both
black and white in-migrations).
Despite these similarities, which are overwhelming, some differences
exist between the two states. In Namibia, every ethnic group except the San
is represented in the national legislature, a situation which is largely absent in
Botswana. That said, in Botswana societal (as opposed to political or
economic) discrimination is considered to be rather low and intermarriage
between Tswana (the majority and dominant ethnic group) and non-Tswana
citizens is relatively common. Furthermore, while race and ethnicity are
usually considered to be a good predictors of income in Namibia, only race is
considered a similarly good predictor in Botswana.
To summarize, both states have substantial inequity in both the
categories of gender and ethnicity, though neither seems to have particular
problems in terms of religious discrimination. That said, Namibia’s conditions,
as it recovers from apartheid and with its slightly more rural/traditional
populace, seems to experience slightly higher levels – though relatively less
than the mass perception of the two states might seem to indicate. Thus it
should be said that Namibia is slightly more structurally inclined towards
radical, extraordinary politics but is in parity in terms of institutions.
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Political Participation
When weighed alone, political participation does not necessarily
connote any good or bad traits – while it is usually considered a sign of a
functioning democracy, political participation may still be high certain types of
autocracies and, in anocracies, can be a sign of instability, a precursor of the
public demanding reform or, ultimately, radical change. That said, when we
consider that both Namibia and Botswana are functioning democraticrepublics by any measure, we can assume that at minimum political
participation in and of itself is not a destabilizing agent and, given the
youthfulness of the political systems, is likely and indicator of the political
system’s legitimacy.
When we look at Tables 4.27, 4.28, 4.29, 4.30, 4.31, all of which detail
data on voter participation (as reported by the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance or IIDEA) we can immediately see a few
key points. First, the 1990s saw declining voter participation (in parliamentary
elections) as a percentage of the total population in both Botswana and
Namibia, though the decline in Namibia was far more marked (though in the
next parliamentary elections, of 2004, both states saw a rebound in voter
participation). A substantial part of the variance between the two states is
almost definitely a product of the fading of “honeymoon” sentiments in
Namibia – after independence, things seemed to be unerringly improving, but
with time a harsher, though not hopeless, sentiment seeps in. We cannot
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Table 4.26: Botswana Parliamentary Voting Participation
Year

Total
Vote

Registration

Vote/
Registration

Invalid

Population
Size

Voting
Age
Population

1989
1994
1999

250,487
283,375
354,463

367,069
370,173
459,662

68.2%
76.6%
77.1%

n/a
n/a
4.9%

1,245,000
1,445,000
1,592,528

522,900
643,920
844,338

Vote/
Voting
Age
Population
47.9%
44.6%
42.0%

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(Stockholm, Sweden) http://www.idea.int (accessed October 7th, 2006)
Table 4.27: Namibia Parliamentary Voting Participation
Year

Total
Vote

Registration

Vote/
Registration

Invalid

Population
Size

Voting
Age
Population

Vote/
Voting
Age
Population

1989
1994
1999

680,688
497,499
541,114

701,483
654,189
861,848

97.0%
76.0%
62.8%

1.5%
1.6%
0.9%

1,313,000
1,500,000
1,711,793

669,630
780,000
876,828

101.7%
63.8%
61.7%

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(Stockholm, Sweden) http://www.idea.int (accessed October 7th, 2006)
Table 4.28: Namibia Presidential Voting Participation
Year

Total
Vote

Registration

Vote/
Registration

Invalid

Population
Size

Voting
Age
Population

1994
1999

485,295
545,465

654,189
878,869

74.2%
62.1%

2.4%
1.2%

1,500,000
1,711,793

780,000
876,828

Vote/
Voting
Age
Population
62.2%
62.2%

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(Stockholm, Sweden) http://www.idea.int (accessed October 7th, 2006)

272

Table 4.29: Parliamentary Electoral Results in Namibia and Botswana
1989
1994
1999

Botswana
Vote/Registration
68.2
76.6
77.1

Botswana
Vote/VAP
47.9
44.6
42

Namibia
Vote/Registration
97
76
62.8

Namibia
Vote/VAP
101.7
63.8
61.7

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Note: "Vote/Registration" is a the percentage of registered voters who voted
in the election and "Vote/VAP" is the percentage of the Voting Age Population
that voted in the election
Table 4.30: Presential Electoral Results in Namibia
Vote/Registration
1994
1999

Vote/VAP
74.2
62.1

62.2
62.2

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Note: "Vote/Registration" is a the percentage of registered voters who voted
in the election and "Vote/VAP" is the percentage of the Voting Age Population
that voted in the election
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fully dismiss this difference, however, on this point, if for no other reason than
the fact that registered voters participated at a slightly higher rate in Botswana
with each succeeding election. There must be, even if it is slight, a somewhat
higher sentiment in Botswana that the proper mechanism for solving
problems of state is through electoral participation, at least among persons
who were previously engaged in affairs of the state. Ultimately, then, we can
say that Namibia at the end of the 1990s was experiencing a state of lower
voter confidence either in the effectiveness of the system or the legitimacy of
voting as a mechanism for political change, thereby rendering it more likely to
experience an onset of radical, extraordinary politics. I would like to say,
however, that I consider this judgment to be moderated by the fact that the
gradually but steadily declining Batswana voting population as a proportion of
the total eligible population infers that the political sentiments of general
population of Botswana are becoming more polarized between those who
believe in the system and those who do not – a situation which is not the case
in Namibia.
Gray and Black Political Market
Data on underground or non-governmental political action is and will remain
difficult to acquire. Yet there are some resources which may at least, in a
limited way, allow us to at least roughly gauge the significance of nongovernmental political activities. For instance, as indicated in Table 4.31
Namibians are far more likely to seek solutions to problems through
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Table 4.31: In the past year, have you contacted any non-governmental elites
in order solve a problem?
Namibia

Botswana

No
Just Once or Twice
A Few Times
Frequently
Don't Know

702
250
169
45
9

Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 285.28 ; p is less than or equal to
0.001; The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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1061
76
22
33
2

consultation with non-state elites than are Batswana. This is an indicator that
state monopoly over resource acquisition and dispensation is far less
developed in Namibia than in Botswana, inferring that the propensity of
Namibian citizens to seek political solutions through informal and unofficial
channels is higher, thereby disposing it to a higher likelihood for radical,
political disestablishmentarianism.
SWAPO v. BDP
Both Namibia and Botswana have, since their inception, been ruled by a
single party respectively, the Southwest African People’s Organization in the
case of Namibia and the Botswana Democratic Party in the case of
Botswana. In both of these states these single-parties have won successive
elections through generally free and fair elections, speaking to a pattern of
electoral politics not unlike that of an otherwise unlikely comparison – Japan
and its Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
There is little question that, at least in this respect, both of these states
exist in what is essentially a state of parity. Both have won consistently in the
face of multiparty elections that are generally regarded, both internally and
externally, as free and fair, though critics of both parties note that each
election carries its own series of protests from the opposition. In both states
there has been virtually no real competition for control of the legislative
branch, the only exception being the Botswana National Front’s single
election showing of 1994 in which it garnered 13 of 40 seats – still a safe
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victory for the BDP. This pattern in both states has led to substantial political
stability, particularly in terms of maintaining the course of developmental
policies (compare either Namibia or Botswana’s generally steady progress
with the “jumpy” policies of many other democracies), but comes with all the
baggage of any single-party state, as Nengwenkhulu (1989) notes. When we
consider that both states have several different minor parties, 11 in Botswana
and 6 in Namibia, the reason for the dominance of their single-parties
becomes even more manifest.
There are two obvious differences between the parties, however. First,
SWAPO evolved from a paramilitary organization that was formed to
coordinate forces from across Namibia during the protracted Namibian war of
independence. Compare this to the BDP, a party that was formed shortly
after the independence of Botswana explicitly and solely for the purpose of
governing the state. Of course, the importance of these differences may be
less substantial than one might first imagine. Both parties were formed to
pool resources to guarantee the political futures of their members, and both
are governed with a coalition mindset, recognizing that their power remains
assured as long as they avoid fractionalization.
The second key difference lies in the fact that the Namibian war for
independence was coincident with the Cold War. This meant that SWAPO
had the advantage of being able to ally themselves with whatever world
power was at odds with their contemporary rulers – South Africa being their
ruler, the Soviet Union being South Africa’s antagonist. Thus, while the BDP
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has always been a moderate party, SWAPO was for decades a Marxist
organization, allied not only with the Soviet Union but also with African
Marxist states and non-state actors. This difference, again, can be
overemphasized, however. Once independence was assured as the Cold
War came to an end and international support for an independent Namibia
(then Southwest Africa) swelled, SWAPO immediately began moderating its
rhetoric, improving relations with the democratic/capitalist West, and steering
its policies towards international neoliberal ideals, marking the party as an
organization at least as pragmatic as its cohort in Botswana.

Interstate Comparison
Using structuralist and institutionalist methods of analysis, we may use
several different means of comparison in examining Namibia and Botswana.
First, we may compare their international trade, emphasizing specifically their
interstate debt, the nations with whom they trade, and variations in that trade,
as well as their membership in intergovernmental organizations, their bilateral
and multilateral treaties, their participation in interstate disputes, their
relationships with the “great” powers (the United States, Russia, People’s
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and France) and their relative places
in the international/regional situation of southern Africa.
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Interstate Relations
When we consider the relationships of Namibia and Botswana with other
states, particular major states both internationally and regionally, we should
look for a few key vectors of interaction. First, we should consider whether or
not their relationships are grounded in security or economic terms, or
something else entirely, and where on the scale of mutually beneficial to fully
neocolonial their relationships exist. Second, we should consider whether or
not these great powers are seeking to intervene in domestic politics, in
particular in terms of supporting counter-orthodox groups or in terms of
manipulating electoral politics. Finally, we should look for signs of exploitation
and dependency – since neither of the states we are discussing are major
powers, we can assume any such exploitation or dependency is antithetic to
their own benefit.
Prior to the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist States (USSR),
Cold War prerogatives dominated utterly the perspective of most states
towards sub-Saharan Africa in general, including of course Namibia. The
various Western states’ de facto support of the South African regimes’ efforts
to maintain control of Southwest Africa depended largely on South Africa’s
staunch anti-Soviet stance cross-referenced with SWAPO’s dependence on
supplies and shelter from Marxist organizations throughout the region,
particularly those centered in Angola. Botswana survived largely unscathed
by the Cold War largely because the state’s single party developed an
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effective method of preventing the development of Marxist movements –
development of a social welfare system. Furthermore, Botswana’s foreign
policy, one of semi-neutrality with a lean towards the West, and its
geography, that of an interior state with relatively few strategic assets helped
shield it from the worst of American, British, French, Soviet, and Chinese
machinations.
All this said, in the 1990s we can speak of one transnational
phenomena as defining the most important security vector of both Namibia
and Botswana – the fear of the breakup of post-colonial states through civil
wars that, almost universally, tended to spillover into neighboring states. In
the 1990s such examples abound throughout the Congo basin and the Lakes
Region, not to mention the civil war in Angola that survived the extinction of
UNITA’s Marxist ally the Soviet Union and the correlative withdrawal of Cuban
troops, lasting into 2001. State failure was a near universal condition across
virtually the entire midsection of Africa as outright civil war and/or genocide
caused massive population displacements and disrupted any semblance of a
true Westphalian interstate system of stable, solid borders. This is a recipe
for enabling political disruption on the hinterlands, in states like Botswana,
Zambia, Namibia, and Zimbabwe that, while remaining largely stable, found
themselves awash with aliens, many of whom were experienced solidiers,
and unregistered weapons. In states where identity groups might otherwise
not have had access to the means of fighting, the universal disruption of the
near-north and the rise of easily accessible black markets (see Nordstrom
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2004 for a tremendous discussion of the effects of shadow politicaleconomies) are forces for the dissolution of nation-states. The political
geography of these conflicts is a potentially important point of departure
between Botswana and Namibia – whereas the latter had to maintain a long
border throughout the 1990s with a region of major disruption (Angola),
Botswana could use Namibia as a buffer zone against the spread of weapons
and refugees into their own state, thanks in large part to the Caprivi Strip.
Interstate Trade
We may consider international trade in several different manners. First, using
data from the CIA World Factbook (Tables 4.32 and 4.33 and Figures 4.20
and 4.21) we can see that the general patterns for Namibia and Botswana are
similar – both states are experiencing gradual general increases in interstate
trade, both in terms of exports and imports, over time. There are, of course,
periods of relatively slight decline in interstate interconnectivity, specifically in
1993 for Botswana and 2000 for Namibia, but here I cannot overemphasize
the importance of the term slight – never in either state was such a drop of
more than US$ 100 million. That said, in gross terms it warrants substantial
note that Botswana is more deeply involved in total capital terms in the
interstate system.
This does not, however, measure how deeply Botswana or Namibia
are entrenched in the international system, that is to say how deeply
internationalized their economies are. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
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Table 4.32: Exports (In Billions, US$)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
0.935
1.3

1991
1.021
1.8

1992
1.021
1.8

1993
1.184
1.6

1994
1.289
1.7

1995
1.3
1.8

1996
1.3
1.8

1997
1.45
2.1

1998
1.45
2.31

1999
1.44
2.25

2000
1.4
2.36

1995
1.1
1.8

1996
1.2
1.8

1997
1.55
1.5

1998
1.55
1.6

1999
1.48
2.43

2000
1.5
2.05

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
Table 4.33: Imports (In Billions, US$)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
0.856
1.1

1991
0.894
1.7

1992
0.894
1.6

1993
1.238
1.7

1994
1.178
1.8

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Figure 4.13: Exports
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Figure 4.14: Imports
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)

283

Botswana
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Figure 4.15: Reliance on Foreign Sources (Imports as a Percentage of Gross
Domestic Product)
Source: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
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(CIFP), for instance, provides a measure for reliance on foreign sources (see
Figure 4.22) which is, simply put, imports as a percentage of the gross
domestic product. As the data makes clear, there is a clear divergence
occurring here – Botswana’s economy is becoming substantially less
dependent on foreign imports. Exactly what this might mean may be
debatable, however it seems that this would infer that as Botswana’s import
dependency lowers, domestic industries and service-providers are taking on a
greater share of the nation’s wealth. Alternatively, of course, this also means
that Botswana’s elites are in a position of greater independence, allowing
them to ignore the dictates of the international economic and political elite – in
other words their actions are less constrained and the opportunities for the
international community to prevent the outbreak of violence is diminished.
Alternatively, we may consider exports as a proportion of the total
gross domestic product. As illustrated in Table 4.34 and Figure 4.23, in both
Botswana and Namibia exports became decreasingly important in the early
part of the 1990s, but this condition largely stabilized in the latter half with,
and this is important, Botswana depriving a higher proportion of its income
from exports than Namibia. The implication, then, is simple – Botswana’s
economy is more friendly to domestic businesses that hope to export their
goods and services than its neighbor, whereas Namibia’s economy is more
friendly to outside businesses seeking to do business within its borders. To
put this is in frank terms, given that neither nation-state has a developed
political-economy, we may confidently assert that Namibia’s relation to the
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Table 4.34: Exports as a Proportion of the Gross Domestic Product
Namibia
Botswana

1990
60.7
69.5

1991
56.7
58.0

1992
51.0
50

1993
59.2
44.4

1994
33.4
28.3

1995
22.4
41.8

1996
22.4
40

1997
23.3
45.6

1998
23.3
46.2

1999
21.8
42.8

2000
19.7
41.4

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Figure 4.16: Exports as a Proportion of the Gross Domestic Product
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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1999

2000

outside world is more neocolonial than Botswana. Of course, we cannot be
too quick to assert the long-term consequences of this. Autonomy too early in
a state’s development, as demonstrated time and again in Latin America,
often leads to backsliding, whereas neocolonialism may actually result in very
stable states, as in the United States’ “clients” in East Asia during the Cold
War.
Turning now to trade balances (and imbalances), we may see a deeply
interesting set of patterns. First, Namibia and Botswana’s trade balances
seem to follow extremely similar patterns up through 1996 with neither state
“winning” on the balance side by more than US$ 200 million and deficits
lasting no more than two years and making up less than half that amount (see
Table 4.35 and Figure 4.20). The late 1990s, however, stand in stark
contrast. By and large, Botswana’s trade balance becomes radically more
favorable, largely due to skyrocketing diamond prices, while Namibia’s
becomes slightly less favorable. As to how this would relatively effect
stability, our appraisal should be simply that sustained imbalance likely did
cost Namibia some stability, though probably this is slight, whereas
Botswana’s favorable trade position’s importance in improving its own stability
is dependent almost wholly on the government’s ability to effectively
redistribute the income – thus, while Botswana’s stability was likely increased
by the trade balance, it probably was not effected radically.
I also turned to the “Building the Capacity of ACP Countries in Trade
Policy Formulation, Negotiations and Implementation” project, more
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Table 4.35: Trade Balance/Deficit (in US$ Billions)
Namibia
Botswana

1990
0.079
0.2

1991
0.127
0.1

1992
0.127
0.2

1993
-0.05
-0.1

1994
0.111
-0.1

1995
0.2
0

1996
0.1
0

1997
-0.1
0.6

1998
-0.1
0.71

1999
-0.04
-0.18

2000
-0.1
0.31

1997

1998

1999

2000

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-1999)
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Figure 4.17: Trade Balances and Deficits
Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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Botswana

commonly known as the “Hub-and-Spoke Project,” and a joint project of the
European Commission (EC), the Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec), the
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), and the Africa,
Caribbean, Pacific Group (ACP). The Hub-and-Spoke Project first notes that
both states are members of the Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC), an economic community which, among other things, cooperatively
negotiates economic agreements with the major Western powers, specifically
the United States and the European Union (not to mention other major trade
organizations in developing regions, including Latin America). The project
also reports that:
Namibia 's only bilateral preferential trade agreement was
signed with Zimbabwe. Namibia maintains non-preferential or
MFN agreements with China, Cuba, the People's Democratic
Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, India,
Ghana, Malaysia, Romania, and the Russian Federation.
Namibia is also a beneficiary of the United States African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and also receives GSP
treatment from Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic,
the EU, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Russia, Slovak Republic and Switzerland.
Whereas:
Botswana has free trade agreements with Zimbabwe and India.
Botswana also has a reciprocal customs agreement with
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Malawi and MFN trade agreements with China, Czech
Republic, Cuba, India, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Republic of
Korea and Zambia. In addition, Botswana is also a beneficiary
of the United States African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA). Other countries providing Botswana with GSP
treatment include Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway and Switzerland.
In general, what we see in this light is that Namibia and Botswana have few
significant differences in their countries of association, economically
speaking. First, Botswana’s special relationship with India stands out, as
does the fact that Namibia trades with North Korea, while Botswana favors
relations with South Korea. Besides this, the differences seem to be minor.
Both states trade with Russia, the EU, the United States, Japan, and India
and both states seem to have sought and both are party to the SADC
development community – though intriguingly both have far fewer bilateral
trade relationships that one might expect on the regional level. At first glance,
at least, there would appear to be parity in this point.
To add depth, we should consider both states’ figures on exports and
imports with specific attention to those states with whom this form of
engagement is occurring. According to the Hub-and-Spoke Project, as of
2000 some 87% of Botswana’s exports went to members of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) (essentially the European Union and other
developed non-EU states, including Iceland and Switzerland), some 7% to
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members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU – composed of
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), and another 4%
to Zimbabwe. Contrarily, approximately 79% of Namibia’s exports at
approximately the same period went to European states, and some 4% to the
United States – the remaining trade, according to the CIA World Factbook,
was largely conducted with South Africa.
In terms of imports at the same time, Botswana’s imports are largely
derived from Southern African Customs Union states (74%), whereas EFTA
states provided 17% and Zimbabwe 4%. Alternatively some 50% of
Namibia’s imports came from the United States, 31% from European states,
while most of the remaining imports were a product of South Africa.
This information gives us a far better picture of the nature of our two
states interstate economic relationships. Similarities include two key points.
Specifically, both states’ interstate trade is heavily European and South Africa
(SACU being dominated by South Africa). The fundamental difference
between the two states is that Namibia has been able to bring in another
great power, the United States, an act that has decreased both the European
Union and South Africa’s influence on Namibian economic policy.
What does this mean, however? Well, both states are similarly
dependent on interstate trade, with Namibia’s GDP being composed of only
slightly less interstate trade (39% versus 44%) than Botswana, and both
states are economically dependent on regional or global great economic
powers. What we can say, however, is that Namibia is slightly more inclined
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to rebellion because its relationship to the global economy is a politically freer
one (see Table 4.36 and Figure 4.17). Specifically, its greater relative
autonomy and its ability to play more actors against one another increases its
government’s ability to act independent of interstate pressures, if only slightly,
thereby increasing the state’s ability to pass on the costs of exploitation to
politically weaker groups. That said, however, given that the US pursues
virtually identical ends as South Africa and the European states and the fact
that Botswana has more exploitation to ‘spread around’ probably offsets the
potential destabilizing effects of the structural differences, resulting in nearparity.
Foreign Aid
As we can see from Table 4.36 and Figure 4.18, a key difference between
Namibia and Botswana lies in their relative dependence on foreign aid as a
driving factor of their economies. Granted, neither state is radically high in
terms of the proportion of their incomes derived from foreign aid, but an
important pattern of divergence appears early in the 1990s – Botswana
begins a general trend of decreasing its proportional dependence on foreign
aid vis-à-vis Namibia, increasing the gap from .88% in 1990 to 4.23% in 1996
(though this gap had begun to decrease again the next year, down to 3.45%
in 1998). The inference, then, is that Botswana is likely to be slightly less
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Table 4.36: Foreign Aid as a Proportion (%) of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Namibia
4.89 6.81 4.84 5.51 4.37 5.53
Botswana 4.01 3.31 2.63
2.9 2.05 1.85
Source: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2006)
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Figure 4.18: Foreign Aid as a Proportion (%) of GDP
Source: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2006)
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likely to exhibit the destabilizing traits of dependence and neocolonialism visà-vis Namibia.
Intergovernmental Organization and Treaty Membership
Little needs to be said in terms of Namibia and Botswana’s parity in terms of
intergovernmental and nongovernmental membership variance – as Table
4.38 demonstrates, both states are nearly equally entrenched in the
neoliberal, interstate system, converging rapidly in the period following
Namibian independence.
This point is further emphasized by the total number of international
agreements to which both states are party to during the period studied.
While, again, Botswana begins the decade as party to more agreements than
its peer state, Namibia rapidly accedes to all but one of the same agreements
itself during the period of inquiry (Table 4.39). Put simply, in terms of formal
international cooperation, there can be little doubt that both states exist in
near parity.
Interstate Disputes
In terms of interstate disputes, we may compare Namibia and Botswana in
two different manners. First, we may compare the total number of official,
formal interstate disputes to which each state is party. This genre of dispute
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Table 4.37: Total Number of Intergovernmental Organizations in Which State
is a Member
Namibia
Botswana

1990
5
24

1991
21
33

1992
29
33

1993
29
34

1994
35
37

1995
36
39

1996
36
35

1997
37
36

1998
37
36

1999
40
37

2000
39
39

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
Table 4.38: Total Number of Major International Agreements to Which State is
Party
Namibia
(signed &
ratified)
Namibia
(signed)
Botswana
(signed &
ratified)
Botswana
(signed)

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

3

3

4

6

8

8

8

5

5

7

8

8

8

8

5

5

6

7

7

8

9

6

6

7

7

7

8

9

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
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specifically includes those in which some sort of formal diplomatic protest or
gesture has been made – negotiations need not be forthcoming. As we can
see from Table 4.39, Namibia was engaged in more formal interstate disputes
than its peer Botswana soon after it acquired independence, but ultimately
resolves most of these, reaching levels of disputation virtually identical (save
for two years in which it was actually engaged in fewer disputes) to Botswana.
Thus we can say that well before the 1999 East Caprivi revolt a manifest state
of parity along these lines existed.
Secondly, we may consider militarized interstate disputes, or MIDs.
Originally conceived by Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer and J. David
Singer (1996), the militarized interstate dispute as part of their Correlates of
War project (and later updated in its third version by Faten Ghosn, Glenn
Palmer, and Stuart Bremer in 2004), a militarized interstate dispute may be
defined as any instance in which force was used between state actors. Note
that this does not necessarily even infer that shots were fired (for instance,
“threatening” fly-bys may be used), and it certainly does not require there be
casualties. In other words, this is the lowest possible threshold for measuring
interstate violence recognized in the academic community.
That said, if we consider the data in Table 4.40, we can immediately
see that, since the period of Namibian independence, both states have
engaged in exactly the same number of MIDs (including one between one-

296

Table 4.39: Total Number of International Disputes to Which State is Party
Namibia
Botswana

1990
3
2

1991
3
3

1992
4
3

1993
5
3

1994
2
3

1995
3
3

1996
3
3

1997
2
3

1998
3
3

1999
3
3

2000
1
1

Source: CIA World Factbook (1990-2000)
Table 4.40: Militarized Interstate Disputes (1992-Present)
4117

4162

4339

Botswana and Namibia dispute the border demarcation along the Chobe River, and
both claim several islands including Situngu Island. Situngu is submerged for much of
the year, but is apparently cultivated when not submerged. Namibia claims Botswana
is occupying the island--Botswana denies the claim. On Oct. 4, Botswana Defence
Force soldiers reportedly told farmers to leave the area. Accusations by Namibia of
Botswana's occupation follow in Jan 1998. Namibia claims Botswana wants to build
military bases to thwart efforts at farming. Agreement reached on 1/22/98 violated
almost immediately. Followed by a border violation by Namibia in April.
Lesotho's king Lutsie III ousted Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhekle (8/17/94) with force.
South Africa (along with Zimbabwe and Botswana) urged the reinstatement of the
Prime Minister (8/25/94). During 9/7-9/9/94, South Africa takes escalatory action
against Lesotho, including (repeatedly) massing troops at the border, threatening
blockade, and flying fighters over a Lesotho military base. Lesotho responds by
fortifying its border.
A peace agreement was reached on July 7, 1999 and signed by all six states
(Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe) on July 10, 1999. Two rebel groups signed later in August of 1999.
However, the agreement was never fully implemented or adhered to and at some
point denounced both by the rebel groups as well as Democratic Republic of Congo.
The end date is set to June 3, 2001 as this is 6 months after the last codable incident.
As for Chad it withdrew its troops following a peace agreement attempt on April 18,
1999.

Source: Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3
Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict
Management and Peace Science 21:133-154. and “Dispute Narratives – MID
3.0 dataset Correlates of War 2 project.” 2004.
http://cow2.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID_v3.0.narratives.pdf
(accessed August 8th, 2006)
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another): two. The obvious parity of the river dispute between Botswana and
Namibia, which yielded only land-grabs, and no explicit violence, is distinct.
That said, there is a distinct disharmony in the other MIDs. Botswana’s other
MID is composed merely of a set of threatening gestures in support of the
deposed democratic regime in Lesotho – war was not an outcome. Namibia,
on the other hand, deployed troops into the relatively large-scale war that
ravaged the Democratic Republic of Congo, engaging in violent action on a
substantially larger scale. That said, Namibia’s role in this conflict was not
particularly deep or wide – this is perhaps best spoken to by the point that,
with the onset of this conflagration, Namibia raised their defense spending by
only one-half of a percent of their GDP, meaning for the first time since 1990
Namibia’s proportional defense spending was over that of Botswana’s, which
was cut radically that same year.
All this said, given that the MIDs elicited only minor domestic
transformation, their significance can definitely be said to be minor – but one
must assume that Namibian participation in the Congolese civil war did, at
least slightly, increase pressures on the orthodox system.
Handling of Refugees
I include the handling of refugees as a factor because it hearkens to several
theoretical traditions. On the one hand, handling of refugees, a politically and
economically disadvantaged group in virtually every incident, calls to mind
feminist theories and the tendency of norms of equality to be related to norms
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for tolerance for violence. States that are less tolerant of refugees and their
crises, in other words, might be expected to be more likely to experience
radical, extraordinary politics that states which are.
Alternatively, realists of numerous types, and particular Malthusian
realists, would be concerned about the fact that refugees increase the
utilization of resources that, otherwise, would be dedicated to the native
population. Consider in particular the work of Hardin (1968) and his lifeboat
theory – shifting populations threaten to unbalance particular ecosystems and
political economies by putting population pressures on territories that are illequipped to deal with them. Accepting refugees is tantamount to accepting
additional costs for your society with few prospects, in the short-term at least,
of every defraying said costs. Accepting costs without concurrent benefits
demands that the ruling elites place greater pressure on native populations
and, therefore, increase the number of grievances and the amount of
resource competition. Add in the classical and neorealist calculi of increased
threats of transnational action (e.g. refugees using your nation-state as a
base to strike their home nation or another nation-state fearing such an action
and taking preemptive actions) that necessitate the build-up and
concentration of military forces along borders that are already sensitive to
risks of arms races and so forth, and realists in general would assert that
accepting refugees constitutes a (generally) unwise strategic decision,
destabilizing in both the domestic and international fields of play.
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I would like to begin by noting that the Statistical Yearbooks of the
United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) list both Botswana
and Namibia as having no internally displaced persons, or refugees fleeing
from one part of a nation-state to another, reported during the period of the
study – a nod in the direction of stability for both states. Further, I would also
like to point out that the geography of refugee camps in the two states is very
similar – by and large refugee camps are bundled very close to the northern
borders of the states, specifically to deal with Angolan and Congolese
refugees, though in the past some Rwandan refugees have also made their
way to Botswana (though most of these were granted asylum).
Secondly, in order to determine how the governments of Namibia and
Botswana treated refugees to their states I reviewed the 1999, 2000, and
2001 “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” published by the United
States Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor). According to the reports, the states were fairly similar in this
category. Institutionally, both states were signatories to the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
and both states worked with the UNHCR consistently to guarantee quality of
human rights. That said, both states had some military and/or police
personnel reportedly abuse some refugees through imprisonment in local jails
rather than camps and through beatings. In the case of Botswana this was
usually in response to individuals leaving refugee camps without authorization
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from government officials, while in Namibia abuse was largely aimed at
individuals suspected of ties with the Angolan rebel group UNITA (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola or União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola). In both states, however, abuses were
generally considered the exception rather than the rule, and generally
refugees were as well treated as could be expected.
Finally, in order to determine capacity, I returned to the UNHCR
Statistical Yearbooks and compiled the data found on Tables 4.41 and 4.42.
What we can see is that Namibia not only has grossly more refugees than
Botswana (around five times as many on any given year), but bears a
financial burden that is equally disproportionate. Such a burden would be
difficult for even developed states to swallow, but for a still developing state
like Namibia, the costs are disproportionately high.
To summarize, then, we can say that while Namibia and Botswana are
effectively in parity in terms of their institutional approach to refugees, not to
mention their structural patterns of limited abuse, Namibia’s political
geography along the Angolan border has put far more of a burden on them
than in the case of Botswana. The result is, assuming Hardin is correct, that
Namibia’s high concentration of refugees, itself in part a product of pacifying
liberal domestic policies, is probably increasing its propensity to experience
radical, extraordinary politics.
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Table 4.41: Total Number of Refugees
1997
281
2511

1998
2137
3820

1999
1296
7612

Table 4.42: Refugees Per 1 US$ GDP/Per Capita
1995
1996
1997
Botswana
0.1
0.1
0.1
Namibia
0.8
1
1.2
Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks

1998
0.5
1.8

1999
0.3
3.6

Botswana
Namibia

1995
266
1682

1996
214
2204

Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks

302

Summary
This section of my dissertation has aimed to accomplish one simple
point: to determine whether or not Botswana and Namibia were so structurally
and institutionally similar that one could expect that, following the orthodox
methods of determining a state’s ripeness to experience an onset radical,
extraordinary politics, both states would be predicted to experience a similar
outcome. I did this by dividing this chapter into four sections, each of which
examined the structures and institutions of the two states in detail. I would
like to summarize these findings briefly, then discuss their implications.
In terms of their economies, with specific reference to both their levels
of development and their rate of development, in general we have found that
that Botswana and Namibia exist in a state of general parity. The only
substantial exception to this lies in the simple point that Botswana’s rate of
physical infrastructure growth more closely resembles a pattern expected to
result in rebellion than does Namibia, with the exception of the development
of in-home electrical infrastructure.
Social structural patterns are in rough parity, though Botswana’s
somewhat worse HIV/AIDS crisis may be said to have imbalanced that state
at a slightly higher rate. Culturally, however, we can note some differences,
though the mixed bag nature of these differences yields no conclusive results.
Specifically, we find that that the general structure of religious, ethnic,
linguistic, and racial diversity in Botswana is more conducive to the onset of
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radical, extraordinary politics than in Namibia, though by no means radically
so. Alternatively, in terms of the geography of transnational ethnolinguistic
identities, we can say that there is near parity between the two states – both
states’ populations are almost entirely composed of persons who share their
ethnolinguisitic identities with individuals in other states. Finally, we can say
that the Minorities at Risk measure highlights Namibia as having more
minorities at risk of government oppression, etc., though again not radically
so.
By and large, we can say that, institutionally, Namibia and Botswana
are in a general parity, though Namibia’s institutional arrangements,
particularly with regards to the rights of defendants, seem to be slightly
superior in preventing radicalization. Structurally as well we can speak of a
general parity, though here we have to discuss a few key points in more
detail. For instance, while discrimination is present in both Botswana and
Namibia, it seems to be more expressly political in the former and more socioeconomic in the latter, though in both states racial (though not ethnic)
identities are correlatable with income. Furthermore, both states party
systems, which favor a democratically elected but utterly dominate single
party, are virtually indistinguishable in terms of their party behavior and
apparatus, despite their varied backgrounds. And, while the Polity IV
measure states that Botswana is a more democratic state than Namibia, there
appears to be little real difference between the two states in real terms, and
this difference lies largely in the age of their systems (which is further
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problematized by the lack of recent updates to the Southern African states).
The key difference between the states likes in the tendency of Namibian’s to
seek solutions to socio-economic problems through accessing nongovernmental elites and communities, a point which does not necessarily
infer a greater likelihood of radical, extraordinary politics but which does
decrease the costs of engaging in this form of politics and creates extraorthodox political-economic mechanisms capable of enhancing non-state
actors abilities should such a situation come into being.
With regards to interstate relations, we can assert that these two states
are, again, in general parity with one another. Three key exceptions to this,
however, exist. The first two lay in Botswana’s pattern of trade and Namibia’s
slightly greater dependence on interstate loans and aid – both of which may
be said to increase domestic instability. The third is a product of Namibia’s
internationally advocated open-policy towards refugees (primarily from
Angola) that has led it to acquire a human burden far in excess of
Botswana’s.
What are the implications of this high level of parity – the existence of
two states that are so similar that, absent non-structural and non-institutional
details they are nigh indistinguishable? We can only conclude that, as I have
earlier posited, some other factor or factors have played a role the causal
chain, either dampening dissent in Botswana or heightening it in Namibia. I
argue that, ultimately, this difference lies at least part in the decisions of nontraditional elites in one state (Namibia) to begin the process of publicly
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rationalizing a shift from the ordinary to extraordinary (and radical) political
discourse and action. In other words, elites determine that radical,
extraordinary politics is a rational course of action and begin manipulating
their legions through the use of two means: 1) transforming the nature of the
political-cultural discourse through speeches and other means of propaganda,
thereby altering “their people’s” cost-benefit analyses, and 2) developing
alternative political-economic resources that are not dependent on the
orthodox political-economy (especially the state), again, altering their people’s
cost-benefit analyses. I will explore this further in my next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
DIVERGENT IDENTITIES AND DEGREES OF
MOBILIZATION IN NAMIBIA AND BOTSWANA
The model I have developed describes the onset of radical, extraordinary
politics in general and wars of secession and in particular asserts that the key
flaw with the contemporary, orthodox approach to the predicting these events
lies in the fact that most literature focuses on structural and institutional
precursors to such conflict at the expense of other stages of conflict
development, notably the mobilization of resources and manpower and
environmental policy factors that are likely to effect the decision-making
process of disestablishmentarian elites and their relevant populations by
either increasing or decreasing perceived risk. The next two chapters will
constitute elementary inquiries into the possible relevancy of these stages to
the prediction of conflict, notably by attempting to determine whether Namibia
and Botswana, so notably similar in their structural and institutional
characteristics, diverge in terms of these characteristics.
I have selected four measures to employ for this first chapter:
Identities and Loyalties
The first question I will consider is, simply, are members of the relevant
identity group shifting their personal identity and loyalties towards a
disestablishmentarian identity relative to the orthodox/dominant identity? The
validity of this principle is manifest and requires little discussion. Consider the
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American Revolution, for instance. This war of secession was largely fought
by three parties, two of which were allied. On the one hand was the dominant
power, the British forces from Britain. Allied with there were North American
colonists who continued to identify themselves as British. And, of course,
opposing these two groups, who believed (rightly or wrongly) that they
constituted a single, valid new identity were those North American colonists
who had become convinced they were Americans, or more obliquely, not
British. Wars of secession, whether ethnic or not, necessarily require both a
reiteration of the rebelling group’s identity in and of itself and relative to the
dominant/ruling group’s identity.
While there are several potential methods of operationalizing this
vector of analysis, two extremely straightforward methods exists in this case.
First, data on self-identity from the Afrobarometer surveys of Namibia can be
compared to that on Botswana. In essence, Afrobarometer asks those
persons it surveys whether they identify themselves primarily as members of
the nation-state in which they reside or whether they primarily utilize a
different identifier – for instance a minority ethnicity or a religious identity
when conceptualizing their group-of-first-allegiance.
Comparisons of this data can be made on two levels. First, I will use
the same source to determine if there is a divergence between the degree to
which identity and value entropy have pervaded the system, or more
accurately, the consciousness of the people of the state in particular.
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Secondly, on the state level, in which we can compare the frequency of
“Namibianism” to the frequency of “Batswanaism” to determine if, following
the state-level orientation of structuralists and institutionalists, variation exists
at a high-level. Secondly, and perhaps more tellingly, using cross-referenced
Afrobarometer data we should be able to isolate data from Caprivi
(specifically, data acquired from persons surveyed in Caprivi) and compare it
to data from the Kalanga-dominated North East District of Botswana.
The Genesis of an Alternative, Unsanctioned Political-Economy
Are members of the relevant identity group being weaned off of the orthodox
political-economy as an alternative political-economy is developed? This is
my second question. Specifically, this is constituted by the development of
effective black and gray economies and polities. Black and gray economies
are central because they deprive the state of resources which could be used
to continue to dominate the relevant identity group, as well as allow the state
a key capacity: the ability to withhold those resources and/or services. Black
and gray polities are central because they not only deprive the state of
essential legitimacy, but furthermore decrease the costs and risks of rebellion
for participants or passive supporters.
This operationalization presents one obvious and key problem – it
seeks to uncover evidence of political and economic systems whose
members explicitly seek to remain hidden from formal authorities. The logical
assumption, then, is that if the supporters of black and gray economies and
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polities are at all effective (and we can assume they were in Namibia at the
time, given that they managed to allow the acquisition of adequate material to
allow for the development of the Caprivian revolt), they will remain largely
hidden from public purview.
Our goal, then, should not to seek open admissions of the existence of
such systems – if they exist, they will likely originate from authorities who are
biased against their targets and will like as not have a vested interest in either
underestimating or overestimating the size of said markets. What we can do,
however, is look for secondary markers that such systems exist.
Another marker should be the level of corruption in a state. From this
perspective, corruption plays a different role than that generally supposed by
structuralists and institutionalists. For them, corruption is a sign of injustice
and of the unequal distribution of resources, and therefore destabilizing by
supporting widening and deepening resentment and alienation, wealth
concentration, and political mismanagement – all of which are valid
assertions. However, at this stage in the causal chain, corruption plays an
additional role – it provides disestablishmentarian elites with additional
“doors”, means and methods of moving personnel, hiding, acquiring and
selling resources, and so forth. Disestablishmentarian elites will often seek to
either support or harness corruption in the bureaucracy and government of
the state in order to create room for the development of their alternative
political economy. Thus, we would expect to see in Namibia in general, or at
least in Caprivi, higher levels than in Botswana (or in the Central District).
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There are numerous potential resources for this data, including Transparency
International and the Internet Center for Corruption Research’s Corruption
Perceptions Index, and again Afrobarometer. I have elected to favor the
Afrobarometer survey here for a few key reasons, however. First, while
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is well respected
and has the advantage of allowing non-natives to survey the states, the
number of persons surveyed for Third-World states is extraordinarily small –
only four for Botswana and three for Namibia in 1999 – calling into serious
doubt the validity of those findings. Secondly, Afrobarometer survey has a
particularly high utility in this regard, specifically because its surveys are not
limited to the state-level. Quantitative comparisons would be expected to
reveal that Namibia’s level of corruption is higher and therefore its black and
gray political-economy is more robust, providing the Caprivi rebels with a
substantially increased capacity.
Personnel Mobilization
Another question which remains to be asked is, simply, are members of the
relevant identity group being recruited into political and/or military positions?
In most cases, including the Namibian experience, this realm of
analysis will be necessarily limited to post-violence explanation – prediction is
highly unlikely for academics because to acquire this information is likely to
necessitate powerful and effective intelligence resources. This said, I intend
to review major regional and local newspapers (English-language, with
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particular emphasis on The Namibian) for references both to the number of
recruits and the primary occupations of those recruits. While the gross data
may give us some information (on the proportion of Caprivi who were willing
to engage in the act of rebellion), data on the rebels’ occupations will provide
likely explanations of the recruitment patterns. By this I mean, specifically,
what groups of people were recruited early and which later by the original
cadre. This inquiry is, of course, necessarily one-dimensional – since no
such rebellion has taken place in Botswana we cannot hope to find relevant
data on the recruitment therein.
Resource Mobilization
Beyond recruitment and personnel mobilization, which we have addressed
above, another, question we might ask is whether or not
disestablishmentarian political elite, at minimum, are acquiring the physical
resources necessary for warfare? Most explicitly this refers to weapons, but
ultimately this sort of analysis might also include other such infrastructure,
including communications, transportation, and field medical equipment.
This operationalization, is again, a difficult one since again it is rational
to assume that disestablishmentarians will attempt to hide their progress.
This limits us, by and large, to a historical (explanatory but not predictive)
review of journalistic communications, with the possible exception of captured
material, for instance if weapons caches are captured or if shipments are
interdicted. While this measure is imperfect, frequent interdiction and capture
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of material will like as not hint at very high levels of resource development
acquisition, given that relatively poor states with highly porous borders are
simply incapable of very of high levels of interdiction relative to the total
quantity of contraband available – if one doubts this, consider the size of illicit
interstate arms and drug markets in developed states with similar democratic
restraints. Of course, in order to establish comparability, similar frequency
searches will be conducted for both the Caprivi and Kalanga peoples.

Identities and Mobilization
That part of the process of mobilizing a population to resist an orthodox
political-economy which hinges upon the dimension of identity takes place, as
discussed above, not merely in two forms, but in two stages which in
individuals take place in temporally distinct stages – we can assume that in a
given population both processes can be simultaneously occurring in different
people. The first of these stages is that of identity entropization/alienation.
Alienation is term that requires a definition, if for no other reason that
the term has been applied in so many ways and for so many purposes, many
of which are arbitrary or contradictory. When I use the term alienation, what I
mean is the process by which human beings cease to conceive of themselves
as part of a given broader community, be it a literal community or a
metaphorical, imagined community. The process, then, is not necessarily one
of ostracism or immigration, though these may constitute behavioral
manifestations of alienation, but rather is one by which humans come to
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believe that they no longer share the interests, goals, symbols, and so on of a
community with which they formerly did identify. It is, in other words,
synonymous with the concept of identity entropy, that is to say the tendency
of individuals in a society to enter a chaotic state in terms of their identity and
values.
This stage must occur prior to the second stage, that of adopting a new
identity or identity set (and the accompanying political and economic goals,
norms, mores, etc.) because, in instances of disestablishmentarianism,
identity serves specifically as a dividing element – it defines both allies and
enemies. To merely adopt several contiguous identities, on the other hand, a
condition which we may refer to as ethnic cosmopolitanism (for an Africa
specific version, see Werbner 2004, 63), does not allow for the necessary
fractures that justify acts of revisionism, particularly violent acts of
revisionism. Specific examples of this sort of cosmopolitanism abound in
present and historical successful multiethnic polities – the United States, the
United Kingdom (especially since the late 18th Century), Canada, the Roman
Empire, the Persian Empire, the Carthagenian Empire, and the Incan Empire
are but a few of these.
Of course, we must assume that practically this model may not occur.
Some populations carry high levels of alienation for tremendous periods of
time, never adopting the identity of the dominant regime and/or never losing
their pre-regime identity. We can assume this is most likely to occur (1) in
states where the concept of nation is weak and (2) where nation-building
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experiences have been limited; sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and among
native American populations of Latin America stand out as likely candidates
for this condition in particular.
Identity Entropy/Alienation
A logical expectation in a functioning democracy is that in states in which
alienation, an almost universally acknowledged precedent to the onset of
radical, extraordinary politics, is high, the population’s engagement with
politics tends to drop off. Table 5.1 reports the Afrobarometer’s findings on
whether or not people follow their nation’s politics. The results are surprising.
Whereas in both states the proportion of population that follow politics
intensely is relatively similar, separated by only four percent, the proportion of
the population that sometimes follows politics is far lower in Botswana than in
Namibia – in fact, Botswana’s politically interested proportion is less than half
that of Namibia’s. Thus the proportion of the population that often follows
politics in Namibia (72%) is nearly double that of Botswana (39%). Fully 39%
of Batswana are entirely unconcerned with politics, as compared to 19% of
Namibians. This data is surprising to say the least.
More moderate differences exist with regards to people’s beliefs as to
whether or not voting matters (Table 5.2), that is to say whether or not the
democratic process is capable of improving the political-economic state of
affairs for the population of the given state. The proportion of those persons
who strongly believe in the system are virtually indistinguishable in our cases,
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Table 5.1: Do You Follow Politics?
Namibia

Botswana

Always/Most of the Time
Some of the Time
Only Now and Then
Hardly at All
Don't Know

211
572
166
141
77

177
274
250
454
30

Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 310.09 ; p is less than or equal to
0.001; The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)

Table 5.2: Does Voting Make a Difference in the Quality of the Future?
Namibia

Botswana

Agree Strongly Will Make a
Difference
Agree Will Make a Difference
Agree Won't Make A
Difference
Agree Strongly Won't Make a
Difference

208
228

237
90

139

184

511

623

Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 78.11 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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about 2% more in Botswana than in Namibia, but the proportion with more
moderated but still generally positive perspectives swells in Namibia relative
to Botswana, 21% as compared to 8%. That said, however, the proportion of
both populations who don’t believe that democracy will have an effect
remains within a 10% variance, 60% in Namibia and 71% in Botswana.
Nonetheless, this again challenges the general perspective as to what should
be occurring in this period – common wisdom holds that as a population
grows closer to experiencing radicalization and violence, the proportion of
persons with little faith should grow vis-à-vis states who do not experience
such rebellion.
One category in which the differences between Botswana and Namibia
are quite minimal is in whether or not people believe who is in power matters
(Table 5.3) – there is only a one percent difference in the proportion of
Namibians and Batswana who believe that the political system’s performance
is affected by whom holds formal political power. This seems to indicate that
there are multiple types of alienation at work – that which affects people’s
interest in politics and that which affects people’s expectations from the
political process. Even so, however, this still seems to contradict
contemporary common sense about the nature of identity entropization and
political radicalization – it is almost universally believed that states whose
people believe the system is irredeemable (e.g. no matter who is in power in
the system it will fail to function) should be higher in states about to
experience the onset of radical, extraordinary politics.
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Table 5.3: Who is in Power Matters in Determining the Quality of the Future
Namibia

Botswana

Agree Strongly Will Make a
Difference
Agree Will Make a Difference
Agree Won't Make A
Difference
Agree Strongly Won't Make a
Difference

476
139

569
225

97

71

150

258

Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 27.36 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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Table 5.4 provides us yet more data on the legitimacy of the systems
of government present in Namibia and Botswana, with specific reference to
whether or not people believe their system of government is in fact
democratic, with the implication, of course, that if the state is not genuinely
democratic than it is merely a puppet for one or a coalition of dominating
powers. Here again the results are not what we’d expect according to the
common wisdom. Namibia’s proportion of population who explicitly reject the
system as undemocratic is only 3%, while Botswana’s is 5%. This
significance of this is somewhat moderated by the fact that 17% of Namibians
assert that the system is democratic with major exceptions, as opposed to 8%
of Batswana, but even this merely indicates state similarity (rather than the
alternative, which is standing the popular hypothesis on its head). This
principle is again reiterated in the nearly identical proportions in Namibia and
Botswana who believe in (or disagree with) the sentiment that “democracy
works well” in Namibia or Botswana (Table 5.5).
Moving on to more explicit measures of popular conceptualizations of
the state’s legitimacy (Table 5.6), another blow to the common
conceptualization radical, extraordinary politics lies in the minimal difference
between Namibia and Botswana’s populations’ perception of whether or not
the preceding elections were generally free and fair. Only a three percent
difference lies between the population of Botswana’s (with 58%) belief that
the elections where entirely free and fair and that of Namibia (with 55%) and
the proportion of the population who believed that the elections were not free
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Table 5.4: Is the State Democratic?
Namibia

Botswana

Completely Democratic
Democratic With Minor
Exceptions
Democratic With Major
Exceptions
Not a Democracy

347

550

486

434

176
32

91
60

Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 80.55 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 5.5: Are You Satisfied With Democracy?
Namibia

Botswana

Very Satisfied
Fairly Satisfied
Not Very Satisfied
Not At All Satisfied

331
417
229
67

384
511
171
89

Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 19.41 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 5.6: Were the Last Elections Free and Fair?
Namibia

Botswana

Completely Free and Fair
Free and Fair With Minor
Problems
On the Whole Free and Fair
with Several Major Problems
Not Free or Fair

581

654

333

340

91
39

78
41

Degrees of freedom: 3 ; Chi-square = 3.23 ; For significance at the .05 level,
chi-square should be greater than or equal to 7.82 ;The distribution is not
significant ; p is less than or equal to 1.
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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and fair at all is identical in both states – four percent. Again, common
wisdom would hold that this latter statistic should be observably different in
the two states, and yet it is indistinguishable. When we compare these
results to those which are the product of a similar question – was the
government in power elected through appropriate accepted procedures, again
we see that the variance is relatively small (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) – 85% of
Batswana assert that their government was elected in such a fashion, with
83% of Namibians agreeing.
Perhaps (now) unsurprisingly, the variance between the two societies
of Botswana and Namibia opinions on the legitimacy of the state vary less
than common wisdom would expect – only 12 percent of Namibians feel that
their state did not exercise its power in a legitimate fashion, while 15 percent
of Batswana felt as much (Table 5.7) – a double surprise in that not only did
Batswana opinions lie close to those of Namibians, but in fact were more
negative than those of their neighbors!
Before continuing, it is worth pausing to summarize. What the
Afrobarometer surveys have found is that consistently in Namibia and
Botswana, two states whose structural and institution characteristics are as
similar as can be expected, the differences in terms of state legitimacy and
systemic legitimacy, in terms of performance, expectations, and method of
acquiring power, are virtually indistinguishable, and when they are
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Namibia: The Government Was Elected to Power by Accepted
Procedures

2% 7%
8%

29%

54%

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neither Agree or Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Figure 5.1: Namibia: Election of the Government was by Accepted
Procedures
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Botswana: The Government Was Elected to Power by
Accepted Procedures

4%

7%
4%

35%

50%

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neither Agree or Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Figure 5.2: Botswana: Election of the Government was by Accepted
Procedures
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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Table 5.7: The Current Government Exercises Power Acceptably
Namibia

Botswana

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Disagree or Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

24
113
149
536
296

49
131
101
605
267

Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 24.24 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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distinguishable, it is the state which did not experience the onset of radical,
extraordinary politics that usually experienced the lower levels of legitimacy.
While this matches the assumptions neither of common wisdom nor the
formal hypothesis expostulated by this paper, it remains an important point of
order, inferring that we require other methods of legitimacy measurement or
that the role of disestablishmentarian elites may be greater than had
previously been considered.
One major relevant sector of Afrobarometer data remains to be
considered. All the preceding data have been agglomerated attitudinal data
measuring the legitimacy of the contemporary political system.
Afrobarometer, playing a scientific Devil’s advocate, tests for legitimacy using
an alternative method as well: measuring the acceptability of non-orthodox
political systems. These questions, while limited in scope and number, do
ask something fundamental – if presented with an alternative form of
government, would you support it? These questions are interesting because
they touch on attitudes that are not repressed, but are dependent on latent
ideals such as romanticism.
First, when asked whether or not they would accept a one-party rule as
legitimate, 26% of Namibians stated that yes, they would, as opposed to 18%
of Batswana (Table 5.8). When asked essentially the same question but with
regards to rule by traditional elites, the proportion of Namibians stating yes
shot up to 44%, whereas the proportion of Batswana remained the same as in
the prior question, 18% (Table 5.9). The proportion of Namibians willing to
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Table 5.8: Would You Accept One-Party Rule?
Namibia

Botswana

Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove
Neither Disapprove or
Approve
Approve
Strongly Approve

406
337

555
380

71
215
62

27
108
100

Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 87.14 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 5.9 Would You Accept Rule by Traditional Elders?
Namibia

Botswana

Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove
Neither Disapprove or
Approve
Approve
Strongly Approve

299
343

486
399

9
382
129

60
143
68

Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 214.15 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001
; The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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accept an alternative political system shrank to 25% when asked if they would
support military rule as an alternative, but the total number of Batswana who
would support the same system shrank even more radically to only 9% (Table
5.10). And similarly, when asked if they would support a presidential
monarchy, Namibians agreed that they would at a rate of 27% whereas
Batswana did so only at a rate of 7% (Table 5.11).
This data is interesting in two dimensions. First, in and of itself, this
data demonstrates that Namibians are far more likely to accept any
alternative to the current regime and regime-type than Batswana. This data
takes on even more significance in comparison the earlier data. It seems that
the Namibian people do not hate their political system at any greater
frequency than do their peers in Botswana, but they also are far less
convinced that their political system is the only legitimate institutional
alternative available. The sources of this indifference are not entirely clear,
but it seems very likely that it is a dual product of both Namibia’s relative
youth and Namibia’s somewhat more security situation vis-à-vis Angola. A
secondary source could be the fact that the Namibian state has not
successfully co-opted all power away from traditional political units, whereas
Botswana has integrated most powerful traditional political systems into its
government, presenting them and their adherents with a prisoner’s dilemma
should they seek to undercut the system – escape could mean losing what
influence they currently have.
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Table 5.10 Would You Accept Rule by the Military?
Namibia

Botswana

Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove
Neither Disapprove or
Approve
Approve
Strongly Approve

376
310

760
259

128
177
102

14
74
34

Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 5.11: Would You Accept Absolute Rule by the President?
Namibia

Botswana

Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove
Neither Disapprove or
Approve
Approve
Strongly Approve

360
298

674
359

130
199
83

34
50
34

Degrees of freedom: 4 ; Chi-square = 264.29 ; p is less than or equal to
0.001; The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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A key weakness of this data, as already discussed, lies in the lack of
time-series data. While we have seen that the first series of indicators
discussed do not seem to be relevant for distinguishing states structurally and
institutionally predisposed for radical, extraordinary politics that will
experience said political transformations from those who will not, this is only
when considering them in the static – time-series data, reflecting not simply
attitude in the period immediately adjacent to the onset of radical,
extraordinary politics, but the changes prior to said onset, could reveal far
more utility.
That said, it seems likely that the degree to which a state’s population
is likely to accept an alternative political system may turn out to be a good
predictor of its likelihood to engage in radical, extraordinary politics. Despite
the fact that the legitimacy systems of both Namibia and Botswana are
arguably weak, the fact that the Batswana do not believe themselves to have
any acceptable alternatives may be a or the key difference in the states’
comparative political fortunes in the late 1990s/early 21st Century.
Of course, we have another dimension to consider before moving, that
of the local/ethnic minority homeland level of analysis. To do this, I utilized
the same Afrobarometer data at the region specific level, comparing survey
results from the North East District (alternatively known in Afrobarometer as
the Francistown District) to those of East Caprivi in Namibia on two
dimensions: (1) in absolute terms, specifically emphasizing their particular
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variance and (2) in relative terms, which is to say in terms of their variance
from the state-level of analysis.
Returning to the subject of the whether or not the surveyed population
follows politics, a surprising set of patterns seem to be emerging.
Specifically, the Caprivi are not only far more engaged in politics than the
average Namibian, but they are far more so than the Kalanga as well, both in
absolute and relative terms (Table 5.12). Perhaps then dissociation from the
political process does not precede radical disestablishmentarianism, but quite
the contrary, a burst of political interest accompanies it. This would infer, of
course, that alienation/identity entropy does not necessarily imply disinterest
in the political sphere, merely disgust with the status quo. Alternatively, it
seems that the Kalanga have, consciously or not, elected to withdraw from
politics on a day-to-day basis, particularly curious given Werbner’s (2004)
analysis which emphasizes the political activism of that minority.
Next we turn to the measures of systemic and institutional efficacy,
specifically the questions on whether voting makes a difference and whether
who is in power has the potential to affect the quality of the political-economy.
I began by comparing survey results on whether or not respondents felt like
voting made a difference in their quality of life (Table 5.13). The first thing we
notice is that in both the cases of Namibia/Caprivi and Botswana/Francistown
the variance between the state-level opinions and local-level opinions at the
extreme ends of the opinion ranges are relatively similar, though the latter set
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Table 5.12: Do You Follow Politics?
Always/Most of
the Time
Some of the
Time
Only Now &
Then
Hardly At All

Namibia

East Caprivi

Botswana

211 (19%)

8 (11%)

177 (15%)

North East
District
14 (17%)

572 (53%)

52 (74%)

274 (24%)

16 (20%)

177 (15%)

8 (11%)

250 (22%)

13 (16%)

141 (13%)

3 (4%)

454 (39%)

38 (47%)

Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 343.00 ; p is less than or equal to
0.001; The distribution is significant.
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)

Table 5.13: Does Voting Make a Difference?
Namibia
East Caprivi
Strongly
Believe No
Believe No
Believe Yes
Strongly
Believe Yes

Botswana

North East
District

208 (19%)

15 (21%)

237 (21%)

17 (19%)

228 (21%)
139 (13%)
511 (47%)

4 (6%)
17 (24%)
36 (49%)

90 (8%)
184 (16%)
623 (55%)

10 (11%)
18 (20%)
43 (53%)

Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 95.63 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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is 7-8% more negative than the former. On the other hand, respondents in
moderate terms in Caprivi were not only substantially more likely to be
optimistic about the possibility that voting will have a positive influence than
were Namibians in general both in the abstract and in comparison to the
Batswana/North East District instance, but furthermore were absolutely more
likely to consider the likelihood that voting would have a positive effect than
were Kalanga. These results are inexplicable, especially when we contrast
them to the findings on these populations opinions on the possible effects of
changing leadership (Table 5.14) where the Caprivi Lozi demonstrate
themselves to be substantially more pessimistic in relative and absolute terms
than the Kalanga (though both ethnic groups are relatively more pessimistic
than their states as a whole). Perhaps the first of these questions was
misunderstood, or reflects a latent respect for the democratic process, but not
for the government in power.
Additionally, in terms of efficacy, the Afrobarometer polled to determine
whether their subjects were satisfied with democracy and whether or not they
felt that they felt the democratically elected governments of their states
exercised power acceptably (see Tables 5.15 and 5.16). Here we see a few
patterns that are more explicitly in line with my predicted expectations. First,
the East Caprivi are both substantially more negative than the Kalanga with
regards to their satisfaction with democracy both absolutely and relative to the
state. The degree of difference, in fact, warrants a bit more attention.
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Table 5.14: Does Who is in Power Matters?
Namibia
East Caprivi
Strongly
Believe Yes
Believe Yes
Believe No
Strongly
Believe No

Botswana

North East
District

476 (56%)

8 (12%)

596 (51%)

37 (43%)

139 (16%)
97 (11%)
150 (17%)

9 (14%)
16 (24%)
33 (50%)

225 (20%)
71 (6%)
258 (23%)

15 (17%)
10 (11%)
25 (29%)

Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 94.57 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 5.15: Are You Satisfied with Democracy?
Namibia
East Caprivi
Botswana
Very Satisfied
Fairly Satisfied
Not Satisfied
Not at all
Satisfied
State is Not a
Democracy

North East
District

331 (32%)
417 (39%)
229 (22%)
67 (6%)

18 (25%)
15 (21%)
30 (43%)
8 (11%)

384 (33%)
511 (43%)
171 (15%)
89 (8%)

27 (31%)
42 (47%)
13 (15%)
5 (6%)

6 (1%)

0 (0%)

9 (1%)

1 (1%)

Degrees of freedom: 12 ; Chi-square = 53.41 ; p is less than or equal to
0.001; The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 5.16: Government Exercises Power Acceptably?
Namibia
East Caprivi
Botswana
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree
nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

North East
District

24 (2%)

4 (6%)

49 (4%)

1 (1%)

113 (10%)
149 (13%)

10 (14%)
13 (18%)

131 (11%)
101 (9%)

10 (12%)
3 (3%)

536 (49%)
296 (26%)

34 (47%)
11 (15%)

605 (53%)
267 (23%)

54 (63%)
18 (21%)

Degrees of freedom: 12 ; Chi-square = 40.83 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001
; The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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Batswana are unsatisfied with their democracy at a rate only 23%, while the
Kalanga are unsatisfied at a rate even more slight – only 21%. Namibia in
general is comparable, weighing in at 28%, significant, but not radically so.
East Caprivians, however, were dissatisfied at a rate of 54%, a huge jump
relative both to Namibia and the Kalanga. Of course, we can risk overstating
the case here. The Caprivi are responding the question, “Overall, how
satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Namibia?” This question
may carry with it two different meanings, one a judgment on democracy as a
system, the other a judgment on democracy as-practiced in the state of the
answerer. The difference may be a sign that the Caprivi in general are far
more dissatisfied with the contemporary SWAPO-led government, their oneparty democracy, than are the Kalanga with the Botswana Democratic Party,
or BDP. Of course, this level of dissatisfaction also may capture the Caprivi’s
lower sense of loyalty to the democratic process as a whole (see below for
more on this).
When we consider, on the other hand, to what degree the Caprivi Lozi
and the Kalanga were satisfied with the way in which the government
exercises power, we again find something intriguing. The Caprivi are
relatively and absolutely more negative than the Kalanga – this is not
surprising. But the North East District Kalanga actually approve of the way in
which the Batswana government conducts itself at a higher rate than does the
nation as a whole! Granted, the difference is very small (only 2%) but is
fascinating on the whole, and reflects the degree to which the Kalanga elite
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have effectively convinced their people of the propriety of seeking their
fortunes within Botswana, rather than in lieu thereof.
Additionally we can consider whether or not the Caprivi are (relatively)
alienated from this polity by looking at measures which capture their opinions
on democracy relative to other political systems. Ideally, the Afrobarometer
would have surveyed for a rank-order of major institutional arrangements –
sadly, this was not the case. In lieu of this we can consider look at the
region’s (as well as our other geopolitical entities) opinions on alternative
political systems. Afrobarometer provides us with four options to consider –
formalization of the de facto one-party rule present in both Namibia and
Botswana, the reestablishment of traditional rule, the establishment of military
rule, and the establishment of a presidential monarchy (Figures 5.3-5.16).
Obviously a tremendous number of observations could be made about
the variations between the states and regions of concern here along these
vectors. Yet a few in particular stand out and, I believe, warrant the most
attention.
(1) Respondents from Botswana in general and the North East
District in particular approve the non-democratic institutional
arrangements for which the polls were conducted at lower
frequencies in every case than Namibia and Botswana.
Furthermore, they are, in every case, relatively closer to one
another in their variance.
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Namibia: Who is in Power Matters

17%

11%
56%
16%

Agree Strongly Will Make a Diff erence

Agree Will Make a Dif ference

Agree Won't Make A Difference

Agree Strongly Won't Make a Difference

Figure 5.3: Namibia: Who is in Power Matters
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)

Botsw ana: Who is in Pow er Matters

23%

51%

6%

20%

Agree Strongly Will Make a Difference

Agree Will Make a Difference

Agree Won't Make A Difference

Agree Strongly Won't Make a Difference

Figure 5.4: Botswana: Who is in Power Matters
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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Nam ibia: Would Accept Military Rule

9%
35%

16%

12%
28%

Strongly Disapprove

Disapprove

Neither Disapprove or Approve

Approve

Strongly Approve

Figure 5.5: Namibia: Would You Accept Military Rule?
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)

Botsw ana: Would Accept Military Rule

6%

3%

1%
23%
67%

Strongly Disapprove

Disapprove

Neither Disapprove or Approve

Approve

Strongly Approve

Figure 5.6: Botswana: Would You Accept Military Rule ?
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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Nam ibia: Acceptance of Presidential Monarchy

8%
33%

19%

12%
28%

Strongly Disapprove

Disapprove

Neither Disapprove or Approve

Approve

Strongly Approve

Figure 5.7: Namibia: Would You Accept President-Only Rule?
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Botsw ana: Acceptance of Presidential Monarchy
3%
4%
3%

31%

59%

Strongly Disapprove

Disapprove

Neither Disapprove or Approve

Approve

Strongly Approve

Figure 5.8: Botswana: Would You Accept President-Only Rule?
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
337

Would a One-Party Gov't Be Acceptable (North East District)

7%
13%
33%

Strongly Disapprove

2%

Disapprove
Neither Approve nor Disapprove
Approve
Strongly Approve
45%

Figure 5.9: Would a One-Party Government be Acceptable in Botswana
(North East District)
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)

Would a One-Party Gov't Be Acceptable (Caprivi)

8%

4%

1%
Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove
22%

Neither Approve nor Disapprove
Approve
65%

Strongly Approve

Figure 5.10: Would a One-Party Government be Acceptable in Namibia (East
Caprivi)
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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Rule by Traditional Elite Acceptable (North East District)

5%
20%

30%

Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove
Neither Approve nor Disapprove

2%

Approve
Strongly Approve

43%

Figure 5.11: Would Rule by Traditional Elite be Acceptable in Botswana
(North East District)
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)

Rule by Traditional Elite Acceptable (Caprivi)

7%
20%

33%

Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove
Neither Approve nor Disapprove
Approve
Strongly Approve

13%
27%

Figure 5.12: Would Rule by Tradtional Elite be Acceptable in Namibia (East
Caprivi)
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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Is Military Rule Acceptable (North East District)
7%

2%

1%
Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove
Neither Approve nor Disapprove

32%
58%

Approve
Strongly Approve

Figure 5.13: Would Military Rule be Acceptable in Botswana? (North East
District)
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)

Is Military Rule Acceptable (Caprivi)

10%
10%
Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove

6%

Neither Approve nor Disapprove
12%

Approve

62%

Strongly Approve

Figure 5.14: Would Military Rule be Acceptable in Namibia? (Caprivi)
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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Is a Presidential Monarchy Acceptable (North East District)

6%

4%

1%
Strongly Disapprove
47%

Disapprove
Neither Approve nor Disapprove
Approve

42%

Strongly Approve

Figure 5.15: Would a Presidential Monarchy be Acceptable in Botswana?
(North East District)
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)

Is a Presidential Monarchy Acceptable (Caprivi)

13%
10%

Strongly Disapprove
Disapprove

1%
14%

Neither Approve nor Disapprove
Approve

62%

Strongly Approve

Figure 5.16: Would a Presidential Monarchy be Acceptable in Namibia? (East
Caprivi)
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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(2) Residents of East Caprivi in every instance favored the
institution of non-democratic methods of rule at lower
frequencies than among the Namibian public at large. The
closest the two came was, surprisingly, along the option of
president-only rule (4%). Even more surprising, however, was
that the point at which the two differed the most was along the
option of rule by traditional elites, some 15%, a far cry from what
might be expected given that the Caprivi were seeking
independence in ethno-nationalist terms.
What does this mean? First, it means, that I was correct in assuming that the
degree to which the Caprivi would favor a non-democratic government would
be higher than that among the Kalanga. What I did not predict and am,
frankly deeply surprised about, is the fact that the Namibians in general were,
at the time of the surveys at least, even more amenable to the creation of a
non-democratic system of government than were the Caprivi. This seems to
indicate, again, that while the Caprivi may have become alienated with the
functioning of democracy in the case of Namibia under SWAPO’s rule, they
seem to have faith in the institutional arrangement at a higher rate than do
normal Namibians. One might assume, as well, that this infers that
democracy would be perfect in Caprivi eyes if it was democracy for, of, and
by Lozi – which of course brings up the question of whether or not the Caprivi
conceive of democracy as a competitive system at all.
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Re-Identification
Having established that a high level of alienation exists in Namibia in general
and Caprivi in particular, it remains to be demonstrated that this identity
entropy has been utilized effectively by disestablishmentarian elites. By this I
mean it has not yet been demonstrated that disestablishmentarians have
effectively taken advantage of the entropy left by the Namibian politicaleconomy’s failings to introduce and culture and alternative identity set.
Our expectation would be that the Caprivi rebels would have focused
their propaganda efforts at one of two identities: either
Lozi/Silozi/Barotse/Itenge or Caprivi. Of course these two concepts are
interchangeable to a degree, but the Caprivi identity may be considered a
more conservative identity, specifically because it implies that the “nation” in
question would be restricted to the boundaries of Lozi territories within the
current state of Namibia. On the other hand, any of the Lozi-in-general
identities would infer a more pan-Lozi perspective, probably with the goal of
reuniting a Greater Barotseland (including territory currently constituting much
of the southwestern region of Zambia).
Upon review of the Afrobarometer findings, however, an extremely
surprising number of facts emerge. The first of these are the product of one
of the survey’s core questions (number 83) which reads:
We have spoken to many Namibians and they have all
described themselves in different ways. Some people describe
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themselves in terms of their language, religion, race, and others
describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class,
middle class, or a farmer. Besides being a Namibian, which
specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?
The question then goes on to provide a whole list of options, 101 in fact, from
which the respondent was allowed to choose. Two of these options were
among those expected above, specifically Silozi and Caprivi. Yet the number
of respondents who identified themselves as either of these was surprisingly
low. No respondents identified themselves primarily as Silozi and only five as
Caprivians, only one of whom actually lived in Caprivi!
What then, were Lozi-speaking Namibians identifying themselves as in
1999? The answer to this question was nearly as surprising as those which
proceeded it. Some 69% of respondents living in Caprivi asserted that their
primary identity was that of “farmer,” while 6% identified themselves as
middle- or working-class. This identification with economic position in and of
itself does not make sense, especially given that members of non-Caprivi
ethnic groups (notably the Malwe and San) tended to respond with their
ethnic identities.
There are three key options for explaining this variance. First, the
variance may be a lingering product of the Namibian war of independence,
not to mention the ongoing Angolan wars, in which Marxists tended to
emphasize class-relations as part of their mobilization means. Secondly, this
outcome might be the product of the Caprivi, by and large, being apolitical, at
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least in the sense of nationalism. Their high dependence on a traditional
political-economy and low economic integration with the national center may
simply have resulted in their not considering ethnicity to matter.
I favor a third hypothesis, however. The Afrobarometer surveys were
not conducted until 1999, a year after Muyongo and his allies had fled into
Botswana. It seems likely then, that most of the Caprivi Lozi who were willing
to accept the risk of openly admitting that they supported Caprivi secession
had already fled the region. This, therefore, undermines our ability to use the
surveys to confirm or deny the rise of Caprivi nationalism. I can therefore not
confirm my theory, but the conditions under which the survey was conducted
disallow our being able to state that the theory was disconfirmed as well. This
problem is further complicated by the fact that the Afrobarometer surveys
constitute a relatively young research institution. The 1999 surveys, while a
significant accomplishment, are also the earliest collection of data on the
subject to which we can turn. Thus, we cannot confirm or deny that there was
even a swelling of Caprivi nationalism prior to the 1998 exodus.
Before I discuss the importance of this regional data, I would first like
to take note of the Afrobarometer’s findings regarding the Kalanga, which are
quite contrary to what I expected. First, the Kalanga, whose leaders
emphasized assimilation (which will be discussed at more length below) into
the greater Tswana population from independence until the early 21st
Century, are far more widely distributed than the Caprivi – substantial
populations of Kalanga have migrated into Botswana’s Central District (so
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many so, in fact, that some less-well researched geographers have actually
placed the Kalanga homeland here, rather than in the North East District,
alternatively referred to as the Francistown District) and the national capital of
Gabrone (Kweneng and the Southwest District also had at least two selfidentifying Kalanga). Secondly, and implied in the first statement, Kalanga
are far more likely to self-identify themselves as Kalanga than the Caprivi who
actually fought the war. This is surprising not only because it seems
contradictory to the logic which underpins our understanding of how radical
ethnic movements develop, and because this poll precedes the first serious
efforts by Kalanga to formally defend their cultural rights in the early 21st
Century (see Werbner 2004, 38-39).
Specifically, before the popularization of pro-Kalanga culture and
language organizations, Werbner (2004) notes that several identitysuppressing behaviors were present among Botswana’s Kalanga.
Specifically, these are:
(1) Kalanga leaders, as early as the colonial period, actively
supported assimilation of the Kalanga with the Tswana majority,
even unto sacrificing their language and accepting a
constitutional arrangement which explicitly excluded them from
any influence in one of the houses of the legislature, the House
of Chiefs (see the Political Comparison in Chapter 4 for more on
this).
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(2) A backlash among Tswana, both popular and elite, began in
the 1980s and was severe enough that many Tswana have
taken measures as drastic as naming their children with Tswana
names in order to avoid active discrimination. This backlash
was the product of three accomplishments. First, Kalanga
leaders emphasized that their population should seek education
(in English and/or Tswana) and ultimately positions in the civil
service as far back as during the colonial period. The product of
this, ultimately was disproportionate employment in higher
education and political representation and influence (a situation
not dissimilar from that seen in the United Kingdom, where
Scots have long had disproportionate influence). This situation
was further exacerbated by the fact that in the 1980s the
government of Botswana supported the deep involvement of
experienced civil servants in business (similar to the
controversial relationship between Japanese civil servants and
businessmen during the post-War period), leading the Kalanga
to gain disproportionate wealth as well. This backlash is more
evident in the rise of Tswana ultranationalist organizations such
as Pitso Ya Batswana or “Forum of the Tswana) and Lefatshe
Larona or “Our Country “(Werbner 2004, 52-56, 79).
(3) As part of the backlash against Kalanga success,
ultranationalist Tswana attempted to discredit Kalanga ethnic
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rights, in particular by asserting that the Kalanga were only a
‘visiting people’ who had recently immigrated to Tswana territory
and were there at the discretion of their Tswana hosts. This
false history emphasized in particular the immigration of
Kalanga from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe during the transition from
colony to state. Kalanga scholars countered this propaganda
salvo by demonstrating that their people not only had resided in
the territory comprising Botswana for centuries (for a large
period of that time ruling a kingdom known as Mambo, which
overlapped into present-day Zimbabwe), but furthermore had
been there prior to the immigration of Tswana-speakers. This of
course only served to inflame anti-Kalanga sentiments (Werbner
2004, 71).
There were, then, at the time of the 1999 polls, substantial push and pull
factors to dissuade Kalanga from identifying themselves as Kalanga, ranging
from their elites assimilationist tendencies to their fear of discrimination and
reprisal. Yet, self-identification seems hardly affected, despite the obvious
similarities in the situation of the Kalanga to that of Tutsi in Rwanda, Jews in
Germany and Austria in the 19th and through the First World War, and
overseas Chinese in southeast Asia repeatedly through the last several
centuries. This is intriguing, because it would seem to indicate that the
Kalanga’s behavioral pattern may not be that of a secessionist group, but may
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be that of a group on the verge of experiencing extraordinary pressures to
either migrate or risk genocide.
In summation, there is little doubt that my expectations that the
residents of East Caprivi would observably identify with their ethnicity at a
higher rate than the Kalanga residents of the North East District were proven
far from correct. Regardless of the reasons, this seriously calls into question
the utility of using open self-identification as a tool for violent secession
prediction.

Unsanctioned Political-Economy
As has been described earlier, the development of an alternative politicaleconomy is well established in the literature as method utilized by
disestablishmentarians; it is a process by which non-state actors begin to
acquire the legitimacy of a state, the experience needed to run and organize
a state, and the resource base necessary to support a state (and of course, a
state-movement). Despite this point, often mentioned by structural and
institutional theorists of civil war, there have been few efforts to utilize this
dimension as a predictor, or even as an explainer, of the onset of domestic
violence. There are two key reasons for this. First and foremost, the
relationship of this process to the onset of radical, extraordinary violence of all
kinds, including wars of secession, cannot rightly be described as causal –
black and gray political-economies certainly do not “cause” revolutions or their
kin - and therefore their relationship tends to be underemphasized. I reject
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this argument explicitly, assuming that since this sort of resource
development system is both rational and common, it should be a correlate of
wars of secession and their ilk. The second argument against this sort of
inquiry would simply be the difficulty of the undertaking. Grey and black
political and economic markets are, of course, illegal in every state in the
world – a defining characteristic of these organizations is their hidden nature.
In other words, acquiring data on these markets is difficult, likely to be spotty,
and so forth. My response to this assertion is that such arguments constitute
no valid impediment – difficulty does not equal lacking in utility.
Corruption
To determine the extent to which alternative markets exist is a difficult thing. I
decided to start by surveying the literature on black and grey markets in
Namibia and Botswana, performing Lexis-Nexis searches on the subject
(using the entire Sub-Saharan African category). My searches revealed
virtually no articles on the subject – the few that it did uncover focused on
gem smuggling in Botswana and these seemed to lack any real relevance to
the current study, and I decided to seek potentially useful data in other
venues.
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation I discussed the extent to which
corruption was present in Namibia and Botswana at the state-level. In both
states the popular consensus was that corruption was low. We cannot,
however stop there, especially given that our concern is that an alternative
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political-economy is constructed within the Caprivi region in particular, rather
than in Namibia in general.
I specifically looked at responses by the residents of East Caprivi,
Namibia and the North East District (Francistown), Botswana in the 1999
Afrobarometer surveys on two of the corruption questions discussed above at
the state-level of analysis. Specifically, these were (1) how frequently were
traditional elites believed to be involved in corruption and (2) how many local
officials did the respondent believe to be involved in corruption. I selected
these measures because of their immediate relevance – corruption among
officials with whom the residents interact with on a day-to-day basis should be
higher in those states that rebel than in those states which fail to attempt
secession given that it is these officials who are in the position to alert the
central government of misdeeds and that it is these officials who must be paid
off in order to guarantee space for the development of the alternative politicaleconomy, not to mention to support the movement of illicit persons and goods
(particularly important for the mobilization discussed below).
If we look at Tables 5.17 and 5.18 we can see immediately, however,
that the expected conditions were not, in fact, those that actually prevailed.
Quite the contrary, in fact, a few very different patterns seem to have
emerged. A few include:
(1) The lower perceived corruption of traditional leaders,
including chiefs, in Namibia relative to Botswana;
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Table 5.17: Are Most Traditional Elites Corrupt?
All, Almost
All
Most
A Few,
Some
Almost
None, None

Namibia
25 (4%)

East Caprivi
1 (2%)

Botswana
23 (5%)

North East District
1 (3%)

77 (13%)
193 (32%)

2 (4%)
23 (40%)

120 (23%)
182 (36%)

10 (31%)
12 (38%)

305 (51%)

31 (54%)

186 (36%)

9 (28%)

Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 46.85 ; p is less than or equal to 0.001 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
Table 5.18: Are Most Local Elites Corrupt?
All, Almost
All
Most
A Few,
Some
Almost
None, None

Namibia
38 (5%)

East Caprivi
1 (2%)

Botswana
31 (5%)

North East District
3 (6%)

166 (22%)
312 (42%)

18 (28%)
30 (47%)

210 (31%)
271 (40%)

21 (42%)
19 (38%)

232 (31%)

15 (23%)

161 (24%)

7 (14%)

Degrees of freedom: 9 ; Chi-square = 27.77 ; p is less than or equal to 0.01 ;
The distribution is significant
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (Botswana 1999; Namibia 1999)
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(2) The higher perceived corruption of traditional leaders among
the Kalanga relative to the Batswana mainstream; and
(3) The lower perceived corruption of traditional leaders among
the Caprivi relative to the Namibian mainstream; implying of
course, that
(4) The expectation that Caprivi will assert that their traditional
leaders are more corrupt vis-à-vis Kalanga leaders was
incorrect.
These findings reveal a methodological conundrum that I failed to predict. It
reveals that the concept of “corruption” is probably a culturally and politically
relativistic one. In this case, for instance, if you are a Caprivi who distrusts
your central government and would prefer greater autonomy or
independence, actions taken by your elite that might be perceived as corrupt
by outsiders may not be perceived as corrupt by you. Alternatively, if you are
a Kalanga, a minority in a state in which the constitution enshrines the rights
and privileges of the traditional leaders of the majority ethnicity, but not your
own, one’s perception of those traditional leaders is very likely to be heavily
slanted.
Furthermore, if we focus on the perception of local officials and the
degree to which they are corrupt, we can see that:
(1) East Caprivians perceive local officials of the state to be
corrupt more frequently than do Namibians as a whole;
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(2) Residents of the North East District perceive local officials of
the state to be corrupt more frequently than do Batswana as a
whole;
(3) Quite contrary to our expectations, Kalanga perceive local
officials of the state to be corrupt at a substantially greater
proportion than do Caprivi (by 12%).
Again, my predictions were incorrect. The Kalanga again believe their local
government officials to be relatively more corrupt than do the Caprivi. This is
less easily understood, especially given that Kalanga elites tend to emphasize
Kalanga receive education in order to enter the Batswana civil service,
thereby giving them access to business opportunities (Werbner 2004). It is
hard to imagine that the Kalanga, in the midst of their success, would
perceive their benefits in the system cynically, acknowledging on a mass
scale that they are the beneficiaries of nepotism, but perhaps this is indeed
the case.
This of course highlights a tremendous problem with any attempt to
use corruption as a predictor of intrastate violence of any kind, including wars
of secession, in a purely theory-driven fashion. Specifically, these cases
highlight the fact that corruption is deeply loaded with normative connotations
that are culturally and politically specific, necessitating sociohistorical analysis
if we are to understand the connotations of these statements.
That said, these cases also illustrate a potential boon to incorporating
corruption into our analyses, accepting the necessity of engaging in
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sociohistorical analysis. Specifically, it seems that comparing the perceptions
of corruption among different political sectors (local elite, national
bureaucracies, elected officials, traditional leaders, etc.) within identity groups
may be able to inform our understanding of which genre of radical,
extraordinary politics said identity group might be most likely to engage in
should violence break out. Here we see a situation in which traditional
leaders in East Caprivi are regarded more kindly by the masses than are
state officials – this seems to constitute at least part of an explanation of why
the dissatisfied Caprivi sought to engage in an ethnic war of secession, rather
than, for instance, a Marxist revolution.

Personnel Mobilization
Direct measures of mobilization (and, as discussed later, resource
mobilization) are difficult to come by for the prediction of wars of secession in
particular and the onset of radical, extraordinary politics in general for one
simple reason – the participants in secessionist and other radical movements
have manifest cause for hiding their participation in such movements.
Exposure not only could mean imperilment of their lives, property, and
freedom, but furthermore would undermine the likelihood that their efforts will
be successful. While this presents obvious problems for police and
intelligence services, the problems presented to academics depending on
unclassified data and with far more limited resources are tremendous.
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My research was conducted in the following manner. First, I reviewed
every article from 1997 to 1999 in The Namibian (the major, independent
English-language newspaper of that state) in which the Caprivi region was
mentioned, using an embedded Google search engine to review the archives.
Second, I used Lexis-Nexis to review every article which mentioned the
Caprivi region over the same period of time in the major newspapers of
Southern Africa, specifically The Post of Zambia, The Sunday Times, The
Times of Zambia, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Zimbabwe Standard.
Third, I used Lexis-Nexis to review several international news
sources/services, specifically the Associated Press, the Cable News Network
(CNN), The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Gannett Service, the
Inter Press Service The New York Times, and Xinhua News Agency.
My review of the journalistic sources available, however, revealed that
in the case of the Caprivi incident at least, there were at least some sign that
a massive personnel mobilization process was underway. The most obvious
of these was the mass migration that accompanied Muyongo’s flight to
Botswana (Wakin 1999). In the simplest of terms, thousands of Caprivi
moved across the Botswana-Namibia border in response to then unrealized
threats against openly pro-secessionism leadership from President Nujoma.
Regardless of how this was accomplished, be it by promises of wealth or
political office or claims that the Namibian state would inevitably crush the
Caprivi people or by nationalist sentiments, certain key facts were known prior
to the onset of violence. Specifically, (1) thousands of people moved across
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national borders to a protected zone, responding to the calls of their
leadership and (2) hundreds of these were recognizably armed and preparing
for resistance (Wakin 1999). In the realm of explanation-only data, several
resources indicate that the Caprivi were mobilizing fighters from outside of
their borders, specifically from the National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA) and among extranationals from Zambia who apparently
were apparently members of the Barotseland (or Barotese) Patriotic Front
(BPF) (Grobler 1999A, McNeil 1999, Shimo and Moyo 1999).
Of additional interest, my review of (list news services) revealed a
clear, if underdeveloped, pattern of personnel mobilization that warrants at
minimum listing and some minor discussion. I say underdeveloped because
not only has there been no in-depth study of the attempted secession (in
English, at least) but further the reports on the active participants in the
conflict tend to be limited to mere lists, occasionally lists of names with
occupations and ages, but never more than this. What we can eke out, at
least, are the following statements:
(1) The rebellion was led by several traditional (especially
leaders of the three Lozi tribes of Namibia) and elected elites
(specifically former members of the Democratic Turnhalle
Alliance, or DTA). Chief among these elites was Mishake
Muyongo, former leader of the DTA. His chief lieutenants were
Chief Boniface Mamili (Mafwe Tribe), and former Caprivi
Regional Governor John Mabuku (Wakin 1999).
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(2) Most of the non-elite participants (the infantry of the Caprivi
Liberation Army) were drawn from state positions in the military,
the police, the educational establishment, or other
bureaucracies (The Namibian 2000)
The Caprivi war of secession, then, was led and fought by people who prior to
the Muyongo-inspired exodus, at least, held varying degrees of power in the
Namibian state. First among the implications of this could be that only stateoffice holders in the region had the ability to rationalize risking rebellion.
These persons drew their income based on their talents, which of course
were transportable, rather than the condition of the average Caprivi, who
drew their living, or at least a sizable proportion of it, from their property.
Secondly, this mobilization pattern, while lacking any utility as a predictor of
the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) leadership’s plan to create an alternative
political-economy, is a strong explainer. Perhaps few signs of an alternative
political-economy were visible in our earlier review of the subject because the
strategy selected by the CLA was to merely recruit the local government in
situ for their purposes. Note in particular that the leaders were drawn from
those minor elites who have the capacity and training to use force and those
who have the most capacity to indoctrinate – the only other major means of
doing so were the primary targets of the CLA’s attacks.
With regards to the Kalanga counter-example, little needs to be stated.
Kalanga elites definitively emphasized cooperation and negotiation with the
state. The only indication that any personnel mobilization is occurring comes
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not from journalistic sources but from an academic source, specifically
Werbner’s review of ultranationalist Tswana accusations that Kalanga cultural
organizations such as the Society for the Propagation of the Ikalanga
Language (SPIL) are merely recruiting and propaganda tools of the elite who
are mobilizing to either takeover Botswana or to establish a new state along
the borders of the ancient Mambo kingdom (Werbner 2004, 52-57). Of
course, this view cannot be wholly dismissed – the apparent strategy of the
CLA testifies to this point in particular.
This perspective even seems to be present, if at a less virulent level,
among more mainstream Tswana, for instance President Festus Mogae who,
when addressing SPIL called upon the organization to make sure that it
avoided packing political content with its cultural work (Werbner 2004, 54).
Werbner however, dismisses offhand these assertions, insisting that at most
the Kalanga hope to regain their ethnic identity through cultural activities and
reinvigorating the Kalanga language. While this may be the case, however, it
seems to infer that Kalanga assimilationist ideals are gradually wearing away,
and the grounds on which conflict might occur are expanding.
This is potentially a fertile ground for future inquiry. Similar
accusations against minorities abound throughout world history, particularly
among minorities that make their goal cosmopolitanism. Specifically, some
minorities seek to politically and economically assimilate with their majority
population while still retaining their own identity along certain key axes (e.g.
Jews and Hui Muslims who retain their eating restrictions respectively in the
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West and China). While on a day to day basis this strategy decreases the
notoriety of those ethnic groups, in the long-term it tends to lend itself to a
particular characterization. Specifically, those minorities who elect to use this
strategy tend to be seen by conservative, majoritarian zealots as scheming,
plotting, and so forth – if they are “keeping secrets” about certain day-to-day
activities, how much more likely is it that they are maintaining a secret cabal
aimed at disenfranchising or exploiting the majority? This means that these
minorities can be used easily, with little evidence (indeed, evidence would be
an example that they were not secretive) by said conservatives as a means of
gaining support for themselves and their policies without risking alienating
members of the majority population. Therefore, it would seem that this policy
choice by minorities carries a higher relative likelihood of resulting in either
ostracism or genocide comparative to the other major policy choices available
along this dimension – full assimilation or avoiding any assimilation. Of
course, both of these other choices carry their own costs and risks, notably
the complete loss of a socio-economic tradition on the part of the first and a
high likelihood of day-to-day discrimination on the part of the second, but the
likelihood of distinct behavioral correlations here seems high.

Resource Mobilization
In the first consideration, this dimension of analysis seems elegant enough.
Were there signs that the Caprivian elite were taking steps to agglomerate the
capital necessary to attempt an act of secession? As with so many
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dimensions of analysis, however, once unpacked, complications proliferate.
How does one determine whether or not a faction may or may not be arming
itself secretly for rebellion? This problem is an elephant in the room.
There are two methods by which I might have approached this
conundrum, neither of which is extraordinarily satisfactory. On the one hand,
I might have surveyed police and intelligence reports from throughout
Namibia and its neighboring states. The resources and foreign language
skills for such an undertaking, however, were obviously not at my disposal.
On the other hand, I was able to conduct my second method of analysis, a
simple review of international journalistic sources that cover southern African,
including Namibia, in order to determine (1) if substantial evidence existed
that weapons build-ups were occurring in the Caprivi region or among Caprivi
secessionists and (2) if that evidence was available publicly in significant
quantities prior to the onset of the attempted secession.
My review was conducted using the same sources as my other reviews
of news media. First, I reviewed every article from 1997 to 1999 in The
Namibian (the major, independent English-language newspaper of that state)
in which the Caprivi region was mentioned, using an embedded Google
search engine to review the archives. Second, I used Lexis-Nexis to review
every article which mentioned the Caprivi region over the same period of time
in the major newspapers of Southern Africa, specifically The Post of Zambia,
The Sunday Times, The Times of Zambia, The Zimbabwe Independent, The
Zimbabwe Standard. Third, I used Lexis-Nexis to review several international
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news sources/services, specifically the Associated Press, the Cable News
Network (CNN), The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Gannett
Service, the Inter Press Service The New York Times, and Xinhua News
Agency. With regards to this subject, I specifically looked for any information
regarding weapons caches, weapons interdiction, and the like. My goal was
merely to determine if, temporally prior to the incident, there indications that
Caprivi rebels were stockpiling munitions in anticipation of violence.
My review found that not only was there definite, well-publicized
evidence that Caprivi secessionists were preparing materially for warfare, but
that this preparation had at least three major stages, each of which were
publicly documented. The first of these build-up stages occurred in the period
leading up to Muyongo’s expulsion from the DTA. At an unspecified time
prior to the expulsion, perhaps as far back as Muyongo’s break with the
South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), Caprivi Lozi seeking
independence began stockpiling assault rifles (primarily the ubiquitous AK-47)
and mortars (Ilukena 1998a). In the early stages, probably this was funded
out of CLA members pockets with the help of South African industrialist and
Caprivi sympathizer Erich Zimmerman (Nthengwe 1998). While the route of
acquisition for these early weapons is indefinite, the most likely source was
Angola’s UNITA rebels (Ilukena 1998a). Intriguingly, it was partly the
existence of these stockpiles that made Muyongo’s call for Caprivi selfdetermination so inflammatory, thereby provoking President Nujoma to take a
hardline against Muyongo and his peers.
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The second readily observable stage in the mobilization of war
infrastructure among the Caprivi separatists occurred during their exodus to
Botswana. In the midst of this flight a high percentage of the “refugees” were
interdicted crossing the border with assault rifles and mortars (Mooketsi
1999). Botswana arrested those who were armed and charged them, but
soon released them on bail and never followed through with any prosecutions
for gun-running, illegal border crossing, or any other charge. While all those
weapons interdicted were seized, one can assume that the small number
charged compared to the tremendous flow of humanity (less than one
hundred people were detained of the over 2,500 who fled) indicates that a
substantial quantity of the weapons probably made it across the borders
undetected.
The third readily observable stage of weapons mobilization came along
with the earliest indications of the CLA’s connections with the BPF and
UNITA. There was little doubt from the beginning that the two organizations
were not only providing training grounds and at least limited training, but were
increasing the stockpile of weapons (Ilukena 1998a, Grobler 1999A, McNeil
1999, Siona 1999).
On the other hand, our control group, the Kalanga, demonstrate no
documented similar behavior, be it in academic or journalistic sources. There
seem to be no documented cases of either a weapons build-up or any
comparable strategic infrastructure development that cannot be explicitly
attributed to the assimilationist goals of the Kalanga elite.
363

Summary
What conclusions can we draw from the above research? I would like to
address this question by tackling each subsection, briefly reviewing the
findings, and dispensing some minor judgments as to the quality of my
original hypotheses and the implications of my actual findings.
With regards to my work on identity and loyalty, using the
Afrobarometer data as the source for the vast majority of my research, a few
points are merited. First, the Caprivi do seem to have developed a high level
of ambivalence towards the contemporary system, both in terms of the
contemporary government and, to a lesser degree, towards the institutional
arrangement itself. A substantial proportion of the people of Caprivi do seem
dissatisfied with the status quo. That said, there is little evidence that any
alternative identity was populating the region at the time of the 1999
attempted secession. Quite the contrary, the Caprivi seem to be avoiding
political identity entirely, focusing rather on their economic identities instead.
Whether this is the product of fears at the time the survey was conducted, a
product of self-selection (those Caprivi who thought of themselves as Lozi
had already fled the nation), or some other mechanism (or the simple lack
thereof) is unclear. It seems at this stage of consideration that ambivalence,
rather than (or at the very least concurrent with) the more packed term of
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“alienation,” should be explored as a correlate of wars of secession in the
future.
This final point takes on particular significance when we contrast the
Caprivi experience with that of the Kalanga of Botswana. In this instance we
find a minority people who have adopted, quite comfortably, a cosmopolitan
understanding of themselves – they are Batswana and Kalanga – and whose
perspective towards to the government and its behavior is far less ambivalent,
even if it is more complex. The Kalanga seem, at first glance, to meet our
understanding of what makes a minority group rebellious – they are wellorganized, self-aware, have a distinct homeland, are transnational, and so on
– yet they have a distinct and definite non-majority identity in a state that
discriminates openly against its minorities and there is no evidence that they
now or have ever sought independence. This seems to indicate that
ambivalence is the more likely predictor, at least in simple, quantifiable terms.
My search for evidence of the creation of an unsanctioned politicaleconomy turned out to be, in all the dimensions I discussed prior to the study,
to be a wild goose chase. No direct evidence of black or grey political or
economic markets was visible prior to the onset of violence in August and
corruptness, while an interesting vector of analysis, hardly seems to be a
good covariate for such a hidden political-economy. This point was pushed
home in particular by the fact that corruption is inevitably relative to the
position of the person asked about it. If one asks, for instance, are tribal elite
corrupt? That depends on whether you are a member of the tribe.
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The search I conducted for evidence that personnel were being
mobilized uncovered evidence that an alternative political-economy was in the
making. The personnel mobilized were recruited, by and large, to fulfill tasks
essential to any modern government. The Caprivi resistance was composed
primarily of preeminent leaders, police, soldiers, bureaucrats, and teachers,
reinforced largely by their family members and students. Of course, no
evidence for this was forthcoming prior to the onset of violence (and the
capture of many members of the CLA). That said, there is no practical reason
why at least some data towards this ends could not have been collected by
the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) as refugees
entered Botswana, thus implying that even if academicians could not have
acquired substantial data on the subject, that organization, and possibly
certain governmental agencies (particularly of Botswana) could have done so
had the political will existed.
The reviews of available journalistic literature for evidence of personnel
and resource mobilization, on the other hand, fell more in line with my earlier
expectations. Specifically, ample evidence that pro-secessionist Caprivi Lozi
were (1) building an army and (2) equipping and training that army were
amply available as far as two years prior to the outbreak of violence. While
this should have sounded a clarion call to the Namibian state, leading it if
nothing else to improve its border security, Nujoma’s administration actually
withdrew troops from the region during this time. Since the CLA was unable
to quickly capture the police and military stations in Katima Mulilo as they had
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hoped, this presented no tremendous challenge. Had, on the other hand,
they successfully captured either of these facilities, the odds that their
numbers, reinforced with an armory, would have at the least have extended
their bid for independence, resulting in far more casualties – at the most, they
likely would have been able to capture all of their other targets, eliminated
ability of the Namibian army to enter the area easily, and perhaps would have
been able to draw the United Nations even deeper into the area’s politics,
specifically on the side of the Caprivi rebels.
This chapter seems to make it clear that the possibility of multinational,
possibly quantitative, studies are warranted for three of the subjects herein
considered. First, the question of ambivalence, though superior measures
should be employed to those I used here. Second, the question of whether or
not personnel are being mobilized for a resistance has distinct potential. Here
the most likely measures of utility are likely either to be (1) merely a yes/no
statement as to whether such mobilization is occurring or, in a more telling
measure, (2) a proportional measure using the estimated proportion of the
total population mobilized, of instance. The third potentially useful measure
lies in evidence that the group is not merely mobilizing personnel but has
actually begun acquiring weapons. Again, this may be merely a simple
yes/no measure, but alternatively it may be a graded measure, perhaps
emphasizing the maximum firepower of known units (assuming, of course,
that as the frequency of known large-firepower weapons increase the
frequency of smaller firepower weapons will correlatedly increase.
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While I can say in simple yes/no terms that the Caprivi were, as I
predicted, acquiring the necessary war-making tools for a secession attempt,
I have sparse numbers or proportions with which to work. And, indeed, my
review of the literature discovered that the CLA probably never felt that it was
adequately armed – their plan, as is made clear in post-violence court
statements, hinged on their ability to seize the Katima police and military
stations, allowing them access to enough weapons to distribute to all of their
participants, some of whom entered the fray with only sticks or flailing rods
(Menges 2006). When the CLA failed to quickly and successfully storm either
station, their rebellion had already failed. For our purposes though, it brings
in an interesting and, heretofore, unconsidered point – the threshold for a
rebelling group to “have enough weapons” can be transformed according to
the strategy of battle selected by disestablishmentarian group. Guerrilla units,
for instance, require very little hardware comparative to even ordinary infantry
units.
As constraining to our ability to predict as this is, it nonetheless gives
us at least an elementary mechanism. Like as not, it seems highly probably
that weapons build-ups by disestablishmentarians will generally be visible to
at least some degree. This build-up indicates a willingness to incur costs and
risks on the part of the disestablishmentarians, on the one hand, and an even
simpler truth – disestablishmentarians are considering rebellion, and, of
course, considering an attempted secession an option increases the odds it
may happen.
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CHAPTER VI
OPPORTUNITIES AND FLASHPOINTS:
THE EFFECTS OF DIVERGENT INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL POLICIES ON NAMIBIA AND BOTSWANA
According to the model I have developed, once disestablishmentarian elites
have effectively mobilized their relative population, one key and essential act
remains – they must decide to utilize their forces, both human and
instrumental, to attempt to force the dominant state to allow them to exercise
their political-economic independence. The question, however, is what are
the relevant factors leading to this decision beyond the structural-institutional
situation and an adequately mobilized population and resource base. I would
argue that there are at least three key factors, two of which are largely
dependent on the policy decisions of organizations external to the state in
question and one of which is dependent on the policy decisions of the state
in question’s orthodox predominant elite.
Interstate Support for Secession
First, does it appear that international support, diplomatic and/or material, for
secession will be forthcoming? If the international community engages in
actions and/or communications which make them believe that support for
their cause is forthcoming then they will likely recalculate the costs, benefits,
and risks involved in rebellion in such a way that such action is more likely
than otherwise. This is dependent on two key factors. On the one hand, the
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contemporary interstate system is built at least partially on humanistic
concerns. Rebels may believe that they can manipulate this impulse in such
a way that, in order to decrease the suffering of their own relevant population,
interstate actors will support independence over the maintenance of the
contemporary interstate order and identities. On the other hand, in a far more
realpolitick vein, there are, in every state system, states which recognize that
by supporting such movements they have the ability, on occasion, to change
their own position in the interstate system.
Specifically, I intend to construct a history of Caprivi rebels in the
period immediately preceding the revolution with specific reference to both
their relationship with other states and intergovernmental organizations, as
well as relevant extra-territorial non-state actors with political, military, or
economic capabilities of consequence. I will specifically be looking for
indications that real support (in terms of material, arms, territory, troops, and
so forth) has been offered and/or given or that rhetorical support has been
offered and/or given. International communications which frame the Caprivi
situation in a favorable light, particularly from other Lozi-speaking groups,
sub-Saharan African states, the United Nations, the African Union, or the
great powers are of particular significance.
Additionally I intend to perform a wide review of the history of the postCold War reactions of the international system to similar situations to
determine if the Caprivi leadership may have been led to expect a radically
different international response to their rebellion, particularly if the Namibian
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state’s response had not been as powerful, single-minded, and frankly
effective.
Risk Alleviation: Exit-Strategies
Second, do the elites have a valid exit strategy should they fail? This measure
may seem to be in dialectic opposition with the earlier assumption that the
state has ultimately backed rebels into a corner, guaranteeing that they no
longer have any ability to pursue, via official, peaceful means, the ends of
political independence or increased self-rule, but that is not the case. The
former speaks to the inability of disestablishmentarian elites to acquire more
power without risk, whereas this vector speaks of the ability of elites to pursue
more power while decreasing (personal) risk. The difference is perhaps
subtle, but real.
I intend to determine, using journalistic and academic resources, if
interstate bodies and governments made offers (rhetorical or practical) of
sanctuary to disestablishmentarian elites (and, if possible, the masses to
whom they cater) prior to the onset of the Caprivi war of secession. I have no
particular expectations as to whether or not such offers will be manifest prior
in publications prior to the onset of the war, since this again is information
which is likely to be held in confidence by disestablishmentarians, however
we may see a pattern useful for simple explanation in publications from after
the war.
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Internal Bounds Set by Establishment Elites
Third, has the dominant system excluded beyond redemption the elites of the
disestablishmentarian movement from restitution and redemption within the
contemporary system?
Political and military theorists dating as far back as Sun Zi
(alternatively Tzu or Tsu) have discussed the implications of relatively
powerful belligerents limiting the available options to the their weaker
antagonists. Specifically, the odds that the weaker belligerent will engage in
violence (rather than opting for a strategic retreat of one type or another,
including surrender) increases as the available avenues of retreat decrease.
A logical and inevitable extension of this premise, noted by Sun Zi himself, is
that weak belligerents will inevitably choose to fight if no avenue of retreat
remains, and will often fight all the more viciously as a result. In both
interstate and intrastate warfare examples of this principle abound – perhaps
the most famous of the Twentieth Century being the American refusal to allow
the Japanese any type of surrender other than unconditional, extending the
war for at least several months (until, of course, the United States
demonstrated its nuclear capabilities in Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
The principle here is simply that the state, or rather the state’s
establishment and orthodox elites, have publicly and actively intimated that
reform, negotiation, and mutual accommodation is an impossibility. The
effect of cutting off all debate and discussion on the logic of elites is clear – it
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eliminates virtually all key arguments for accepting a nonviolent resolution to
reigning disputes. This principle is active in the structuralist and
institutionalist theories at one level – democracy, capitalism, and so forth
allow dominated parties access to the system, the possibility of affecting
transformation. This increases systemic stability. Here, however, the
principle is more nuanced. If in Namibia the democratically elected
government made hardline demands and took steps that would, without
undermining structural and institutional integrity, eliminate the possibility of
accommodation with minority parties demanding more self-rule and/or
independence, the odds are that structuralists and institutionalists would
foresee no increase in the likelihood of a secession movement. On the other
hand, elite theorists would likely assert that such demands substantially
transform the logic of elites, increasing the attractiveness of radical action.
To operationalize this I intend to review both academic and journalistic
literature and construct a general history of both Namibia’s central
government’s (and the elites thereof) relationship to the Caprivi
disestablishmentarians and, for comparison, a similar general history of
Botswana’s state towards the Kalanga. I assume that the Namibian state will
have taken both substantial and rhetorical steps that constrained the options
of the Caprivi elite in such a way as to make outright rebellion an rational
political behavior, with special reference to the interests and/or needs of the
Caprivi disestablishmentarian elites.
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Summary
Why these factors? My model is an straightforward one, which precedes
temporally after the appearance of an unstable institutional and structural
arrangement and concurrent with the mobilization efforts of the
disestablishmentarians, including secessionists. Specifically, I assume that
external actors have the capacity to both decrease the risks and costs of a
decision to engage in a war of secession through their support (in one or
more of several ways, to be discussed at far more length below). If they
choose to do so, they increase the odds disestablishmentarians will choose to
rebel. On the other hand, as internal elites choose to limit the nature and
range of discourse with regards to disestablishmentarian interests, they
increase the potential benefits of rebellion or secession should it succeed.
Radical limitation of discourse, including the suppression of counter-orthodox
elites and organizations, should therefore radically increase the odds
disestablishmentarians will choose to rebel.

Interstate Support
Ultimately, this vector of analysis is dependent on the fact that rebels,
including secessionists, are usually underdogs, with substantially if not
radically inferior capital and/or human capital than the establishment from
which they hope to withdraw. They are compelled to seek means and
methods of offsetting the capabilities of their potential enemies, that is to say
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to offset the superiority of their enemies. While there are a number of ways
by which this goal may be pursued, arguably the most expedient and
historically successful is to draw extra-territorial actors into the conflict. This
may be done in a number of ways:
(1) They may be brought in as negotiators;
(2) They may be contracted as guaranteers of “rules” that
weaken the ability of the establishment to undermine the act of
secession;
(3) They may be contracted as providers of material and/or
training;
(4) They may supplement combat personnel, providing of
secret or “volunteer” troops; and/or
5) They may supplement combat personnel, entering the war as
open combatants, forcing the split of resources.
Each of these options, of course, comes packed with its own set of potential
benefits, costs, and risks – by and large, as an interstate actor progresses
down the list of available options, costs and risks increase. Two additional
points demand note here. First, the first two of these options do not require
the interstate actor to acknowledge their support of the secessionists.
Indeed, it is quite possible that the interstate actors may conceive of
themselves as developing neutral policies. Neither of these options are,
however, neutral in practice. The first of these immediately throws a carrot to
secessionists by recognizing that, even if they are not seen (yet) as a state,
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they are a valid authority. This may increase the legitimacy of the
secessionist movement both internally and externally, and creates
opportunities for disestablishmentarians to cut their loss, wait for superior
timing, and so forth. The second of these also tends to weaken state actors
more than non-state actors. This is because (1) state action is more readily
observable in most cases and (2) since the capability of states usually vastly
exceeds that of secessionists, the most likely outcome, should the state
comply with rules of combat, is that establishment capabilities and
disestablishmentarian capabilities tend to converge in relative terms. In
addition, it is also important to remember that these options are in no case
mutually exclusive. Interstate actors are quite capable of supporting several
policies simultaneously, including policies which are mutually contradictive.
Types of Actors
Throughout this dissertation I use the term extra-territorial actors and
interstate actors interchangeably. Before continuing I would like to
emphasize that the relevant actors need not exclusively be states. The
possible actors fall into one of four primary categories First among these are,
of course, states, the primary constituents of the interstate system, the
contemporary, monopolistic legitimate wielders of force, and the final vector of
control for virtually every resource on earth.
Second are intergovernmental organizations, bodies which exercise
some measure of sovereignty and legitimacy, largely at the behest of their
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member states. Frequently, these bodies have the ability to create and
implement new political and/or economic policies, either independent from
their member states or in concordance with them, and in a few cases, in spite
of them (e.g. the European Union and the International Court of Justice).
Whether they intend to surrender power to these organizations, the states
which are members of them in point of fact do – and in doing so, accept that
these new, semi-independent bureaucracies will inevitably develop their own
goals and ends, goals and ends that may violate the foreign policy goals of
many, if not most, of their member states to a lesser or greater degree. The
United Nations, for instance, may simply be an agglomeration of its near 200
member-states, but there is no question that it exercises a substantial degree
of independence.
Third are state-like actors. These are organizations that, like states,
claim the right to utilize force in pursuit of their political goals, but, unlike
states, have far more fluid territorial, population, and/or legitimacy bases.
Specifically, I refer here to ‘rebel’ organizations (e.g. the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola or UNITA in Angola) and to bodies which
are states in all but name and/or international recognition (e.g. Puntland or
Somaliland, on the Horn of Africa).
Fourth are non-state actors. Like states and state-like actors, these
organizations tend to have access to substantial resources, be it capital,
labor, legitimacy, or a measure of all three. Unlike their peer groups,
however, these groups make no claim to sovereignty, borrowed or otherwise.
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Most of these organizations fall into two general categories. Chief among
their number are nongovernmental organizations (interstate non-profit
organizations) and transnational corporations (interstate profit-oriented
organizations). That said, the bureaucracies and advocates of the various
organized religious orders as well as the small (but growing) number of
transnational labor unions also wield some limited, but real, influence.
Methodology
My review of the role of extra-territorial actors in fomenting the war of
secession in East Caprivi is a relatively straightforward one. First, I reviewed
every article from 1997 to 1999 in The Namibian (the major, independent
English-language newspaper of that state) in which the Caprivi region was
mentioned, using an embedded Google search engine to review the archives.
Second, I used Lexis-Nexis to review every article which mentioned the
Caprivi region over the same period of time in the major newspapers of
Southern Africa, specifically The Post of Zambia, The Sunday Times, The
Times of Zambia, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Zimbabwe Standard.
Third, I used Lexis-Nexis to review several international news
sources/services, specifically the Associated Press, the Cable News Network
(CNN), The Christian Science Monitor, The Economist, Gannett Service, the
Inter Press Service The New York Times, and Xinhua News Agency. My
research focused on one simple task – I sought to put together a sociohistorical account of the relationships between the Caprivi Liberation Army
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(CLA) and other actors, regional and global, to determine whether or not
particular foreign policy decisions can be linked to convincing the Caprivi elite
to mobilize and utilize their forces.
States
There is little or no evidence, either prior to or after the Caprivi rebellion, that
any government formally assisted the Caprivi Liberation Army with weapons
or munitions. Nor is there any evidence that any state formally encouraged
the attempted secession in formal statements or through secret treaties.
There are, however, three instances of states, or at least the representatives
of states, acting in such a manner and form that they might be taken as
implicitly supporting rebellion. These states are Botswana, Zambia, and most
surprisingly, Denmark.
Botswana’s encouragement of rebellion, if it can properly be called
that, lay in its willingness to accept Caprivi refugees after only brief
questioning and internment (Malema 1998). Granted, these refugees were
interned in formal camps, but the camps borders were only loosely
maintained and escape into unmanaged territories was a relatively simple
task.
Why might accepting the refugees have been considered an act of
implicit support? There are several reasons. First, those persons who fled to
Botswana did so in response to Namibian governmental communications
which indicated that they were about to begin prosecuting rebel leaders – the
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implication is that the refugee population, at least in large part, was composed
to secessionists and persons who supported secessionists. Secondly,
Botswana made few efforts to filter out secessionist elites, the
disestablishmentarians most responsible for the crisis, much to the chagrin of
Namibia. The only instance of any efforts on the part of the Batswana
government to interdict the rebel elite that I found in my research I found in an
article of December 3, 1998 entitled “Mishake Muyongo out on bail”
(NAMPA/SAPA/AFP 2000). Of the first 600 or so refugees entering
Botswana, approximately 100, suspected of being leaders and active
combatants, were arrested upon their entry, including the predominant CLA
leader Muyongo. Almost immediately, however, these persons were released
on bail and allowed to rejoin their peers at the Dukwe (or Dukwi) refugee
camp, and none ever faced a trial for their illegal entry. (Associated Press
1999A, Mooketsi 1999, Wakin 1999)
This point is only further emphasized by the fact that the Batswana
government allowed Muyongo, the predominant leader of the CLA, to flee to
Denmark where he received asylum (see below for more information). Third,
the Batswana government made no real effort to prevent the mobilization and
arming of the CLA within their borders, including allowing the refugees to
carry assault rifles with them into the camps, though the first several hundred
were briefly arrested and presented for trial before being released indefinitely
on bail (Mooketsi 1999). The sum of all these actions and omissions had the
practical effect of providing the Caprivi rebels with both an initial staging
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ground (from which to recruit and transfer soldiers for training to Zambia) and
an ideal retreat point to fall-back to in the event of failure. Unquestionably we
can assume that this series of policies, whether intended to support the
rebellion or not, had the effect of doing so.
What motivations might the Batswana government have for taking
such a stance? Beyond humanitarian empathy for the plight of refugees in
general (Botswana has a history, of instance, of sheltering thousands of
refugees from Angola and other relatively nearby states), only one in stands
out. In the years preceding the Caprivi war Botswana and Namibia had been
in dispute over whether or not a small island, Kasikili/Sedudu/Situngu, that lay
approximately half-way between the two states in the Linyanti River that
makes up part of the border between the two states. The dispute was
minimally salient, however, and farmers from both states had used the island
occasionally during those periods when it wasn’t submerged beneath the
surface of the river (Wakin 1999). That was, at least, until February of 1998
when Batswana forces took the island and expelled farmers from Namibia,
and later to allow Namibian statesmen to enter and survey the territory
(Mooketsi and Shigwedha 1998). While there were reports of some injuries,
the incident was apparently accompanied by no deaths. That said, it
apparently increased tensions between the states substantially (Mooketsi
1999).
Of course, the event was never accompanied by an arms race,
secondary skirmishes, or even serious troop movements and Botswana and
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Namibia agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice
(which ultimately found, in December of 1999, that the island was the
sovereign territory of Botswana). That said, event unquestionably increased
tensions between the states and the Botswana government may have taken
their lackadaisical stance towards dealing with the Caprivi Lozi refugees as a
jab at Nujoma or, in a realpolitick vein, they may have seen the manipulation
of the Caprivi refugees as a potential negotiating chit.
In the case of Zambia, there are two key points at which we may talk
about state (rather than non-state actors) supporting the Caprivi cause. First
among these is the simple point that the Zambian government made little or
no apparent effort to seek out and eliminate the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF)
bases at which the CLA was training and arming its troops. I am hesitant to
overemphasize this point, however, given the potential problems of
demonstrating that the CLA’s elites perceived this action as such. What is
more definite, however, is the explicit support a minority party leader,
Akashambatwa Lewanika of the Agenda for Zambia (affiliated but separate
from the BPF), provided for the CLA movement in an interview with a stateowned newspaper, The Times of Zambia (quoted here from The Namibian):
We are one people with the people of Caprivi Strip, whose
proper name is Itengi. The Zambezi River (boundary between
Zambia and Namibia) has never been an iron curtain. We do not
accept the colonial boundaries as God-given, and we demand a
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review of the African practices that have used national unity to
suppress others. (Mfula 1998)
While this moral support hardly calls for the explicit use of violence to
reconstitute “Itengi,” and indeed calls for formal proceedings to take place, it
unquestionably supports the principles of the Caprivi secessionists.
Finally, the Danish government may be regarded as implying support
(or at least, as discussed elsewhere, providing an exit strategy to
disestablishmentarian elites) prior to the onset of violence through their
willingness to provide sanctuary to Muyongo. Indeed, despite attacks on the
Danish consulate, the government of Denmark not only refused to revoke
Muyongo’s refugee status (he is still in Denmark to this day), but furthermore
it declared that the only way they would even consider allowing Muyongo to
be tried would be within their borders. Granted, these statements on the
nature of Muyongo’s refugee status came after the conflict, but their firmness
indicates that they are probably echoes of earlier promises made to Muyongo
and those of his peers who fled with him prior to traveling to Europe.
Intergovernmental Organizations
In the light of the current international debates as to the efficacy of the United
Nations (UN) as a body in dealing with intrastate and interstate violence,
imagining that a group of rebels’ expectations of UN action might play a
causal role in determining their behavior may seem surprising. Yet, I would
argue that just such an expectation set played an essential role in bounding
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the rationale of the CLA elite, convincing them that they could expect a very
particular outcome which, ultimately, would favor their position.
The United Nations, or more specifically the United Nations High
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), played a functional role in the East
Caprivi revolt that parallels that, or perhaps more properly reinforced that of
the government of Botswana.
Perhaps the best place to start is with a review of the history of the
UNHCR’s involvement on the Namibian/Batswana borders. Over the course
of the Cold War, throughout most of which the South African government
attempted to maintain its power against the South-West African People’s
Organzation (SWAPO), displacement of peoples remained at relatively low
levels (relative to that found in other regions of Africa). Even so, around
2,400 (as well as small numbers of refugees from other states, including
Angola, Burundi, and Zaire/the Democratic Republic of Congo) people from
Southwest Africa became refugees in Botswana, primarily at the Dukwe
camp. Of course, this population was dwarfed by another nearby
displacement. Over 32,000 Angolans resided at the time the camps of
Meheba and Mayukwayukwa in Zambia. (UNHCR 1999a)
Upon Southwest Africa/Namibia’s independence from South Africa the
UNHCR and Botswana, noting that the state was stabilizing rapidly, began
repatriating displaced persons from the Dukwe camp – by 1999 1,300
Namibians had returned to their homes (UNHCR 1999a). Yet with the
beginning of political dissension in Namibia between pro-Caprivi
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independence supporters (notably Muyongo) and those opposed to such a
move, the tide began to reverse. This reversal turned into a flood when
Namibia’s president, Sam Nujoma accused Muyongo and his peers, saying:
“They have committed a serious act of treason and coldblooded murder in the Republic of Namibia. We will not allow
them to get off scot-free this time. They have violated the
constitute, broken the laws of the land, disturbed the peace and
social harmony and armed themselves against the government
and the Namibian people as a whole. We will make them pay
for this . . . ” (Mujuda 1998)
By the time of the Caprivian revolt the number of Namibians in Dukwe
numbered between 2,220 and 2,500 and the UNHCR had shut off all
voluntary and involuntary repatriation (UNHCR 2000a). Furthermore, the
UNHCR, in an attempt to limit violence, repatriated as many strategic leaders
of the Caprivi independence movement in third-party states (notably
Denmark) as possible, assuming that such an action would decrease proindependence movements, set the minds of Namibian officials at ease, and
generally help to decrease tensions (UNHCR 1999a).
All of the UNHCR’s efforts were noble in sentiment, but their work,
frankly, increased the likelihood of war in numerous ways. First, by
guaranteeing the sanctity of the Dukwe camp from Namibian incursions and
discouraging Batswana efforts to deport actual combatants from the camp,
the UNHCR essentially sanctioned the rear operational zone of the Caprivi
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rebels. As unpalatable as it may have been, there is little doubt that had the
Namibian state been able to enter the Dukwe camp and remove the
predominant leaders (especially Muyongo) from their populations, the odds of
civil war would have decreased radically, if not to infinitesimal proportions.
Furthermore, by helping to repatriate Caprivi secessionist elites the UNHCR
transformed the risks associated with a war of secession for those leaders –
war now existed largely as a rational opportunity, as most costs and risks had
been effectively eliminated.
In the 1990s the United Nations (and associated key states and other
IGOs, notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) set a series of
precedents which further transformed the environment in which the Caprivi
secessionists were operating in such a manner as to increase the odds they
would attempt violent insurrection. Specifically, I refer to both the kind of
peace-keeping operations which had dominated the international scene and
the tone negotiations took after these operations had succeeded (or, in some
cases, merely after violence had subsided).
Peacekeeping operations of the 1990s by and large fell into two
categories. The first of these were those operations which mitigated ethnic
civil wars, the most visible of which were the various UN-initiated, NATO-led
operations in the states that formerly composed Yugoslavia, though another
significant (though ironically, contemporarily failing) effort of this sort
transpired in nearby Angola. Additionally, there were the highly visible efforts
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to ‘clean up’ after genocides, the most notable of which occurred in the wake
of the Rwandan genocides and, again, the genocides of Bosnia.
In other words, most of those United Nations activities of post-Cold
War that dealt with intrastate violence were instances of ethnic conflict. Of
further importance to the rationale of the Caprivi, however, was that the
United Nations in every instance explicitly took the position of defending
minority rights, either helping them to gain sovereignty or radically increasing
their power vis-à-vis the majority population. In many instances this involved
the United Nations sanctioning the partition of rebelling areas from their
hereto prior states, whereas in others the result was effective sovereignty
within the bounds of their states. The precedent even, it should be said,
strayed outside of the realm of purely internal conflict, as in the establishment
of no-fly zones in northern Iraq which rendered the area an effectively
independent “Kurdistan.” (CITE)
There is evidence that the Caprivi rebels did not assume that the UN
would become involved in the situation; there is also, however, an awareness
that they specifically designed the war in such a way that they felt the United
Nations would be drawn into the conflict on the side of the initiating Lozi
combatants. This evidence comes in three forms. First, in the post-war period
there were statements by captured minor elites asserting that this strategy
was central to their plan – they sought to gain independence by focusing
interstate attention on the plight of Caprivi Lozi, thereby forcing the Namibian
government into making substantial concessions. Of course, these
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concessions would then be guaranteed by the interstate community
(Economist 1999). Secondly, the attack was specifically timed to coincide with
a period in which Namibia would hold several key offices in the United
Nations, increasing the state’s visibility in the body substantially (Amupadhi
1999). Finally, the strategy of the attacks was not to take control of and hold
the entire state, nor was it to begin a guerilla/terrorist war of attrition. Rather,
the strategy was to take control of key strategic cites, emphasizing in
particular communications facilities. The most important of these targets, for
instance, was the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) office in
Caprivi’s capital of Katima Mulilo (Grobler 1999). The obvious reason for this
strategy, which emphasized minimizing casualties inflicted on establishment
elites and noncombatants, the Caprivi could make their point while retaining a
moral high ground. Any violent government action, then, would serve to
reinforce their status as an oppressed people deserving of interstate
attention.
Of course, while the Caprivi rebels were successful in drawing some
interstate attention to their cause, they succeeded in doing so only once the
rebels had largely fled Namibia or been imprisoned. Had they successfully
seized the weapon caches in the Katima police and military stations, the
outcome might have been dramatically different. Thus, while Namibia drew
some, brief reprobation from the interstate community, the rebels had no
ground from which to negotiate from, and their rebellion was essentially
stillborn.
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State-Like Organizations
Namibia’s social profile is hardly unique in Africa. As in most of the states
south of the Sahara on the continent, borders are more a product of late 19th
and early 20th Century inter-European machinations than of indigenous
interstate or intertribal politics. The result is blasphemous to those who
advocate nationalism and the nation-state. Nations cross borders as often as
not, and their straddling of these borders leads not only to broken political
identities, but broken political economies and political geographies as well.
Fearing continent-wide warfare, post-colonial African leaders have generally
agreed to maintain the European-set boundaries, but the products have been
less than stable.
This said, the presence of Lozi-speakers in numerous states (in
particular Zambia and Namibia and, to a lesser extent Botswana, Angola, and
Zimbabwe) is a classic example of the conundrum. In each state they are a
minority, but in each state they dominate their local political geography
(Caprivi in Namibia, in Barotseland in the Southern and Western Provinces of
Zambia, and Matabeleland North in Zimbabwe) (Gordon 2005). The product
of this is both a high degree of cultural isolation from the “national” culture as
well as a rational (and tempting) potential homeland.
That secessionist groups should appear in each of the states
containing the Lozi is unsurprising. The primary focus of this dissertation, the
Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA), of course developed in the East Caprivi region
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of Namibia. Our questions here then are (1) whether or not pan-Lozi
organizations developed independently outside of Namibia and (2) whether or
not said organization or organizations sought to aid the CLA, (3) if so, how,
and finally (4) was this evident prior to the rebellion?
The answer to the first question is a simple one: yes. The Barotse
Patriotic Front (BPF), founded an indeterminate time before the CLA and a
secret arm of the Agenda for Zambia party, sought to support the secession
movement from relatively early on (Grobler 1999A). All indications point to at
least three types of support being provided, though the evidence is limited for
the latter two, entirely expected given the nature of the events being
considered here. In order of definitiveness, we can say first and definitely that
the BPF and its public face, the Agenda for Zambia party, provided
substantial moral support to the CLA, releasing numerous press releases in
the period immediately preceding and during the East Caprivi rebellion (Jere
1998, Shimo 1999, Times of Zambia 1999).
Second, it seems almost definite that the BPF was essential in
providing the CLA’s raw recruits with both training grounds and the material of
war. From all evidence (Menges 2004) it seems that troops were drawn from
the Lozi nationalists that had fled to Botswana. These troops were
specifically selected, we can assume for their particular strategic and/or
tactical potential, by CLA committees that acted as the de facto government
in the Batswana refugee camps. Once individuals were chosen as troops,
these troops were then smuggled out of the refugee camps in into Zambia,
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where they were outfitted trained by the BPF and UNITA (for more on UNITA
see below). Finally, in the days immediately preceding the attempted
secession, CLA troops were smuggled back into Namibia so that they would
be in place to foment the secession.
Third and finally, some sources allude to the fact that at least some
volunteer BPF fighters joined CLA troops in August of 1999 (Shimo and Moyo
1999). While this is not definite, the significant number of “illegal alien”
fighters who could not be linked directly to UNITA and who were from
Botswana and other neighboring states seems to indicate that this was the
case.
The question remains, however, whether or not statesmen (or we
humble scholars) could have known any of this prior to the onset of the
conflagration. My search of the digital records of The Namibian specifically
revealed that there were at least some indications that the connection
between Barotse separatists and Caprivi separatists were engaged in joint
planning. Three articles specifically mention the connection in fact (one from
November 13, 1998, one from five days later, and one from December 3,
1998). The sentiment is perhaps best demonstrated in the following quote
from the second of the three articles:
We are one people with the people of Caprivi Strip, whose
proper name is Itengi. The Zambezi River (boundary between
Zambia and Namibia) has never been an iron curtain. We do not
accept the colonial boundaries as God-given, and we demand a
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review of the African practices that have used national unity to
suppress others. (Mfula 1998)
This statement, intriguingly, reflects the nuances of the pan-Lozi
independence movements. There is a recognition that their drive for
independence is specifically mired in the institutions and structures of the
African interstate system, not just national systems, necessitating
international attention be involved in civil disputes (Ilukena 1998b, Inambao
1998b, NAMPA/SAPA/AFP 1998)
A second state-like organization that seems to have supported the
Caprivi secessionist rebellion of 1999 was UNITA, or National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola, a decades-old rebel organization of Angola.
UNITA almost unquestionably supplied arms to the CLA (Grobler 1999a,
McNeil 1999), and seems very likely that they supplied training and troops as
well (Inambao 1998b). The effect would be to substantially increase the
perceived capabilities of CLA (in several instances, it would later emerge, the
weapons provided were of inferior quality and failed to work properly on the
battlefield, see, for instance, Grobler 1999B), both in terms of experience and
simple fighting capacity. It would also increase the proportion of the
Namibian border the CLA would have access to from the outside. As for
UNITA, the utility having an independent ally (or even a neutral party) on the
border of Angola would have likely been motivation enough for supporting the
CLA. Besides that, UNITA was equipped with a surplus of weapons (they
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were, according to one source, selling assault rifles for as cheaply as a 10kilogram bag of corn from. (Ilukena 1998a).

Exit Strategies
What constitutes an exit strategy? In the simplest of terms, one would expect
it to be a strategic backdoor that would allow the participants in a
conflagration a means of escaping some or most of the costs of failure. They
matter, I argue, because they have the ability to substantially decrease the
risks involved in participating in a war of secession, or, for that matter, any
other type of radical, disestablishmentarian behavior. They do so not by
decreasing the costs of participation in the event of success, nor by
increasing the potential benefits of a successful war of secession, but by
decreasing the potential costs, that is to say the risks, associated with such a
war in the event of failure. In the absence of a valid exit strategy the
participants in a war of secession can expect only one of two possible
outcomes: to great victory wearing laurels or failure wearing noose. The
potential benefits, then, are high, but so are the risks. Exit strategies,
however, give participants the ability to run away, be it to fight another day or
merely to pursue another life.
A point of order is called for here, with regards to the cross-over of
factors here with those discussed in the subsection of this dissertation on
transnational support (implied and explicit) for secessionist. We must assume
that, given that disestablishmentarians feel that the extremely risky act of
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attempted secession is a necessary act, they feel that strategies of
coexistence within the state at hand are few – the assumption then, is that
expected exit strategies will always involve interstate actors (save, perhaps,
in states which lack true internal sovereignty, such as Somalia).
A key question of degree, of course, is whether the sanctuary involved
in a given exit strategy hold for the entire fighting population or simply for the
secessionist elites. While I have no reason to expect a regularity in the
distribution of these two varieties of sanctuary, nor the shades between them,
a correlation can be expected to exist between the proportion of the rebelling
population expecting sanctuary in the event of failure and the likelihood that
war of secession will actually occur. In other words, the greater the breadth
and depth of the expected exit strategy, the greater the likelihood of a war of
secession.
Our first question, then, is did the Caprivi rebel elites believe they had
and/or have a valid exit strategy prior to the onset of their rebellion attempt?
As the earlier discussion on the role explicit and implicit transnational support
played in increasing the rational utility of a war of secession in Caprivi made
clear, there were numerous corridors for retreat provided by the international
community, some intentional (which seem by and large to have failed) and
some unintentional (which seem to have been exploited extremely effectively
by the Caprivi rebels). I would like to revisit each of these corridors briefly
and discuss their relative importance.
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The Batswana Corridor
The first line of retreat for the Caprivi rebels was a simple withdrawal back
across national boundaries into Botswana, back into the Dukwe refugee
camp, which was administered jointly by the United Nationals High
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), the government of Botswana, and
numerous Batswana non-governmental agencies. The nature of this exit
strategy was elegant in the extreme – specifically, if secession looked as if it
was doomed to failure, all rebels had to do was withdraw into Botswana and
they could avoid the most severe consequences. This is not to imply they
could avoid all consequences, particularly in the case of minor elites (those
not high enough in the leadership to be offered Danish sanctuary, but high
enough to have responsibility for “leading” violence, thereby severely
decreasing their chances for repatriation in the foreseeable future in the event
of failure) who became the focus of interdiction efforts as the Caprivi
secessionists fled, but to say that it stands as a tantalizing risk-alleviation
condition is to understate in the extreme.
This would be interesting enough if the data could be described as of
explanatory utility only. Yet the existence of the Dukwe camp and its role as
an extraterritorial center for Caprivi independence activities were both well
known for years to political science for years preceding the rebellion. There
was little doubt that, should open violence occur in East Caprivi refugees
would be readily accepted again in Botswana and, further, that these
395

refugees not only could but would include participants in the violence. Simply
put, had theorists of wars of secession been interested in this dimension, they
could have predicted an increased chance that the Lozi people of East
Caprivi would have rebelled comparative to groups who lacked such an openended option for retreat.
Danish Sanctuary
The opportunity of a general exit-strategy for all participants to Botswana
seems like it would be enough to radically increase the odds the Caprivi
rebels would undertake their war. Yet the risk-alleviating opportunities do not
end with that sanctuary/corridor. Quite the contrary, another major option
existed, though this one was available only to secessionist elites –
specifically, the UNHCR cooperated with the government of Denmark to
provide refugee status to most those Caprivi predominant elites who
successfully escaped when the rebellion failed. Specifically, these elites were
and are predominantly composed of the lieutenants of Muyongo (Schutz
1999). Like the Batswana exit strategy, there is sufficient evidence to indicate
that the Danish sanctuary plan was taken into the calculations of the Caprivi
elite prior to the onset of violence. In particular, this is was a product of the
fact that Muyongo himself, wanted for fomenting rebellion even before the
Caprivi revolt occurred, was given sanctuary well before the rebellion.
The product of this was to increase the rational utility of rebellion
among the predominant leaders of the Caprivi people. To spell out the
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situation, the Caprivi leaders could expect that should they rebel and fail the
worst they could expect, assuming they could successfully retreat, were (1)
their supporters from the general ranks would return to Dukwe where their
security would be guaranteed by the UNHCR and the state of Botswana and
(2) they themselves would be given refugee status in a First-World state
where they would be able to continue their press for Caprivi independence, if
only as a sort of government-in-exile. The product was to minimize their
risks, thereby increasing the odds of war.
Options Not Taken
There is reason to suspect that the Caprivi elites expected that even were
they denied reentry to Dukwe and transit to Denmark that they would have
other valid, if less palatable points of sanctuary. Two options in particular
seem likely, again based on their prior transnational relationships. The first of
these is a “Zambian retreat,” specifically a retreat either through Botswana or
directly across the Zambian border into the hands, and camps, of the
Barotseland Patriotic Front (BPF). Given that Caprivi elites and common
soldiers were trained and equipped in these camps, it seems likely that they
considered such a retreat a valid strategic opportunity, if one that, given the
more limited border area (which limits permeability) or, alternatively, the more
complex transportation chain, carried far greater risks associated with them.
The second probable untaken option, or the fourth probable expected
exit strategy option, though undoubtedly the least palatable, was flight into
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Angola, into the hands of UNITA rebels. Remembering the various methods
by which UNITA supported the Caprivi rebels, including with at least a few
troops, with armaments, and with training, it seems likely that UNITA’s
leadership would have willingly accepted the CLA rebel leadership. Indeed,
given that the CLA’s displaced rebels may have provided a potential
manpower windfall to UNITA (which was contemporaneously the object of an
Angolan military drive), this becomes all the more likely. Of course, the costs
of accepting UNITA’s sanctuary may ultimately have been excessive for
Muyongo and his peers, but this remains a point of conjecture.

The Flashpoint: Bounds Set by Establishment Elites
This chapter, so far, has sought to demonstrate that the policies of external
actors in the period immediately preceding the East Caprivi rebellion
transformed the political environment in such a manner that the costs and
risks associated with such a rebellion were acceptably limited, thereby
increasing the odds that disestablishmentarian elites would attempt to
transform their systemic and institutional conditions. This final subsection will
address, on the contrary, the internal policies of Namibia, specifically dealing
with whether or not the predominant actors of the Namibian state enunciated
policies which effectively ended any discourse on the possibility of Caprivian
autonomy and/or independence. By cutting off dialogue and effectively
ending disestablishmentarians’ potential to accomplish their radical ends
through rule-observing behavior, the odds that disestablishmentarians will
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seek to engage in rule-violating behavior on a massive, radical scale (as in
the case of secession and other varieties of rebellion) increases substantially.
It is important to note that bound-setting of the type discussed need not
be illiberal, nor need they affect the fundamental nature of the relevant
political-economy’s institutions or structures. For example, for a government
to call for the arrest of an elite or set of elites who have been stockpiling
military hardware in preparation for rebellion is not only a rational decision, in
most countries, including the United States, it would be considered an
essential one. This is, of course, just the sort of case discussed below. Such
policies can hardly be argued to be increasing the structural or institutional
instability of the system by increasing its oppressiveness. Rather, what such
policies effectively do is assert that institutional and structural discrimination
and oppressiveness, in as far as it does exist, is likely to continue to exist
inviolate. The adoption of these policies, in other words, does not change the
institutional or structural system – they consolidate it in such a way that it
transforms the logic of disestablishmentarians. Of course, this is not to say
that the bound-setting excludes the option of further destabilizing the
institutions and structures of a state, simply that such an outcome is not
necessary, nor is it the functionally essential element at this stage in our
model.
Of course, there are a variety of policy decisions that could serve the
purpose of effectively ending the possibility of further discourse, necessitating
radical behavior if disestablishmentarians are to accomplish their goals, but
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unquestionably the most frequent involve (1) the purging and sequestering or
ostracism of the predominant elite leading those disestablishmentarians and
(2) the banning of public discussions of and/or preparation for radical,
extraordinary political behavior. Why these particular policies? Well, in the
case of both, they have both the effect of rapidly decreasing the visibility of
disestablishmentarian movements at relatively low (immediate) costs. In the
case of removing disestablishmentarian elites from the public sphere, this
policy set also, if effective, cuts the head from the serpent, and in the case of
the latter, decreases the ability of the disestablishmentarian movement to
mobilize and recruit at either low cost or risk.
In we see in particular the first of these scenarios play out immediately
preceding (and largely spurring on) the 1998 refugee crisis that both
preceded and allowed for the 1999 attempted secession. Using reports from
The Namibian we are able to develop a timeline that details the efforts of
President Nujoma to eliminate the primary threat to Namibian territorial
integrity – a scheming, secretly mobilizing Muyongo clique.
(1) August, 1998 – Muyongo is expelled from the DTA in large
part because his renewed calls for East Caprivi independence
which approximately coincide with the discovery of Caprivi arms
caches and the discover of secret meetings by Caprivi elite on
the subject (Nthengwe 1998, McNeil 1999);
(2) Late October, 1998 – Muyongo is declared by Namibia to an
enemy of the state (Wakin 1999);
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(3) Late October, 1998– Muyongo flees to Botswana (Wakin
1999);
(4) October & November 1998 – Muyongo’s (and the CLA’s)
links to BPF and Agenda for Zambia revealed
(5) Late October, 1998 – Caprivian exodus begins (Economist
1998a)
This history, interesting in and of itself, but here it is essential to note two
points. First, Muyongo was already mobilizing, preparing the CLA for
secession, but he did not overtly resist the government of Namibia until he
was purged from the legitimate political process. Second, it was not until the
government of Nujoma made it entirely clear that Muyongo and his chief
peers were enemies of the state of Namibia and could not hope to reenter the
political process that the Caprivi exodus, essentially a mass public
mobilization by the CLA, which laid the groundwork for the 1999 rebellion,
occurred. Why?
I would like to begin by noting that that using violence (literal or
symbolic) against the preeminent leader is at the center of this concept – the
violence of rebellion was seen as justified by Muyongo because, rightly or
wrongly, he believed that Nujoma and his associates were aggressors. The
act of ending debate, of threatening Muyongo’s political influence (not to
mention his very freedom), was a declaration of war to a leader who believes
that he represents a state as of yet unfulfilled. Why does this play out with
Muyongo’s constituents?
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The work of Margaret Hermann (1995) helps us to understand this.
She notes that as crisis deepens the flexibility available to leaders to choose
alternative policies increases – people will accept, in other words, more
dramatic acts during times crisis than during times of systemic normality. Of
particular interest here, Hermann notes that just such a crisis is the kind
discussed here – those moments in history when the preeminence of a leader
is threatened by contenders or usurpers (164). Threatening a leader
increases said leader’s empathy with his or her constituents and can be
portrayed as a an attack on those constituents themselves.
In other words, attacking the predominant leader, Muyongo, and his
lieutenants both gave Muyongo the legitimacy he required to take his
movement to the next step and constituted, in the eyes of Muyongo’s allies,
an attack on the Caprivi Lozi people themselves, an effort by Nujoma to
unilaterally and, it should be added, in an extrajudicial fashion, disenfranchise
the Namibian Lozi minority.
As for banning public discourse on Caprivi secession, this was largely
unnecessary following the exodus, and untenable besides. It was
unnecessary because most of the supporters of Caprivian independence had
either fled, were literally undercover, “sleeping” in preparation for rebellion, or
were merely fair-weather supporters, favorable to independence but hardly
willing to risk their lives for it. On the other hand, such a ban would have
been untenable because the Namibian state was desperately attempting to
demonstrate to the broader interstate community that it was a functioning
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democratic-republican state, and to publicly ban discourse on such a valid
and significant political subject would have been sure to draw the rancor of
Western observers.
It should be said explicitly that this is the point predicted in my general
theory that constitutes the flashpoint, the point at which the various
ingredients have consolidated to essentially guarantee the onset of radical,
extraordinary politics – though not in the form that one would generally
conceive of such a mechanism.
We must establish what is meant by the term flashpoint here, as
opposed to its colloquial use. Colloquially we conceive of flashpoints as
literally instants in time where an object transforms from one state into
another. This perspective is derived, ultimately, from that form of oxidization
known as burning – an object that is not oxygen-fixed already is immersed in
an oxygen-rich atmosphere. That object is then exposed to an adequate
amount of energy to set off a chain-reaction of oxidization which then
releases stored chemical energy in the form of light and heat. The process is
dramatic and often, though not always, instantaneous, and that moment of
ignition constitutes the flashpoint.
Similarly, in our historical memories there are moments which are
generally regarded as flashpoints, points at which the matter of a certain
political-economy and society is thrown into a state of disarray, the result
being that the system is changed through the disarray (whether or not the
disestablishmentarians are successful or not). When I created my
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hypothesis, I tended to accept this flashpoint logic, the understanding that the
moment at which radical, disestablishmentarian violence, including wars of
secession, becomes inevitable immediately precedes said violence, that the
flashpoint would be instantaneous.
The premise of a flashpoint remains sound – ultimately, there is a point
where degeneration becomes virtually inevitable, temporally preceding every
radical, disestablishmentarian event. That said, the Caprivi instance seems
to indicate a different sort of transformation, at least in terms of immediacy.
The Caprivi war of secession’s flashpoint lays with Muyongo’s complete
ousting – the point where Caprivi negotiation within the system for autonomy
seems to have been eliminated as an option. This of course presents a
problem. It infers that the onset of radical systemic change may smolder for a
time before bursting into open violence – in this instance around a year. This
is both surprising and disturbing. It is surprising because it seems to
contradict common sense – the “last straw” that makes a war nearly inevitable
instinctively seems like it should immediately precede the event itself, literally
marking the transformation from peace into war. This is not the case,
however – the flashpoint now seems to be introduction of the key final
ingredient which forces rapid inevitable change (the equivalent of oxygen in
our oxidization metaphor), whether the change is rapid in the explosive sense
or rapid in the sense of other forms of rapid oxidization – rusting accelerated
by the presence of chlorine, for instance. This is disturbing, however,
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because it infers that our ability to predict the onset of wars of secession
exactly in time might be extremely attenuated.
This of course brings up a question – should this point at which the
onset of radical, disestablishmentarian politics be referred to as a flashpoint
or should it be given an alternative conceptual title, one which better
encapsulates the possibility that the process may take place explosively or
“merely” rapidly. What should such a thing be called? Perhaps the point at
which the politics of resistance is constrained into extraordinariness (which is
to say all resistance to the ordinary, orthodox political-economic order for
those so constrained must take illegal forms).
Whether these events were observable, therefore could have been
used in a predictive, rather than simply explanatory capacity, the only
possible answer is yes. The articles used in the timeline above were all
published contemporary with the events themselves, and the alienation
between the Namibian orthodoxy and the Caprivian radicals is so manifest as
to be stark.

The Kalanga Counter-Example
Prior to writing the preceding chapter, I may have been inclined to think that
substantial variance between the East Caprivi Lozi and the Kalanga of
northeastern Botswana was a near inevitability, not quite a straw man, but not
far short either. After writing that chapter, which demonstrated that on several
of the dimensions I studied the concepts were substantially more complex
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than I had previously imagined, I expected almost the opposite – that the
Kalanga counter-examples herein would swell this chapter’s size
substantially, especially given that I employed the socio-historical method
throughout.
As I performed my reviews of both the journalistic and academic
literature, the former consisting of the same sources discussed above, the
latter depending especially on the work of Werbner (2002, 2004) but,
secondarily on that of van Binsbergen (1994) and Solway (2002), I found the
situation to be far less problematic that I had imagined, which seems to lend
at least some strength to my additions to the general model on the origins of
wars of secession examined in here. I would like to briefly comment on each
of the major vectors of analysis I posit in this chapter with regards to the
Botswana Kalanga, noting in particular the absence of useful internal/external
policies and on how changing interstate and domestic policies in the relatively
near-term might change this.
Extra-territorial Support
Interstate support for Kalanga independence would have to emerge from one
of a few sources. First among these is the states of Zimbabwe, but with its
own substantial Kalanga population and a stable relationship with Botswana,
this seems unlikely. It is possible that other states might support the Kalanga,
in the West or in South Africa for instance, but with Kalanga holding
substantial relative wealth and influence, this seems unlikely to occur. A
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second option would be from among a Kalanga nationalist group, probably in
Zimbabwe, but again, this seems unlikely. Every major movement of persons
since Botswana’s independence has been of Zimbabwean Kalanga into
Botswana, usually as a product of disorders in Zimbabwe, disorders which
tend to have ethnic and/or racial undertones. Of course, should Zimbabwe’s
internal situation continue to deteriorate the ends and space for the rise of a
Zimbabwean Kalanaga disestablishmentarian group might eventually appear.
Additionally, the interest of the United Nations and other
intergovernmental organizations in the Botswana/Zimbabwe border area is
low. There are no major refugee camps and the border is stable and
undisputed. Should the Zimbabwean disorders continue, however, human
displacement might increase along the border, focusing UN attention on the
area – of course, should any refugee camp be erected in the near future, it
would like as not be placed within Batswana territory, rather than
Zimbabwean. Finally, the area is isolated from most state-like actors –
eastern Botswana is, frankly, far away from the Congo basin, and there are
no known contacts between leaders of the Kalanga, including the members of
the Society for the Promotion of the Ikalanga Language (SPIL), and other
extra-Botswana organizations.
Exit Strategies
With specific reference to the existence of exit strategies for potential Kalanga
secessionists, there are simply none readily visible. Not only is there a
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general lack of cross-border ties to Kalanga peers in Zimbabwe since the last
major migration of Kalanga from that state (Werbner 2004), but furthermore
there is no precedent of United Nations intervention in the region.
This vector is, however, probably the most easily transformed. For
instance, Werbner (2004) makes it clear that interstate ties are again on the
rise between different groups of Kalanga – though of course the effectiveness
of the Zimbabwean government at undermining Kalanga efforts to acquire
group rights has been substantial and remains an additional impediment.
Furthermore, the possibility of UN attention in the area continues for as long
as Zimbabwe remains a state whose fortunes are declining. Additionally,
should the Kalanga begin seeking extra-territorial support for their campaign
to excise discriminatory elements from the constitution and to combat
discrimination in political appointments, educational acceptance, and so on,
or should ultranationalist Tswana groups begin acting on their fears, rather
than simply stating them, international attention and support of the Kalanga
could increase and with it the opportunities for Kalanga elite to seek
international asylum.
Internal Bounds
In the foreseeable future it seems unlikely that the Kalanga will be
‘cornered into rebellion’ by Botswana’s center for any number of reasons.
First, the Botswana Democratic Party, or BDP, seems set to continue its
domination of that state for at least the next decade. Unless the BDP, which
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has substantial Kalanga membership and representation, somehow lost to an
alternative party with an ultranationalist ideology at its core, there is little
reason to suspect that Kalanga opponents to Tswanafication or their
communications will be brutally repressed. Botswana, though excluding the
Kalanga (and other minorities) from the House of Chiefs and limiting their
maximum political attainment through the BDP, still allows them wide
participation and substantial upward mobility, and the right to attempt to
redress this discrimination, even if it has so far proven less than successful.
Secondly, Kalanga elites have chosen a strategy of maximizing their
political and economic benefits based originally on assimilation and
increasingly on cooperation with the Tswana majority – they have, in other
words, elected to join the system, rather than alienating themselves from it.
This means that Kalanga are already deeply invested in the status quo, even
if it does not function entirely to their liking. It also means that they have real
power to affect changes to that status quo, including helping to undermine
efforts to decrease their influence, power, and political freedoms. As long as
this power continues to exist in substantial portions, the Kalanga are unlikely
to see their hands as tied, necessitating the kind of preparations that
Muyungo was caught with – preparations that led SWAPO to crackdown, a
crackdown which led thousands of Caprivi Lozi to see their options as twofold – rebel or be disenfranchised.
All this said, it is essential to remember that the seeds for internal
bounding to occur are already planted in Botswana. As Kalanga have
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become unhappy with both the political system’s institutional discrimination
and the rapid disappearance of their traditional culture and language, they
have begun to form organizations like SPIL. These organizations have made
those Tswana already distrustful of the ‘alien’ people in their midst even more
distrustful – identities are the loci of interests, after all, and multiple identities
means interests that will diverge. The response has been a cooling of the
relationship between the two ethnic groups – generally only a minor cooling,
but in some cases, as with the rise of several ultranationalist Tswana groups,
extreme. Obviously this sort of interaction could lead to a snowballing effect –
Kalanga becoming more pluralistic, demanding ethnic and political rights and
Tswana responding by become more nationalistic themselves and taking
steps to reinforce their power, leading to more discrimination which of course
leads to yet further Kalanga dissatisfaction. We need only consider the case
of Yugoslavia to see just how quickly this process can occur, and how
devastating its effects can be.

Summary
What have we found in the preceding chapter? That the Namibian case
matches our expectations of when external and internal policies will transform
the rational matrix of a radical internal constituency in such a way as to make
attempting a war of secession a superior option compared to acquiescence to
the contemporary orthodoxy. My theory predicted that in the case of Namibia
we would see external actors promising (or appearing to promise) substantial
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support in preparation for and in the event of the onset of a war of secession.
Just such circumstances were seen, across multiple levels and among
several types of organizations. My theory also asserted that civil wars of
secession become far more likely when and if a valid exit strategy is available
for the predominant elites (in the first order) and for other participants (in the
second order). These are just the circumstances that played out.
My theory also predicted that the Caprivian revolt needed a “flashpoint”
of sorts, a juncture in which the internal policies of Namibia radically
decreased the utility (both present and future) of continuing to operate (even
nominally) according to the orthodox rules. The collapse of Muyongo and his
associates’ power with the hardline taken by Nujoma provided just such a
flashpoint.
Alternatively, my theory predicted that the Kalanga would have neither
interstate support for independence, nor available practical risk minimization
strategies, nor a specific point in which their dialogue about their ethnicity’s
rights, powers, and so forth vis-à-vis the Batswana state was specifically cut
off. In fact, despite the Kalanga being consciously discriminated against in
the institutional arrangement of the Batswana institutional structure, their right
to discuss and debate this arrangement never faltered in the least (Werbner
2004).
My hypotheses assert the significance of both internal and external
factors in determining the onset of a war of secession – both are capable of
dramatically increasing the likelihood of the onset of radical, extraordinary
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politics, with the latter of these most likely constituting a necessary condition.
Yet my hypotheses do so using a very particular method – by emphasizing
these factors’ significance in terms of their likely effect on the decision-making
process of disestablishmentarian elites.
Of course, it is too early to overemphasize these findings – this study
is, again, merely a first inquiry, an attempt to determine if there is reason to
develop a more systematic approach and applying it to a larger set of cases
to determine if these correlations constitute a transnational regularity. That
said, the findings are definitely hopeful, indicating there may be a relatively
simple method of adding more predictive and explanatory capabilities to our
generally accepted models. Additionally, these models also have the utility of
highlighting transforming rationalities, even when institutional and structural
conditions remain fairly stable, particularly in reference to the flashpoint of the
internal policy transformation. By doing so we should be able to speak in far
more subtle terms about the degree of risk of internal war, moving beyond
merely being able to say a state is structurally and institutionally unstable to
being able to say that, among states which are structurally and institutionally
unstable X, Y, and Z states have entered a stage in which civil war is
imminent (within the next year or two).
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
To conclude this study, I would like to briefly review my model, discuss my
findings and the accuracy of my model in describing the situations in Namibia
and Botswana respectively, and discuss the implications of my research.

Model
My approach to this dissertation was simple in its intent, even if that
necessitated substantial complications in practice. I sought to determine
whether or not there was a pattern the literature on the approaches to
explaining and predicting the genesis of wars of secession in particular and
the onset radical, extraordinary politics in general. What I found was that
almost every theory and model on the origins of wars of secession and their
ilk agreed that the causes lay exclusively or predominantly in the structural
and/or institutional conditions either within or encompassing the state in
question. This pattern held among realist, liberal, feminist, and Marxist
theories of revolution in weak and strong forms. The weak form asserted that
the institutional and/or structural conditions were the only conditions readily
able to be generalized, the strong that these conditions were deterministic,
necessitating certain behavioral outcomes.
What I argued, however, was that other agencies matter as a
determinant of the onset of wars of secession, with human agency, usually
but not exclusively in the form of elite agency, in particular being the essential
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element in setting transformation (attempted or successful) into motion. I
asserted that this occurred in three key ways. First, civil conflicts, including
wars of secession, are impossible in the absence of the disestablishmentarian
group establishing, among both elites and those masses they ultimately hope
to mobilize, an alternative identity. Secondly, elites are responsible for
deciding to (or not) mobilize resources and forces. Finally, elites were
capable of choosing to exploit (or not exploit) not only favorable structural and
institutional conditions, but of exploiting smaller scale transformations in
policy that cannot be classified as institutional or structural in nature. I also
felt that it was essential to look at these elements at the regional- and identitygroup levels of analysis, rather than simply the state-level of analysis favored
almost universally in all variants of the literature save some, but by no means
all, of the works on the causes of ethnic and religious revolutions.
My selection of these specific elements was driven by my critique of
the blank spots in the realist, liberal, feminist, and Marxist approaches to wars
of secession – it was never my intention to vary radically from the conditiondriven, sometimes deterministic, logic of these approaches, but rather to
augment them. I have, since conducting this research, come to the
conclusion that these criticisms could have arisen within a very specific, if
relatively new and under-researched, approach to the study of international
relations, specifically that of constructivism.
I refer in particular to John Gerard Ruggie’s 1998 piece “What Makes
the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist
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Challenge” and his dichotomous taxonomy of the kinds of scientific
approaches possible with regards to international politics. Most interstate
relations theorists, argues Ruggie, are neo-utilitarian. They assume that
human behavior in general, and interstate behavior in particular, is the
product of human beings rationally considering the structural and institutional
conditions which surround them, assessing their situation absolutely and
relatively, then act to acquire their ends in as efficient a method as possible.
The effects of identities integration or disintegration, the role of human
agency, and the genesis of constitutive (rather than regulatory) rules, for
instance, are usually either ignored or discounted as merely given. Ruggie
asserts that the failure to account for these elements of interstate politics is a
product of both the complications inherent in such undertakings (dealing with
ideational and rational concerns involves the psychological black box and all
its conundrums) and the conservative bias of international relations
(emphasizing contemporary identities and constitutive rules, for instance,
rather than emphasizing identity as part of a geographic and historical
moment – also see Galtung 1968).
Despite the fact that his work is specifically an international relations
paper, Ruggie emphasizes that research needs to be done in exactly the
venue that I have been testing the waters of. Structural and institutional
analyses, despite their deterministic claims, are not enough – they may
determine something will happen, that a decision must be made, but they
cannot determine what policies will be selected by disestablishmentarians.
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Furthermore, structures and institutions speak to the stable, the contemporary
– they speak of regular patterns, not the process of diverging from these
patterns. What Ruggie argues for, what he names constructivism, is a
scientific attack on the processes of transformation – how do individuals or
groups of individuals, recognizing the failings and weaknesses of a particular
structural and institutional situation, proceed in constituting new identities and
new rules, and what role does their human agency play therein?
This is, ultimately, all I have tried to do. I compared the structures and
institutions of Namibia and Botswana, demonstrating that they are highly
similar, similar enough that one would generally assume that they would have
similar behavioral outcomes – both should have experienced civil wars in the
last decade of the Twentieth Century. Given that they did not both
experience civil wars, one must assume other factors, non-institutional and
non-structural factors, were active. I asserted that the most likely points of
divergence were the specific ideas and policies of minority elites in those two
states, with specific reference to their identities, their decision to mobilize
resources and personnel (the decision to physically constitute a new
collective around their disestablishmentarian identity or not), and those
environmental factors that simply do not fit into the typical definition of
structural and institutional factors.
In other words, my dissertation, through critiquing the mainstream
theories on the causes of wars of secession, may be described as partly
constructivist (through no conscious intention of my own) and as partly micro416

structural and micro-institutional. By adding the micro- to structural and
institutional what I mean to infer is that I insist that I have employed logics
native to institutional and structural approaches but at sub-national levels,
examining the emergence (or failure to emerge) of new identities and
systems. Alternatively, I have looked at policies which had immediate
consequences, rather than long-term patterns. These policies, given the
immediacy of their impact, can hardly be described as structures or
institutions – they are alike in their importance and perhaps even in their
behavior, but unalike in their temporal characteristics (and, one would infer,
their limited impact on norms – they are more likely to effect rationality
exclusively).
I would like point out, before continuing, that I am less concerned with
why elites (or the masses they are convincing to follow their leads) are
deciding to pursue wars of secession (or other types of
disestablishmentarianism). On the contrary, what I am concerned with is the
search for evidence (1) that elite agency does matter in addition to structural
and institutional concerns and (2) that there is a behavioral variance between
minority elites and masses in structurally and institutionally conditions who
have chosen to prepare to revolt and those who have chosen to address their
grievances within the orthodox system.
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Findings
Before enumerating my findings, I would like to point out, as I did at the
onset of this dissertation, that this study has been an exploratory study of
sorts. Its goal has been, explicitly, to determine if there was just cause for
expanding upon the orthodox methodology for predicting the onset of wars of
secession by adding in additional non-institutional and non-structural
dimensions of analysis. While I will discuss in the implications the possibility
that future inquiries into the same subject matter might confirm certain
generalizations, this study was conducted with an eye for detail for one
particular reason – to determine if, in a case barely remembered outside of
the state it occurred in, data emerged prior to the conflict that might have
allowed us to predict it with some accuracy had we been looking for the
indicators I emphasized in addition to those usually utilized by projects like
the SFTF.
Structural-Institutional Causes
What I found in my exhaustive study of the structural and institutional
attributes of Namibia and Botswana was essentially what I expected to find.
The states were structurally and institutionally very similar. The most
pronounced differences lay in their physical geographies, the nature of
international instability along their border areas, in the length of their period of
independence, in the length of time in which the regions were administered
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with racially discriminatory policies, and in the continued existence of formal
institutional discrimination in one, but not the other, state.
In Table 7.1 I outline those structural and institutional indicators
theoretically predicted to affect a state’s likelihood to experience the onset of
radical, extraordinary politics, such as wars of secession. Whereas my
review of these (and several other) indicators focused on the similarity
between Namibia and Botswana’s institutional and structural conditions, this
chart focuses on the broad picture of just how similar they are. Specifically, it
delineates the points at which pressures on the two states can be expected to
diverge or converge, either underscoring or eliminating instability. The picture
here is a simple one. In terms of trade balance and religious composition
Botswana is the more stable state, while in terms of economic composition
Namibia is the more stable state. Given that the favorable trade balance of
Botswana is dependent on a single key resource (gemstones) that
disproportionately favors a very small proportion of Batswana, it is easily
argued that this point of variance does not actually constitute a stable point
for Botswana.
What is the implication of this? While Namibia and Botswana are not
identical (it would be unrealistic to expect them to be so as my detailed
discussion of the variances between the states makes very clear), a tallying of
whether or not they are unstable on the theoretically relevant dimensions
makes it clear that they are functionally similar enough for us to expect them
to have both experienced the genesis of radical, extraordinary politics
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Table 7.1: Comparison of Structural and Institutional Indicators of Namibia
and Botswana
Namibia
Unstable
GNP
GNP per capita
Consumer Price
Inflation
Gini Index
Economic
Composition
Labor Force
Composition
Transportation
Infrastructure
Development
Rate
Communication
Infrastructure
Development
Rate
Economic
Prospects
AIDS
Fertility Rate
Religious
Composition
Ethno-Linguistic
Composition
Transnational
Minorities
Institutionalized
Discrimination
Competition for
Political Office
Polity IV
Corruption
Gender Equity
Trade Balance
Dependence
Interstate
Cooperation
Neighborhood
Stability

Namibia
Stable
X
X
X

X

Botswana
Unstable

Botswana
Stable
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
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sometime in the post-Cold War period if structural and institutional variables
constituted the only necessary variables. Since they did not experience
similar behavioral outcomes we can say with some confidence that some
other variables are also necessary to complete our causal equation.
Identity Change as an Indicator
I predicted, unconsciously mirroring Galtung (1968), that there would be two
processes of identity transformation that preceded the onset of war of
secession in Namibia among the Lozi people of East Caprivi, but absent
among the Kalanga of Botswana. First, I expected alienation and anomie
(what Galtung called “disintegration” and what I refer to in my theoretical
portion as “identity and value entropy”) to be higher in East Caprivi in relation
to Namibia and that a reintegration of sorts would be occurring as Lozi
nationalists recruited substantial proportions of their ethnic group to national
awareness, leading to higher levels of self-identification among Namibian Lozi
as Lozi comparative to Batswana Kalanga as Kalanga.
At the state level of analysis, what I found was quite different than what
I expected. Consistently in Namibia and Botswana the differences in terms of
state legitimacy and systemic legitimacy, in terms of performance,
expectations, and method of acquiring power, are virtually indistinguishable,
and when they are distinguishable, it is the state which did not experience the
onset of radical, extraordinary politics (Botswana) that usually experienced
the lower levels of legitimacy. While this matches the assumptions neither of
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common wisdom nor the formal hypothesis expostulated by this paper, it
remains an important point of order, inferring that we require other methods of
legitimacy measurement or that the role of disestablishmentarian elites may
be greater than had previously been considered.
Looking at the ethnic homelands of the Caprivi Lozi and Kalanga, on
the other hand, what I found was quite different. While Kalanga and Caprivi
both have relatively high levels of disdain for the contemporary system and its
ability to solve problems, the Caprivi Lozi actually felt in 1999 that an
alternative political system could constitute a viable alternative to the
contemporary system. This nuance was not expected, but it does make
sense – disintegration may be of a simple type, engendering only
dissatisfaction and alienation or it may be more complex, engendering both a
sense of dissatisfaction and alienation and a sense that a viable alternatives
exist.
My findings on whether or not the Caprivi Lozi self-identified as Lozi (or
as Silozi, Itenge, or Barotse) at a higher rate than Batswana Kalanga fell
farther from my expectations, however. Kalanga self-identified at a very high
rate despite their fears of recriminations in terms of access to jobs and
education, while Lozi-speakers of East Caprivi tended to identify themselves
according to their economic position in society, either according to class or,
far more frequently, according to their occupation (most were farmers). While
this might have been expected in the case of a Marxist revolution, it was far
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from expected in the case of a war of secession defined along ethno-linguistic
terms.
There are two possible explanations for this. First, it may simply be
that the East Caprivi people while holding disintegrated identities and being
highly alienated, and indeed, believe that an alternative political-economic
system might be the cure for their ills, they have not been overwhelming
convinced that this systemic change should take the form of ethno-national
radicalism. The second option, which need not exclude the first, is that those
Caprivi Lozi who were willing to take the perceived risks of self-identifying as
Caprivi or Lozi rather than Namibian had already fled Namibia, following
Muyongo into Botswana, leaving behind those who were merely deeply
entropic with regards to their identity.
Mobilization as an Indicator
I define in this study mobilization as the process by which human beings and
resources, particularly weapons, are prepared to resist the orthodox system,
in this case through attempting a war of secession. My assumption, at the
outset, was that the Caprivi Lozi would exhibit readily observable
characteristics that indicated they were (1) developing an alternative politicaleconomy to fund their war of secession and/or as a shadow political-economy
to be put into place upon independence, were (2) developing a military, and
were (3) arming their military. In the same vein, I hypothesized that the
Kalanga of Botswana would demonstrate no similar precursors of violence.
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In the case of an alternative political-economy, I focused my efforts on
a search for black or gray political markets and comparisons of perceived
levels of corruption in East Caprivi, Namibia and the North East District,
Botswana respectively. In my review of the journalistic or academic literature
on the regions/peoples, I found virtually no explicit evidence of black or gray
market, leading me to believe at the time that this was utterly a dead end, and
my research on corruption indicated that it was believed to be more pervasive
by Kalanga than Lozi, though this may be because of the nature of the
surveyed people’s opinions on the legitimacy of the leadership more than the
actual level of corruption in those states.
Yet there was an unexpected source of hope that this indicator still had
some potential. In my study of mobilization of personnel what I found was
that recruitment patterns by the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) focused on the
development of a shadow state, composed of persons with military, political,
bureaucratic, and educational experience. Furthermore, the transnational
CLA network of relationships essentially functioned as an alternative politicaleconomy without fostering internal corruption – probably a wise decision if it
had led to a successful war of secession.
When I was discussing my findings with a friend and former student of
mine at the University of Tennessee, one Justin Smith who is a senior at the
University this year in anthropology, he suggested that interstate networks
might be essential in this case, citing Carolyn Nordstrom’s (2004) Shadows of
War. In this work Nordstrom examines the “shadow” political-economies that
424

develop in states engulfed in internal crisis – her focus is Mozambique - and
how developed states such as the United States and United Kingdom exploit
these shadow political-economies to cheaply extract valuable unrefined
goods.
This is relevant here because it brings up the simple fact that shadow
political-economies are built on the extraction of luxury goods to exchange for
essential goods lower down on the hierarchy of values, such as food,
medicine, armaments, and other finished goods. Great powers can exploit
these at will, of course, because of their tremendous wealth, but small
powers, or disestablishmentarians in those powers, might also be able to
exploit these states assuming they are both spatially near the shadow
political-economies and have desirable goods. Earlier, for instance, I noted
that Caprivi Lozi were able to purchase assault rifles in exchange for relatively
small amounts of grain. Where did these rifles originate from? They
originated from southern Angola where until 2001 the Angolan civil war raged
between the Angolan state and UNITA. Perhaps no obvious signs of a black
market existed in East Caprivi because the leaders therein exploited the
instability of southern Angola, limited state control of southwest Zambia, and
the humanitarian efforts of the UNHCR and Botswana in such a way that
these bodies took over the functions of a black market in this case.
As to my research with regards to whether or not there was evidence
that the Caprivi Lozi were both mobilizing, training, and arming a military force
prior to the onset of violence, the only answer must be yes, and further, that
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no similar behavioral markers existed in Botswana among the Kalanga. This
constitutes a simple point. The Caprivi Lozi not only decided that force might
be a necessary option to accomplish their goals, they took practical steps to
prepare for it. This is far from saying that the attempted Lozi secession was
inevitable – it was not. What it is to say is that a scholar, asked whether
Namibia was more likely to experience an ethnic war of secession than was
Botswana, could have stated absolutely based on a relatively simple inquiry
that is easily replicable, though perhaps not in quantifiable terms. What this
demands, however, is that the scholar (1) probe deeper than the state-level of
analysis favored by contemporary structuralists and institutionalists and (2)
invest the rebels with agency separate from the state of which they are a part
in practical terms.
Discrete Policies and Conditions as Causes
Above I described structuralist and institutionalist conditions and their
apparent roles in Namibia and Botswana. I described them as “causes”
because they are necessary to the onset of wars of secession and their kin. I
also asserted that, while necessary, they are not sufficient.
I ascribe a similar role to discrete policy decisions that cannot be
described as institutions or structures because their effect is (1) immediate,
rather than long-term and (2) would not register as changes in either the
institutional arrangement or the structural patterns of a given system. I
identified three of these discrete conditions as likely having particular
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salience. First, I asserted that if extra-territorial actors lend moral or real
support to radical disestablishmentarians, aiding them in their cause, we
could expect the odds that a war of secession would occur would increase
substantially since such assistance would either lower costs, lower risks, or
lower increase the apparent value of the benefits. Second, I asserted that if a
mobilizing identity group had access to an exit strategy or a series of exit
strategies, the risks entailed in attempting to secede would decrease, thereby
making the odds that they would attempt secession increase. Third, I
asserted that if leaders of the establishment ended any possibility of legal
recourse to secession (or other sovereignty acquisition options) and/or
criminalized the leadership of the disestablishmentarians – both of which
constitute limitations to discourse – then the costs entailed in rebellion would
decrease and the benefits increase, especially to elites – therefore the odds
that a war of secession would increase.
What I found matched my expectations quite well. The Caprivi Lozi had
access to international support of several types, some clearly intended to
support rebellion, some intended to be humanitarian, while the Batswana
Kalanga neither had access to such support nor, and this point can easily be
looked over, did their elite seek it. The Caprivi Lozi had access to numerous
exit strategies, while the Batswana Kalanga had no such access – their only
escape route would be into a state in which their repression would be far
worse. Finally, Namibian President Sam Nujoma consciously and finally
ended any discussion of the possibility of East Caprivi independence and
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declared Mishake Muyongo and his peers to be enemies of the state, forcing
them to flee and leaving them no option other than discard their dream of
independence or use violence. In Botswana, however, even as the Kalanga
continue to be excluded from office, prevented from using their language in
formal situations, and are experiencing increasing discrimination in the
acquisition of higher office and educational opportunities, there is no question
that the government remained open to Kalanga protests, entreaties, and
demands even if they never responded satisfactorily.
On Elites
Though I have made an effort to highlight the role of elites in each of the
preceding finding summaries, I would like to briefly reemphasize their
essential role. I do this not only because my solutions to the weaknesses of
the structuralist and institutionalist approaches hinged on theories excised
from the literature on elites’ roles in crises, but further because it is
disestablishmentarian elites who played (or failed to play) the critical role at
each vector.
This is essential to remember for future research, because it implies
that fully comprehensive research designs constitute analytic “sandwiches.”
The bottom layer, the first set of research, should be constituted of structural
and institutional analyses – these constitute the effort to determine whether or
not a state has the necessary characteristics to be considered ripe for the
onset of radical, extraordinary politics. The second layer, the second set of
researches, should constitute the development of a framework of actionable
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non-state actors, both sub-state and extra-state, that have grievances with
the state. Specifically, this layer would concentrate on (1) isolating out those
groups which have any possible cause for rebellion and (2) isolating out the
elites within those groups. This layer is a difficult one to conduct, particularly
in the instance of states that are only now being examined by social and
political scientists – I speak of course of those states which are practically
difficult to study: members of the Third World, totalitarian states, religiously
fundamentalist states, states only recently emerged from the Communist bloc,
and so forth. That said, this difficulty must be overcome – without political
maps of potential dissenters and disestablishmentarians we can hardly hope
to predict the onset any sort of large-scale political violence.
In our third layer of research the researcher should try to rank order
these groups in terms of desperation (how deeply threatened and/or alienated
the groups are) and genuine capabilities, and furthermore, the researcher
should try to develop at least a basic taxonomy of these groups’ ideologies.
This sort of ideological mapping is for practical purposes, largely, since the
ideology of a disestablishmentarian group will be substantially (though by no
means exclusively) responsible for determining said group’s method of
rebelling should the time come – both in terms of the ends (e.g. overthrowing
the state, seceding from the state, retaining the current framework while
instituting a second legal base, acquisition of autonomy, genocidal removal of
another group, etc.) and in terms of the acceptable means and costs for the
accomplishment of those ends. In other words, knowing the ideology largely
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will allow the researcher to predict that type of radical, extraordinary politics
most likely to be fomented by said group.
The fourth and final layer of our sandwich should be something akin to
that work I have just completed – it should examine those environmental
factors that are either (1) a measure of the activities of disestablishmentarian
elites or (2) a measure of the environmental factors that are neither structural
nor institutional but which will effect the rational calculus of
disestablishmentarian elites. Not only will this reveal the proximate causes of
the onset of an episode of radical, extraordinary politics, but furthermore it will
constitute the most precise bellwether of such. In other words, while the
elites are not the only substantive influence on a state’s likelihood to
experience radical, extraordinary politics, they do constitute the most
immediately influential in the period immediately preceding such violence.

Implications for Namibia and Botswana
What are the implications for the states which sat at the center of this study,
Namibia and Botswana? There are a few. First, I would argue that the swift
reaction of the Namibian state to the Caprivi revolt probably has ended any
real threat that the CLA may represent in the future and has probably
decreased the likelihood that other minority groups will seek autonomy
through violent means – the failure of the United Nations or developed world
to care about the Caprivi Lozi simply adds more weight to this. This is not to
say, however, that such rebellion is impossible – as long as the structural and
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institutional conditions remain ripe for rebellion, the possibility a
disestablishmentarian group might again arise remains. The only way we will
be able to predict such disestablishmentarianism is if we apply methods of
study beyond those currently being utilized widely.
Botswana remains ripe for rebellion as well, though again, it takes a
group of disestablishmentarian elite to decide they will make a rebellion for a
rebellion to appear. Indeed, as Kalanga seek to reestablish their identity and
Tswana nationalists and ultra-nationalists respond by trying to continue to
force assimilation the likelihood that the Kalanga will seek their solutions in
the realm radical, extraordinary politics, rather than radical, ordinary politics,
particularly in the form of a war of secession, gradually increase. If Botswana
would take the simple step, however, of eliminating the ethnic biases built into
their legislature and educational systems, the odds that such a rebellion
would occur would drop exponentially – at least in the short term.
Ultimately, what may prove most interesting about these cases is just
how clear it is that the variance between them may ultimately be traced to
decisions made by minority elites prior to independence with regards to how
they should proceed in their political aspirations. Caprivi Lozi elites sought,
even when allied as with SWAPO against their South African oppressors, a
political revival, an ascension to the status once more of sovereigns of their
own state, while Batswana Kalanga elites sought consciously to integrate
themselves with the post-colonial state, willingly accepting discrimination in
the short-term in pursuit of political-economic advancement. The question
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remains, however, which strategy is superior over long periods of time,
especially given that the success the Kalanga are now experiencing is leading
to a resurgence in tensions between the Tswana majority and themselves.

Implications for the Study of the Genesis of Wars of
Secession and their Kin
This dissertation succeeded in its fundamental goal: to determine whether or
not non-institutional/structural dimensions of analysis have the potential to
improve our explanatory and/or predictive abilities with reference to the
origins of wars of secession. There is cause to believe that in states
determined to be ripe for such wars, the new variables I discussed herein do
hold potential as indicators, though in varying degrees (mobilization, internal
limitation of discourse, and interstate influences having a high potential,
identity disintegration some, while identity reintegration remains
questionable). There is reason to question what degree these factors are
quantifiable, but some sort of standardized, cross-national system for
monitoring not just states which are ripe, but the identity groups (religious,
ethnic, and non-traditional) in those states should be possible, if difficult
(especially in the first order – maintenance will be far simpler). The next step
should probably be to develop a regional database ranging over a number of
years that focuses on states meeting the criterion of ripeness, probably as
defined by the SFTF – Latin America and the Middle East seem to me to be
the best candidates for this undertaking, at least at this point. Those identity
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groups to come under focus first should probably be those already identified
by the Minorities at Risk project, but I would argue that once these groups
have been integrated into a system of constant vigilance, the list should be
expanded in as much as possible.
Several additional studies are suggested by my findings here. First,
the role of extra-territorial disorders specifically as the bases of
disestablishmentarian political-economies in unstable states should be looked
into to determine if different types of disorders (civil wars versus regime
transitions, for instance) have measurable different effects on their
neighboring states. Furthermore, there is a distinct need for developing and
testing theories on identity formation, with specific reference to determining if
there are measurable thresholds of self-identification or other indicators that
are regular within particular cultural frameworks or, ideally, on a trans-cultural
level. Furthermore, a database of case studies should be developed in order
to determine if certain ideational processes, cultural biases, and so forth
among disestablishmentarian elites in a given area are the key in determining
what means and ends should be the responses to their institutional and
structural conditions.
There is also an obvious need for those persons who make it their
business to predict warfare to recognize several key points. First and
foremost, the divide between interstate and domestic factors is once more
disintegrating as the new medievalism emerges and its practical tenets
become ever more the standard rather than atypical. This will necessitate at
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minimum the conscious and on-going cooperation of regional specialists,
comparative politics generalists, political psychologists, international relations
experts, public and foreign policy experts, and organizational theorists, all
focusing their efforts at specific links in the causal chain if we are to create not
merely statistically powerful but practically accurate prediction tools with
regards to warfare. None of these sub-disciplines can argue for superiority in
such a framework – the absence of any of them is tantamount to the loss of a
sense. It is, in other words, time to accept that warfare, and in particular
domestic wars such as wars of secession, are always nested games.
Finally, this dissertation has uncovered something disturbing. The
United Nations and several well-intentioned states, as part of their efforts to
(1) diffuse tensions in Namibia and (2) care for the interests of refugees may
have laid the foundations of a war. Substantial, cross-national studies should
be conducted on this subject in order to determine whether or not there are
observable relationships between the creation of defended refugee camps
and their attributes (are they porous, are all arms seized, are residents
admitted indiscriminately, how far are they from the territory being fled, and so
forth), the origins of the refugee crisis, and the onset (or lack thereof) of
further, related hostilities soon there after. Doing so could yield tremendous
benefit in improving the method by which refugee crises are handled, to the
benefit of both the United Nations (and its member states) and the refugees
themselves. Failure to do so could lead to the UN actually complicating
matters and worsening the potential for political violence.
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Plans for Future Research
I plan to follow up this research in a few key ways. First, I plan to conduct
similar studies to those found in my fourth, fifth, and six chapters on at least
two more pairs of states: Nepal and Bhutan in Himalayan Asia, Fiji and Tonga
in Oceana, Armenia and Azerbaijan in Caucasia, and Peru and Ecuador have
all come two mind. My goal here is merely to create a powerful, if relatively
elementary argument for the widespread adoption of my multilayer approach.
Secondly, I want to develop a plan for the practical application of my
multilayer approach to the prediction of radical, extraordinary politics for use
of the United States and its allies and intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations for policy development and early crisis
preparation (with the secondary utility of potentially informing American
investors in developing states as to when and where capital investment is
least likely to be appropriated or destroyed by disestablishmentarians). I
have also grown interested in whether or not there are regularities in the
effects of refugee camps (and their relative characteristics) on the likelihood
of crises becoming open war and on the scale and intensity of said war, and
hope to conduct a study on this in order to develop practical plans for
minimizing the negative effects of such humanitarian aid. Finally, on a
somewhat more esoteric level, I hope to construct a full taxonomy of varieties
of politics in terms of the extremeness of their means and ends, rather than
the contemporary linear ideological maps. By doing so I hope to illustrate the
435

similarity of ultimate causes for numerous radical, extraordinary movements
generally assumed to be disparate because of their ideological justifications
or cultural variances, thus allowing for more elegant heuristics as well
superior explanatory methods.
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Appendix I
The Constitution of Namibia (1991)
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is indispensable for freedom, justice
and peace; Whereas the said rights include the right of the individual to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, regardless of race, colour, ethnic origin,
sex, religion, creed or social or economic status; Whereas the said rights are
most effectively maintains and protected in a democratic society, where the
government is responsible to freely elected representatives of the people,
operating under a sovereign constitution and a free and independent
judiciary;
Whereas these rights have for so long been denied to the people of Namibia
by colonialism, racism and apartheid;
Whereas we the people of Namibia - have finally emerged victorious in our
struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid;
are determined to adopt a Constitution which expresses for ourselves and our
children our resolve to cherish and to protect the gains of our long struggle;
desire to promote amongst all of us the dignity of the individual and the unity
and integrity of the Namibian nation among and in association with the
nations of the world; will strive to achieve national reconciliation and to foster
peace, unity and a common loyalty to a single state;
committed to these principles, have resolved to constitute the Republic of
Namibia as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State securing to all
our citizens justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity.
Now therefore, we the people of Namibia accept and adopt this Constitution
as the fundamental law of our Sovereign and Independent Republic.
Chapter I The Republic
Article 1 [Establishment of the Republic of Namibia and Identification of its
Territory]
(1) The Republic of Namibia is hereby established as a sovereign, secular,
democratic and unitary State founded upon the principles of democracy, the
rule of law and justice for all.
(2) All power shall vest in the people of Namibia who shall exercise their
sovereignty through the democratic institutions of the State.
(3) The main organs of the State shall be the Executive, the Legislature and
the Judiciary.
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(4) The national territory of Namibia shall consist of the whole of the territory
recognised by the international community through the organs of the United
Nations as Namibia, including the enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay, as
well as the offshore islands of Namibia, and its southern boundary shall extend to the
middle of the Orange River.
(5) Windhoek shall be the seat of central Government.
(6) This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Namibia.
Article 2 [National Symbols]
(1) Namibia shall have a National Flag, the description of which is set out in
Schedule 6.
(2) Namibia shall have a National Coat of Arms, a National Anthem and a
National Seal to be determined by Act of
Parliament, which shall require a two-thirds majority of all the members of the
National Assembly for adoption and amendment.
(3)(a) The National Seal of the Republic of Namibia shall show the Coat of
Arms circumscribed with the word "NAMIBIA" and the motto of the country,
which shall be determined by Act of Parliament as aforesaid.
(b) The National Seal shall be in the custody of the President or such person
whom the President may designate for such purpose and shall be used on
such official documents as the President may determine.
Article 3 [Language]
(1) The official language of Namibia shall be English.
(2) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall prohibit the use of any other
language as a medium of instruction in private schools or in schools financed
or subsidised by the State, subject to compliance with such requirements as
may be imposed by law, to ensure proficiency in the official language, or for
pedagogic reasons.
(3) Nothing contained in Paragraph (1) shall preclude legislation by
Parliament which permits the use of a language other than English for
legislative, administrative and judicial purposes in regions or areas where
such other language or languages are spoken by a substantial component of
the population.
Chapter II Citizenship
Article 4 [Acquisition and loss of Citizenship]
(1) The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by birth:
a) those born in Namibia before the date of Independence whose fathers or
mothers would have been Namibian citizens at the time of the birth of such
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persons, if this Constitution had been in force at that time; and
b) those born in Namibia before the date of Independence, who are not
Namibian citizens under Paragraph (a), and whose fathers or mothers were
ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time of the birth of such persons:
provided that their fathers or mothers were not then persons:
aa) who were enjoying diplomatic immunity in Namibia under any law relating
to diplomatic privileges; or
bb) who were career representatives of another country; or
cc) who were members of any police, military or security unit seconded for
service within Namibia by the Government of another country: provided
further that this paragraph shall not apply to persons claiming citizenship of
Namibia by birth if such persons were ordinarily resident in Namibia at the
date of Independence and had been so resident for a continuous period of not
less than five (5) years prior to such date, or it the fathers or mothers of such
persons claiming citizenship were ordinarily resident in Namibia at the date of
the birth of such persons and had been so resident for a continuous period of
not less than five (5) years prior to such date;
c) those born in Namibia after the date of Independence whose fathers or
mothers are Namibian citizens at the time of the birth of such persons;
d) those born in Namibia after the date of Independence who do not qualify
for citizenship under Paragraph (c), and whose fathers or mothers are
ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time of the birth of such persons:
provided that their fathers or mothers are not then persons:
aa) enjoying diplomatic immunity in Namibia under any law relating to
diplomatic privileges; or
bb) who are career representatives of another country; or
cc) who are members of any police, military or security unit seconded for
service within Namibia by the Government of
another country; or
dd) who are illegal immigrants:
provided further that Paragraphs (aa), (bb), (cc) and (dd) will not apply to
children who would otherwise be stateless.
(2) The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by descent:
a) those who are not Namibian citizens under Paragraph (1) and whose
fathers or mothers at the time of the birth of such persons are citizens of
Namibia or whose fathers or mothers would have qualified for Namibian
citizenship by birth under Paragraph (1), if this Constitution had been in force
at that time; and
b) who comply with such requirements as to registration of citizenship as may
be required by Act of Parliament: provided that nothing in this Constitution
shall preclude Parliament from enacting legislation which requires the birth of
such persons born after the date of Independence to be registered within a
specific time either in Namibia or at an embassy, consulate or office of a trade
representative of the Government of Namibia.
(3) The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by marriage:
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a) those who are not Namibian citizens under Paragraph (1) or (2) and who:
aa) in good marry a Namibian citizen or, prior to the coming into force of this
Constitution, in good faith married a person who would have qualified for
Namibian citizenship if this Constitution had been in force; and
bb) subsequent to such marriage have ordinarily resided in Namibia as the
spouse of such person for a period of not less than two (2) years; and
cc) apply to become citizens of Namibia;
b) for the purposes of this paragraph (and without derogating from any effect
that it may have for any other purposes) a marriage by customary law shall be
deemed to be a marriage: provided that nothing in this Constitution shall
preclude Parliament from enacting legislation which defines the requirements
which need to be satisfied for a marriage by customary law to be recognised
as such for the purposes of this paragraph.
(4) Citizenship by registration may be claimed by persons who are not
Namibian citizens under Paragraph (1), (2) or (3) and who were ordinarily
resident in Namibia at the date of Independence, and had been so resident
for a continuous period of not less than five (5) years prior to such
date:provided that application for Namibian citizenship under this paragraph is
made within a period of twelve (12) months from the date of Independence,
and prior to making such application, such persons renounce the citizenship
on any other country of which they are citizens.
(5) Citizenship by naturalisation may be applied for by persons who are not
Namibian citizens under Paragraphs (1), (2), (3) or (4) and who:
a) are ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time when the application for
naturalisation is made; and
b) have been so resident in Namibia for a continuous period of not less than
five (5) years (whether before or after the date of Independence); and
c) satisfy any other criteria pertaining to health, morality, security or legality of
residence as may be prescribed by law.
(6) Nothing contained herein shall preclude Parliament from authorizing by
law the conferment of Namibian citizenship upon any fit and proper person by
virtue of any special skill or experience or commitment to or services
rendered to the Namibian nation either before or at any time after the date of
Independence.
(7) Namibian citizenship shall be lost by persons who renounce
their Namibian citizenship by voluntarily signing a formal declaration to that
effect.
(8) Nothing in this Constitution shall preclude Parliament from enacting
legislation providing for the loss of Namibian citizenship by persons who, after
the date of Independence:
a) have acquired the citizenship of any other country by any voluntary act; or
b) have served or volunteered to serve in the armed or security forces of any
other country without the written permission of the Namibian Government; or
c) have taken up permanent residence in any other country and have
absented themselves thereafter from Namibia for a period in excess of two (2)
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years without the written permission of the Namibian Government:
provided that no person who is a citizenship of Namibia by birth or descent
may be deprived of Namibian citizenship by such legislation.
(9) Parliament shall be entitled to make further laws not inconsistent with this
Constitution regulating the acquisition or loss of Namibian citizenship.
Chapter III Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
Article 5 [Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms]
The fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this chapter shall be
respected and upheld by the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and all
organs of the Government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by
all natural and legal persons in Namibia, and shall be enforceable by the
Courts in the manner hereinafter prescribed.
Article 6 [Protection of Life]
The right to life shall be respected and protected. No law may prescribe death
as a competent sentence. No Court or Tribunal shall have the power to
impose a sentence of death upon any person. No executions shall take place
in Namibia.
Article 7 [Protection and Liberty]
No persons shall be deprived of personal liberty except according to
procedures established by law.
Article 8 [Respect for Human Dignity]
(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable.
(2)(a) In any judicial proceedings or in other proceedings before any organ of
the State, and during the enforcement of a penalty, respect for human dignity
shall be guaranteed.
(b) No persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Article 9 [Slavery and Forced Labour {Labor}]
(1) No persons shall be held in slavery or servitude.
(2) No persons shall be required to perform forced labour {labor}.
(3) For the purposes of this article, the expression "forced labour" shall not
include:
a) any labour required in consequence of a sentence or order of a Court;
b) any labour required of persons while lawfully detained which, though not
required in consequence of a sentence or order of a Court, is reasonably
necessary in the interests of hygiene;
c) any labour required or members of the defence force, the police force and
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the prison service in pursuance of their duties as such or, in the case of
persons who have conscientious objections to serving as members of the
defence force, any labour which they are required by law to perform in place
of
such service;
d) any labour required during any period of public emergency or in the event
of any other emergency or calamity which threatens the life and well-being of
the community, to the extent that requiring such labour is reasonably
justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing during that
period or as a result of that other emergency or calamity, for the purpose of
dealing with that situation;
e) any labour reasonably required as part of reasonable and normal
communal or other civic obligations.
Article 10 [Equality and Freedom from Discrimination]
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law.
(2) No persons may be discriminated against on the grounds of sex, race,
colour {color}, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status.
Article 11 [Arrest and Detention]
(1) No persons shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention.
(2) No persons who are arrested shall be detained in custody without being
informed promptly in a language they understand of the grounds for such
arrest.
(3) All persons who are arrested and detained in custody shall be brought
before the nearest Magistrate or other judicial officer within a period of fortyeight (48) hours of their arrest or, if this is not reasonably possible, as soon as
possible thereafter, and no such persons shall be detained in custody beyond
such period without the authority of a Magistrate or other judicial officer.
(4) Nothing contained in Paragraph (3) shall apply to illegal immigrants held in
custody under any law dealing with illegal immigration: provided that such
persons shall not be deported from Namibia unless deportation is authorised
by a Tribunal empowered by law to give such authority.
(5) No persons who have been arrested and held in custody as illegal
immigrants shall be denied the right to consult confidentially legal
practitioners of their choice, and there shall be no interference with this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interest of national security or for public safety.
Article 12 [Fair Trial]
(1)(a) In the determination of their civil rights and obligations or any criminal
charges against them, all persons shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing
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by an independent, impartial and competent Court or Tribunal established by
law: provided that such Court or Tribunal may exclude the press and/or the
public from all or any part of the trial for reasons of morals, the public order or
national security, as is necessary in a democratic society.
(b) A trial referred to in Paragraph (a) shall take place within a reasonable
time, failing which the accused shall be released.
(c) Judgments in criminal cases shall be given in public, except where the
interests of juvenile persons or morals otherwise require.
(d) All persons charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until
proven guilty according to law, after having had the opportunity of calling
witnesses and cross-examining those called against them.
(e) All persons shall be afforded adequate time and facilities for the
preparation and presentation of their defence, before the commencement of
and during their trial, and shall be entitled to be defended by a legal
practitioner of their choice.
(f) No persons shall be compelled to give testimony against themselves or
their spouses, who shall include partners in a marriage by customary law, and
no Court shall admit in evidence against such persons testimony which has
been obtained from such persons in violation of Article 8(2)(b).
(2) No persons shall be liable to be tried, convicted or punished again for any
criminal offence for which they have already been convicted or acquitted
according to law: provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed
as changing the provisions of the common law defence of "previous acquittal"
and "previous conviction".
(3) No persons shall be tried or convicted for any criminal offence or on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence at
the time when it was committed, nor shall a penalty be imposed exceeding
that which was applicable at the time when the offence was committed.
Article 13 [Privacy]
(1) No persons shall be subject to interference with the privacy of their
homes, correspondence or communications save as in accordance with law
and as is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety of the economic well-being of the country, for the
protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the
protection of the rights or freedoms of others.
(2) Searchers of the person or the homes of individuals shall only be justified:
a) where these are authorised by a competent judicial officer;
b) in cases where delay in obtaining such judicial authority carries with it the
danger or prejudicing the objects of the search or the public interest, and such
procedures as are prescribed by Act of Parliament to preclude abuse are
properly satisfied.
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Article 14 [Family]
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, colour,
ethnic origin, nationality, religion, creed or social or economic status shall
have the right to marry and to found a family. They shall be entitled to equal
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the
intending spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 15 [Children's Rights]
(1) Children shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and, subject to legislation enacted in the best interests of children,
as far as possible the right to know and be cared for by their parents.
(2) Children are entitled to be protected from economic exploitation and shall
not be employed in or required to perform work that is likely to be hazardous
or to interfere with their education, or to be harmful to their health or physical,
mental, spiritual, moral, or social development. For the purposes of this
paragraph children shall be under the age of sixteen (16) years.
(3) No children under the age of fourteen (14) years shall be employed to
work in any factory or mine, save under conditions and circumstances
regulated by Act of Parliament. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed
as derogating in any way from Paragraph (2).
(4) Any arrangement or scheme employed on any farm or other undertaking,
the object or effect of which is to compel the minor children of an employee to
work for or in the interest of the employer of such employee, shall for the
purposes of Article 9 be deemed to constitute an arrangement or scheme to
compel the performance of forced labour {labor}.
(5) No law authorising preventive detention shall permit
children under the age of sixteen (16) years to be detained.
Article 16 [Property]
(1) All persons shall have the right in any part on Namibia to acquire, own and
dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in
association with others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or
legatees: provided that Parliament may be legislation prohibit or regulate as it
deems expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are not
Namibian citizens.
(2) The State or a competent body or organ authorised by law may
expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment of just
compensation, in accordance with requirements and procedures to be
determined by Act of Parliament.
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Article 17 {...}
Article 18 [Administrative Justice]
Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and
reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed upon such bodies and
officials by common law and any relevant legislation, and persons aggrieved
by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek
redress before a competent Court or Tribunal.
Article 19 [Culture]
Every person shall be entitled to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and
promote any culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the terms of this
Constitution and further subject to the condition that the rights protected by
this article do not impinge upon the rights of others or the national interest.
Article 20 [Education]
(1) All persons shall have the right to education.
(2) Primary education shall be compulsory and the State shall provide
reasonable facilities to render effective this right for every resident within
Namibia, by establishing and maintaining State schools at which primary
education will be provided free of charge.
(3) Children shall not be allowed to leave school until they have completed
their primary education or have attained the age of sixteen (16) years,
whichever is the sooner, save in so far as this may be authorised by Act of
Parliament on grounds of health or other considerations pertaining to the
public interest.
(4) All persons shall have the right, at their own expense, to establish and to
maintain private schools, or colleges or other institutions of tertiary education:
provided that:
a) such schools, colleges or institutions of tertiary education are registered
with a Government department in accordance with any law authorising and
regulating such registration;
b) the standards maintained by such schools, colleges or institutions of
tertiary education are not inferior to the standards maintained in comparable
schools, colleges or institutions of tertiary education funded by the State; c)
no restrictions of whatever nature are imposed with respect to the admission
of pupils based on race, colour {color} or creed; d) no restrictions of whatever
nature are imposed with respect to the recruitment of staff based on race or
colour {color}.
Article 21 [Fundamental Freedoms]
(1) All persons shall have the right to: a) freedom of speech and expression,
which shall include freedom of the press and other media; b) freedom of
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thought, conscience and belief, which shall include academic freedom in
institutions of higher learning; c) freedom to practice any religion and to
manifest such practice; d) assemble peaceably and without arms;
e) freedom of association, which shall include freedom to form and join
associations or unions, including trade unions and political parties; f) withhold
their labour {labor} without being exposed to criminal penalties; g) move freely
throughout Namibia;
h) reside and settle in any part of Namibia;
i) leave and return to Namibia;
j) practice any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business.
(2) The fundamental freedoms referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be exercised
subject to the law of Namibia, in so far as such law imposes reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the rights and freedoms conferred by the said
Paragraph, which are necessary in a democratic society and are required in
the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia, national security,
public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence.
Article 22 [Limitation upon Fundamental Rights and Freedoms]
Whenever or wherever in terms of this Constitution the limitation of any
fundamental rights or freedoms contemplated by this chapter is authorised,
any law providing for such limitation shall: a) be of general application, shall
not negate the essential content, and shall not be aimed at a particular
individual;
b) specify the ascertainable extent of such limitation and identify the article or
articles on which authority to enact such limitation is claimed to rest.
Article 23 [Apartheid and Affirmative Action]
(1) The practice of racial discrimination and the practice and ideology of
apartheid from which the majority of the people of Namibia have suffered for
so long shall be prohibited and by Act of Parliament such practices, and the
propagation of such practices, may be rendered criminally punishable by the
ordinary Courts by means of such punishment as Parliament deems
necessary for the purposes of expressing the revulsion of the Namibian
people at such practices.
(2) Nothing contained in Article 10 shall prevent Parliament from enacting
legislation providing directly or indirectly for the advancement of persons
within Namibia who have been socially, economically or educationally
disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices, or for the
implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social,
economic or educational imbalances in the Namibian society arising out of
past discriminatory laws or practices, or for achieving a balanced structuring
of the public service, the police force, the defence force, and the prison
service.
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(3) In the enactment of legislation and the application of any policies and
practices contemplated by Paragraph (2), it shall be permissible to have
regard to the fact that women in Namibia have traditionally suffered special
discrimination and that they need to be encouraged and enabled to play a full,
equal and effective role in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the
nation.
Article 24 [Derogation]
(1) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of Article 26 shall be held
to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this Constitution to the extent
that it authorises the taking of measures during any period when Namibia is in
a state of national defence or any period when a declaration of emergency
under this Constitution is in force.
(2) Where any persons are detained by virtue of such authorization as is
referred to in Paragraph (1), the following provisions shall apply:
a) they shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case not more
than five (5) days after the commencement of their detention, be furnished
with a statement in writing in a language that they understand specifying in
detail the grounds upon which they are detained and, at their request, this
statement shall be read to them;
b) not more than fourteen (14) days after the commencement of their
detention, be furnished with a statement in writing in a language that they
understand specifying in detail the grounds upon which they are detained
and, at their request, this statement shall be read to them; c) not more than
one (1) month after the commencement of their detention and thereafter
during their detention at intervals of not more than three (3) months, their
cases shall be reviewed by the Advisory Board referred to in Article 26 (5)(c),
which shall order their release from detention if it is satisfied that it is not
reasonably necessary for the purposes of the emergency to continue the
detention of such persons; d) they shall be afforded such opportunity for the
making of representations as may be desirable or expedient in the
circumstances, having regard to the public interest and the interests of the
detained persons.
(3) Nothing contained in this article shall permit a derogation from or
suspension of the fundamental rights or freedoms referred to in Articles 5, 6,
8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19 and 21 (1)(a), (b), (c), and (e), or the denial of
access by any persons to legal practitioners or a Court of law.
Article 25 [Enforcement of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms]
(1) Save in so far as it may be authorised to do so by this Constitution,
Parliament or any subordinate legislative authority shall not make any law,
and the Executive and the agencies of Government shall not take any action
which abolishes or abridges the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred
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by this chapter, and any law or action in contravention thereof shall to the
extent of the contravention be invalid; provided that:
a) a competent Court, instead of declaring such law or action to be invalid,
shall have the power and the discretion in an appropriate case to allow
Parliament, any subordinate legislative authority, or the Executive and the
agencies of Government, as the case may be, to correct any defect in the
impugned law or action within a specified period, subject to such conditions
as may be specified by it. In such event and until such correction, or until the
expiry of the time limit set by the Court, whichever be the shorter, such
impugned law or action shall be deemed to be valid;
b) any law which was in force immediately before the date of Independence
shall remain in force until amended, repealed or declared unconstitutional, it
may either set aside the law, or allow Parliament to correct any defect in such
law, in which event the provisions of Paragraph (a) shall apply.
(2) Aggrieved persons who claim that a fundamental right or freedom
guaranteed by this Constitution has been infringed or threatened shall be
entitled to approach a competent Court to enforce or protect such a right or
freedom, and may approach the Ombudsman to provide them with such legal
assistance or advice as they require, and the Ombudsman shall have the
discretion in response thereto to provide such legal or other assistance as he
or she may consider expedient.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court referred to in
Paragraph (2) shall have the power to make all such orders as shall be
necessary and appropriate to secure such
applicants the enjoyment of the rights of freedoms conferred on them under
the provisions of this Constitution, should the Court come to the conclusion
that such rights or freedoms have been unlawfully denied or violated, or that
grounds exist for the protection of such rights or freedoms by interdict.
(4) The power of the Court shall include the power to award monetary
compensation in respect of any damage suffered by the aggrieved persons in
consequence of such unlawful denial or violation of their fundamental rights
and freedoms, where it considers such an award to be appropriate in the
circumstances of particular cases.
Chapter IV Public Emergency, State of National Defence and Martial Law
Article 26 [State of Emergency, State of National Defence and Martial Law]
(1) At a time of national disaster or during a state of national defence or public
emergency threatening the life of the nation or the constitutional order, the
President may by Proclamation in the Gazette declare that a state of
emergency exists in Namibia or any part thereof.
(2) A declaration under Paragraph (1), if not sooner revoked, shall cease to
have effect:
a) in the case of a declaration made when the National Assembly is sitting or
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has been summoned to meet, at the expiration of a period of seven (7) days
after publication of the declaration; or
b) in any other case, at the expiration of a period of thirty (30) days after
publication of the declaration;
unless before the expiration of that period, it is approved by a resolution
passed by the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority of all its members.
(3) Subject to the provisions of Paragraph (4), a declaration approved by a
resolution of the National Assembly under Paragraph (2) shall continue to be
in force until the expiration of a period of six (6) months after being so
approved or until such earlier date as may be specified in the resolution:
provided that the National Assembly may, by resolution by a two-thirds
majority of all its members, extend its approval of the declaration for periods
of not more than six (6) months at a time.
(4) The National Assembly may by resolution at any time revoke a declaration
approved by it in terms of this article.
(5)(a) During a state of emergency in terms of this article or when a state of
national defence prevails, the President shall have the power by Proclamation
to make such regulations as in his or her opinion are necessary for the
protection of national security, public safety and the maintenance of law and
order.
(b) The powers of the President to make such regulations shall include the
power to suspend the operation of any rule of the common law or statute or
any fundamental right or freedom protected by this Constitution, for such
period and subject to such conditions as are reasonably justifiable for the
purpose of dealing with the situation which has given rise to the emergency:
provided that nothing in this paragraph shall enable the President to act
contrary to the provisions of Article 24.
(c) Where any regulation made under Paragraph (b) provides for detention
without trial, provision shall also be made for an Advisory Board, to be
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service
Commission, and consisting of no more than five (5) persons, of whom no
fewer than three (3) persons shall be Judges of the Supreme Court or the
High Court or qualified to be such. The Advisory Board shall perform the
function set out in Article 24 (2)(c).
(6) Any regulations made by the President pursuant to the provisions of
Paragraph (5) shall cease to have legal force if they have not been approved
by a resolution of the National Assembly within fourteen (14) days from the
date when the
National Assembly first sits in session after the date of the commencement of
any such regulations.
(7) The President shall have the power to proclaim or terminate martial law.
Martial law may be proclaimed only when a state of national defence involving
another country exists or when civil war prevails in Namibia: provided that any
proclamation of martial law shall cease to be valid if it is not approved within a
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reasonable time by a resolution passed by a two-third majority of all the
members of the National Assembly.
Chapter V The President
Article 27 [Head of State and Government]
(1) The President shall be the Head of State and of the Government and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force.
(2) The executive power of the Republic of Namibia shall vest in the President
and the Cabinet.
(3) Except as may be otherwise provided in this Constitution or by law, the
President shall in the exercise of her functions be obliged to act in
consultation with the Cabinet.
Article 28 [Election]
(1) The President shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution and subject thereto.
(2) Election of the President shall be:
a) by direct, universal and equal suffrage; and
b) conducted in accordance with principles and procedures to be determined
by Act of Parliament: provided that no person shall be elected as President
unless he or she received more than fifty (50) per cent of the votes cast and
the necessary number of ballots shall be conducted until result is reached.
(3) Every citizen of Namibia by birth of descent, over the age of thirty-five (35)
years, and who is eligible to be elected to office as a member of the National
Assembly shall be eligible for election as President.
(4) The procedures to be followed for the nomination of candidates for
election as President, and for all matters necessary and incidental to ensure
the free, fair and effective election of a President, shall be determined by Act
of Parliament: provided that any registered political party shall be entitled to
nominate a candidate, and any person supported by a minimum number of
registered voters to be determined by Act of Parliament shall also be entitled
to be nominated as a candidate.
Article 29 [Term of Office]
(1)(a) The President's term of office shall be five (5) years unless he or she
dies or resigns before the expiry of the said term or is removed from office.
(b) In the event of the dissolution of the National Assembly in the
circumstances provided for under Article 57 (1), the President's term of office
shall also expire.
(2) A President shall be removed from office if a two-thirds majority of all the
members of the National Assembly, confirmed by a two-thirds majority of all
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the members of the National Council, adopts a resolution impeaching the
President on the ground that he or she has been guilty of a violation of the
Constitution or guilty of a serious violation of the laws of the land or otherwise
guilty of such gross misconduct or ineptitude as to render him or her unfit to
hold with dignity and honour the office of President.
(3) A person shall hold office as President for not more than two terms.
(4) If a President dies, resigns or is removed from office in terms of this
Constitution, the vacant office of President shall
be filled for the unexpired period thereof as follows: a) if the vacancy occurs
not more than one (1) year before the date on which Presidential elections
are required to be held, the vacancy shall be filled in accordance with the
provisions of Article 34;
b) if the vacancy occurs not more than one (1) year before the date on which
Presidential elections are required to be held, an election for the President
shall be held in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date on which the vacancy occurred, and pending
such election the vacant office shall be filled in accordance with the provisions
of Article 34.
(5) If the President dissolves the National Assembly under Article 32 (3)(a)
and 57 (1), a new election for President shall be held in accordance with the
provisions of Article 28 within ninety (90) days, and pending such election the
President shall remain in office, and the provisions of Article 58 shall be
applicable.
(6) If a person becomes President under Paragraph (4), the period of time
during which he or she holds office consequent upon such election or
succession shall not be regarded as a term for the purposes of Paragraph (3).
Article 30 [Oath or Affirmation]
Before formally assuming office, a President-elect shall make the following
oath or affirmation which shall be administered by the Chief Justice or a
Judge designated by the Chief Justice for this purpose:
"I, ..., do hereby swear/solemnly affirm,
That I will strive to the best of my ability to uphold, protect and defend as the
Supreme Law the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, and faithfully to
obey, execute and administer the laws of the Republic of Namibia;
That I will protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the
material and spiritual resources of the Republic of Namibia; and
That I will endeavour {endeavour} to the best of my ability to ensure justice for
all the inhabitants of the Republic of Namibia.
(In the case of an oath:) So help me God."
Article 31 [Immunity from Civil and Criminal Proceedings]
(1) No person holding the office of President or performing the functions of
President may be sued in any civil proceedings save where such proceedings
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concern an act done in his or her official capacity as President.
(2) No person holding the office of President shall be charged with any
criminal offence or be amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of any Court in
respect of any act allegedly performed, or any omission to perform any act,
during his or her tenure of office as President.
(3) After a President has vacated that office:
a) no Court may entertain any action against him or her in any civil
proceedings in respect of any act done in his or her official capacity as
President;
b) a civil or criminal Court shall only have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings
against him or her, in respect of acts of commission or omission alleged to
have been perpetrated in his or her personal capacity whilst holding office as
President, if Parliament by resolution has removed the President on the
grounds specified in this Constitution and if a resolution is adopted by
Parliament resolving that any such proceedings are justified in the public
interest notwithstanding any damage such proceedings might cause to the
dignity of the office of President.
Article 32 [Functions, Powers and Duties]
(1) As the Head of State, the President shall uphold, protect and defend the
Constitution as the Supreme Law, and shall perform with dignity and
leadership all acts necessary, expedient, reasonably and incidental to the
discharge of the executive functions of the Government, subject to the
overriding terms of this Constitution and the laws of Namibia, which he or she
is constitutionally obliged to protect, to administer and to execute.
(2) In accordance with the responsibility of the executive branch of
Government to the legislative branch, the President and the Cabinet shall
each year during the consideration of the official budget attend Parliament.
During such session the President shall address Parliament on the state of
the nation and on the future policies of the Government, shall report on the
policies of the previous year and shall be available to respond to questions.
(3) Without derogating from the generality of the functions and powers
contemplated by Paragraph (1), the President shall preside over meetings of
the Cabinet and shall have the power, subject to this Constitution to: a)
dissolve the National Assembly by Proclamation in the circumstances
provided for in Article 57 (1);
b) determine the times for the holding of special sessions of the National
Assembly, and to prorogue such sessions;
c) accredit, receive and recognise ambassadors, and to appoint
ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, diplomatic representatives and other
diplomatic officers, consuls and consular officers;
d) pardon or reprieve offenders, either unconditionally or subject to such
conditions as the President may deem fit;
e) negotiate and sign international agreements, and to delegate such power;
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f) declare martial law or, if it is necessary for the defence of the nation,
declare that a state of national defence exists: provided that this power shall
be exercised subject to the terms of Article 26 (7);
g) establish and dissolve such Government departments and ministries as the
President may at any time consider to be necessary or expedient for the good
government of Namibia; h) confer such honours {honors} as the President
considers appropriate on citizens, residents and friends of Namibia in
consultation with interested and relevant persons and institutions; i) appoint
the following persons:
aa) the Prime Minister;
bb) Ministers and Deputy-Ministers;
cc) the Attorney-General;
dd) the Director-General of Planning;
ee) any other person or persons who are required by any other provision of
this Constitution or any other law to be appointed by the President.
(4) The President shall also have the power, subject to this Constitution, to
appoint:
a) on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission:
aa) the Chief Justice, the Judge-President of the High Court and other Judges
of the Supreme Court and the High Court;
bb) the Ombudsman;
cc) the Prosecutor-General;
b) on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission:
aa) the Auditor-General;
bb) the Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Central Bank;
c) on the recommendation of the Security Commission:
aa) the Chief of the Defence Force;
bb) the Inspector-General of Police;
cc) the Commissioner of Prisons.
(5) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution dealing with
the signing of any laws passed by Parliament and the promulgation and
publication of such laws in the Gazette, the President shall have the power to:
a) sign and promulgate any Proclamation which by law he or she is entitled to
proclaim as President;
b) initiate, in so far as he or she considers it necessary and expedient, laws
for submission to and consideration by the National Assembly;
c) appoint as members of the National Assembly but without any vote therein,
not more than six (6) persons by virtue of their special expertise, status, skill
or experience.
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution or any other law, any person
appointed by the President pursuant to the powers vested in him or her by
this Constitution or any other law may be removed by the President by the
same process through which such person was appointed.
(7) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any other law of
application in this matter, the President may, in consultation with the Cabinet
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and on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission:
a) constitute any office in the public service of Namibia not otherwise provided
for by any other law;
b) appoint any person to such office;
c) determine the tenure of any person so appointed as well as the terms and
conditions of his or her service.
(8) All appointments made and actions taken under Paragraph (3), (4), (5), (6)
and (7) shall be announced by the President by Proclamation in the Gazette.
(9) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and save where this
Constitution otherwise provides, any action taken by the President pursuant
to any power vested in the President by the terms of this article shall be
capable of being reviewed, reversed or corrected on such terms as are
deemed expedient and proper should there be a resolution proposed by at
least one-third of all the members of the National Assembly and passed by a
two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Assembly disapproving
any such action and resolving to review, reverse or correct it.
(10) Notwithstanding the review, reversal or correction of any action in terms
of Paragraph (9), all actions performed pursuant to any such action during the
period preceding such review, reversal or correction shall be deemed to be
valid and effective in law, until and unless Parliament otherwise enacts.
Article 33 [Remuneration]
Provision shall be made by Act of Parliament for the payment out of the State
Revenue Fund of remuneration and allowances for the President, as well as
for the payment of pensions to former Presidents and, in the case of their
deaths, to their surviving spouses.
Article 34 [Succession]
(1) If the office of President becomes vacant or if the President is otherwise
unable to fulfil the duties of the office, the following persons shall in the order
provided for in this paragraph act as President for the unexpired portion of the
President's term of office or until the President is able to resume office,
whichever is the earlier:
a) the Prime Minister;
b) the Deputy-Prime Minister;
c) a person appointed by the Cabinet.
(2) Where it is regarded as necessary or expedient that a person deputise for
the President because of a temporary absence from the country or because
of pressure of work, the President shall be entitled to nominate any person
enumerated in Paragraph (1) to deputise for him or her in respect of such
specific occasions
or such specific matters and for such specific periods as in his or her
discretion may be considered wise and expedient, subject to consultation with
the Cabinet.
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Chapter VI The Cabinet
Article 35 [Composition]
(1) The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Prime Minister and such
other Ministers as the President may appoint from the members of the
National Assembly, including members nominated under Article 46 (1)(b), for
the purposes of administering and executing the functions of the Government.
(2) The President may also appoint a Deputy-Prime Minister to perform such
functions as may be assigned to him or her by the President of the Prime
Minister.
(3) The President or, in his or her absence, the Prime Minister or other
Minister designated for this purpose by the President, shall preside at
meetings of the Cabinet.
Article 36 [Functions of the Prime Minister]
The Prime Minister shall be the leader of Government business in Parliament,
shall co-ordinate the work of the Cabinet and shall advise and assist the
President in the execution of the functions of Government.
Article 37 [Deputy-Ministers]
The President may appoint from the members of the National Assembly,
including members nominated under Article 46 (1)(b), and the National
Council such Deputy-Ministers as he or she may consider expedient, to
exercise of perform on behalf of Ministers any of the powers, functions and
duties which may have been assigned to such Ministers.
Article 38 [Oath of Affirmation]
Before assuming office, a Minister or Deputy-Minister shall make and
subscribe to an oath or solemn affirmation before the President or a person
designated by the President for this purpose, in the terms set out in Schedule
2.
Article 39 [Vote of No Confidence]
The President shall be obliged to terminate the appointment of any member
of the Cabinet, if the National Assembly by a majority of all its members
resolves that it has no confidence in that member.
Article 40 [Duties and Functions]
The members of the Cabinet shall have the following functions:
a) to direct, co-ordinate and supervise the activities of Ministries and
Government departments including para-statal enterprises, and to review and
advise the President and the National Assembly on the desirability and
wisdom of any prevailing subordinate legislation, regulations or orders
pertaining to such para-statal enterprises, regard being had to the public
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interest;
b) to initiate bills for submission to the National Assembly;
c) to formulate, explain and assess for the National Assembly the budget of
the State and its economic development plans and to report to the National
Assembly thereon;
d) to carry out such other functions as are assigned to them by law or are
incidental to such assignment;
e) to attend meetings of the National Assembly and to be available for the
purposes of any queries and debates pertaining to the legitimacy, wisdom,
effectiveness and direction of Government policies; f) to take such steps as
are authorised by law to establish such economic organisations
{organizations}, institutions and para- statal enterprises on behalf of the State
as are directed or authorised by law;
g) to formulate, explain and analyze for the members of the National
Assembly the goals of Namibian foreign policy and its relations with other
States and to report to the National Assembly thereon;
h) to formulate, explain and analyze for the members of the National
Assembly the directions and content of foreign trade policy and to report to
the National Assembly thereon;
i) to assist the President in determining what international agreements are to
be concluded, acceded to or succeeded to and to report to the National
Assembly thereon;
j) to advise the President on the state of national defence and the
maintenance of law and order and to inform the National Assembly thereon;
k) to issue notices, instructions and directives to facilitate the implementation
and administration of laws administered by the Executive, subject to the terms
of this Constitution or any other law;
l) to remain vigilant and vigorous for the purposes of ensuring that the
scourges of apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest
themselves in any form in a free and independent Namibia and to protect and
assist disadvantaged citizens of Namibia who have historically been the
victims of these pathologies.
Article 41 [Ministerial Accountability]
All Ministers shall be accountable individually for the administration of their
own Ministries and collectively for the administration of the work of the
Cabinet, both to the President and to Parliament.
Article 42 [Outside Employment]
(1) During their tenure of office as members of the Cabinet, Ministers may not
take up any other paid employment, engage in activities inconsistent with the
positions as Ministers, or expose themselves to any situation which carries
with it the risk of a conflict developing between their interests as Ministers and
their private interests.
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(2) No members of the Cabinet shall use their positions as such or use
information entrusted to them confidentially as such members of the Cabinet,
directly or indirectly to enrich themselves.
Article 43 [Secretary to the Cabinet]
(1) There shall be a Secretary to the Cabinet who shall be appointed by the
President and who shall perform such functions as may be determined by law
and such functions as are from time to time assigned to the Secretary by the
President or the Prime Minister. Upon appointment by the President, the
Secretary shall be deemed to have been appointed to such office on the
recommendation of the Public Service Commission.
(2) The Secretary to the Cabinet shall also serve as a depository of the
records, minutes and related documents of the Cabinet.
Chapter VII The National Assembly
Article 44 [Legislative Power]
The legislative power of Namibia shall be vested in the National Assembly
with the power to pass laws with the assent of the President as provided in
this Constitution subject, where applicable, to the powers and functions of the
National Council as set out in this Constitution.
Article 45 [Representative Nature]
The members of the National Assembly shall be representative of all the
people and shall in the performance of their duties be guided by the
objectives of this Constitution, by the public interest and by their conscience.
Article 46 [Composition]
(1) The composition of the National Assembly shall be as follows: a) seventytwo (72) members to be elected by the registered voters by general, direct
and secret ballot. Every Namibian citizen who has the qualifications described
in Article 17 shall be entitled to vote in the elections for members of the
National Assembly and, subject to Article 47, shall be eligible for candidature
as a member of the National Assembly; b) not more than six (6) persons
appointed by the President under Article 32 (5)(c), by virtue of their special
expertise, status, skill or experience: provided that such members shall have
no vote in the National Assembly, and shall not be taken into account for the
purpose of determining any specific majorities that are required under this
Constitution or any other law.
(2) Subject to the principles referred to in Article 49, the members of the
National Assembly referred to in Paragraph (1)(a) shall be elected in
accordance with procedures to be determined by Act of Parliament.
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Article 47 [Disqualification of Members]
(1) No persons may become members of the National Assembly if they:
a) have at any time after Independence been convicted of any offence in
Namibia, or outside Namibia if such conduct would have constituted an
offence within Namibia, and for which they have been sentenced to death or
to imprisonment of more than twelve (12) months without the option of a fine,
unless they have received a free pardon or unless such imprisonment has
expired at least ten (10) years before the date of their election; or
b) have at any time prior to Independence been convicted of an offence, if
such conduct would have constituted an offence within Namibia after
Independence, and for which they have been sentenced to death or to
imprisonment of more than twelve (12) months without the option of a fine,
unless they have received a free pardon or unless such imprisonment has
expired at least ten (10) years before the date of their election: provided that
no person sentenced to death or imprisonment for acts committed in
connection with the struggle for the independence of Namibia shall be
disqualified under this paragraph from being elected as a member of the
National Assembly; or
c) are unrehabilitated insolvents; or
d) are of unsound mind and have been so declared by a competent Court; or
e) are remunerated members of the public service of Namibia; or
f) are members of the National Council, Regional Councils or Local
Authorities.
(2) For the purpose of Paragraph (1):
a) no person shall be considered as having been convicted by any Court until
any appeal which might have been noted against the conviction or sentence
has been determined, or the time for noting an appeal against such conviction
has expired;
b) the public service shall be deemed to include the defence force, the police
force, the prison service, para-statal enterprises, Regional Councils and Local
Authorities.
Article 48 [Vacation of Seats]
(1) Members of the National Assembly shall vacate their seats:
a) if they cease to have the qualifications which rendered them eligible to be
members of the National Assembly;
b) if the political party which nominated them to sit in the National Assembly
informs the Speaker that such members are no longer members of such
political party;
c) if they resign their seats in writing addressed to the Speaker;
d) if they are removed by the National Assembly pursuant to its rules and
standing orders permitting or requiring such removal for good and sufficient
reasons;
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e) if they are absent during sittings of the National Assembly for ten (10)
consecutive sitting days, without having obtained the special leave of the
National Assembly on grounds specified in its rules and standing orders.
(2) If the seat of a member of the National Assembly is vacated in terms of
Paragraph (1), the political party which nominated such member to sit in the
National Assembly shall be entitled to fill the vacancy by nominating any
person on the party's election list compiled for the previous general election,
or if there be no such person, by nominating any member of the party.
Article 49 [Elections]
The election of members in terms of Article 46 (1)(a) shall be on party lists
and in accordance with the principles of proportional representation as set out
in Schedule 4.
Article 50 [Duration]
Every National Assembly shall continue for a maximum period of five (5)
years, but it may before the expiry of its term be dissolved by the President by
Proclamation as provided for in Article 32 (3)(a) and 57 (1).
Article 51 [Speaker]
(1) At the first sitting of a newly elected National Assembly, the National
Assembly, with the Secretary acting as Chairperson, shall elect a member as
Speaker. The National Assembly shall then elect another member as DeputySpeaker. the Deputy-Speaker shall act as Speaker whenever the Speaker is
not available.
(2) The Speaker or Deputy-Speaker shall cease to hold office if he or she
ceases to be a member of the National Assembly. The Speaker or DeputySpeaker may be removed from office by resolution of the National Assembly,
and may resign from office or from the National Assembly in writing
addressed to the Secretary of the National Assembly.
(3) When the office of Speaker or Deputy-Speaker becomes vacant the
National Assembly shall elect a member to fill the vacancy.
(4) When neither the Speaker nor the Deputy-Speaker is available for duty,
the National Assembly, with the Secretary acting as Chairperson, shall elect a
member to act as Speaker.
Article 52 [Secretary and other Officers]
(1) Subject to the provisions of the laws pertaining to the public service and
the directives of the National Assembly, the Speaker shall appoint a person
(or designate a person in the public service made available for that purpose),
as the Secretary of the National Assembly, who shall perform the functions
and duties assigned to such Secretary by this Constitution or by the Speaker.
(2) Subject to the laws governing the control of public monies, the Secretary
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shall perform his or her functions and duties under the control of the Speaker.
(3) The Secretary shall be assisted by officers of the National
Assembly who shall be persons in the public service made available for that
purpose.
Article 53 [Quorum]
The presence of at least thirty-seven (37) members of the National Assembly
entitled to vote, other than the Speaker or the presiding member, shall be
necessary to constitute a meeting of the National Assembly for the exercise of
its powers and the performance of its functions.
Article 54 [Casting Vote]
In the case of an equality of votes in the National Assembly, the Speaker or
the Deputy-Speaker or the presiding member shall have and may exercise a
casting vote.
Article 55 [Oath or Affirmation]
Every member of the National Assembly shall make and subscribe to an oath
or solemn affirmation before the Chief Justice or a Judge designated by the
Chief Justice for this purpose, in the terms set out in Schedule 3.
Article 56 [Assent to Bills]
(1) Every bill passed by Parliament in terms of this Constitution in order to
acquire the status of an Act of Parliament shall require the assent of the
President to be signified by the signing of the bill and the publication of the
Act in the Gazette.
(2) Where a bill is passed by a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the
National Assembly and has been confirmed by the National Council the
President shall be obliged to give his or her assent thereto.
(3) Where a bill is passed by a majority of the members of the National
Assembly but such majority consists of less than twothirds of all the members of the National Assembly and has been confirmed
by the National Council, but the President declines to assent to such bill, the
President shall communicate such dissent to the Speaker.
(4) If the President has declined to assent to a bill under Paragraph (3), the
National Assembly may reconsider the bill and, if it so decides, pass the bill in
the form in which it was referred back to it, or in an amended form or it may
decline to pass the bill. Should the bill then be passed by a majority of the
National Assembly it will not require further confirmation by the National
Council but, if the majority consists of less than two-thirds of all the members
of the National Assembly, the President shall retain his or her power to
withhold assent to the bill. If the President elects not to assent to the bill, it
shall then lapse.
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Article 57 [Dissolution]
(1) The National Assembly may be dissolved by the President on the advice
of the Cabinet if the Government is unable to govern effectively.
(2) Should the National Assembly be dissolved a national election for a new
National Assembly and a new President shall take place within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date of such dissolution.
Article 58 [Conduct of Business after Dissolution]
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 57:
a) every person who at the date of its dissolution was a member of the
National Assembly shall remain a member of the National Assembly and
remain competent to perform the functions of a member until the day
immediately preceding the first polling day for the election held in pursuance
of such dissolution;
b) the President shall have power to summon Parliament for the
conduct of business during the period following such dissolution, up to and
including the day immediately preceding the first polling day for the election
held in pursuance of such dissolution, in the same manner and in all respects
as if the dissolution had not occurred.
Article 59 [Rules of Procedure, Committees and Standing Orders]
(1) The National Assembly may make such rules of procedure for the conduct
of its business and proceedings and may also make such rules for the
establishing, functioning and procedures of committees, and formulate such
standing orders, as may appear to it to be expedient or necessary.
(2) The National Assembly shall in its rules of procedure make provision for
such disclosure as may be considered to be appropriate in regard to the
financial or business affairs of its members.
(3) For the purpose of exercising its powers and performing its functions any
committee of the National Assembly established in terms of Paragraph (1)
shall have the power to subpoena persons to appear before it to give
evidence on oath and to produce any documents required by it.
Article 60 [Duties, Privileges and Immunities of Members]
(1) The duties of the members of the National Assembly shall include the
following:
a) all members of the National Assembly shall maintain the dignity and image
of the National Assembly both during the sittings of the National Assembly as
well as in their acts and activities outside the National Assembly;
b) all members of the National Assembly shall regard themselves as servants
of the people of Namibia and desist from any conduct by which they seek
improperly to enrich themselves or alienate themselves from the people.
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(2) A private members' bill may be introduced in the National Assembly if
supported by one-third of all the members of the National Assembly.
(3) Rules providing for the privileges and immunities of members of the
National Assembly shall be made by Act of Parliament and all members shall
be entitled to the protection of such privileges and immunities.
Article 61 [Public Access to Sittings]
(1) Save as provided in Paragraph (2), all meetings of the National Assembly
shall be held in public and members of the public shall have access to such
meetings.
(2) Access by members of the public in terms of Paragraph (1) may be denied
if the National Assembly adopts a motion supported by two-thirds of all its
members excluding such access to members of the public for specified
periods or in respect of specified matters. Such a motion shall only be
considered if it is supported by at least one-tenth of all the members of the
National Assembly and the debate on such motion shall not be open to
members of the public.
Article 62 [Sessions]
(1) The National Assembly shall sit:
a) at its usual place of sitting determined by the National Assembly, unless
the Speaker directs otherwise on the grounds of public interest, security or
convenience;
b) for at least two (2) sessions during each year, to commence and terminate
on such dates as the National Assembly from time to time determines;
c) for such special sessions as directed by Proclamation by the President
from time to time.
(2) During such sessions the National Assembly shall sit on such days and
during such times of the day or night as the
National Assembly by its rules and standing orders may provide.
(3) The day of commencement of any session of the National Assembly may
be altered by Proclamation by the President, if the President is requested to
do so by the Speaker on grounds of public interest or convenience.
Article 63 [Functions and Powers]
(1) The National Assembly, as the principal legislative authority in and over
Namibia, shall have the power, subject to this Constitution, to make and
repeal laws for the peace, order and good government of the country in the
best interest of the people of Namibia.
(2) The National Assembly shall further have the power and function, subject
to this Constitution: a) to approve budgets for the effective government and
administration of the country; b) to provided for revenue and taxation;
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c) to take such steps as it considers expedient to uphold and defend this
Constitution and the laws of Namibia and to advance the objectives of
Namibian independence;
d) to consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such international
agreements as may have been entered into prior to Independence by
administrations within Namibia in which the majority of the Namibian people
have historically not enjoyed democratic representation and participation; e)
to agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements which
have been negotiated and signed in terms of Article 32 (3)(e);
f) to receive reports on the activities of the Executive, including para-statal
enterprises, and from time to time to require any senior official to appear
before any of the committees of the National Assembly to account for and
explain his or her acts and programmes; g) to initiate, approve or decide to
hold a referendum on matters of national concern; h) to debate and to advise
the President in regard to any matters which by this Constitution the President
is authorised to deal with;
i) to remain vigilant and vigorous for the purpose of ensuring that the
scourges of apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest
themselves in any form in a free and independent Namibia and to protect and
assist disadvantaged citizens of Namibia who have historically been the
victims of these pathologies;
j) generally to exercise any other functions and powers assigned to it by this
Constitution or any other law and any other functions incidental thereto.
Article 64 [Withholding of Presidential Assent]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President shall be
entitled to withhold his or her assent to a bill approved by the National
Assembly if in the President's opinion such bill would upon adoption conflict
with the provisions of this Constitution.
(2) Should the President withhold assent on the grounds of such opinion, he
or she shall so inform the Speaker who shall inform the National Assembly
thereof, and the Attorney-General, who may then take appropriate steps to
have the matter decided by a competent Court.
(3) Should such Court thereafter conclude that such bill is not in conflict with
the provisions of this Constitution, the President shall assent to the said bill if
it was passed by the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority of all its
members. If the bill was not passed with such majority, the President may
withhold his or her assent to the bill, in which event the provisions of Article
56 (3) and (4) shall apply.
(4) Should such Court conclude that the disputed bill would be in conflict with
any provisions of this Constitution, the said bill shall be deemed to have
lapsed and the President shall not be entitled to assent thereto.
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Article 65 [Signature and Enrolment of Acts]
(1) When any bill has become an Act of Parliament as a result of its having
been passed by Parliament, signed by the President and published in the
Gazette, the Secretary of the National Assembly shall promptly cause two (2)
fair copies of such Act in the English language to be enrolled in the office of
the Registrar of the Supreme Court and such copies shall be conclusive
evidence of the provisions of the Act.
(2) The public shall have the right of access to such copies subject to such
regulations as may be prescribed by Parliament to protect the durability of the
said copies and the convenience of the Registrar's staff.
Article 66 [Customary and Common Law]
(1) Both the customary law and the common law of Namibia in force on the
date of Independence shall remain valid to the extent to which such
customary or common law does not conflict with this Constitution or any other
statutory law.
(2) Subject to the terms of this Constitution, any part of such common law or
customary law may be repealed or modified by Act of Parliament, and the
application thereof may be confined to particular parts of Namibia or to
particular periods.
Article 67 [Requisite Majorities]
Save as provided in this Constitution, a simple majority of votes cast in the
National Assembly shall be sufficient for the passage of any bill or resolution
of the National Assembly.
Chapter VIII The National Council
Article 68 [Establishment]
There shall be a National Council which shall have the powers and functions
set out in this Constitution.
Article 69 [Composition]
(1) The National Council shall consist of two (2) members from each region
referred to in Article 102, to be elected from amongst their members by the
Regional Council for such region.
(2) The elections of members of the National Council shall be conducted
according to procedures to be prescribed by Act of Parliament.
Article 70 [Term of Office of Members]
(1) Members of the National Council shall hold their seats for six (6) years
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from the date of their election and shall be eligible for re-election.
(2) When a seat of a member of the National Council becomes vacant
through death, resignation or disqualification, an election for a successor to
occupy the vacant seat until the expiry of the predecessor's term of office
shall be held, except in the instance where such vacancy arises less than six
(6) months before the expiry of the term of the National Council, in which
instance such vacancy need not be filled. Such election shall be held in
accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Act of Parliament referred
to in Article 69 (2).
Article 71 [Oath or Affirmation]
Every member of the National Council shall make and subscribe to an oath or
solemn affirmation before the Chief
Justice, or a Judge designated by the Chief Justice for this purpose, in the
terms set out in Schedule 3.
Article 72 [Qualifications of Members]
No person shall be qualified to be a member of the National Council if he or
she is an elected member of a Local Authority, and unless he or she is
qualified under Article 47 (1)(a) to (e) to be a member of the National
Assembly
Article 73 [Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson]
The National Council shall, before proceeding to the dispatch of any other
business, elect from its members a Chairperson and a Vice-Chairperson. The
Chairperson, or in his or her absence the Vice-Chairperson, shall preside
over sessions of the National Council. Should neither the Chairperson nor the
ViceChairperson be present at any session, the National Council shall elect from
amongst its members a person to act as Chairperson in their absence during
that session.
Article 74 [Powers and Functions]
(1) The National Council shall have the power to: a) consider in terms of
Article 75 all bills passed by the National Assembly;
b) investigate and report to the National Assembly on any subordinate
legislation, reports and documents which under law must be tabled in the
National Assembly and which are referred to it by the National Assembly for
advice;
c) recommend legislation on matters of regional concern for submission to
and consideration by the National Assembly;
d) perform any other functions assigned to it by the National Assembly or by
an Act of Parliament.
(2) The National Council shall have the power to establish committees and to
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adopt its own rules and procedures for the exercise of its powers and the
performance of its functions. A committee of the National Council shall be
entitled to conduct all such hearings and collect such evidence as it considers
necessary for the exercise of the National Council's powers of review and
investigations, and for such purposes shall have the powers referred to in
Article 59 (3).
(3) The National Council shall in its rules of procedure make provision for
such disclosure as may be considered to be appropriate in regard to the
financial or business affairs of its members.
(4) The duties of the members of the National Council shall include the
following:
a) all members of the National Council shall maintain the dignity and image of
the National Council both during the sittings of the National Council as well as
in their acts and activities outside the National Council;
b) all members of the National Council shall regard themselves as servants of
the people of Namibia and desist from any conduct by which they seek
improperly to enrich themselves or alienate themselves from the people.
(5) Rules providing for the privileges and immunities of members of the
National Council shall be made by Act of Parliament and all members shall be
entitled to the protection of such privileges and immunities.
Article 75 [Review of Legislation]
(1) All bills passed by the National Assembly shall be referred by the Speaker
to the National Council.
(2) The National Council shall consider bills referred to it under Paragraph (1)
and shall submit reports thereon with its recommendations to the Speaker.
(3) If in its report to the Speaker the National Council confirms a bill, the
Speaker shall refer it to the President to enable the President to deal with it
under Articles 56 and 64.
(4) (a) If the National Council in its report to the Speaker recommends that the
bill be passed subject to amendments proposed by it, such bill shall be
referred by the Speaker back to the National Assembly.
(b) If a bill is referred back to the National Assembly under Paragraph (a), the
National Assembly may reconsider the bill and may make any amendments
thereto, whether proposed by the National Council or not. If the bill is again
passed by the National Assembly, whether in the form in which it was
originally passed, or in an amended form, the bill shall not again be referred
to the National Council, but shall be referred by the Speaker to the President
to enable it to be dealt with under Article 56 and 64.
(5) (a) If a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the National Council
objects to the principle of a bill, this shall be mentioned in its report to the
Speaker. In that event, the report shall also indicate whether or not the
National Council proposes that amendments be made to the bill, if the
principle of the bill is confirmed by the National Assembly under Paragraph
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(b), and if amendments are proposed, details thereof shall be set out in the
report.
(b) If the National Council in its report to the principle of the bill, the National
Assembly shall be required to reconsider the principle. If upon such
reconsideration the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the bill by a
majority of two-thirds of all its members, the principle of the bill shall no longer
be an issue. If such two-thirds majority is not obtained in the National
Assembly, the bill shall lapse.
(6) (a) If the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the bill under
Paragraph 5(b) by a majority of two-thirds of all its members, and the report of
the National Council proposed that in such event amendments be made to
the bill, the National Assembly shall then deal with the amendments proposed
by the National Council, and in that event the provisions of Paragraph 4(b)
shall apply mutatis mutandis.
(b) If the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the bill under Paragraph
5(b) by a majority of two-thirds of all its members, and the report of the
National Council did not propose that in such event amendments be made to
the bill, the National Council shall be deemed to have confirmed the bill, and
the Speaker shall refer the bill to the President to be dealt with under Articles
56 and 64.
(7) Paragraphs (5) and (6) shall not apply to bills dealing with the levying of
taxes or the appropriation of public monies.
(8) The National Council shall report to the Speaker on all bills dealing with
the levying of taxes or appropriations of public monies within thirty (30) days
of the date on which such bills were referred to it by the Speaker, and on all
other bills within three (3) months of the date of referral by the Speaker, failing
which the National Council will be deemed to have confirmed such bills and
the Speaker shall then refer them promptly to the President to enable the
President to deal with the bills under Articles 56 and 64.
(9) If the President withholds his or her assent to any bill under Article 59 and
the bill is then dealt with in terms of that article, and is again passed by the
National Assembly in the form in which it was originally passed or in an
amended from, such bill shall not again be referred to the National Council,
but shall be referred by the Speaker directly to the President to enable the bill
to be dealt with in terms of Articles 56 and 64.
Article 76 [Quorum]
The presence of a majority of the members of the National Council shall be
necessary to constitute a meeting of the
National Council for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its
functions.
Article 77 [Voting]
Save as is otherwise provided in this Constitution, all questions in the
National Council shall be determined by a majority of the votes cast by
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members present other than the Chairperson, or in his or her absence the
Vice-Chairperson or the member presiding at that session, who shall,
however, have and may exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of
votes.
Chapter IX The Administration of Justice
Article 78 [The Judiciary]
(1) The judicial power shall be vested in the Courts of Namibia, which shall
consist of: a) a Supreme Court of Namibia;
b) a High Court of Namibia;
c) Lower Courts of Namibia.
(2) The Courts shall be independent and subject only to this Constitution and
the law.
(3) No member of the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall
interfere with Judges or judicial officers in the exercise of their judicial
functions, and all organs of the State shall accord such assistance as the
Courts may require to protect their independence, dignity and effectiveness,
subject to the terms of this Constitution or any other law.
(4) The Supreme Court and the High Court shall have the inherent jurisdiction
which vested in the Supreme Court of South-West Africa immediately prior to
the date of Independence, including the power to regulate their own
procedures and to make court rules for that purpose.
Article 79 [The Supreme Court]
(1) The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such additional
Judges as the President, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial
Service Commission, may determine.
(2) The Supreme Court shall be presided over by the Chief Justice and shall
hear and adjudicate upon appeals emanating from the High Court, including
appeals which involve the interpretation, implementation and upholding of this
Constitution and the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed
thereunder. The Supreme Court shall also deal with matters referred to it for
decision by the Attorney-General under this Constitution, and with such other
matters as may be authorised by Act of Parliament.
(3) Three (3) Judges shall constitute a quorum of the Supreme Court when it
hears appeals or deals with matters referred to it by the Attorney-General
under this Constitution: provided that provision may be made by Act of
Parliament for a lesser quorum in circumstances in which a Judge seized of
an appeal dies or becomes unable to act at any time prior to judgment.
(4) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with regard to appeals shall be
determined by Act of Parliament.
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Article 80 [The High Court]
(1) The High Court shall consist of a Judge-President and such additional
Judges as the President, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial
Service Commission, may determine.
(2) The High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon
all civil disputes and criminal prosecutions, including cases which involve the
interpretation, implementation and upholding of this Constitution and the
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed thereunder. The High Court
shall also
have jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon appeals from Lower Courts.
(3) The jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to appeals shall be
determined by Act of Parliament.
Article 81 [Binding Nature of Decisions of the Supreme Court]
A decision of the Supreme Court shall be binding on all other Courts of
Namibia and all persons in Namibia unless it is reversed by the Supreme
Court itself, or is contradicted by an Act of Parliament lawfully enacted.
Article 82 [Appointment of Judges]
(1) All appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court and the High Court shall
be made by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service
Commission and upon appointment Judges shall make an oath or affirmation
of office in the terms set out in Schedule 1.
(2) At the request of the Chief Justice the President may appoint Acting
Judges of the Supreme Court to fill casual vacancies in the Court from time to
time, or as ad hoc appointments to sit in cases involving constitutional issues
or the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, if in the opinion of the
Chief Justice it is desirable that such persons should be appointed to hear
such cases by reason of their special knowledge of or expertise in such
matters.
(3) At the request of the Judge-President, the President may appoint Acting
Judges of the High Court from time to time to fill casual vacancies in the
Court, or to enable the Court to deal expeditiously with its work.
(4) All Judges, except Acting Judges, appointed under this Constitution shall
hold office until the age of sixty-five (65) but the President shall be entitled to
extend the retiring age of any Judge to seventy (70). It shall also be possible
by Act of Parliament to make provision for retirement at ages higher than
those specified in this article.
Article 83 [Lower Courts]
(1) Lower Courts shall be established by Act of Parliament and shall have the
jurisdiction and adopt the procedures prescribed by such Act and regulations
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made thereunder.
(2) Lower Courts shall be presided over by Magistrates or other judicial
officers appointed in accordance with procedures prescribed by Act of
Parliament.
Article 84 [Removal of Judges from Office]
(1) A Judge may be removed from office before the expiry of his or her tenure
only by the President acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service
Commission.
(2) Judges may only be removed from office on the ground of mental
incapacity or for gross misconduct, and in accordance with the provisions of
Paragraph (3).
(3) The Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether or not a Judge
should be removed from office on such grounds, and if it decides that the
Judge should be removed, it shall inform the President of its
recommendation.
(4) If the deliberations of the Judicial Service Commission pursuant to this
article involve the conduct of a member of the Judicial Service Commission,
such Judicial Service Commission and, pending the outcome of such
investigations and recommendation, suspend the Judge from office.
Article 85 [The Judicial Service Commission]
(1) There shall be a Judicial Service Commission consisting of the Chief
Justice, a Judge appointed by the President, the Attorney-General and two
members of the legal profession nominated in accordance with the provisions
of an Act of Parliament by the professional organisation {organization} or
organisations representing the interests of the legal profession in Namibia.
(2) The Judicial Service Commission shall perform such functions as are
prescribed for it by this Constitution or any other law.
(3) The Judicial Service Commission shall be entitled to make such rules and
regulations for the purposes of regulating its procedures and functions as are
not inconsistent with this Constitution or any other law.
(4) Any casual vacancy in the Judicial Service Commission may be filled by
the Chief Justice or in his or her absence by the Judge appointed by the
President.
Article 86 [The Attorney-General]
There shall be an Attorney-General appointed by the President in accordance
with the provisions of Article 32 (3)(1)(cc).
Article 87 [Powers and Functions of the Attorney-General]
The powers and functions of the Attorney-General shall be:
a) to exercise the final responsibility for the office of the Prosecutor-General;
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b) to be in principal legal adviser to the President and Government.
c) to take all action necessary for the protection and upholding of the
Constitution;
d) to perform all such functions and duties as may be assigned to the
Attorney-General by Act of Parliament.
Article 88 [The Prosecutor-General]
(1) There shall be a Prosecutor-General appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. No person shall be
eligible for appointment as Prosecutor-General unless such person:
a) possesses legal qualifications that would entitle him or her to practice in all
the Courts of Namibia;
b) is, by virtue of his or her experience, conscientiousness and integrity a fit
and proper person to be entrusted with the responsibilities of the office of
Prosecutor-General.
(2) The powers and functions of the Prosecutor-General shall be:
a) to prosecute, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, in the name of
the Republic of Namibia in criminal proceedings;
b) to prosecute and defend appeals in criminal proceedings in the High Court
and the Supreme Court;
c) to perform all functions relating to the exercise of such powers;
d) to delegate to other officials, subject to his or her control and direction,
authority to conduct criminal proceedings in any Court;
e) to perform all such other functions as may be assigned to him or her in
terms of any other law.
Chapter X The Ombudsman
Article 89 [Establishment and Independence]
(1) There shall be an Ombudsman, who shall have the powers and functions
set out in this Constitution.
(2) The Ombudsman shall be independent and subject only to this
Constitution and the law.
(3) No member of the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall
interfere with the Ombudsman in the exercise of his or her functions and all
organs of the State shall accord such assistance as may be needed for the
protection of the independence, dignity and effectiveness of the Ombudsman.
(4) The Ombudsman shall either be a Judge of Namibia, or a
person possessing the legal qualifications which would entitle him or her to
practice in all the Courts of Namibia.
Article 90 [Appointment and Term of Office]
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(1) The Ombudsman shall be appointed by Proclamation by the President on
the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.
(2) The Ombudsman shall hold office until the age of sixtyfive (65) but the President may extend the retiring age of any Ombudsman to
seventy (70).
Article 91 [Functions]
The functions of the Ombudsman shall be defined and prescribed by an Act
of Parliament and shall include the following:
a) the duty to investigate complaints concerning alleged or apparent
instances of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, abuse of power,
unfair, harsh, insensitive or discourteous treatment of an inhabitant of
Namibia by an official in the employ of any organ of Government (whether
central or local), manifest injustice, or corruption or conduct by such official
which would properly be regarded as unlawful, oppressive or unfair in a
democratic society;
b) the duty to investigate complaints concerning the functioning of the Public
Service Commission, administrative organs of the State, the defence force,
the police force and the prison service in so far as such complaints relate to
the failure to achieve a balanced structuring of such services or equal access
by all to the recruitment of such services or fair administration in relation to
such services;
c) the duty to investigate complaints concerning the overutilization of living natural resources, the irrational exploitation of nonrenewable resources, the degradation and destruction of ecosystems and
failure to protect the beauty and character of Namibia;
d) the duty to investigate complaints concerning practices and actions by
persons, enterprises and other private institutions where such complaints
allege that violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under this
Constitution have taken place;
e) the duty and power to take appropriate action to call for the remedying,
correction and reversal of instances specified in the preceding Paragraphs
through such means as are fair, proper and effective, including:
aa) negotiation and compromise between the parties concerned;
bb) causing the complaint and his or her finding thereon to be reported to the
superior of an offending person;
cc) referring the matter to the Prosecutor-General;
dd) bringing proceedings in a competent Court for an interdict or some other
suitable remedy to secure the termination of the offending action or conduct,
or the abandonment or alteration of the offending procedures;
ee) bringing proceedings to interdict the enforcement of such legislation or
regulation by challenging its validity if the offending action or conduct is
sought to be justified by subordinate legislation or regulation which is grossly
unreasonable or otherwise ultra vires;
ff) reviewing such laws as were in operation before the date of Independence
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in order to ascertain whether they violate the letter or the spirit of this
Constitution and to make consequential recommendations to the President,
the Cabinet or the AttorneyGeneral for appropriate action following thereupon;
f) the duty to investigate vigorously all instances or alleged or suspected
corruption and the misappropriation of public monies by officials and to take
appropriate steps, including reports to the Prosecutor-General and the
Auditor-General pursuant thereto;
g) the duty to report annually to the National Assembly on the exercise of his
or her powers and functions.
Article 92 [Powers of Investigation]
The powers of the Ombudsman shall be defined by Act of Parliament and
shall include the power:
a) to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of any person before the
Ombudsman and the production of any document or record relevant to any
investigation by the Ombudsman;
b) to cause any person contemptuous of any such subpoena to be
prosecuted before a competent Court;
c) to question any person;
d) to require any person to co-operate with the Ombudsman and to disclose
truthfully and frankly any information within his or her knowledge relevant to
any investigation of the Ombudsman.
Article 93 [Meaning of "Official"]
For the purposes of this chapter the word "official" shall, unless the context
otherwise indicate, include any elected or appointed official or employee of
any organ of the central or local Government, any official of a para-statal
enterprise owned or managed or controlled by the State, or in which the State
or the Government has substantial interest, or any officer of the defence
force, the police force or the prison service, but shall not include a Judge of
the Supreme Court or the High Court or, in so far as a complaint concerns the
performance of a judicial function, any other judicial officer.
Article 94 [Removal from Office]
(1) The Ombudsman may be removed from office before the expiry of his or
her term of office by the President acting on the recommendation of the
Judicial Service Commission.
(2) The Ombudsman may only be removed from office on the ground of
mental incapacity or for gross misconduct, and in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph (3).
(3) The Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether or not the
Ombudsman shall be removed from office on the grounds referred to in
Paragraph (2) and, if it decides that the Ombudsman shall be removed, it
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shall inform the President of its recommendation.
(4) While investigations are being carried out into the necessity of the removal
of the Ombudsman in terms of this article, the President may, on the
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and, pending the
outcome of such investigations and recommendation, suspend the
Ombudsman from office.
Chapter XI Principles of State Policy
Article 95 [Promotion of the Welfare of the People]
The State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by
adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the following:
a) enactment of legislation to ensure equality of opportunity for women, to
enable them to participate fully in all spheres of Namibian society; in
particular, the Government shall ensure the implementation of the principle of
non-discrimination in remuneration of men and women; further, the
Government shall seek, through appropriate legislation, to provide maternity
and related benefits for women;
b) enactment of legislation to ensure that the health and strength of the
workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and
that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter vocations unsuited
to their age and strength; c) active encouragement of the formation of
independent trade unions to protect workers' rights and interests, and to
promote sound labour {labor} relations and fair employment practices; d)
membership of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
and, where possible, adherence to and action in accordance with the
international Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO;
e) ensurance that every citizen has a right to fair and reasonable access to
public facilities and services in accordance with the law;
f) ensurance that senior citizens are entitled to and do receive a regular
pension adequate for the maintenance of a decent standard of living and the
enjoyment of social and cultural opportunities;
g) enactment of legislation to ensure that the unemployed, the incapacitated,
the indigent and the disadvantaged are accorded such social benefits and
amenities as are determined by Parliament to be just and affordable with due
regard to the resources of the State;
h) a legal system seeking to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity
by providing free legal aid in defined cases with due regard to the resources
of the State;
i) ensurance that workers are paid a living wage adequate for the
maintenance of a decent standard of living and the enjoyment of social and
cultural opportunities;
j) consistent planning to raise and maintain an acceptable level of nutrition
and standard of living of the Namibian people and to improve public health; k)
encouragement of the mass of the population through education and other
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activities and through their organisations {organizations} to influence
Government policy by debating its decisions; l) maintenance of ecosystems,
essential ecological processes and biological diversity of Namibia and
utilization of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit of
all Namibians, both present and future; in particular, the Government shall
provide measures against the dumping or recycling of foreign nuclear and
toxic waste on Namibian territory.
Article 96 [Foreign Relations]
The State shall endeavour {endeavor} to ensure that in its international
relations it: a) adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment;
b) promotes international co-operation, peace and security;
c) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations;
d) fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations;
e) encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.
Article 97 [Asylum]
The State shall, where it is reasonable to do so, grant asylum to persons who
reasonably fear persecution on the ground of their political beliefs, race,
religion or membership of a particular social group.
Article 98 [Principles of Economic Order]
(1) The economic order of Namibia shall be based on the principles of a
mixed economy with the objective of securing economic growth, prosperity
and a life of human dignity for all Namibians.
(2) The Namibian economy shall be based, inter alia, on the following forms
of ownership:
a) public;
b) private;
c) joint public-private;
d) co-operative;
e) co-ownership;
f) small-scale family.
Article 99 [Foreign Investments]
Foreign investments shall be encouraged within Namibia subject to the
provisions of an Investment Code to be adopted by Parliament.
Article 100 [Sovereign Ownership of Natural Resources]
Land, water and natural resources below and above the surface of the land
and in the continental shelf and within the territorial waters and the exclusive
economic zone of Namibia shall belong to the State if they are not otherwise
lawfully owned.
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Article 101 [Application of the Principles contained in this Chapter]
The principles of state policy contained in this chapter shall not of and by
themselves be legally enforceable by any Court, but shall nevertheless guide
the Government in making and applying laws to give effect to the fundamental
objectives of the said principles. The Courts are entitled to have regard to the
said principles in interpreting any laws based on them.
Chapter XII Regional and Local Government
Article 102 [Structures of Regional and Local Government]
(1) For purpose of regional and local government, Namibia shall be divided
into regional and local units, which shall consist of such region and Local
Authorities as may be determined and defined by Act of Parliament.
(2) The delineation of the boundaries of the regions and Local Authorities
referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be geographical only, without any reference
to the race, colour {color} or ethnic origin of the inhabitants of such areas.
(3) Every organ of regional and local government shall have a Council as the
principal governing body, freely elected in accordance with this Constitution
and the Act of Parliament referred to in Paragraph (1), with an executive and
administration which shall carry out all lawful resolutions and policies of such
Council, subject to this Constitution and any other relevant laws.
(4) For the purposes of this chapter, a Local Authority shall include all
municipalities, communities, village councils and other organs of local
government defined and constituted by Act of Parliament.
(5) There shall be a Council of Traditional Leaders to be established in terms
of an Act of Parliament in order to advise the President on the control and
utilization of communal land and on all such other matters as may be referred
to it by the President for advice.
Article 103 [Establishment of Regional Councils]
(1) the boundaries of regions shall be determined by a Delimitation
Commission in accordance with the principles set out in Article 102 (2).
(2) The boundaries of regions may be changed from time to time and new
regions may be created from time to time, but only in accordance with the
recommendation of the Delimitation Commission.
(3) A Regional Council shall be established for every region the boundaries of
which have been determined in accordance with Paragraph (1) and (2).
Article 104 [The Delimitation Commission]
(1) The Delimitation Commission shall consist of a Chairperson who shall be
a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, and two other persons to be
appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament.
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(2) The Delimitation Commission shall discharge its duties in accordance with
the provisions of an Act of Parliament and this
Constitution, and shall report thereon to the President.
Article 105 [Composition of Regional Councils]
Every Regional Council shall consist of a number of persons determined by
the Delimitation Commission for the particular region for which that Regional
Council has been established, and who are qualified to be elected to the
National Council.
Article 106 [Regional Council Elections]
(1) Each region shall be divided into constituencies the boundaries of which
shall be fixed by the Delimitation Commission in accordance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament and this Constitution: provided that there shall
be no fewer than six (6) and no more than twelve (12) constituencies in each
region.
(2) Each constituency shall elect one member to the Regional Council for the
region in which it is situated.
(3) The elections shall be by secret ballot to be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of an Act of Parliament, and the candidate receiving the most
votes in any constituency shall be the elected member of the Regional
Council for that constituency.
(4) All Regional Council elections for the various regions of Namibia shall be
held on the same day.
(5) The date for Regional Council elections shall be determined by the
President by Proclamation in the Gazette.
Article 107 [Remuneration of Members of Regional Councils]
The remuneration and allowances to be paid to members of Regional
Councils shall be determined by Act of Parliament.
Article 108 [Powers of Regional Councils]
Regional Councils shall have the following powers:
a) to elect members to the National Council;
b) to exercise within the region for which they have been constituted such
executive powers and to perform such duties in connection therewith as may
be assigned to them by Act of Parliament and as may be delegated to them
by the President;
c) to raise revenue, or share in the revenue raised by the central Government
within the regions for which they have been established, as may be
determined by Act of Parliament;
d) to exercise powers, perform any other functions and make such by-laws or
regulations as may be determined by Act of Parliament.
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Article 109 [Management Committees]
(1) Each Regional Council shall elect from amongst its members a
Management Committee, which shall be vested with executive powers in
accordance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament.
(2) The Management Committee shall have a Chairperson to be elected by
the members of the Regional Council at the time that they elect the
Management Committee, and such Chairperson shall preside at meetings of
his or her Regional Council.
(3) The Chairperson and the members of the Management Committee shall
hold office for three (3) years and shall be eligible for re-election.
Article 110 [Administration and Functioning of Regional Councils]
The holding and conducting of meetings of Regional Councils, the filling of
casual vacancies on Regional Councils and the employment of officials by the
Regional Councils, as well as all other matters dealing with or incidental to the
administration and functioning of Regional Councils, shall be determined by
Act of Parliament.
Article 111 [Local Authorities]
(1) Local Authorities shall be established in accordance with the provisions of
Article 102.
(2) The boundaries of Local Authorities, the election of Councils to administer
the affairs of Local Authorities, the method of electing persons to Local
Authority Councils, the methods of raising revenue for Local Authorities, the
remuneration of Local Authority Councillors and all other matters dealing with
or incidental to the administration and functioning of Local Authorities, shall
be determined by Act of Parliament.
(3) Persons shall be qualified to vote in elections for Local Authorities
Councils if such persons have been resident within the jurisdiction of a Local
Authority for not less than one (1) year immediately prior to such election and
if such persons are qualified to vote in elections for the National Assembly.
(4) Different provisions may be made by the Act of Parliament referred to in
Paragraph (2) in regard to different types of Local Authorities.
(5) All by-laws or regulations made by Local Authorities pursuant to powers
vested in them by Act of Parliament shall be tabled in the National Assembly
and shall cease to be of force if a resolution to that effect is passed by the
National Assembly.
Chapter XIII The Public Service Commission
Article 112 [Establishment]
(1) There shall be established a Public Service Commission which shall have
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the function of advising the President on the matters referred to in Article 113
and of reporting to the National Assembly thereon.
(2) The Public Service Commission shall be independent and act impartially.
(3) The Public Service Commission shall consist of a Chairperson and no
fewer than three (3) and no more than six (6) other persons nominated by the
President and appointed by the National Assembly by resolution.
(4) Every member of the Public Service Commission shall be entitled to serve
on such Commission for a period of five (5) years unless lawfully removed
before the expiry of that period for good and sufficient reasons in terms of this
Constitution and procedures to be prescribed by Act of Parliament. Every
member of the Public Service Commission shall be eligible for reappointment.
Article 113 [Functions]
The functions of the Public Service Commission shall be defined by Act of
Parliament and shall include the power:
a) to advise the President and the Government on:
aa) the appointment of suitable persons to specified categories of
employment in the public service, with special regard to the balanced
structuring thereof;
bb) the exercise of adequate disciplinary control over such persons in order to
assure the fair administration of personnel policy;
cc) the remuneration and the retirement benefits of any such persons;
dd) all other matters which by law pertain to the public service;
b) to perform all functions assigned to it by Act of Parliament;
c) to advise the President on the identity, availability and suitability of persons
to be appointed by the President to offices in terms of this Constitution or any
other law.
Chapter XIV The Security Commission
Article 114 [Establishment and Functions]
(1) There shall be a Security Commission which shall have the function of
making recommendations to the President on the appointment of the Chief of
the Defence Force, the InspectorGeneral of Police and the Commissioner of Prisons and such other functions
as may be assigned to it by Act of Parliament.
(2) The Security Commission shall consist of the Chairperson of the Public
Service Commission, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Inspector-General
of Police, the Commissioner of Prisons and two (2) members of the National
Assembly, appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National
Assembly.
Chapter XV The Police and Defence Forces and the Prison Service
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Article 115 [Establishment of the Police Force]
There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian police force with
prescribed powers, duties and procedures in order to secure the internal
security of Namibia and to maintain law and order.
Article 116 [The Inspector-General of Police]
(1) There shall be an Inspector-General of Police who shall be appointed by
the President in terms of Article 32 (4)(bb).
(2) The Inspector-General of Police shall make provision for a balanced
structuring of the police force and shall have the power to make suitable
appointments to the police force, to cause charges of indiscipline among
members of the police force to be investigated and prosecuted and to ensure
the efficient administration of the police force.
Article 117 [Removal of the Inspector-General of Police]
The President may remove the Inspector-General of Police from office for
good cause and in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of
any Act of Parliament which may prescribe procedures considered to be
expedient for this purpose.
Article 118 [Establishment of the Defence Force]
(1) There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian Defence
Force with prescribed composition, powers, duties and procedures, in order to
defend the territory and national interests of Namibia.
(2) The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force and
shall have all the powers and exercise all the functions necessary for that
purpose.
Article 119 [Chief on the Defence Force]
(1) There shall be a Chief of the Defence Force who shall be appointed by the
President in terms of Article 32 (4)(c).
(2) The Chief of the Defence Force shall make provision for a balanced
structuring of the defence force and shall have the power to make suitable
appointments to the defence force, to cause charges of indiscipline among
members of the defence force to be investigated and prosecuted and to
ensure the efficient administration of the defence force.
Article 120 [Removal of the Chief of the Defence Force]
The President may remove the Chief of the Defence Force from office for
good cause and in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of
any Act of Parliament which may prescribe procedures considered to be
expedient for this purpose.
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Article 121 [Establishment of the Prison Service]
There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian prison service
with prescribed powers, duties and procedures.
Article 122 [Commissioner of Prisons]
(1) There shall be a Commissioner of Prisons who shall be appointed by the
President in terms of Article 32 (4)(c).
(2) The Commissioner of Prisons shall make provision for a balanced
structuring of the prison service and shall have the power to make suitable
appointments to the prison service, to cause charges on indiscipline among
members of the prison service to be investigated and prosecuted and to
ensure the efficient administration of the prison service.
Article 123 [Removal of the Commissioner of Prisons]
The President may remove the Commissioner of Prisons from office for good
cause and in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of any
Act of Parliament which may prescribe procedures considered to be
expedient for this purpose.
Chapter XVI Finance
Article 124 [Transfer of Government Assets]
The assets mentioned in Schedule 5 shall vest in the Government of Namibia
on the date of Independence.
Article 125 [The State Revenue Fund]
(1) The Central Revenue Fund of the mandated territory of South West Africa
instituted in terms of Section 3 of the Exchequer and Audit Proclamation,
1979 (Proclamation 85 of 1979) and Section 31(1) of Proclamation R101 of
1985 shall continue as the State Revenue Fund of the Republic of Namibia.
(2) All income accruing to the central Government shall be deposited in the
State Revenue Fund and the authority to dispose thereof shall vest in the
Government of Namibia.
(3) Nothing contained in Paragraph (2) shall preclude the enactment of any
law or the application of any law which provides that:
a) the Government shall pay any particular monies accruing to it into a fund
designated for a special purpose; or
b) any body or institution to which any monies accruing to the State have
been paid, may retain such monies or portions thereof for the purpose of
defraying the expenses of such body or institution; or
c) where necessary, subsidies be allocated to regional and Local Authorities.
(4) No money shall be withdrawn from the State Revenue Fund except in
accordance with an Act of Parliament.
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(5) No body or person other than the Government shall have the power to
withdraw monies from the State Revenue Fund.
Article 126 [Appropriations]
(1) The Minister in charge of the Department of Finance shall, at least once
every year and thereafter at such interim stages as may be necessary,
present for the consideration of the National Assembly estimates of revenue,
expenditure and income for the prospective financial year.
(2) The National Assembly shall consider such estimates and pass pursuant
thereto such Appropriation Acts as are in its opinion necessary to meet the
financial requirements of the State from time to time.
Article 127 [The Auditor-General]
(1) There shall be an Auditor-General appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the Public Service Commission and with the approval of
the National Assembly. The Auditor-General shall hold office for five (5) years
unless removed earlier under Paragraph (4) or unless he or she resigns. The
Auditor-General shall be eligible for
reappointment.
(2) The Auditor-General shall audit the State Revenue Fund and shall perform
all other functions assigned to him or her by the Government or by Act of
Parliament and shall report annually to the National Assembly thereon.
(3) The Auditor-General shall not be a member of the public service.
(4) The Auditor-General shall not be removed from office unless a two-thirds
majority of all the members of the National Assembly vote for such removal
on the ground of mental incapacity or gross misconduct.
Chapter XVII Central Bank and National Planning Commission
Article 128 [The Central Bank]
(1) There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Central Bank of the
Republic of Namibia which shall serve as the State's principal instrument to
control the money supply, the currency and the institutions of finance, and to
perform all other functions ordinarily performed by a central bank.
(2) The Governing Board of the Central Bank shall consist of a Governor, a
Deputy-Governor and such other members of the Board as shall be
prescribed by Act of Parliament, and all members of the Board shall be
appointed by the President in accordance with procedures prescribed by such
Act of Parliament.
Article 129 [The National Planning Commission]
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(1) There shall be established in the office of the President a National
Planning Commission, whose task shall be to plan the priorities and direction
of national development.
(2) There shall be a Director-General of Planning appointed by the President
in terms of Article 32 (3)(i)(dd), who shall be the head of the National Planning
Commission and the principal adviser to the President in regard to all matters
pertaining to economic planning and who shall attend Cabinet meetings at the
request of the President.
(3) The membership, powers, functions and personnel of the National
Planning Commission shall be regulated by Act of Parliament.
Chapter XVIII Coming into Force of the Constitution
Article 130 [Coming into Force of the Constitution]
This Constitution as adopted by the Constituent Assembly shall come into
force on the date of Independence.
Chapter XIX Amendment of the Constitution
Article 131 [Entrenchment of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms]
No repeal or amendment of any of the provisions of Chapter 3, in so far as
such repeal or amendment diminishes or detracts from the fundamental rights
and freedoms contained and defined in that chapter, shall be permissible
under this Constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall be
valid or have any force or effect.
Article 132 [Repeal and Amendment of the Constitution]
(1) Any bill seeking to repeal or amend any provision of this Constitution shall
indicate the proposed repeals and/or amendments with reference to the
specific articles sought to be repealed and/or amended and shall not deal with
any matter other than the proposed repeals or amendments.
(2) The majorities required in Parliament for the repeal and/or amendment of
any of the provisions of this Constitution shall be:
a) two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly; and
b) two-thirds of all the members of the National Council.
(3)(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (2), if a bill proposing a
repeal and/or amendment of any of the provisions of this Constitution secures
a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, but fails
to secure a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the National Council,
the President may by Proclamation make the bill containing the proposed
repeals and/or amendments the subject of a national referendum.
(b) The national referendum referred to in Paragraph (a) shall be conducted in
accordance with procedures prescribed for the holding of referenda by Act of
Parliament.
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(c) If upon the holding of such a referendum the bill containing the proposed
repeals and/or amendments is approved by a two- thirds majority of all the
votes cast in the referendum, the bill shall be deemed to have been passed in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, and the President shall
deal it in terms of Article 56.
(4) No repeal or amendment of this paragraph or Paragraphs (2) or (3) in so
far as it seeks to diminish or detract from the majorities required in Parliament
or in a referendum shall be permissible under this Constitution, and no such
purported repeal or amendment shall be valid or have any force or effect.
(5) Nothing contained in this article: a) shall detract in any way from the
entrenchment provided for in Article 131 of the fundamental rights and
freedoms contained and defined in Chapter 3;
b) shall prevent Parliament from changing its own composition or structures
by amending or repealing any of the provisions of this Constitution: provided
always that such repeals or amendments are effected in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution.
Chapter XX The Law in Force and Transitional Provisions
Article 133 [The First National Assembly]
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 46, the Constituent Assembly shall
be deemed to have been elected under Articles 46 and 49, and shall
constitute the first National Assembly of Namibia, and its term of office and
that of the President shall be deemed to have begun from the date of
Independence.
Article 134 [Election of the First President]
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 28, the first President of Namibia
shall be the person elected to that office by the Constituent Assembly by a
simple majority of all its members.
(2) The first President of Namibia shall be deemed to have been elected
under Article 28 and upon assuming office shall have all the powers,
functions, duties and immunities of a President elected under that article.
Article 135 [Implementation of this Constitution]
This Constitution shall be implemented in accordance with the provisions of
Schedule 7.
Article 136 [Powers of the National Assembly prior to the Election of a
National Council]
(1) Until elections for a National Council have been held:
a) all legislation shall be enacted by the National Assembly as if this
Constitution had not made provision for a National Council, and Parliament
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had consisted exclusively of the National Assembly acting on its own without
being subject to
the review of the National Council;
b) this Constitution shall be construed as if no functions had been vested by
this Constitution in the National Council; c) any reference in Article 29, 56, 75
and 132 to the National Council shall be ignored: provided that nothing
contained in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting in any way the
generality of Paragraph (a) and (b).
(2) Nothing contained in Paragraph (1) shall detract in any way from the
provisions of Chapter 8 or any other provision of this Constitution in so far as
they make provision for the establishment of a National Council, elections to
the National Council and its functioning after such elections have been held.
Article 137 [Elections of the First Regional Councils and the First National
Council]
(1) The President shall by Proclamation establish the first Delimitation
Commission which shall be constituted in accordance with the provisions of
Article 104 (1), within six (6) months of the date of Independence.
(2) Such Proclamation shall provide for those matters which are referred to in
Articles 102 to 106, shall not be inconsistent with this Constitution and shall
require the Delimitation Commission to determine boundaries of regions and
Local Authorities for the purpose of holding Local Authority and Regional
Council elections.
(3) The Delimitation Commission appointed under such Proclamation shall
forthwith commence its work, and shall report to the President within nine (9)
months of its appointment: provided that the National Assembly may by
resolution and for good cause extend the period within which such report shall
be made.
(4) Upon receipt of the report of the Delimitation Commission the President
shall as soon as reasonably possible thereafter establish by Proclamation the
boundaries of regions and Local Authorities in accordance with the terms of
the report.
(5) Elections for Local Authorities in terms of Article 111 shall be held on a
date to be fixed by the President by Proclamation, which shall be a date
within six (6) months of the Proclamation referred to in Paragraph (4), or
within six (6) months of the date on which the legislation referred to in Article
111 has been enacted, whichever is the later: provided that the National
Assembly may by resolution and for good cause extend the period within
such elections shall be held.
(6) Elections for Regional Councils shall be held on a date to be fixed by the
President by Proclamation, which shall be a date within one (1) month of the
date of the elections referred to in Paragraph (5), or within one (1) month of
the date on which the legislation referred to in Article 106 (3) has been
enacted, whichever is the later: provided that the National Assembly may by
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resolution and for good cause extend the period within which such elections
shall be held.
(7) Elections for the first National Council shall be held on a date to be fixed
by the President by Proclamation, which shall be a date within one (1) month
of the date of the elections referred to in Paragraph (6), or within one (1)
month of the date on which the legislation referred to in Article 69 (2) has
been enacted, whichever is the later: provided that the National Assembly
may by resolution and for good cause extend the period within which such
elections shall be held.
Article 138 [Courts and Pending Actions]
(1) The Judge-President and other Judges of the Supreme Court of SouthWest Africa holding office at the date on which this Constitution is adopted by
the Constituent Assembly shall be deemed to have been appointed as the
Judge-President and Judges of the High Court of Namibia under Article 82 on
the date of Independence, and upon making the oath or affirmation of office in
the terms set out in Schedule 1, shall become the first Judge-President and
Judges of the High Court of Namibia: provided that if the Judge-President or
any such Judges are sixty-five (65) years of age or older on such date, it shall
be deemed that their appointments have been extended until the age of
seventy (70) in terms of Article 82 (4).
(2)(a) The laws in force immediately prior to the date of Independence
governing the jurisdiction of Courts within Namibia, the right of audience
before such Courts, the manner in which procedure in such Courts shall be
conducted and the power and authority of the Judges, Magistrates and other
judicial officers, shall remain in force until repealed or amended by Act of
Parliament, and all proceedings pending in such Courts at the date of
Independence shall be continued as if such Courts had been duly constituted
as Courts of the Republic of Namibia when the proceedings were instituted.
(b) Any appeal noted to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South
Africa against any judgment or order of the Supreme Court of South-West
Africa shall be deemed to have been noted to the Supreme Court of Namibia
and shall be prosecuted before such Court as if that judgment or order
appealed against had been made by the High Court of Namibia and the
appeal had been noted to the Supreme Court of Namibia.
(c) All criminal prosecutions initiated in Courts within Namibia prior to the date
of Independence shall be continued as if such prosecutions had been initiated
after the date of Independence in Courts of the Republic of Namibia.
(d) All crimes committed in Namibia prior to the date of Independence which
would be crimes according to the law of the Republic of Namibia if it had then
existed, shall be deemed to constitute crimes according to the law of the
Republic of Namibia, and to be punishable as such in and by the Courts of
the Republic of Namibia.
(3) Pending the enactment of the legislation contemplated by Article 79:
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a) the Supreme Court shall have the same jurisdiction to hear and determine
appeals from Courts in Namibia as was previously vested in the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa;
b) the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters
referred to it for a decision by the AttorneyGeneral under this Constitution;
c) all persons having the right of audience before the High Court shall have
the right of audience the Supreme Court;
d) three (3) Judges shall constitute a quorum of the Supreme Court when it
hears appeals or deals with matters under Paragraphs (a) and (b): provided
that if any such Judge dies or becomes unable to act after the hearing of the
appeal or such matter has commenced, but prior to judgement, the law
applicable in such circumstances to the death or inability of a Judge of the
High Court shall apply mutatis mutandis;
e) until rules of the Supreme Court are made by the Chief Justice for the
noting and prosecution of appeals and all matters incidental thereto, the rules
which regulated appeals from the Supreme Court of South-West Africa to the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, and were in force
immediately prior to the date of Independence, shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Article 139 [The Judicial Service Commission]
(1) Pending the enactment of legislation as contemplated by Article 85 and
the appointment of a Judicial Service Commission thereunder, the Judicial
Service Commission shall be appointed by the President by Proclamation and
shall consist of the Chief Justice, a Judge appointed by the President, the
Attorney-General, an advocate nominated by the Bar Council of Namibia and
an attorney nominated by the Council of the Law Society of South-West
Africa: provided that until the first Chief Justice has been appointed, the
President shall appoint a second Judge to be a member of the Judicial
Service Commission who shall hold office thereon until the Chief Justice has
been appointed. The Judicial Service Commission shall elect from amongst
its members as its first meeting the person to preside at its meetings until the
Chief Justice has been appointed. The first task of the Judicial Service
Commission shall be to make a recommendation to the President with regard
to the appointment of the first Chief Justice.
(2) Save as aforesaid the provisions of Article 85 shall apply to the functioning
of the Judicial Service Commission appointed under Paragraph (1), which
shall have all the powers vested in the Judicial Service Commission by this
Constitution.
Article 140 [The Law in Force at the Date of Independence]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all laws which were in force
immediately before the date of Independence shall remain in force until
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repealed or amended by Act of Parliament or until they are declared
unconstitutional by a competent Court.
(2) Any powers vested by such laws in the Government, or in a Minister or
other official of the Republic of South Africa shall be deemed to vest in the
Government of the Republic of Namibia or in a corresponding Minister or
official of the Government of the Republic of Namibia, and all powers, duties
and functions which so vested in the Government Service Commission, shall
vest in the Public Service Commission referred to in Article 112.
(3) Anything done under such laws prior to the date of Independence by the
Government, or by a Minister or other official of the Republic of South Africa
shall be deemed to have been done by the Government of the Republic of
Namibia or by a corresponding Minister or official of the Government of the
Republic of Namibia, unless such action is subsequently repudiated by an Act
of Parliament, and anything so done by the Government Service Commission
shall be deemed to have been done by the Public Service Commission
referred to in Article 112, unless it is determined otherwise by an Act of
Parliament.
(4) Any reference in such laws to the President, the Government, a Minister
or other official or institution in the Republic of South Africa shall be deemed
to be a reference to the President of Namibia or to a corresponding Minister,
official or institution in the Republic of Namibia and any reference to the
Government Service Commission or the government service, shall be
construed as a reference to the Public Service Commission referred to in
Article 112 or the public service of Namibia.
(5) For the purpose of this article the Government of the Republic of South
Africa shall be deemed to include the Administration of the AdministratorGeneral appointed by the Government of South Africa to administer Namibia,
and any reference to the Administrator-General in legislation enacted by such
Administration shall be deemed to be a reference to the President of Namibia,
and any reference to a Minister or official of such Administration shall be
deemed to be a reference to a corresponding Minister or official of the
Government of the Republic of Namibia.
Article 141 [Existing Appointments]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, any person holding office
under any law in force on the date of
Independence shall continue to hold such office unless and until he or she
resigns or is retired, transferred or removed from office in accordance with
law.
(2) Any reference to the Attorney-General in legislation in force immediately
prior to the date of Independence shall be deemed to be a reference to the
Prosecutor-General, who shall exercise his or her functions in accordance
with this Constitution.
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Article 142 [Appointment of the First Officers of Defence Force, Police, and
Prisons]
The President shall, in consultation with the leaders of all political parties
represented in the National Assembly, appoint by Proclamation the first Chief
of the Defence Force, the first Inspector-General of Police and the first
Commissioner of Prisons.
Article 143 [Existing International Agreements]
All existing international agreements binding upon Namibia shall remain in
force, unless and until the National Assembly acting under Article 63 (2)(d)
otherwise decides.
Chapter XXI Final Provisions
Article 144 [International Law]
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the
general rules of public international law and international agreements binding
upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia.
Article 145 [Saving]
(1) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed as imposing
upon the Government of Namibia:
a) any obligations to any other State which would not otherwise have existed
under international law;
b) any obligations to any person arising out of the acts or contracts of prior
Administrations which would not otherwise have been recognised by
international law as binding upon the Republic of Namibia.
(2) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed as recognising in
any way the validity of the Administration of Namibia by the Government of
the Republic of South Africa or by the Administrator-General appointed by the
Government of the Republic of South Africa to administer Namibia.
Article 146 [Definitions]
(1) Unless the context otherwise indicates, any word or expression in this
Constitution shall bear the meaning given to such word or expression in any
law which deals with the interpretation of statutes and which was in operation
within the territory of Namibia prior to the date of Independence.
(2)(a) The word "Parliament" shall mean the National Assembly and, once the
first National Council has been elected, shall mean the National Assembly
acting, when so required by this Constitution, subject to the review of the
National Council.
(b) Any reference to the plural shall include the singular and any reference to
the singular shall include the plural.
508

(c) Any references to the "date of Independence" or "Independence" shall be
deemed to be a reference to the day as of which Namibia is declared to be
independent by the Constituent Assembly.
(d) Any references to the "Constituent Assembly" shall be deemed to be a
reference to the Constituent Assembly elected for Namibia during November
1989 as contemplated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of
1978.
(e) Any references to "Gazette" shall be deemed to be a reference to the
Government Gazette of the Republic of
Namibia.
Article 147 [Repeal of Laws]
The laws set out in Schedule 8 are hereby repealed.
Article 148 [Short Title]
This Constitution shall be called the Namibian Constitution.
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Appendix II
The Constitution of Botswana (1966)
CHAPTER I
The Republic (ss 1-2)
[Ch0000s1] 1.
Declaration of Republic
Botswana is a sovereign Republic.
[Ch0000s2] 2.
Public Seal
The Public Seal of the Republic shall be such device as may be
prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.
CHAPTER II
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual (ss 3-19)
[Ch0000s3] 3.
Fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual
Whereas every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his
race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest to
each and all of the following, namely—
(a)
life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law;
(b)
freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and
association; and
(c)
protection for the privacy of his home and other property and
from deprivation of property without compensation,
the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording
protection to those rights and freedoms subject to such limitations of that
protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations designed to
ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual
does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.
[Ch0000s4] 4.
Protection of right to life
(1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in
execution of the sentence of a court in respect of an offence under the law in
force in Botswana of which he has been convicted.
(2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life
in contravention of subsection (1) of this section if he dies as the result of the
use, to such extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of
such force as is reasonably justifiable—
(a)
for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of
property;
(b)
in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a
person lawfully detained;
(c)
for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny; or
(d)
in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal
offence,
or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war.
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[Ch0000s5] 5.
Protection of right to personal liberty
(1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be
authorized by law in any of the following cases, that is to say—
(a)
in execution of the sentence or order of a court, whether
established for Botswana or some other country, in respect of a criminal
offence of which he has been convicted;
(b)
in execution of the order of a court of record punishing him for
contempt of that or another court;
(c)
in execution of the order of a court made to secure the fulfilment
of any obligation imposed on him by law;
(d)
for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the
order of a court;
(e)
upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being
about to commit, a criminal offence under the law in force in Botswana;
(f)
under the order of a court or with the consent of his parent or
guardian, for his education or welfare during any period ending not later than
the date when he attains the age of 18 years;
(g)
for the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious or
contagious disease;
(h)
in the case of a person who is, or is reasonably suspected to be,
of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or a vagrant, for the purpose
of his care or treatment or the protection of the community;
(i)
for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of that person
into Botswana, or for the purpose of effecting the expulsion, extradition or
other lawful removal of that person from Botswana, or for the purpose of
restricting that person while he is being conveyed through Botswana in the
course of his extradition or removal as a convicted prisoner from one country
to another;
(j)
to such extent as may be necessary in the execution of a lawful
order requiring that person to remain within a specified area within Botswana
or prohibiting him from being within such an area, or to such extent as may be
reasonably justifiable for the taking of proceedings against that person
relating to the making of any such order, or to such extent as may be
reasonably justifiable for restraining that person during any visit that he is
permitted to make to any part of Botswana in which, in consequence of any
such order, his presence would otherwise be unlawful; or
(k)
for the purpose of ensuring the safety of aircraft in flight.
(2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed as soon
as reasonably practicable, in a language that he understands, of the reasons
for his arrest or detention.
(3) Any person who is arrested or detained—
(a)
for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the
order of a court; or
(b)
upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being
about to commit, a criminal offence under the law in force in Botswana,
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and who is not released, shall be brought as soon as is reasonably
practicable before a court; and if any person arrested or detained as
mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection is not tried within a reasonable
time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought
against him, he shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable
conditions, including in particular such conditions as are reasonably
necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings
preliminary to trial.
(4) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained by any other
person shall be entitled to compensation therefor from that other person.
[Ch0000s6] 6.
Protection from slavery and forced labour
(1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude.
(2) No person shall be required to perform forced labour.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the expression "forced labour"
does not include—
(a)
any labour required in consequence of the sentence or order of
a court;
(b)
labour required of any person while he is lawfully detained that,
though not required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court, is
reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance of the
place at which he is detained;
(c)
any labour required of a member of a disciplined force in
pursuance of his duties as such or, in the case of a person who has
conscientious objections to service as a member of a naval, military or air
force, any labour that that person is required by law to perform in place of
such service;
(d)
any labour required during any period of public emergency or in
the event of any other emergency or calamity that threatens the life and wellbeing of the community, to the extent that the requiring of such labour is
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing
during that period or as a result of that other emergency or calamity, for the
purpose of dealing with that situation; or
(e)
any labour reasonably required as part of reasonable and
normal communal or other civic obligations.
[Ch0000s7] 7.
Protection from inhuman treatment
(1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
punishment or other treatment.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent
that the law in question authorizes the infliction of any description of
punishment that was lawful in the country immediately before the coming into
operation of this Constitution.
[Ch0000s8] 8.
Protection from deprivation of property
512

(1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken
possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall
be compulsorily acquired, except where the following conditions are satisfied,
that is to say—
(a)
the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary or
expedient—
(i)
in the interests of defence, public safety, public order,
public morality, public health, town and country planning or land settlement;
(ii)
in order to secure the development or utilization of that,
or other, property for a purpose beneficial to the community; or
(iii)
in order to secure the development or utilization of the
mineral resources of Botswana; and
(b)
provision is made by a law applicable to that taking of
possession or acquisition—
(i)
for the prompt payment of adequate compensation; and
(ii)
securing to any person having an interest in or right over
the property a right of access to the High Court, either direct or on appeal
from any other authority, for the determination of his interest or right, the
legality of the taking of possession or acquisition of the property, interest or
right, and the amount of any compensation to which he is entitled, and for the
purpose of obtaining prompt payment of that compensation.
(2) No person who is entitled to compensation under this section shall
be prevented from remitting, within a reasonable time after he has received
any amount of that compensation, the whole of that amount (free from any
deduction, charge or tax made or levied in respect of its remission) to any
country of his choice outside Botswana.
(3) Subsection (1)(b)(i) of this section shall be deemed to be satisfied
in relation to any 30 of 1969 Law applicable to the taking of possession of
minerals or the acquisition of rights to minerals if that law makes provision for
the payment at reasonable intervals of adequate royalties.
(4) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (2) of this
section to the extent that the law in question authorizes—
(a)
the attachment, by order of a court, of any amount of
compensation to which a person is entitled in satisfaction of the judgment of a
court or pending the determination of civil proceedings to which he is a party;
or
(b)
the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the manner in which
any amount of compensation is to be remitted.
(5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1) of this
section—
(a)
to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the
taking of possession or acquisition of any property—
(i)
in satisfaction of any tax, rate or due;
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(ii)
by way of penalty for breach of the law whether under
civil process or after conviction of a criminal offence under the law in force in
Botswana;
(iii)
as an incident of a lease, tenancy, mortgage, charge, bill
of sale, pledge or contract;
(iv)
in the execution of judgments or orders of a court in
proceedings for the determination of civil rights or obligations;
(v)
in circumstances where it is reasonably necessary to do
so because the property is in a dangerous state or injurious to the health of
human beings, animals or plants;
(vi)
in consequence of any law with respect to the limitation
of actions; or
(vii) for so long only as may be necessary for the purposes of
any examination, investigation, trial or inquiry or, in the case of land, for the
purposes of the carrying out thereon of work of soil conservation or the
conservation of other natural resources or work relating to agricultural
development or improvement (being work relating to such development or
improvement that the owner or occupier of the land has been required, and
has without reasonable excuse refused or failed, to carry out),
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the
thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society; or
(b)
to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the
taking of possession or acquisition of—
(i)
enemy property;
(ii)
property of a deceased person, a person of unsound
mind, a person who has not attained the age of 21 years, a prodigal, or a
person who is absent from Botswana, for the purpose of its administration for
the benefit of the persons entitled to the beneficial interest therein;
(iii)
property of a person declared to be insolvent or a body
corporate in liquidation, for the purpose of its administration for the benefit of
the creditors of the insolvent or body corporate and, subject thereto, for the
benefit of other persons entitled to the beneficial interest in the property; or
(iv)
property subject to a trust, for the purpose of vesting the
property in persons appointed as trustees under the instrument creating the
trust or by a court, or by order of a court, for the purpose of giving effect to the
trust.
(6) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1) of this
section to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the
compulsory taking of possession in the public interest of any property, or the
compulsory acquisition in the public interest in or right over property, where
that property, interest or right is held by a body corporate established by law
for public purposes in which no moneys have been invested other than
moneys provided by Parliament.
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[Ch0000s9] 9.
Protection for privacy of home and other property
(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the
search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent
that the law in question makes provision—
(a)
that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public
safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning,
the development and utilization of mineral resources, for the purpose of any
census or in order to secure the development or utilization of any property for
a purpose beneficial to the community;
(b)
that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the
rights or freedoms of other persons;
(c)
that authorizes an officer or agent of the Government of
Botswana, a local government authority or a body corporate established by
law for a public purpose to enter on the premises of any person in order to
inspect those premises or anything thereon for the purpose of any tax, rate or
duty or in order to carry out work connected with any property that is lawfully
on those premises and that belongs to that Government, authority or body
corporate, as the case may be; or
(d)
that authorizes, for the purpose of enforcing the judgment or
order of a court in any civil proceedings, the search of any person or property
by order of a court or entry upon any premises by such order,
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, anything done
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society.
[Ch0000s10] 10.
Provisions to secure protection of law
(1) If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the
charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established or
recognized by law.
(2) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence—
(a)
shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has
pleaded guilty;
(b)
shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a
language that he understands and in detail, of the nature of the offence
charged;
(c)
shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence;
(d)
shall be permitted to defend himself before the court in person
or, at his own expense, by a legal representative of his own choice;
(e)
shall be afforded facilities to examine in person or by his legal
representative the witnesses called by the prosecution before the court, and
to obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify
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on his behalf before the court on the same conditions as those applying to
witnesses called by the prosecution; and
(f)
shall be permitted to have without payment the assistance of an
interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the
charge,
and except with his own consent the trial shall not take place in his absence
unless he so conducts himself as to render the continuance of the
proceedings in his presence impracticable and the court has ordered him to
be removed and the trial to proceed in his absence.
(3) When a person is tried for any criminal offence, the accused person
or any person authorized by him in that behalf shall, if he so requires and
subject to payment of such reasonable fee as may be prescribed by law, be
given within a reasonable time after judgment a copy for the use of the
accused person of any record of the proceedings made by or on behalf of the
court.
(4) No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on
account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute
such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence
that is severer in degree or description than the maximum penalty that might
have been imposed for that offence at the time when it was committed.
(5) No person who shows that he has been tried by a competent court
for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for
that offence or for any other criminal offence of which he could have been
convicted at the trial for that offence, save upon the order of a superior court
in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or
acquittal.
(6) No person shall be tried for a criminal offence if he shows that he
has been pardoned for that offence.
(7) No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to
give evidence at the trial.
(8) No person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless that
offence is defined and the penalty therefor is prescribed in a written law:
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court of record
from punishing any person for contempt of itself notwithstanding that the act
or omission constituting the contempt is not defined in a written law and the
penalty therefor is not so prescribed.
(9) Any court or other adjudicating authority prescribed by law for the
determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation shall be
established or recognized by law and shall be independent and impartial; and
where proceedings for such a determination are instituted by any person
before such a court or other adjudicating authority, the case shall be given a
fair hearing within a reasonable time.
(10) Except with the agreement of all the parties thereto, all
proceedings of every court and proceedings for the determination of the
existence or extent of any civil right or obligation before any other adjudicating
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authority, including the announcement of the decision of the court or other
authority, shall be held in public.
(11) Nothing in subsection (10) shall prevent the court or other
adjudicating authority from excluding from the proceedings persons other
than the parties thereto and their legal representatives to such extent as the
court or other authority—
(a)
may consider necessary or expedient in circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice or in interlocutory
proceedings; or
(b)
may be empowered by law to do so in the interests of defence,
public safety, public order, public morality, the welfare of persons under the
age of 18 years or the protection of the private lives of persons concerned in
the proceedings.
(12) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall
be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of—
(a)
subsection (2)(a) of this section to the extent that the law in
question imposes upon any person charged with a criminal offence the
burden of proving particular facts;
(b)
subsection (2)(d) or (2)(e) of this section to the extent that the
law in question prohibits legal representation before a subordinate court in
proceedings for an offence under customary law (being proceedings against
any person who, under that law, is subject to that law);
(c)
subsection (2)(c) of this section to the extent that the law in
question imposes reasonable conditions that must be satisfied if witnesses
called to testify on behalf of an accused person are to be paid their expenses
out of public funds;
(d)
subsection (5) of this section to the extent that the law in
question authorizes a court to try a member of a disciplined force for a
criminal offence notwithstanding any trial and conviction or acquittal of that
member under the disciplinary law of that force, so, however, that any court
so trying such a member and convicting him shall in sentencing him to any
punishment take into account any punishment awarded him under that
disciplinary law;
(e)
subsection (8) of this section to the extent that the law in
question authorizes a court to convict a person of a criminal offence under
any customary law to which, by virtue of that law, such person is subject.
(13) In the case of any person who is held in lawful detention, the
provisions of subsection (1), subsection (2)(d) and (e) and subsection (3) of
this section shall not apply in relation to his trial for a criminal offence under
the law regulating the discipline of persons held in such detention.
(14) In this section "criminal offence" means a criminal offence under
the law in force in Botswana.
[Ch0000s11] 11.
Protection of freedom of conscience
(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the
enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, and for the purposes of this section
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the said freedom includes freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others, and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate his
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Every religious community shall be entitled, at its own expense, to
establish and maintain places of education and to manage any place of
education which it wholly maintains; and no such community shall be
prevented from providing religious instruction for persons of that community in
the course of any education provided at any place of education which it wholly
maintains or in the course of any education which it otherwise provides.
(3) Except with his own consent (or, if he is a minor, the consent of his
guardian) no person attending any place of education shall be required to
receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony
or observance if that instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion
other than his own.
(4) No person shall be compelled to take any oath which is contrary to
his religion or belief or to take any oath in a manner which is contrary to his
religion or belief.
(5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent
that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably required—
(a)
in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public
morality or public health; or
(b)
for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other
persons, including the right to observe and practise any religion without the
unsolicited intervention of members of any other religion,
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society.
[Ch0000s12] 12.
Protection of freedom of expression
(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the
enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold
opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information
without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information without
interference (whether the communication be to the public generally or to any
person or class of persons) and freedom from interference with his
correspondence.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent
that the law in question makes provision—
(a)
that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public
safety, public order, public morality or public health; or
(b)
that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the
reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of
persons concerned in legal proceedings, preventing the disclosure of
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information received in confidence, maintaining the authority and
independence of the courts, regulating educational institutions in the interests
of persons receiving instruction therein, or regulating the technical
administration or the technical operation of telephony, telegraphy, posts,
wireless, broadcasting or television; or
(c)
that imposes restrictions upon public officers, employees of
local government bodies, or teachers,
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society.
[Ch0000s13] 13.
Protection of freedom of assembly and association
(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the
enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right
to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form
or belong to trade unions or other associations for the protection of his
interests.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent
that the law in question makes provision—
(a)
that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public
safety, public order, public morality or public health;
(b)
that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the
rights or freedoms of other persons;
(c)
that imposes restrictions upon public officers, employees of
local government bodies, or teachers; or
(d)
for the registration of trade unions and associations of trade
unions in a register established by or under any law, and for imposing
reasonable conditions relating to the requirements for entry on such a register
(including conditions as to the minimum number of persons necessary to
constitute a trade union qualified for registration, or of members necessary to
constitute an association of trade unions qualified for registration) and
conditions whereby registration may be refused on the grounds that any other
trade union already registered, or association of trade unions already
registered, as the case may be, is sufficiently representative of the whole or of
a substantial proportion of the interests in respect of which registration of a
trade union or association of trade unions is sought,
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society.
[Ch0000s14] 14.
Protection of freedom of movement
(1) No person shall be deprived of his freedom of movement, and for
the purposes of this section the said freedom means the right to move freely
throughout Botswana, the right to reside in any part of Botswana, the right to
enter Botswana and immunity from expulsion from Botswana.
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(2) Any restriction on a person's freedom of movement that is involved
in his lawful detention shall not be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of this section.
(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent
that the law in question makes provision—
(a)
for the imposition of restrictions that are reasonably required in
the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public
health or the imposition of restrictions on the acquisition or use by any person
of land or other property in Botswana and except so far as that provision or,
as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof, is shown not
to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society;
(b)
for the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement of
any person who is not a citizen of Botswana;
(c)
for the imposition of restrictions on the entry into or residence
within defined areas of Botswana of persons who are not Bushmen to the
extent that such restrictions are reasonably required for the protection or wellbeing of Bushmen;
(d)
for the imposition of restrictions upon the movement or
residence within Botswana of public officers; or
(e)
for the removal of a person from Botswana to be tried outside
Botswana for a criminal offence or to undergo imprisonment in some other
country in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence
under the law in force in Botswana of which he has been convicted.
(4) If any person whose freedom of movement has been restricted by
order under such a provision as is referred to in subsection (3)(a) of this
section (other than a restriction which is applicable to persons generally or to
general classes of persons) so requests at any time during the period of that
restriction not earlier than six months after the order was made or six months
after he last made such request, as the case may be, his case shall be
reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal presided over by a person,
qualified to be enrolled as an advocate in Botswana, appointed by the Chief
Justice.
(5) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this section of the case
of a person whose freedom of movement has been restricted, the tribunal
may make recommendations, concerning the necessity or expediency of
continuing the restriction to the authority by which it was ordered but, unless it
is otherwise provided by law, that authority shall not be obliged to act in
accordance with any such recommendations.
[Ch0000s15] 15.
Protection from discrimination on the grounds of race,
etc.
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (7) of this
section, no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself
or in its effect.
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(2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (6), (7) and (8) of this
section, no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person
acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of
any public office or any public authority.
(3) In this section, the expression "discriminatory" means affording
different treatment to different persons, attributable wholly or mainly to their
respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour
or creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities
or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made
subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to
persons of another such description.
(4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any law so far as
that law makes provision—
(a)
for the appropriation of public revenues or other public funds;
(b)
with respect to persons who are not citizens of Botswana;
(c)
with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of
property on death or other matters of personal law;
(d)
for the application in the case of members of a particular race,
community or tribe of customary law with respect to any matter whether to the
exclusion of any law in respect to that matter which is applicable in the case
of other persons or not; or
(e)
whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in
subsection (3) of this section may be subjected to any disability or restriction
or may be accorded any privilege or advantage which, having regard to its
nature and to special circumstances pertaining to those persons or to persons
of any other such description, is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
(5) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or
in contravention of subsection (1) of this section to the extent that it makes
reasonable provision with respect to qualifications for service as a public
officer or as a member of a disciplined force or for the service of a local
government authority or a body corporate established directly by any law.
(6) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to anything which is
expressly or by necessary implication authorized to be done by any such
provision of law as is referred to in subsection (4) or (5) of this section.
(7) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent
that the law in question makes provision whereby persons of any such
description as is mentioned in subsection (3) of this section may be subjected
to any restriction on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 9, 11,
12, 13 and 14 of this Constitution, being such a restriction as is authorized by
section 9(2), 11(5), 12(2) 13(2), or 14(3), as the case may be.
(8) Nothing in subsection (2) of this section shall affect any discretion
relating to the institution, conduct or discontinuance of civil or criminal
proceedings in any court that is vested in any person by or under this
Constitution or any other law.
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(9) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with the provisions of this section—
(a)
if that law was in force immediately before the coming into
operation of this Constitution and has continued in force at all times since the
coming into operation of this Constitution; or
(b)
to the extent that the law repeals and re-enacts any provision
which has been contained in any written law at all times since immediately
before the coming into operation of this Constitution.
[Ch0000s16] 16.
Derogation from fundamental rights and freedoms
(1) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of section 5 or 15 of this
Constitution to the extent that the law authorizes the taking during any period
when Botswana is at war or any period when a declaration under section 17
of this Constitution is in force, of measures that are reasonably justifiable for
the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during that period.
(2) Where a person is detained by virtue of such an authorization as is
referred to in subsection (1) of this section the following provisions shall
apply—
(a)
he shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case not
more than five days after the commencement of his detention, be furnished
with a statement in writing in a language that he understands specifying in
detail the grounds upon which he is detained;
(b)
not more than 14 days after the commencement of his
detention, a notification shall be published in the Gazette stating that he has
been detained and giving particulars of the provision of law under which his
detention is authorized;
(c)
not more than one month after the commencement of his
detention and thereafter during his detention at intervals of not more than six
months, his case shall be reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law and presided over by a person, qualified to be enrolled as
an advocate in Botswana, appointed by the Chief Justice; and
(d)
he shall be afforded reasonable facilities to consult and instruct,
at his own expense, a legal representative and he and any such legal
representative shall be permitted to make written or oral representations or
both to the tribunal appointed for the review of his case.
(3) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this section of the case
of a detained person, the tribunal may make recommendations, concerning
the necessity or expediency of continuing his detention, to the authority by
which it was ordered but, unless it is otherwise provided by law, that authority
shall not be obliged to act in accordance with any such recommendations.
[Ch0000s17] 17.
Declarations relating to emergencies
(1) The President may at any time, by Proclamation published in the
Gazette, declare that a state of public emergency exists.
(2) A declaration under subsection (1) of this section, if not sooner
revoked, shall cease to have effect—
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(a)
in the case of a declaration made when Parliament is sitting or
has been summoned to meet within seven days, at the expiration of a period
of seven days beginning with the date of publication of the declaration; or
(b)
in any other case, at the expiration of a period of 21 days
beginning with the date of publication of the declaration,
unless before the expiration of that period, it is approved by a resolution
passed by the National Assembly, supported by the votes of a majority of all
the voting members of the Assembly.
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, a
declaration approved by a resolution of the National Assembly under
subsection (2) of this section shall continue in force until the expiration of a
period of six months beginning with the date of its being so approved or until
such earlier date as may be specified in the resolution:
Provided that the National Assembly may, by resolution, supported by
the votes of a majority of all the voting members of the Assembly, extend its
approval of the declaration for periods of not more than six months at a time.
(4) The National Assembly may by resolution at any time revoke a
declaration approved by the Assembly under this section.
[Ch0000s18] 18.
Enforcement of protective provisions
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (5) of this section, if any
person alleges that any of the provisions of sections 3 to 16 (inclusive) of this
Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to
him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same
matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for
redress.
(2) The High Court shall have original jurisdiction—
(a)
to hear and determine any application made by any person in
pursuance of subsection (1) of this section; or
(b)
to determine any question arising in the case of any person
which is referred to it in pursuance of subsection (3) of this section,
and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such direction as it may
consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement
of any of the provisions of sections 3 to 16 (inclusive) of this Constitution.
(3) If in any proceedings in any subordinate court any question arises
as to the contravention of any of the provisions of sections 3 to 16 (inclusive)
of this Constitution, the person presiding in that court may, and shall if any
party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the High Court
unless, in his opinion, the raising of the question is merely frivolous or
vexatious.
(4) Parliament may confer upon the High Court such powers in addition
to those conferred by this section as may appear to be necessary or desirable
for the purpose of enabling that court more effectively to exercise the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section.
(5) Rules of court making provision with respect to the practice and
procedure of the High Court for the purposes of this section may be made by
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the person or authority for the time being having power to make rules of court
with respect to the practice and procedure of that court generally.
[Ch0000s19] 19.
Interpretation and savings
(1) In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires—
"court" means any court of law having jurisdiction in Botswana other
than a court established by a disciplinary law, and in sections 4 and 6 of this
Constitution a court established by a disciplinary law;
"disciplinary law" means a law regulating the discipline of any
disciplined force;
"disciplined force" means—
(a)
a naval, military or air force;
(b)
a police force; or
(c)
a prison service;
"legal representative" means a person entitled to practise in Botswana
as an advocate or attorney;
"member", in relation to a disciplined force, includes any person who,
under the law regulating the discipline of that force, is subject to that
discipline.
(2) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force
raised under an Act of Parliament, nothing contained in or done under the
authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent
with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter other than
sections 4, 6 and 7.
(3) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force
raised otherwise than as aforesaid and lawfully present in Botswana, nothing
contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the
provisions of this Chapter.
CHAPTER III
Citizenship (ss 20-29: repealed)
[Ch0000s20to29]20 to 29 inclusive.
[Repealed.]
CHAPTER IV
The Executive (ss 30-56)
PART I
The President and the Vice-President (ss 30-41)
[Ch0000s30] 30.
Office of President
There shall be a President of the Republic of Botswana who shall be
the Head of State.
[Ch0000s31] 31.
First President
(1) The first President shall be the person who immediately before 30th
September, 1966 holds the office of Prime Minister under the Constitution.
(2) The first President shall be deemed to have assumed office at the
coming into operation of this Constitution.
[Ch0000s32] 32.
Election of President after dissolution of Parliament
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(1) Whenever Parliament is dissolved an election shall be held to the
office of President in such manner as is prescribed by this section and,
subject thereto, by or under an Act of Parliament.
(2) Nominations in the election of a President shall be delivered to the
returning officer on such day and at such time as may be prescribed by or
under any law for the time being in force in Botswana; the nomination of a
candidate in an election of a President shall not be valid unless it is
supported, in such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of
Parliament, by not less than 1000 persons registered as voters for the
purpose of elections to the Assembly.
(3) The following provisions shall then apply—
(a)
a person nominated as a Parliamentary candidate may, at the
time of his nomination and subject to the provisions of paragraph (b), declare
in such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament which
of the candidates in the election of President he supports, but the nomination
of a Parliamentary candidate shall be valid notwithstanding that the
nomination paper does not contain such a declaration;
(b)
such a declaration shall not be made in relation to any
Presidential candidate unless that candidate has signified, in such manner as
may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, his consent to the
making of a declaration in his favour by that Parliamentary candidate;
(c)
where the Parliamentary election is contested in any
constituency a poll shall be taken in that constituency at which the votes shall
be given by ballot, and for the purposes of that poll any Parliamentary
candidate who declared support in accordance with paragraph (a) for a
particular Presidential candidate shall use the same voting colour and symbol,
if any, as may have been allocated under any law for the time being in force
in Botswana to that Presidential candidate for the purposes of the Presidential
election;
(d)
the returning officer shall declare to be elected as President any
candidate for whom support has been declared in accordance with paragraph
(a) above by not less than such number of persons elected as Members of
the National Assembly in the Parliamentary election as corresponds to more
than half the total number of seats for Elected Members in the Assembly, and
if there is no such person the returning officer shall declare that no candidate
has been elected.
(4) Parliament may make provision whereby the time for nominating
Presidential candidates may be extended in the event of there being no
qualified candidate nominated at the expiration of the time for the delivery of
such nominations.
(5) Where, at the expiration of the time for the delivery of nominations
in the election of a President, more than one qualified candidate is validly
nominated and any of those candidates dies before the commencement of
the poll in the Parliamentary election, the poll in the Parliamentary election
shall be countermanded, fresh nominations of Parliamentary candidates shall
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take place in every constituency and a fresh election of a President shall be
held in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section.
(6) Where—
(a)
any candidate in an election of a President dies during the
period commencing with the taking of the poll in the Parliamentary election
and ending when the result of the election has been ascertained and that
candidate would, but for his death, have been entitled to have been declared
elected as President under subsection (3) of this section; or
(b)
the returning officer declares in accordance with the provisions
of subsection (3)(d) of this section that no candidate has been elected,
the new National Assembly shall meet on such day (not being more than 14
days after the result of the election is ascertained or, as the case may be, the
declaration that no candidate has been elected) as the Speaker shall appoint,
and shall elect a person to the office of President in such manner as is
prescribed by section 35(5) of this Constitution and subject thereto by or
under an Act of Parliament. Such an election shall take place before the
election of the Specially Elected Members of the National Assembly.
(7) A person elected to the office of President under this section shall
assume that office on the day upon which he is declared elected.
(8) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 92 of this
Constitution, an Elected Member of the National Assembly may, in the event
of there being one or more successful election petitions following a general
election, move, at the first sitting of the Assembly after the resultant byelections have been decided and the Members thereby elected have taken
their seats, that the President does not enjoy the support of the majority of the
Elected Members of the Assembly; and in the voting on that question the
Specially Elected Members of the Assembly shall have no vote. If it appears
as a result of the voting on that question that the President does not enjoy the
support of a majority of the elected Members of the Assembly, the office of
President shall become vacant.
(9) Any Elected Member of the Assembly may give notice to the
President that he intends to move in the Assembly a motion under subsection
(8) and notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution the President
shall not after receipt of any such notice be empowered to dissolve
Parliament before the conclusion of the sitting of the Assembly mentioned in
the said subsection (8).
(10) If the office of President becomes vacant in accordance with
subsection (8) of this section the seats of the Specially Elected Members of
the Assembly shall also become vacant, and the election of a person to the
office of President shall take place before the election of the Specially Elected
Members.
(11) In this section—
"Parliamentary candidate" means a candidate in the Parliamentary
election;
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"the Parliamentary election" means the general election to elect those
Members of the National Assembly who are referred to in section 58(2)(a) of
this Constitution following any dissolution of Parliament;
"Presidential candidate" means a candidate for the office of President;
"the returning officer" means the returning officer specified in section
38 of this Constitution.
[Ch0000s33] 33.
Qualification for election as President
(1) A person shall be qualified for election as President if, and shall not
be qualified unless, he—
(a)
is a citizen of Botswana by birth or descent;
(b)
has attained the age of 30 years; and
(c)
is qualified to be elected as a Member of the National Assembly.
(2) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, for the purposes of
this section and section 39—
(a)
the term "citizen by birth" shall be understood to include only
those persons who became citizens of Botswana prior to the amendment of
the law relating to citizenship by the Cap. 01:01 Citizenship Act;
(b)
any person who, although his father was a citizen of Botswana
at the time of that person's birth, had, by virtue of his having been born
outside Botswana, to be registered as a citizen of Botswana, under the law
relating to citizenship in force at that time, shall be regarded as a citizen by
descent.
[Ch0000s34]34.
Tenure of office of President 16 of 1997, s. 2.
(1) The President shall, subject to the provisions of this section, hold
office for an aggregate period not exceeding 10 years beginning from the date
of his first assumption of office of President after the commencement of this
Act.
(2) The President shall cease to hold the office of President if at any
time during his tenure of office any circumstances arise that would, if he were
not a member of the National Assembly, cause him to be disqualified for
election thereto.
(3) The President shall cease to hold office of President at the expiry of
the period prescribed under subsection (1) of this section, or when the person
elected at the next election of President following a dissolution of Parliament
assumes office.
[Ch0000s35] 35.
Vacancy in office of President
16 of 1997, s. 3. (1) Whenever the President dies, resigns or ceases to
hold office, the Vice-President shall assume office as President with effect
from the date of the death, resignation or ceasing to be President.
(2) If the office of President—
(a)
becomes vacant in circumstances in which there is no VicePresident; or
(b)
is vacant whilst the Vice-President is absent from Botswana or
is, by reason of physical or mental infirmity unable to perform the functions of
his office,
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the functions of the office of President shall, until such time as a new
President assumes office in accordance with this section or section 32 of this
Constitution, be performed by such Minister as the Cabinet shall appoint. For
the purposes of this subsection, a certificate of the Chief Justice that the VicePresident is by reason of physical or mental infirmity unable to discharge the
functions of his office, shall, in respect of any period for which it is in force, be
conclusive and shall not be questioned in any court.
(3) Any person performing the functions of the office of President by
virtue of subsection (1) or (2) of this section shall not exercise the power of
the President to revoke the appointment of Vice-President or to dissolve
Parliament.
(4) If the office of President becomes vacant, the National Assembly
shall, unless Parliament is dissolved, and notwithstanding that it may be
prorogued, meet on the seventh day after the office of President becomes
vacant, or on such earlier day as may be appointed by the Speaker, and shall
elect a person to the office in such manner as is prescribed by the next
following subsection and, subject thereto, by or under an Act of Parliament.
(5) In an election of a President under this section—
(a)
the Speaker shall preside at the meeting and conduct the
election;
(b)
a person may be a candidate if and shall not be a candidate
unless he has been nominated as a candidate with his consent prior to the
sitting of the National Assembly at which the election takes place, by not less
than 10 Members of the National Assembly entitled to vote in that election;
(c)
at the election every Member of the Assembly except the
Speaker and the Attorney-General shall be entitled to vote;
(d)
the votes of the Members of the Assembly who are entitled to
vote shall be given by ballot in such manner as not to disclose how any
particular Member voted, and any person who receives the votes of more
than one half of the total number of persons entitled to vote shall be declared
elected as President;
(e)
a person elected as President under this section shall assume
the office of President on the day upon which he is declared to be elected;
(f)
not more than three ballots shall be taken unless in the opinion
of the Speaker the holding of further ballots is likely to result in the election of
a President, in which case not more than two further ballots may be taken;
(g)
only one ballot shall be taken at any sitting of the Assembly, and
the Speaker may adjourn the meeting at which a second or subsequent ballot
is to be taken for such number of days (in addition to the days on which and
to which the meeting is adjourned), not being more than two, as he thinks fit;
(h)
if there is no candidate duly nominated for the first ballot in
accordance with paragraph (b) or if after the number of ballots permitted
under paragraph (f) have been taken no candidate has been declared elected
Parliament shall stand dissolved or, in the case of a Presidential election held
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in accordance with section 32(6) of this Constitution, the foregoing general
election shall be void.
(6) No business other than the election of a President shall be
transacted at a meeting of the National Assembly under subsection (4) of this
section or under section 32(6) of this Constitution and such a meeting or any
sitting thereof shall not be regarded as a meeting or sitting of the Assembly
for the purposes of any other provision of this Constitution.
(7) At any time when the office of Speaker is vacant or the holder of
that office is unable by reason of absence or illness to exercise the functions
vested in him by this section and section 32(6) of this Constitution, those
functions may be exercised by the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly
or, if there is no Deputy Speaker or the Deputy Speaker is unable by reason
of absence or illness to exercise those functions, by such member of the
Assembly (not being the President or Vice-President or a Minister or Assistant
Minister) as the Assembly may elect for that purpose.
[Ch0000s36] 36.
Discharge of functions of President during absence,
illness, etc.
(1) Whenever the President is absent from Botswana or considers it
desirable to do so by reason of illness or any other cause he may, by
directions in writing, authorize—
(a)
the Vice-President; or
(b)
during any period when there is no Vice-President or the VicePresident is absent from Botswana or is, by reason of physical or mental
infirmity, unable to perform the functions of his office, some other Minister,
to discharge such of the functions of the office of President as he may
specify, and the Vice-President or other Minister may discharge those
functions until his authority is revoked by the President.
(2) If the President is incapable by reason of physical or mental
infirmity of discharging the functions of his office and the infirmity is of such a
nature that the President is unable to authorize another person under this
section to perform those functions—
(a)
the Vice-President; or
(b)
during any period when there is no Vice-President or the VicePresident is absent from Botswana or the Vice-President is, by reason of
physical or mental infirmity, unable to perform the functions of his office, such
Minister as the Cabinet shall appoint,
shall perform the functions of the office of President.
(3) A person performing the functions of the office of President under
this section shall not exercise the power of the President to revoke the
appointment of the Vice-President or to dissolve Parliament.
(4) A person performing the functions of the office of President by
virtue of subsection (2) of this section shall cease to perform those functions if
he is notified by the President that the President is about to resume those
functions.
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(5) For the purposes of this section, a certificate of the Chief Justice
that—
(a)
the President is incapable by reason of physical or mental
infirmity of discharging the functions of his office and the infirmity is of such a
nature that the President is unable to authorize another person under this
section to perform the functions of his office; or
(b)
the Vice-President is by reason of physical or mental infirmity
unable to discharge the functions of his office,
shall, in respect of any period for which it is in force, be conclusive and shall
not be questioned in any court:
Provided that any such certificate as is referred to in paragraph (a) of
this subsection shall cease to have effect if the President notifies any person
under subsection (4) of this section that he is about to resume the functions of
the office of President.
[Ch0000s37] 37.
Oath of President
A person assuming the office of President shall, before entering upon
the duties of that office, take and subscribe such oaths as may be prescribed
by Parliament.
[Ch0000s38] 38.
Returning officer at elections of President
(1) The Chief Justice shall be the returning officer for the purposes of
elections to the office of President.
(2) Any question which may arise as to whether—
(a)
any provision of this Constitution or any law relating to the
election of a President under section 32 or 35 of this Constitution has been
complied with; or
(b)
any person has been validly elected as President under those
sections,
shall be referred to and determined by the returning officer whose decision
shall not be questioned in any court.
[Ch0000s39] 39.
Vice President
16 of 1997, s. 4. (1) There shall be a Vice-President who shall be
appointed by the President from among the Elected Members of the National
Assembly who are citizens of Botswana by birth or descent, which
appointment shall be endorsed by the said Elected Members.
(2) The Vice-President shall continue in office until a person elected at
the next election of President under section 32 or 35 of this Constitution
assumes office:
Provided that the office of Vice-President shall become vacant—
(i)
if the appointment of the holder of the office is revoked by the
President; or
(ii)
if the holder of the office ceases to be a Member of the National
Assembly for any other reason than a dissolution of Parliament.
(3) The Vice-President shall not enter upon the duties of his office
unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and such oath for
the due execution of his office as may be prescribed by Parliament.
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(4) If the Vice-President is absent from Botswana or is incapable by
reason of illness or any other cause of discharging the functions of his office,
the President may appoint a person, from among the Members of the
Assembly, to perform the functions of the office of Vice-President and any
person so appointed may discharge those functions accordingly:
Provided that a person appointed under this subsection shall cease to
perform the functions of the office of Vice-President—
(i)
if his appointment is revoked by the President;
(ii)
if he ceases to be a Member of the Assembly otherwise than by
reason of a dissolution of Parliament;
(iii)
upon the assumption by any person of the office of President; or
(iv)
upon the President giving him notice that the Vice-President is
about to resume his functions.
(5) Where the Vice-President is performing the functions of the office of
President in accordance with section 35 or 36 of this Constitution he may
appoint a person, from among the Members of the Assembly, to perform the
functions of the office of Vice-President and any person so appointed may
discharge those functions accordingly:
Provided that a person appointed under this subsection shall cease to
perform the functions of the office of Vice-President—
(i)
if his appointment is revoked by the Vice-President;
(ii)
if he ceases to be a Member of the Assembly otherwise than by
reason of a dissolution of Parliament; or
(iii)
if the Vice-President ceases to perform the functions of the
office of President.
(6) In this section references to Members of the Assembly shall, in the
event of Parliament being dissolved, be construed as references to those
persons who immediately before the dissolution were Members of the
Assembly.
[Ch0000s40] 40.
Salary and allowances of President
(1) The President shall receive such salary and allowances as may be
prescribed by resolution of the National Assembly, which shall be a charge on
the general revenues of the Republic.
(2) The salary and allowances of the President shall not be altered to
his disadvantage during his period of office.
(3) A person who has held the office of President shall receive such
pension or, upon the expiration of his term of office, such gratuity as may be
prescribed by resolution of the National Assembly, which shall be a charge on
the Consolidated Fund.
[Ch0000s41] 41.
Protection of President in respect of legal proceedings
(1) Whilst any person holds or performs the functions of the office of
President no criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against him
in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him either in his official
capacity or in his private capacity and no civil proceedings shall be instituted
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or continued in respect of which relief is claimed against him in respect of
anything done or omitted to be done in his private capacity.
(2) Where provision is made by law limiting the time within which
proceedings of any description may be brought against any person, the term
of any person in the office of President shall not be taken into account in
calculating any period of time prescribed by that law which determines
whether any such proceedings as are mentioned in subsection (1) of this
section may be brought against that person.
PART II
The Cabinet (ss 42-46)
[Ch0000s42] 42.
Ministers and Assistant Ministers
(1) There shall be such offices of Minister of the Government (not
exceeding six or such other number as Parliament may from time to time
provide) as may be established by Parliament or, subject to the provisions of
any Act of Parliament, by the President.
(2) There shall be such offices of Assistant Minister (not exceeding
three or such number as Parliament may from time to time provide) as may
be established by Parliament or, subject to the provisions of any Act of
Parliament, by the President.
(3) Appointments to the office of Minister or Assistant Minister shall be
made by the President from among Members of the National Assembly:
Provided that—
(i)
not more than four persons may be appointed as Minister or
Assistant Minister from amongst persons who are not Members of the
Assembly but are qualified for election as such; and
(ii)
if occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of a
Minister or an Assistant Minister while Parliament is dissolved a person who
was a Member of the Assembly before the dissolution may be appointed as a
Minister or an Assistant Minister.
[Ch0000s43] 43.
Tenure of office of Ministers and Assistant Ministers
The office of any Minister or Assistant Minister shall become vacant—
(a)
in the case of a Minister or Assistant Minister appointed from
among the Members of the National Assembly, or in the case of a Minister or
Assistant Minister appointed from among persons who are not Members of
the Assembly who becomes a Member of the Assembly before the expiration
of four months from the date of his appointment—
(i)
if he ceases to be a Member of the National Assembly
otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of the National Assembly; or
(ii)
if, at the first sitting of the Assembly after a general
election, he is not a Member of the Assembly;
(b)
in the case of a Minister or Assistant Minister appointed from
among persons who are not Members of the Assembly, if before the
expiration of four months from the date of his appointment—
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(i)
circumstances arise (other than a dissolution of the
Assembly) that, if he were such a Member, would cause him to vacate his
seat in the Assembly; or
(ii)
he does not become a Member of the Assembly;
(c)
if the holder of the office is removed from office by the
President;
(d)
upon the assumption by any person of the office of President.
[Ch0000s44] 44.
Cabinet
(1) There shall be a Cabinet which shall consist of the President, VicePresident and the Ministers.
(2) There shall preside at meetings of the Cabinet—
(a)
the President;
(b)
in the absence of the President, the Vice-President; or
(c)
in the absence of the President and the Vice-President, such
Minister as the President may designate.
(3) The Cabinet may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its
membership.
[Ch0000s45] 45.
Oaths to be taken by Ministers and Assistant Ministers
The Vice-President, a Minister or an Assistant Minister shall not enter
upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of
allegiance and such oath for the due execution of his office as may be
prescribed by Parliament.
[Ch0000s46] 46.
Secretary to the Cabinet
(1) There shall be a Secretary to the Cabinet whose office shall be a
public office.
(2) The Secretary to the Cabinet shall have charge of the Cabinet
Office and shall be responsible, in accordance with such instructions as may
be given to him by the President, for arranging the business for, and keeping
the minutes of, the Cabinet, for conveying decisions of the Cabinet to the
appropriate person or authority, and shall have such other functions as the
President may from time to time direct.
PART III
Executive Functions (ss 47-56)
[Ch0000s47] 47.
Functions of President
(1) The executive power of Botswana shall vest in the President and,
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, shall be exercised by him either
directly or through officers subordinate to him.
(2) In the exercise of any function conferred upon him by this
Constitution or any other law the President shall, unless it is otherwise
provided, act in his own deliberate judgment and shall not be obliged to follow
the advice tendered by any other person or authority.
(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent Parliament from conferring
functions on persons or authorities other than the President.
[Ch0000s48] 48.
Command of armed forces
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(1) The supreme command of the armed forces of the Republic shall
vest in the President and he shall hold the office of Commander in Chief.
(2) The powers conferred on the President by subsection (1) of this
section shall include—
(a)
the power to determine the operational use of the armed forces;
(b)
the power to appoint members of the armed forces, to make
appointments on promotion to any office in the armed forces and to dismiss
any member of the armed forces.
(3) The President may, by directions in writing and subject to such
conditions as he may think fit, delegate to any member of the armed forces
any of the powers mentioned in subsection (2) of this section.
(4) Parliament may regulate the exercise of the powers conferred by or
under this section.
[Ch0000s49] 49.
Functions of Vice-President
The Vice-President shall be the principal assistant of the President in
the discharge of his executive functions and shall be responsible, under the
directions of the President, for such business of the government of Botswana
(including the administration of any department of Government) as the
President may assign to him.
[Ch0000s50] 50.
Functions of Cabinet Ministers and Assistant Ministers
(1) The Cabinet shall be responsible for advising the President with
respect to the policy of the Government and with respect to such other
matters as may be referred to it by the President and shall, subject to the
provisions of this Constitution, be responsible to the National Assembly for all
things done by or under the authority of the President, Vice-President or any
Minister in the execution of his office.
(2) The President shall, so far as practicable and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution, consult the Cabinet on matters of policy and
the exercise of his functions.
(3) The obligation of the President to consult his Cabinet and for the
Cabinet to accept responsibility under this section shall not apply to the
exercise by the President of his powers in relation to the appointment or
removal of the Vice-President, Ministers and Assistant Ministers, the
dissolution of Parliament, the Prerogative of Mercy, the assignment of
responsibility to the Vice-President or any Minister and the specification of the
functions of an Assistant Minister.
(4) A Minister shall be responsible, under the direction of the President,
for such business of the government of Botswana (including the
administration of any department of Government) as the President may
assign to him.
(5) An Assistant Minister shall—
(a)
assist the President or the Vice-President in the discharge of
such of the functions of the office of President or Vice-President as the
President may specify; or
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(b)
assist such Minister in the discharge of the functions assigned
to him under subsection (4) of this section as the President may specify.
[Ch0000s51] 51.
Attorney-General
(1) There shall be an Attorney-General whose office shall be a public
office.
(2) The Attorney-General shall be the principal legal adviser to the
Government of Botswana.
(3) The Attorney-General shall have power in any case in which he
considers it desirable to do so—
(a)
to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any
person before any court (other than a court-martial) in respect of any offence
alleged to have been committed by that person;
(b)
to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that
have been instituted or undertaken by any other person or authority; and
(c)
to discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered any
such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or any other
person or authority.
(4) The powers of the Attorney-General under subsection (3) may be
exercised by him in person or by officers subordinate to him acting in
accordance with his general or special instructions.
(5) The powers conferred on the Attorney-General by paragraphs (b)
and (c) of subsection (3) shall be vested in him to the exclusion of any other
person or authority:
Provided that where any other person or authority has instituted
criminal proceedings, nothing in this subsection shall prevent the withdrawal
of those proceedings by or at the instance of that person or authority and with
the leave of the court.
(6) For the purposes of this section, any appeal from any judgment in
any criminal proceedings before any court, or any case stated or question of
law reserved for the purpose of any such proceedings, to any other court shall
be deemed to be part of those proceedings:
Provided that the power conferred on the Attorney-General by
subsection (3)(c) of this section shall not be exercised in relation to any
appeal by a person convicted in any criminal proceedings or to any case
stated or question of law reserved at the instance of such a person.
(7) In the exercise of the functions vested in him by subsection (3) of
this section, the Attorney-General shall not be subject to the direction or
control of any other person or authority.
[Ch0000s52] 52.
Permanent Secretaries
Where any Minister has been charged with responsibility for any
department of Government, he shall exercise general direction and control
over that department and, subject to such direction and control, the
department shall be under the supervision of a Permanent Secretary whose
office shall be a public office.
[Ch0000s53] 53.
Prerogative of Mercy
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The President may—
(a)
grant to any person convicted of any offence a pardon, either
free or subject to lawful conditions;
(b)
grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified
period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for any
offence;
(c)
substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment
imposed on any person for any offence; and
(d)
remit the whole or part of any punishment imposed on any
person for any offence or of any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the
Government on account of any offence.
[Ch0000s54] 54.
Advisory Committee on Prerogative of Mercy
(1) There shall be an Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy
which shall consist of—
(a)
the Vice-President or a Minister appointed by the President by
instrument in writing under his hand;
(b)
the Attorney-General; and
(c)
a person qualified to practise in Botswana as a medical
practitioner, appointed by the President by instrument in writing under his
hand.
(2) A member of the Committee appointed under subsection (1)(a) or
(c) of this section shall hold his seat thereon for such period as may be
specified in the instrument by which he was appointed:
Provided that his seat shall become vacant—
(i)
in the case of a person who, at the date of his appointment, was
the Vice-President or a Minister, if he ceases to be the Vice-President or a
Minister; or
(ii)
if the President, by instrument in writing under his hand, so
directs.
(3) The Committee shall not be summoned except by the authority of
the President who shall, as far as is practicable, attend and preside at all
meetings of the Committee, and, in the absence of the President, the member
of the Committee appointed under subsection (1)(a) of this section shall
preside.
(4) The Committee may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its
membership and its proceedings shall not be invalidated by the presence or
participation of any person not entitled to be present at or to participate in
those proceedings.
(5) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Committee may
regulate its own procedure.
[Ch0000s55] 55.
Functions of Advisory Committee on Prerogative of
Mercy
(1) Where any person has been sentenced to death for any offence,
the President shall cause a written report of the case from the trial judge,
together with such other information derived from the record of the case or
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elsewhere as he may require, to be considered at a meeting of the Advisory
Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy; and after obtaining the advice of the
Committee he shall decide whether to exercise any of his powers under
section 53 of this Constitution.
(2) The President may consult with the Committee before deciding
whether to exercise any of his powers under the said section 53 in any case
not falling within subsection (1) of this section.
[Ch0000s56] 56.
Constitution of offices
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any Act of
Parliament, the powers of constituting and abolishing offices for Botswana
shall vest in the President.
CHAPTER V
Parliament (ss 57-94)
PART I
Composition (ss 57-70)
[Ch0000s57] 57.
Parliament
There shall be a Parliament of Botswana which shall consist of the
President and a National Assembly.
[Ch0000s58] 58.
Composition of National Assembly
(1) The President shall be ex-officio a member of the National
Assembly, and shall be entitled to speak and to vote in all proceedings of the
National Assembly.
(2) In addition to the President the National Assembly shall consist of—
27 of 1992, s. 2, 12 of 2002, s. 2. (a)
57 Elected Members who
shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and
subject thereto in accordance with the provisions of any Act of Parliament;
(b)
four Specially Elected Members who shall be elected in
accordance with the provisions of the Schedule to this Constitution and
subject thereto in accordance with the provisions of any Act of Parliament;
and
(c)
the Attorney-General.
(3) If a person who is not a member of the National Assembly is
elected to the office of Speaker of the National Assembly, that person shall,
by virtue of holding that office, be a member of the Assembly in addition to the
members referred to in subsections (1) and (2) of this section.
[Ch0000s59] 59.
Speaker
(1) There shall be a Speaker of the National Assembly who shall be
elected by the Members of the Assembly from among persons who are
Members of the Assembly or from among persons who are not Members of
the Assembly.
(2) The President, the Vice-President, a Minister, an Assistant Minister
or a public officer shall not be qualified to be elected as Speaker.
(3) The Speaker shall vacate his office—
(a)
if, having been elected from among the Members of the National
Assembly, he ceases to be a Member of the Assembly otherwise than by
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reason of a dissolution of Parliament or if he is required by virtue of section
68(2) to (3) of this Constitution, to cease to perform his functions as a
Member of the Assembly;
(b)
if any circumstances arise that, if he were not Speaker, would
disqualify him for election as such;
(c)
when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution of Parliament;
or
(d)
if he is removed from office by a resolution of the Assembly
supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the Members thereof.
(4) No business shall be transacted in the National Assembly (other
than an election to the office of Speaker) at any time when the office of
Speaker is vacant.
[Ch0000s60] 60.
Deputy Speaker
(1) There shall be a Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly who
shall be elected from among the persons who are Members of the Assembly
other than the President, the Vice-President, Ministers or Assistant Ministers.
(2) The Members of the National Assembly shall elect a person to the
office of Deputy Speaker when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution
and, if the office becomes vacant otherwise than by reason of the dissolution
of the Assembly, at the first sitting of the Assembly after the office becomes
vacant.
(3) The Deputy Speaker shall vacate his office—
(a)
if he ceases to be a Member of the National Assembly,
otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of Parliament;
(b)
if any circumstances arise that, if he were not Deputy Speaker,
would disqualify him for election as such;
(c)
if he is required, by virtue of section 68(2) to (3) of this
Constitution, to cease to perform his functions as a Member of the Assembly;
(d)
if he is elected as Speaker;
(e)
if he is removed from office by a resolution of the Assembly
supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the Members of the
Assembly; or
(f)
when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution of Parliament.
[Ch0000s61] 61.
Qualifications for election to National Assembly
Subject to the provisions of section 62 of this Constitution, a person
shall be qualified to be elected as a Member of the National Assembly if, and
shall not be qualified to be so elected unless—
(a)
he is a citizen of Botswana;
16 of 1997, s. 5. (b) he has attained the age of 18 years;
(c)
he is qualified for registration as a voter for the purposes of the
election of the Elected Members of the National Assembly and is so
registered; and
(d)
he is able to speak, and, unless incapacitated by blindness or
other physical cause, to read English well enough to take an active part in the
proceedings of the Assembly.
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[Ch0000s62] 62.
Disqualifications for membership of National Assembly
(1) No person shall be qualified to be elected as a Member of the
National Assembly who—
(a)
is, by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgement of
allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state;
(b)
has been declared insolvent or adjudged or otherwise declared
bankrupt under any law for the time being in force in Botswana and has not
been discharged, or has made a composition with his creditors and has not
paid his debts in full;
(c)
is certified to be insane or otherwise adjudged or declared to be
of unsound mind under any law for the time being in force in Botswana;
(d)
is a Member of the House of Chiefs;
(e)
subject to such exceptions as may be prescribed by Parliament,
holds any public office, or is acting in any public office by virtue of a contract
of service expressed to continue for a period exceeding six months;
S.I. 119/1993. (f)
is under sentence of death imposed on him by a
court in any part of the Commonwealth, or is under a sentence of
imprisonment (by whatever name called) exceeding six months imposed on
him by such a court or substituted by competent authority for some other
sentence imposed on him by such a court;
(g)
holds, or is acting in, any office the functions of which involve
any responsibility for, or in connection with, the conduct of any elections to
the Assembly or the compilation or revision of any electoral register for the
purposes of such elections.
(2) Parliament may provide that a person shall not be qualified for
election to the National Assembly for such period (not exceeding five years)
as may be prescribed if he is convicted of any such offence connected with
elections to the Assembly as may be prescribed.
(3) For the purposes of this section two or more terms of imprisonment
that are required to be served consecutively shall be regarded as a single
term of imprisonment for the aggregate period of those terms, and no account
shall be taken of a sentence of imprisonment imposed as an alternative to or
in default of the payment of a fine.
[Ch0000s63] 63.
Constituencies
Botswana shall be divided into as many constituencies as there are
Elected Members of the National Assembly and each of those constituencies
shall return one Member to the National Assembly.
[Ch0000s64] 64.
Delimitation Commission
(1) The Judicial Service Commission shall, not later than 1st March,
1969, and thereafter at intervals of not less than five nor more than 10 years,
appoint a Delimitation Commission consisting of a Chairman and not more
than four other members.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, at
any time when—
539

(a)
Parliament has made provision altering the number of seats of
Elected Members in the National Assembly; or
(b)
a comprehensive national population census is held in
Botswana,
the Judicial Service Commission shall, as soon as practicable thereafter,
appoint a Delimitation Commission.
(3) The Chairman of a Delimitation Commission shall be selected from
among persons who hold or have held high judicial office.
(4) No person shall be qualified to be appointed as Chairman or
member of a Delimitation Commission who—
(a)
is a Member of the National Assembly;
(b)
is or has been within the preceding five years actively engaged
in politics; or
(c)
is a public officer.
(5) A person shall be deemed to be actively engaged in politics or to
have been so engaged during the relevant period if—
(a)
he is, or was at any time during that period, a Member of the
National Assembly;
(b)
he is, or was at any time during that period, nominated as a
candidate for election to the National Assembly; or
(c)
he is, or was at any time during that period, the holder of an
office in any political organization that sponsors or supports, or has at any
time sponsored or supported, a candidate for election as a Member of the
National Assembly:
Provided that no person shall be disqualified from holding the office of
Chairman or member of a Delimitation Commission by reason only of the fact
that he has been the Speaker of the National Assembly if he was elected to
that office from amongst persons who were not Members of the National
Assembly.
(6) The office of Chairman or other member of the Delimitation
Commission shall become vacant if circumstances arise that, were he not
Chairman or member of the Delimitation Commission, would disqualify him for
appointment as such.
(7) If, after the appointment of the Delimitation Commission and before
the Commission has submitted its report under section 65, the office of
Chairman or any other member of the Commission falls vacant or the holder
of the office becomes unable for any reason to discharge his functions as a
member of the Commission, the Judicial Service Commission may, subject to
the provisions of subsections (3) to (5) of this section, appoint another person
to be a member of the Commission:
Provided that a member appointed under this section because of the
inability of some other member to discharge his functions shall cease to be a
member of the Commission when, in the opinion of the Judicial Service
Commission, that other member is able to resume his functions as a member
of the Commission.
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[Ch0000s65] 65.
Report of Commission
(1) Whenever a Delimitation Commission has been appointed the
Commission shall as soon as practicable submit to the President a report
which shall state whether any alteration is necessary to the boundaries of the
constituencies in order to give effect to subsection (2) of this section or in
consequence of any alteration in the number of seats of Elected Members in
the National Assembly and where any alteration is necessary shall include a
list of the constituencies delimited by the Commission and a description of the
boundaries of those constituencies.
(2) The boundaries of each constituency shall be such that the number
of inhabitants thereof is as nearly equal to the population quota as is
reasonably practicable:
Provided that the number of inhabitants of a constituency may be
greater or less than the population quota in order to take account of natural
community of interest, means of communication, geographical features,
density of population, and the boundaries of Tribal Territories and
administrative districts.
(3) In this section "population quota" means the number obtained by
dividing the number of inhabitants of Botswana (as ascertained by reference
to the latest comprehensive national population census in Botswana) by the
number of constituencies into which Botswana is divided under section 63 of
this Constitution.
(4) The President shall as soon as practicable after the submission of
the report of the Delimitation Commission, by Proclamation published in the
Gazette, declare the boundaries of the constituencies as delimited by the
Commission.
(5) A Proclamation made under subsection (4) of this section shall
come into force at the next dissolution of the National Assembly after it is
made.
(6) The Commission may by regulation or otherwise regulate its own
procedure and may, subject to its rules of procedure, act notwithstanding any
vacancy in its membership or the absence of any member and its
proceedings shall not be invalidated by the presence or participation of any
person not entitled to be present at or to participate in those proceedings:
Provided that any decision of the Commission shall require the
concurrence of a majority of all its members.
(7) In the exercise of its functions under this section the Delimitation
Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other
person or authority.
(8) A Delimitation Commission shall stand dissolved upon the date on
which its report is delivered to the President.
[Ch0000s65A]65A. Appointment of Independent Electoral Commission 18 of
1997, s. 2.
(1) There shall be an Independent Electoral Commission which shall
consist of—
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(a)
a Chairman who shall be a judge of the High Court appointed by
the Judicial Service Commission;
(b)
a legal practitioner appointed by the Judicial Service
Commission; and
(c)
five other persons who are fit, proper and impartial, appointed
by the Judicial Service Commission from a list of persons recommended by
the All Party Conference.
(2) Where the All Party Conference fail to agree on all or any number
of persons referred to in subsection (1)(c) of this section up to dissolution of
Parliament, the Judicial Service Commission shall appoint such person or
persons as are necessary to fill any vacancy.
(3) For the purposes of this section, “All Party Conference” means a
meeting of all registered political parties convened from time to time by the
Minister.
(4) The first appointments of the Chairman and the Members of the
Commission shall be made not later than 31st January, 1999, and thereafter
subsequent appointments shall be made at the last dissolution of every two
successive lives of Parliament.
(5) The Chairman and the members of the Commission shall hold
office for a period of two successive lives of Parliament.
(6) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a member of the
Independent Electoral Commission if—
(a)
he has been declared insolvent or adjudged or otherwise
declared bankrupt under any law in force in any part of the Commonwealth
and has not been discharged, or has made a composition with his creditors
and has not paid his debts in full; or
(b)
he has been convicted of any offence involving dishonesty in
any country.
(7) A person appointed a member of the Commission shall not enter
upon the duties of the office of Commissioner until he has taken and
subscribed the oath of allegiance and such oath for the due execution of his
office as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
(8) The Commission shall regulate its own procedure and proceedings.
(9) The Chairman shall preside over all proceedings, and in his
absence, the legal practitioner referred to in subsection (1)(b) shall preside
over the proceedings.
(10) The quorum shall be four members, one of whom shall be the
Chairman or the said legal practitioner.
(11) All issues shall be decided by the decision of the majority of the
members present and voting.
(12) The Commission shall be responsible for—
(a)
the conduct and supervision of elections of the Elected
Members of the National Assembly and members of a local authority, and
conduct of a referendum;
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(b)
giving instructions and directions to the Secretary of the
Commission appointed under section 66 in regard to the exercise of his
functions under the electoral law prescribed by an Act of Parliament;
(c)
ensuring that elections are conducted efficiently, properly, freely
and fairly; and
(d)
performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act
of Parliament.
(13) The Commission shall on the completion of any election
conducted by it, submit a report on the exercise of its functions under the
preceding provisions of this section to the Minister for the time being
responsible for matters relating to such elections, and that Minister shall, not
later than seven days after the National Assembly first meets after he has
received the report, lay it before the National Assembly.
[Ch0000s66]66.
Appointment of Secretary to Independent Electoral
Commission 18 of 1997, s. 3.
(1) There shall be a Secretary to the Independent Electoral
Commission referred to in section 65A (in this section referred to as “the
Secretary”).
(2) The Secretary shall be appointed by the President.
(3) The functions of the Secretary shall, subject to the directions and
supervision of the Independent Electoral Commission, be to exercise general
supervision over the registration of voters for elections of—
(a)
the Elected Members of the National Assembly; and
(b)
the members of any local authority,
and over the conduct of such elections.
(4) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as Secretary to the
Independent Electoral Commission if—
(a)
he is not a citizen of Botswana;
(b)
he has been declared insolvent or adjudged or otherwise
declared bankrupt under any law in force in any part of the Commonwealth
and has not been discharged, or has made a composition with his creditors
and has not paid his debts in full; or
(c)
he has been convicted of any offence involving dishonesty in
any country.
(5) A person shall not enter upon the duties of the office of Secretary
until he has taken and subscribed to the oath of allegiance and such oath for
the due execution of his office as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
(6) For the purposes of the exercise of his functions under subsection
(3) of this section, the Secretary may give such directions as he considers
necessary or expedient to any registering officer, presiding officer or returning
officer relating to the exercise by that officer of his functions under any law
regulating the registration of voters or the conduct of elections, and any officer
to whom directions are given under this subsection shall comply with those
directions.
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(7) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding office as
Secretary shall vacate that office on attaining the age of 65 years or such
other age as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.
(8) A holder of the office of Secretary may be removed from office only
for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity
of body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and shall not
be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(9) If the President considers that the question of removing the
Secretary ought to be investigated then—
(a)
he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and
not less than two members who hold or have held high judicial office;
(b)
the tribunal shall enquire into and report on the facts thereof to
the President and advise the President whether the Secretary ought to be
removed from office under this section for inability to perform the functions of
his office or for misbehaviour.
(10) Where a tribunal appointed under subsection (9) advises the
President that the Secretary ought to be removed for inability to perform the
functions of his office or for misbehaviour, the President shall remove him
from office.
(11) If the question of removing the Secretary from office has been
referred to a tribunal under subsection (9) of this section, the President may
suspend him from performing the functions of his office, and any such
suspension may at any time be revoked by the President and shall cease to
have effect if the tribunal advises the President that the Secretary ought not to
be removed from office.
[Ch0000s67] 67.
The franchise
(1) A person who—
(a)
is a citizen of Botswana or of any other country to which this
section is applied by Parliament;
18 of 1997, s. 4(a). (b)
has attained the age of 18 years; and
(c)
has either resided in Botswana for a continuous period of at
least 12 months immediately preceding the date on which he applies for
registration as a voter or was born in Botswana and is domiciled in Botswana
on the date on which he applies for registration as a voter,
shall, unless he is disqualified for registration as a voter under any law, be
entitled, upon his making application in that behalf at such time and in such
manner as may be prescribed by any law, to be registered as a voter for the
purposes of elections of Elected Members of the National Assembly, and no
other person may be so registered.
(2) A person who has not continuously resided in Botswana for the
period mentioned in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section but has
during the whole period retained his residence (or if he has more than one
residence, his principal residence) in Botswana and has been absent
therefrom for some temporary purpose only shall be deemed for the purposes
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of the said paragraph (c) to have been resident in Botswana during such
absence.
(3) A person shall be entitled to be registered as a voter—
(a)
in the constituency in which he has his residence, or if he has
more than one residence in Botswana in the constituency in which he has his
principal residence; or
18 of 1997, s. 4(b). (b)
in the case of a person who does not have
a residence in Botswana but is able to register in person, in the constituency
in which he last resided, or in which he was born; or
18 of 1997, s. 4(b). (c)
in the case of a person who is not resident
in Botswana and is unable to register in person, at such place as may be
prescribed by Parliament and registration at such place shall be treated as
registration in the constituency in which he last resided, or in which he was
born in Botswana.
(4) A person shall be entitled to be registered as a voter in one
constituency only.
(5) Every person who is registered in any constituency as a voter for
the purposes of elections of the Elected Members of the National Assembly
shall, unless he is disqualified by Parliament from voting in such elections on
the grounds of his having been convicted of an offence in connection with the
elections or on the grounds of his having been reported guilty of such an
offence by the court trying an election petition or on the grounds of his being
in lawful custody at the date of the election, be entitled so to vote in that
constituency in accordance with the provisions made by or under a law in that
behalf; and no other person may so vote.
[Ch0000s68] 68.
Tenure of office of Members
(1) The seat of an Elected Member or a Specially Elected Member of
the National Assembly shall become vacant—
(a)
upon the dissolution of Parliament;
(b)
if he is absent from the sittings of the Assembly for such period
and in such circumstances as may be prescribed in the rules of procedure of
the Assembly;
(c)
subject to the provisions of subsections (2) to (3) of this section,
if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a Member of the Assembly,
would cause him to be disqualified for election thereto.
(2) If circumstances such as are referred to in paragraph (c) of the
preceding subsection arise in relation to a Member of the Assembly by virtue
of the fact that he is declared insolvent, adjudged to be of unsound mind,
sentenced to death or imprisonment, or convicted of an election offence and it
is open to the Member to appeal against the decision (either with the leave of
the court or other authority or without such leave), he shall forthwith cease to
perform his functions as a Member of the Assembly but, subject to the next
following subsection, he shall not vacate his seat until the expiration of a
period of 30 days thereafter:
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Provided that the Speaker may, at the request of the Member, from
time to time extend that period for further periods of 30 days to enable the
Member to pursue an appeal against the decision, so, however, that
extensions of time exceeding in the aggregate 150 days shall not be given
without the approval of the Assembly signified by resolution.
(3) If, on the determination of any appeal, such circumstances continue
to exist and no further appeal is open to the Member of the Assembly, or if, by
reason of the expiration of any period for entering an appeal or notice thereof
or the refusal of leave to appeal or for any other reason, it ceases to be open
to the Member to appeal, he shall forthwith vacate his seat.
(4) If at any time before the Member of the Assembly vacates his seat
such circumstances as aforesaid cease to exist, his seat shall not become
vacant by reason of those circumstances, and he may resume the
performance of his functions as a Member of the Assembly.
[Ch0000s69] 69.
Determination of questions as to membership of National
Assembly
(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any
question whether—
(a)
any person has been validly elected as an Elected Member of
the National Assembly or the seat of any such Member has become vacant;
(b)
any person has been validly elected as Speaker of the
Assembly or, having been so elected, has vacated the office of Speaker.
(2) Any question whether any person has been validly elected as a
Specially Elected Member of the National Assembly or whether the seat of
any such Member has become vacant shall be determined by the Speaker.
(3) Parliament may make provision with respect to—
(a)
the persons who may apply to the High Court for the
determination of any question under this section;
(b)
the circumstances and manner in which the conditions upon
which any such application may be made; and
(c)
the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court in relation
to any such application.
[Ch0000s70] 70.
Clerk of the Assembly
(1) There shall be a Clerk of the National Assembly and an Assistant
Clerk of the National Assembly and their offices shall be offices in the public
service.
(2) There shall be such other offices in the department of the Clerk of
the Assembly as may be prescribed by resolution of the National Assembly
and such offices shall be offices in the public service.
PART II
General Provisions Relating to Procedure in National Assembly (ss 71-76)
[Ch0000s71] 71.
Oaths to be taken by Speaker and Members
The Speaker, before assuming the duties of his office, and every
Member of the National Assembly before taking his seat therein, shall take
and subscribe before the Assembly the oath of allegiance.
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[Ch0000s72] 72.
Presiding in Assembly
There shall preside at any sitting of the National Assembly—
(a)
the Speaker;
(b)
in the absence of the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker; or
(c)
in the absence of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, such
Member of the Assembly (not being the President or Vice-President or a
Minister or Assistant Minister) as the Assembly may elect for that sitting.
[Ch0000s73] 73.
Quorum in Assembly
1 of 1999, s. 2(a) and (b). If objection is taken by any Member of the
National Assembly present that there are present in the Assembly (besides
the person presiding) less than one third of the Members of the Assembly
and, after such interval as may be prescribed in the rules of procedure of the
Assembly, the person presiding ascertains that the number of Members
present is less than one third, he shall thereupon adjourn the Assembly.
[Ch0000s74] 74.
Voting in Assembly
(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, any question
proposed for decision in the National Assembly shall be determined by a
majority of the votes of the Members present and voting.
(2) The Attorney-General shall have no vote.
(3) The person presiding in the National Assembly shall have neither
an original vote nor a casting vote and if upon any question before the
Assembly the votes are equally divided the motion shall be lost.
[Ch0000s75] 75.
Unqualified persons sitting or voting
Any person who sits or votes in the National Assembly knowing or
having reasonable grounds for knowing that he is not entitled to do so shall
be liable to a penalty not exceeding P50 or such other sum as may be
prescribed by Parliament for each day on which he so sits or votes in the
Assembly, which shall be recoverable by action in the High Court at the suit of
the Attorney-General.
[Ch0000s76] 76.
Regulation of procedure in Assembly
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the National Assembly
may regulate its own procedure.
(2) The National Assembly may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its
membership (including any vacancy not filled when the Assembly first meets
after any dissolution) and the presence or participation of any person not
entitled to be present or to participate in the proceedings of the Assembly
shall not invalidate those proceedings.
PART III
The House of Chiefs (ss 77-85)
[Ch0000s77] 77.
Composition of House of Chiefs
(1) There shall be a House of Chiefs for Botswana.
(2) The House of Chiefs shall consist of—
(a)
eight ex-officio Members;
(b)
four Elected Members; and
(c)
three Specially Elected Members.
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[Ch0000s78] 78.
Ex-officio Members of the House of Chiefs
The ex-officio Members of the House of Chiefs shall be such persons
as are for the time being performing the functions of the office of Chief in
respect of the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse,
Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa Tribes, respectively.
[Ch0000s79] 79.
Elected and Specially Elected Members of House of
Chiefs
(1) The Elected Members of the House of Chiefs shall be elected from
among their own number by the persons for the time being performing the
functions of the office of Sub-Chief in the Chobe, North East, Ghanzi and
Kgalagadi districts, respectively.
(2) The Specially Elected Members of the House of Chiefs shall be
elected by the ex-officio and Elected Members of the House of Chiefs in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution from among persons who
are not and have not been within the preceding five years actively engaged in
politics.
(3) A person shall be deemed to be or to have been actively engaged
in politics for the purposes of subsection (2) of this section in any
circumstances in which he would be deemed to be or to have been so
engaged for the purposes of section 64(4)(b) of this Constitution.
(4) Subject to the provisions of subsections (5) and (6) of this section a
person shall be qualified to be elected as a Specially Elected Member of the
House of Chiefs if, and shall not be qualified to be so elected unless, he—
(a)
is a citizen of Botswana;
(b)
has attained the age of 21 years;
(c)
is able to speak and, unless incapacitated by blindness or other
physical cause, to read English well enough to take an active part in the
proceedings of the House; and
(d)
is qualified for registration as a voter for the purposes of the
election of the Elected Members of the National Assembly and is so
registered.
(5) No person shall be qualified to be elected as a Specially Elected
Member of the House of Chiefs who—
(a)
is, by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgement of
allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state;
(b)
has been declared insolvent or adjudged or otherwise declared
bankrupt under any law in force in any part of the Commonwealth and has not
been discharged, or has made a composition with his creditors and has not
paid his debts in full;
(c)
is certified insane or otherwise adjudged or declared to be of
unsound mind under any law for the time being in force in Botswana;
(d)
subject to such exceptions as may be prescribed by Parliament,
holds any public office, or is acting in any public office by virtue of a contract
of service expressed to continue for a period exceeding six months;
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(e)
is under sentence of death imposed on him by a court in any
part of the Commonwealth, or is under a sentence of imprisonment (by
whatever name called) exceeding six months imposed on him by such a court
or substituted by competent authority for some other sentence imposed on
him by such a court;
(f)
holds, or is acting in, any office the functions of which involve
any responsibility for, or in connection with, the conduct of any elections to
the National Assembly or the compilation or revision of any electoral register
for the purposes of such elections; or
(g)
is disqualified for election to the National Assembly by virtue of
provision made in pursuance of section 62(2) of this Constitution.
(6) For the purposes of this section two or more terms of imprisonment
that are required to be served consecutively shall be regarded as a single
term of imprisonment for the aggregate period of those terms, and no account
shall be taken of a sentence of imprisonment imposed as an alternative to or
in default of the payment of a fine.
[Ch0000s80] 80.
Oath of allegiance
Every Member of the House of Chiefs shall, before taking his seat
therein, take and subscribe before the House of Chiefs the oath of allegiance.
[Ch0000s81] 81.
Secretary to House of Chiefs
There shall be a Secretary to the House of Chiefs whose office shall be
an office in the public service.
[Ch0000s82] 82.
Tenure of office of Elected Members and Specially
Elected Members
(1) An Elected Member of the House of Chiefs shall vacate his seat in
the House—
(a)
on a dissolution of Parliament; or
(b)
if he ceases to be a person for the time being performing the
functions of an office of Sub-Chief in the district from which he has been
elected.
(2) A Specially Elected Member of the House of Chiefs shall vacate his
seat in the House—
(a)
on the dissolution of Parliament;
(b)
if he is absent from the sittings of the House for such period and
in such circumstances as may be prescribed in the rules of procedure of the
House; or
(c)
subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, if any
circumstances arise that, if he were not a Specially Elected Member of the
House of Chiefs, would disqualify him for election as such.
(3) If circumstances such as are referred to in paragraph (c) of the
preceding subsection arise in relation to a Member of the House by virtue of
the fact that he is declared insolvent, adjudged to be of unsound mind,
sentenced to death or imprisonment or convicted of an election offence and it
is open to the Member to appeal against the decision (either with leave of the
court or other authority or without such leave), he shall forthwith cease to
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perform his functions as a Member of the House but, subject to the next
following subsection, he shall not vacate his seat until the expiration of a
period of 30 days thereafter:
Provided that the Chairman of the House may, at the request of the
Member, from time to time extend that period for further periods of 30 days to
enable the Member to pursue an appeal against the decision, so, however,
that extensions of time exceeding in the aggregate 150 days shall not be
given without the approval of the House signified by resolution.
(4) If, on the determination of any appeal, such circumstances continue
to exist and no further appeal is open to the Member of the House, or if by
reason of the expiration of any period for entering an appeal or notice thereof
or the refusal of leave to appeal or for any other reason, it ceases to be open
to a Member to appeal, he shall forthwith vacate his seat.
(5) If at any time before the Member of the House vacates his seat
such circumstances as aforesaid cease to exist, his seat shall not become
vacant by reason of those circumstances, and he may resume the
performance of his functions as a Member of the House.
[Ch0000s83] 83.
Rules of Procedure of House of Chiefs
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the House of Chiefs may,
subject to the approval of the President, make rules regulating its own
procedure and in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, make rules for all or any of the following matter—
(a)
the appointment or election and tenure of office of a Chairman
of the House;
(b)
the time and place at which the House shall meet;
(c)
the manner in which the views of the House shall be recorded
and, if necessary, expressed to a Minister, the National Assembly, or to any
other person or body;
(d)
the regulation and orderly conduct of the proceedings of the
House;
(e)
the manner in which the Elected Members and Specially
Elected Members of the House shall be elected.
[Ch0000s84] 84.
House of Chiefs may transact business notwithstanding
vacancies
The House of Chiefs shall not be disqualified for the transaction of
business by reason of any vacancy among the Members thereof including
any vacancy not filled when the House is first constituted or is reconstituted at
any time; and any proceedings therein shall be valid notwithstanding that
some person who was not entitled to do so sat or voted in the House or
otherwise took part in the proceedings.
[Ch0000s85] 85.
Functions of House of Chiefs
(1) The House of Chiefs shall consider the copy of any Bill which has
been referred to it under the provisions of section 88(2) of this Constitution
and the House shall be entitled to submit resolutions thereon to the National
Assembly.
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(2) Any resolution which has been submitted to the National Assembly
in accordance with the last foregoing subsection shall forthwith be laid before
the Assembly by the Clerk of the Assembly.
(3) Any Minister who is responsible for a Bill such as is referred to in
subsection (1) of this section, or his representative, may attend the
proceedings of the House when the copy of the Bill is being considered.
(4) Any Minister may consult the House of Chiefs in respect of any
matter on which he desires to obtain the opinion of the House, and for that
purpose the Minister or his representative may attend the proceedings of the
House.
(5) The House of Chiefs shall be entitled to discuss any matter within
the executive or legislative authority of Botswana of which it considers it is
desirable to take cognizance in the interests of the tribes and tribal
organizations it represents and to make representations thereon to the
President, or to send messages thereon to the National Assembly.
(6) A person attending the proceedings of the House of Chiefs by
virtue of the provisions of subsection (3) or (4) of this section shall be entitled
to take part in the proceedings of the House relating to the matter in respect
of which he attends as if he were a Member of the House:
Provided that he shall not be entitled to vote in the House.
PART IV
Powers of Parliament (ss 86-89)
[Ch0000s86] 86.
Legislative powers
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament shall have
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Botswana.
[Ch0000s87] 87.
Mode of exercising legislative powers
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 89(4) of this Constitution the
power of Parliament to make laws shall be exercised by Bills passed by the
National Assembly, after reference in the cases specified in section 88(2) of
this Constitution to the House of Chiefs, and assented to by the President.
(2) When a Bill is presented to the President for assent he shall either
assent or withhold his assent.
(3) Where the President withholds his assent to a Bill, the Bill shall be
returned to the National Assembly.
(4) If where the President withholds his assent to a Bill the Assembly
resolves within six months of the Bill being returned to it that the Bill should
again be presented for assent, the President shall assent to the Bill within 21
days of its being again presented to him, unless he sooner dissolves
Parliament.
(5) When a Bill that has been duly passed and presented for assent is
assented to in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution it shall
become law and the President shall thereupon cause it to be published in the
Gazette as a law.
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(6) No law made by Parliament shall come into operation until it has
been published in the Gazette, but Parliament may postpone the coming into
operation of any such law and may make laws with retrospective effect.
(7) All laws made by Parliament shall be styled "Acts" and the words of
enactment shall be "enacted by the Parliament of Botswana".
[Ch0000s88] 88.
Introduction of Bills
(1) Except upon the recommendation of the President, which
recommendation may be signified by the Vice-President or a Minister, the
National Assembly shall not—
(a)
proceed upon any Bill (including any amendment to a Bill) that,
in the opinion of the person presiding, makes provision for any of the following
purposes—
(i)
for the imposition of taxation or the alteration of taxation
otherwise than by reduction;
(ii)
for the imposition of any charge upon the revenues or
other funds of Botswana or the alteration of any such charge otherwise than
by reduction;
(iii)
for the payment, issue or withdrawal from any public fund
of Botswana of any moneys not charged thereon or any increase in the
amount of such payment, issue or withdrawal; or
(iv)
for the composition or remission of any debt to the
Government of Botswana;
(b)
proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a
motion) the effect of which, in the opinion of the person presiding, would be to
make provision for any of those purposes.
(2) The National Assembly shall not proceed upon any Bill (including
any amendment to a Bill) that, in the opinion of the person presiding, would, if
enacted, alter any of the provisions of this Constitution or affect—
(a)
the designation, recognition, removal of powers of Chiefs, SubChiefs or Headmen;
(b)
the organization, powers or administration of customary courts;
(c)
customary law, or the ascertainment or recording of customary
law; or
(d)
tribal organization or tribal property,
unless—
(i)
a copy of the Bill has been referred to the House of Chiefs after
it has been introduced in the National Assembly; and
(ii)
a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date when the copy of
the Bill was referred to the House of Chiefs.
[Ch0000s89] 89.
Alteration of Constitution
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section Parliament may alter this
Constitution.
(2) A Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section shall not be
introduced into the National Assembly unless the text of the Bill has been
published in the Gazette not less than 30 days before it is so introduced.
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(3) In so far as it alters any of the provisions of—
(a)
Chapter II; sections 30 to 44 inclusive, 47 to 51 inclusive, and
56; sections 77 to 79 inclusive and section 85; Chapter VII; or sections 117 to
120 inclusive and section 127 in its application to any of the provisions
mentioned in this paragraph;
(b)
sections 57, 63 to 66 inclusive, 86 to 89 inclusive, 90(2) and (3),
91(2), (3), (4) and (5), and 92; Chapter VI; and section 127 in its application to
any of the provisions mentioned in this paragraph,
a Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section shall not be passed by the
National Assembly unless—
(i)
the final voting on the Bill in the Assembly takes place not less
than three months after the previous voting thereon in the Assembly; and
(ii)
at such final voting the Bill is supported by the votes of not less
than two-thirds of all the Members of the Assembly.
(4) In so far as it alters any of the provisions mentioned in subsection
(3)(b) of this section no Bill shall be presented to the President for his assent
unless after its passage by the Assembly it has been submitted to the electors
qualified to vote in the election of the Elected Members of the National
Assembly, and, on a vote taken in such manner as Parliament may prescribe,
the majority of the electors voting have approved the Bill.
(5) In this section—
(a)
references to any provision of this Constitution include
references to any provision of a law that alters that provision; and
(b)
references to the alteration of any provision of this Constitution
include references to the amendment, modification or re-enactment, with or
without modification, of that provision, the suspension or repeal of that
provision and the making of a different provision in lieu thereof.
PART V
Summoning, Prorogation and Dissolution (ss 90-93)
[Ch0000s90] 90.
Sessions of Parliament
(1) Each session of Parliament shall be held at such place within
Botswana and shall commence at such time as the President may appoint.
(2) There shall be a session of Parliament at least once in every year
so that a period of six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of
Parliament in one session and the first sitting thereof in the next session.
(3) Whenever Parliament is dissolved a general election of the Elected
Members of the Assembly shall be held within 60 days of the date of the
dissolution and a session of Parliament shall be appointed to commence
within 30 days of the date of that general election.
[Ch0000s91] 91.
Prorogation and dissolution of Parliament
(1) The President may at any time prorogue Parliament.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President may at
any time dissolve Parliament.
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section,
Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the
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date of the first sitting of the National Assembly after any dissolution and shall
then stand dissolved.
(4) At any time when Botswana is at war, Parliament may from time to
time extend the period of five years specified in subsection (3) of this section
for not more than 12 months at a time:
Provided that the life of Parliament shall not be extended under this
subsection for more than five years.
(5) If, after a dissolution of Parliament and before the holding of the
general election of the Elected Members of the National Assembly, the
President considers that, owing to the existence of a state of war or of a state
of emergency in Botswana or any part thereof, it is necessary to recall
Parliament, the President may summon the Parliament that has been
dissolved to meet and that Parliament shall be deemed to be the Parliament
for the time being, but the general election of the Elected Members of the
National Assembly shall proceed and the Parliament that has been recalled
shall, if not sooner dissolved, again stand dissolved on the day before the day
on which the election is held.
[Ch0000s92] 92.
Vote of no confidence in the Government
If the National Assembly at any time passes a resolution supported by
a majority of all the Members of the Assembly who are entitled to vote
declaring that it has no confidence in the Government of Botswana,
Parliament shall stand dissolved on the fourth day following the day on which
such resolution was passed, unless the President earlier resigns his office or
dissolves Parliament.
[Ch0000s93] 93.
Sittings of National Assembly
(1) The President may at any time summon a meeting of the National
Assembly.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the sittings of the
National Assembly in any session of Parliament after the commencement of
that session shall be commenced at such times and on such days as the
Assembly shall appoint.
PART VI
Interpretation (s 94)
[Ch0000s94] 94.
Votes of two-thirds of the Assembly
Any reference in this Constitution to the votes of two-thirds of the
Members of the Assembly shall be construed as a reference to the votes of
two-thirds of the Members of the Assembly excluding the person presiding
and the Attorney-General.
CHAPTER VI
The Judicature (ss 95-107)
PART I
The High Court (ss 95-98)
[Ch0000s95] 95.
Jurisdiction and composition
(1) There shall be for Botswana a High Court which shall have
unlimited original jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal
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proceedings under any law and such other jurisdiction and powers as may be
conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law.
2 of 2002, s. 2(a)(i). (2) The judges of the High Court shall be the Chief
Justice and such number of other judges of the Court as may be prescribed
by Parliament:
2 of 2002, s. 2(a)(ii). Provided that the office of a judge of the High
Court shall not be abolished while there is a substantive holder thereof.
(3) The High Court shall be a superior court of record and, save as
otherwise provided by Parliament, shall have all the powers of such a court.
(4) The High Court shall sit in such places as the Chief Justice may
appoint.
(5) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to supervise any civil or
criminal proceedings before any subordinate court or any court martial and
may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may
consider appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that justice is duly
administered by any such court.
(6) The Chief Justice may make rules with respect to the practice and
procedure of the High Court in relation to the jurisdiction and powers
conferred on it by subsection (5) of this section.
2 of 2002, s. 2(b). (7) The Chief Justice may appoint a Rules of Court
Advisory Committee to assist him in reviewing and overhauling the rules
made under subsection (6) and to advise on proposals to update and amend
such rules.
[Ch0000s96] 96.
Appointment of judges of High Court
(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President.
2 of 2002, s. 3(a). (2) The other judges of the High Court shall be
appointed by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission.
(3) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the
High Court unless—
(a)
he holds, or has held office, as a judge of a court having
unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in Botswana, in a
Commonwealth country or in any country outside the Commonwealth that
may be prescribed by Parliament or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from
such a court; or
2 of 2002, s. 3(b). (b)
he is qualified to practise as an advocate or
attorney in such a court and has been qualified for not less than ten years to
practise as an advocate or attorney in such a court;
2 of 2002, s. 3(b). (c)
he is qualified to practise as an advocate or
attorney and he has had the experience in the teaching of law in a recognised
university for not less than ten years; or
2 of 2002, s. 3(b). (d)
he is a Chief Magistrate who has held that
office for not less than five years.
(4) In computing, for the purposes of subsection (3) of this section, the
period during which any person has been qualified to practise as an advocate
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or attorney any period during which he has held judicial office after becoming
so qualified shall be included.
2 of 2002, s. 3(c)(i). (5) If the office of Chief Justice is vacant or if the
Chief Justice is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office,
then, until a person has been appointed to and has assumed the functions of
that office or until the Chief Justice has resumed those functions, as the case
may be, those functions shall be performed by such one of the judges of the
High Court or such other person qualified for appointment as a judge of the
High Court as the President may appoint for that purpose:
Provided that—
2 of 2002, s. 3(e). (i)
a person may be appointed under this
subsection notwithstanding that he has attained the age of 70 years or such
other age as may be prescribed for the purposes of section 97 of this
Constitution;
2 of 2002, s. 3(c)(ii). (ii)
a person appointed under this subsection,
who is not a judge of the High Court, may, notwithstanding the assumption or
resumption of the functions of the office of Chief Justice by the holder of that
office, continue to act as a judge of the High Court for so long thereafter and
to such extent as may be necessary to enable him to deliver judgment or to
do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were commenced before
him previously thereto.
2 of 2002, s. 3(d). (6) If the office of any judge of the High Court is
vacant, or if any such judge is appointed to act as Chief Justice, or is for any
reason unable to perform the functions of his office, or if the President, acting
after consultation with the Chief Justice, is satisfied that the state of business
in the High Court requires that the number of judges of the court should be
temporarily increased, the President, acting in accordance with the advice of
the Judicial Service Commission, may appoint a person qualified for
appointment as a judge of the High Court to act as a judge of that court:
2 of 2002, s. 3(e). Provided that a person may be so appointed
notwithstanding that he has attained the age of 70 years or such other age as
may be prescribed for the purposes of section 88 of this Constitution.
2 of 2002, s. 3(d). (7) Any person appointed under subsection (6) of
this section to act as a judge of the High Court shall, subject to the provisions
of section 97(4) and (5) of this Constitution, continue to act for the period of
his appointment or, if no such period is specified, until his appointment is
revoked by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial
Service Commission:
Provided that the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission, may permit a person whose appointment to act
as a judge of the High Court has expired or been revoked to continue to act
as such a judge for such period as may be necessary to enable him to deliver
judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were
commenced before him previously thereto.
[Ch0000s97] 97.
Tenure of office of judges of High Court
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2 of 2002, s. 4. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person
holding the office of a judge of the High Court shall vacate that office on
attaining the age of 70 years or such other age as may be prescribed by
Parliament:
Provided that the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission, may permit a judge who has attained that age
to continue in office for such period as may be necessary to enable him to
deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were
commenced before him before he attained that age.
(2) A judge of the High Court may be removed from office only for
inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of
body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and shall not be
so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(3) If the President considers that the question of removing a judge of
the High Court under this section ought to be investigated then—
(a)
he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and
not less than two other members, who hold or have held high judicial office;
(b)
the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts
thereof to the President and advise the President whether the judge ought to
be removed from office under this section for inability as aforesaid or for
misbehaviour.
(4) Where a tribunal appointed under subsection (3) of this section
advises the President that a judge of the High Court ought to be removed
from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour, the President shall
remove such judge from office.
(5) If the question of removing a judge of the High Court from office
has been referred to a tribunal under subsection (3) of this section, the
President may suspend the judge from performing the functions of his office,
and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President and
shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal advises the President that
the judge ought not to be removed from office.
[Ch0000s98] 98.
Oaths to be taken by judges of High Court
A judge of the High Court shall not enter upon the duties of his office
unless he has taken and subscribed such oath for the due execution of his
office as may be prescribed by Parliament.
PART II
Court of Appeal (ss 99-102)
[Ch0000s99] 99.
Composition and jurisdiction
(1) There shall be a Court of Appeal for Botswana which shall have
such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or
any other law.
(2) The judges of the Court of Appeal shall be—
(a)
the President of the Court of Appeal;
(b)
such number, if any, of Justices of Appeal as may be prescribed
by Parliament; and
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2 of 2002, s. 5. (c) the Chief Justice and the other judges of the High
Court:
Provided that Parliament may make provision for the office of
President of the Court of Appeal to be held by the Chief Justice ex-officio.
(3) The office of a Justice of Appeal shall not be abolished while there
is a substantive holder thereof.
(4) The Court of Appeal shall be a superior court of record and save as
otherwise provided by Parliament shall have all the powers of such a court.
[Ch0000s100] 100. Appointment of judges of Court of Appeal
(1) The President of the Court of Appeal shall, unless that office is held
ex-officio by the Chief Justice, be appointed by the President.
(2) The Justices of Appeal, if any, shall be appointed by the President,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.
(3) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the
Court of Appeal unless—
(a)
he holds, or has held office as, a judge of a court having
unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in Botswana, in a
Commonwealth country or in any country outside the Commonwealth that
may be prescribed by Parliament or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from
such a court; or
2 of 2002, s. 6(a). (b)
he is qualified to practise as an advocate or
attorney in such a court and has been qualified for not less than ten years to
practise as an advocate or attorney in such a court; or
2 of 2002, s. 6(a). (c)
he is qualified to practise as an advocate or
attorney and he has had experience in the teaching of law in a recognised
university for not less than ten years.
(4) In computing, for the purposes of subsection (3) of this section, the
period during which any person has been qualified to practise as an advocate
or attorney any period during which he has held judicial office after becoming
so qualified shall be included.
(5) If the office of President of the Court of Appeal is vacant or if the
President of the Court of Appeal is for any reason unable to perform the
functions of his office, then, until a person has been appointed to and has
assumed the functions of that office or until the President of the Court of
Appeal has resumed those functions, as the case may be, those functions
shall be performed by such one of the other judges of the Court of Appeal or
such other person qualified for appointment as a judge of the Court of Appeal
as the President may appoint for that purpose:
Provided that—
2 of 2002, s. 6(b). (i)
a person may be appointed under this
subsection notwithstanding that he has attained the age of 70 years or such
other age as may be prescribed for the purposes of section 101 of this
Constitution;
(ii)
a person appointed under this subsection, who is not a judge of
the Court of Appeal, may, notwithstanding the assumption or resumption of
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the functions of the office of President of the Court of Appeal by the holder of
that office, continue to act as a judge of the Court of Appeal for so long
thereafter and to such extent as may be necessary to enable him to deliver
judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were
commenced before him previously thereto.
(6) If the office of a Justice of Appeal is vacant or if any Justice of
Appeal is appointed to act as Chief Justice or President of the Court of
Appeal or is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, the
President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service
Commission, may appoint a person qualified for appointment as a Justice of
Appeal to act as a Justice of Appeal:
2 of 2002, s. 6(b). Provided that a person may be so appointed
notwithstanding that he has attained the age of 70 years or such other age as
may be prescribed for the purposes of section 101 of this Constitution.
(7) Any person appointed under subsection (6) of this section to act as
a Justice of Appeal, shall subject to the provisions of section 101(4) and (5) of
this Constitution, continue to act for the period of his appointment or, if no
such period is specified, until his appointment is revoked by the President,
acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission:
Provided that the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission, may permit a person whose appointment to act
as a Justice of Appeal has expired or been revoked to continue to act as such
a judge for such period as may be necessary to enable him to deliver
judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were
commenced before him previously thereto.
[Ch0000s101] 101. Tenure of office of judges of Court of Appeal
2 of 2002, s. 7. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person
holding the office of a judge of the Court of Appeal shall vacate that office on
attaining the age of 70 years or such other age as may be prescribed by
Parliament:
Provided that—
(i)
the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission, may permit a judge who has attained that age
to continue in office for such period as may be necessary to enable him to
deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were
commenced before him before he attained that age;
(ii)
a person may be appointed as President of the Court of Appeal
or as a Justice of Appeal for a fixed period of three years notwithstanding that
he has attained the age referred to in this subsection or that he will before the
expiry of his appointment have attained that age; and
(iii)
the appointment as President of the Court of Appeal or as
Justice of Appeal serving for a fixed period under paragraph (ii) above shall
not affect the date at which he is due to retire.
(2) A judge of the Court of Appeal may be removed from office only for
inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of
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body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and shall not be
so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(3) If the President considers that the question of removing a judge of
the Court of Appeal under this section ought to be investigated then—
(a)
he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and
not less than two other members, who hold or have held high judicial office;
(b)
the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts
thereof to the President and advise the President whether the judge ought to
be removed from office under this section for inability as aforesaid or for
misbehaviour.
(4) Where a tribunal, appointed under subsection (3) of this section,
advises the President that a judge of the Court of Appeal ought to be
removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour, the
President shall remove such judge from office.
(5) If the question of removing a judge of the Court of Appeal from
office has been referred to a tribunal under subsection (3) of this section, the
President may suspend the judge from performing the functions of his office,
and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President and
shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal advises the President that
the judge ought not to be removed from office.
[Ch0000s102] 102. Oaths to be taken by judges of Court of Appeal
A judge of the Court of Appeal shall not enter upon the duties of his
office unless he has taken and subscribed such oath for the due execution of
his office as may be prescribed by Parliament.
PART III
Judicial Service Commission (ss 103-104)
[Ch0000s103] 103. Composition and procedure
2 of 2002, s. 8(a). (1) There shall be a Judicial Service Commission for
Botswana which shall consist of—
(a)
the Chief Justice who shall be Chairman;
(b)
the President of the Court of Appeal (not being the Chief Justice
or the most Senior Justice of the Court of Appeal);
(c)
the Attorney-General;
(d)
the Chairman of the Public Service Commission;
(e)
a member of the Law Society nominated by the Law Society;
and
(f)
a person of intergrity and experience not being a legal
practitioner appointed by the President.
2 of 2002, s. 8(a). (2) A member nominated under paragraph (e) or
appointed under paragraph (f) of subsection (1) shall hold office for a period
of two years, but shall be eligible for re-nomination or re-appointment, as the
case may be, for another term of office for two years:
Provided that—
(i)
a member nominated under paragraph (e) may be removed
from office by the rest of the members of the Commission acting together only
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for inability of the member to discharge the functions of his office whether
arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause or for gross
misbehaviour; or
(ii)
a member appointed under paragraph (f) may be removed from
office by the President only for inability of the member to discharge the
functions of his office whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any
other cause or for gross misbehaviour.
(3) A member of the Commission shall not enter upon the duties of his
office until he has taken and subscribed such oath for the due execution of his
office as may be prescribed by Parliament.
(4) The Judicial Service Commission shall not be subject to the
direction or control of any other person or authority in the exercise of its
functions under this Constitution.
2 of 2002, s. 8(b). (5) The Commission may regulate its own procedure
and, subject to that procedure, may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its
membership or the absence of any member and its proceedings shall not be
invalidated by the presence or participation of any person not entitled to be
present at or to participate in those proceedings.
2 of 2002, s. 8(b). (6) The decisions of the Commission shall be by the
vote of a majority of the members present, and in the event of an equality of
votes, the Chairman shall have a casting vote.
[Ch0000s104] 104. Appointment, etc., of judicial officers
(1) Power to appoint persons to hold or act in offices to which this
section applies, to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting
in such offices and to remove such persons from office shall vest in the
President acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service
Commission.
(2) The offices to which this section applies are—
(a)
the office of Registrar of the Court of Appeal and High Court;
(b)
all offices of magistrate;
(c)
such other offices of President or member of any court or
connected with any court as may be prescribed by or under an Act of
Parliament.
(3) In this section references to a court do not include references to a
court martial.
PART IV
Interpretation of the Constitution (ss 105-106)
[Ch0000s105] 105. Reference to High Court of cases involving interpretation
of Constitution
(1) Where any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution
arises in any proceedings in any subordinate court and the court is of the
opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, the court
may, and shall, if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question
to the High Court.
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(2) Where any question is referred to the High Court in pursuance of
this section, the High Court shall give its decision upon the question and the
court in which the question arose shall, subject to any appeal, dispose of the
case in accordance with that decision.
[Ch0000s106] 106. Appeal to Court of Appeal
An appeal shall lie as of right to the Court of Appeal from any decision
of the High Court which involves the interpretation of this Constitution, other
than a decision of the High Court under section 69(1) of this Constitution:
Provided that no appeal shall lie from a determination of the High Court
under this section dismissing an application on the ground that it is frivolous
or vexatious.
PART V
Judicial Committee (s 107: repealed)
[Ch0000s107] 107. [Repealed.]
CHAPTER VII
The Public Service (ss 108-116)
[Ch0000s108] 108. Power to specify qualifications for certain offices
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any Act of
Parliament, power to specify the qualifications and disqualifications for
holding such public offices as he may constitute shall vest in the President.
[Ch0000s109] 109. Public Service Commission
(1) There shall be a Public Service Commission for Botswana which
shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two nor more than four other
members.
(2) The members of the Public Service Commission shall be appointed
by the President.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of the
Public Service Commission if he is a Member of the National Assembly or a
public officer, or is or has within the two years immediately preceding his
appointment been actively engaged in politics.
(4) For the purposes of this section a person shall be deemed to be or
to have been actively engaged in politics in circumstances in which he would
be deemed to be or to have been so engaged for the purposes of section
64(4)(b) of this Constitution.
(5) Subject to the provisions of this section, the office of a member of
the Public Service Commission shall become vacant—
(a)
at the expiration of three years from the date of his appointment;
(b)
if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the
Commission, would cause him to be disqualified for appointment as such; or
(c)
if he is removed from office in accordance with the provisions of
subsection (6) of this section.
(6) Subject to subsection (7) of this section a member of the Public
Service Commission may be removed from office by the President for inability
to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of body
or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour.
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(7) If the President considers that the question of removing a member
of the Public Service Commission under subsection (6) of this section ought
to be investigated, then—
(a)
the President shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a
Chairman and not less than two other members selected by the Chief Justice
from among persons who hold or have held high judicial office; and
(b)
the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts
thereof to the President and recommend to him whether the member ought to
be removed under subsection (6) of this section, and the President shall act in
accordance with that recommendation.
(8) A member of the Public Service Commission shall not be removed
from office except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(9) If the office of Chairman of the Public Service Commission is
vacant or if the person holding that office is for any reason unable to perform
the functions of his office, then, until a person has been appointed to and has
assumed the functions of that office or until the person holding that office has
resumed those functions, as the case may be, those functions shall be
performed by such one of the other members of the Commission as may be
designated in that behalf by the President.
(10) If at any time there are less than two members of the Public
Service Commission besides the Chairman or if any such member is
appointed to act as Chairman or is for any reason unable to perform the
functions of his office, the President may appoint a person who is qualified for
appointment as a member of the Commission to act as a member, and any
person so appointed shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (5)(b) of
this section, continue to act until the office in which he is acting is filled, or as
the case may be, until the holder thereof resumes his functions or until his
appointment to act is revoked by the President.
(11) Except as provided in subsection (13) of this section the Public
Service Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any
other person or authority in the exercise of its functions under this
Constitution.
(12) A member of the Commission shall not enter upon the duties of
his office until he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and such
oath for the due execution of his office as may be prescribed by Parliament.
(13) Provision may be made by or under an Act of Parliament
prescribing the procedure of the Commission and, subject thereto, the
Commission may regulate its own procedure.
(14) Except as may be otherwise provided in its rules or procedure, the
Commission may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership or the
absence of any member and its proceedings shall not be invalidated by the
presence or participation of any person not entitled to be present at or to
participate in those proceedings.
(15) Any decision of the Commission shall require the concurrence of a
majority of all the members thereof.
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(16) A member of the Commission shall not, during the tenure of his
office or during the three years immediately following such tenure, be eligible
for appointment to any public office other than that of Ambassador, High
Commissioner or other principal representative of Botswana in any other
country or accredited to any international organization.
[Ch0000s110] 110. Appointment, etc., of public officers
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of sections 111, 113
and 114 of this Constitution, power to appoint persons to hold or to act in any
office in the public service, to exercise disciplinary control over persons
holding or acting in such offices and to remove from such offices shall vest in
such person or persons as may be prescribed by Act of Parliament.
(2) The provisions of this section shall not apply in relation to the
following offices, that is to say—
(a)
the office of judge of the Court of Appeal or of the High Court;
(b)
any office to which section 104 or 112 of the Constitution
applies.
(3) Before any person or persons as may have been prescribed under
the provisions of subsection (1) exercise power to appoint to or to act in any
public office any person who holds or is acting in any office the power to
make appointments to which is vested by this Constitution in the President
acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission such
person shall consult with the Judicial Service Commission.
[Ch0000s111] 111. Appeals to President
(1) Any person other than a member of the Botswana Police Force or
the Prison Service who has been removed from office or subjected to any
other punishment by the exercise of any powers conferred on any person
under the provisions of section 110 of this Constitution may appeal to the
Public Service Commission who may dismiss such appeal or allow it wholly or
in part.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) every decision of the
Public Service Commission under the provisions of this section shall be final.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2) if the Public
Service Commission dismisses an appeal or allows it in part only the person
who appealed may appeal to the President.
(4) If any person appeals to the President in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (3) of this section the President shall either dismiss
the appeal or shall order that it be heard by a tribunal appointed by the
President, the Chairman of which shall be a person who holds or has held
high judicial office or is qualified to be appointed as a judge of the High Court.
(5) If the President appoints a tribunal to hear an appeal in accordance
with subsection (4) of this section the tribunal shall hear the appeal and shall
advise the President whether or not the appeal should be allowed either
wholly or in part, and the President shall act in accordance with that advice.
[Ch0000s112] 112. Powers of President in relation to certain public offices
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(1) The power to appoint a person to hold or act in offices to which this
section applies and to remove from office and to exercise disciplinary control
over persons holding or acting in such offices shall, subject to the provisions
of sections 113 and 114 of this Constitution, vest in the President.
(2) The offices to which this section applies are—
(a)
Ambassador, High Commissioner or other principal
representative of Botswana in any other country or accredited to any
international organisation;
(b)
Secretary to the Cabinet;
(c)
Attorney-General;
(d)
Permanent Secretary;
(e)
Commissioner of Police; and
(f)
any other superscale office (other than an office to which this
Constitution makes specific provision for appointment or an office to which
appointment is made under the provisions of section 104 of this Constitution)
which may be prescribed by Act of Parliament.
[Ch0000s113] 113. Tenure of office of Attorney-General
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding the office
of Attorney-General shall vacate his office when he attains the age of 60
years or such other age as may be prescribed by Parliament.
(2) A person holding the office of Attorney-General may be removed
from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether
arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour
and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this
section.
(3) If the President considers that the question of removing a person
holding the office of Attorney-General from office ought to be investigated
then—
(a)
he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a Chairman and
not less than two other members, who hold or have held high judicial office;
and
(b)
the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts
thereof to the President and advise the President whether the person holding
the office of Attorney-General ought to be removed from office under this
section for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour.
(4) Where a tribunal appointed under subsection (3) of this section
advises the President that a person holding the office of Attorney-General
ought to be removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour,
the President shall remove such person from office.
(5) If the question of removing a person holding the office of AttorneyGeneral from office has been referred to a tribunal under this section, the
President may suspend that person from performing the functions of his
office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the President
and shall in any case cease to have effect if the tribunal advises the President
that the person ought not to be removed from office.
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[Ch0000s114] 114. Tenure of office of Auditor-General
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding the office
of Auditor-General shall vacate his office when he attains the age of 60 years
or such other age as may be prescribed by Parliament.
(2) A person holding the office of Auditor-General may be removed
from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether
arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour
and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this
section.
(3) If the National Assembly resolves that the question of removing a
person holding the office of Auditor-General from office under this section
ought to be investigated then—
(a)
the Assembly shall, by resolution, appoint a tribunal which shall
consist of a Chairman and not less than two other members, who hold or
have held high judicial office;
(b)
the tribunal shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts
thereof to the Assembly;
(c)
the Assembly shall consider the report of the tribunal at the first
convenient sitting of the Assembly after it is received and may, upon such
consideration, by resolution, remove the Auditor-General from office.
(4) If the question of removing a person holding the office of AuditorGeneral from office has been referred to a tribunal under this section, the
National Assembly may, by resolution, suspend that person from performing
the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be
revoked by the Assembly by resolution and shall in any case cease to have
effect if, upon consideration of the report of the tribunal in accordance with the
provisions of this section, the Assembly does not remove the Auditor-General
from office.
[Ch0000s115] 115. Pensions laws and protection of pensions rights
(1) The law to be applied with respect to any pensions benefits that
were granted to any person before the coming into operation of this
Constitution shall be the law that was in force at the date on which those
benefits were granted or any law in force at a later date that is not less
favourable to that person.
(2) The law to be applied with respect to any pensions benefits (not
being benefits to which subsection (1) of this section applies) shall—
(a)
in so far as those benefits are wholly in respect of a period of
service as a public officer that commenced before the date on which this
Constitution comes into operation, be the law that was in force immediately
before that date; and
(b)
in so far as those benefits are wholly or partly in respect of a
period of service as a public officer that commenced after the date on which
this Constitution comes into operation, be the law in force on the date on
which that period of service commenced,
or any law in force at a later date that is not less favourable to that person.
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(3) Where a person is entitled to exercise an option as to which of two
or more laws shall apply in his case, the law for which he opts shall, for the
purposes of this section, be deemed to be more favourable to him than the
other law or laws.
(4) All pensions benefits shall (except to the extent to which under any
law providing for the funding of pensions benefits they are a charge on a fund
established by that law and have been duly paid out of that fund to the person
or authority to whom payment is due) be a charge on the Consolidated Fund.
(5) In this section "pensions benefits" means any pensions,
compensation, gratuities or other like allowances for persons in respect of
their service as public officers or as members of the armed forces or for the
widows, children, dependants or personal representatives of such persons in
respect of such service.
(6) References in this section to the law with respect to pensions
benefits include (without prejudice to their generality) references to the law
regulating the circumstances in which such benefits may be granted or in
which the grant of such benefits may be refused, the law regulating the
circumstances in which any such benefits that have been granted may be
withheld, reduced in amount or suspended and the law regulating the amount
of any such benefits.
(7) In this section references to service as a public officer include
references to service as a public officer of the former Protectorate of
Bechuanaland.
[Ch0000s116] 116. Power of Commissions in relation to pensions, etc.
(1) Where under any law any person or authority has a discretion—
(a)
to decide whether or not any pensions benefits shall be granted;
or
(b)
to withhold, reduce in amount or suspend any such benefits that
have been granted,
those benefits shall be granted and may not be withheld, reduced in amount
or suspended unless the appropriate Commission concurs in the refusal to
grant the benefits or, as the case may be, in the decision to withhold them,
reduce them in amount or suspend them.
(2) Where the amount of any pensions benefits that may be granted to
any person is not fixed by law, the amount of the benefits to be granted to him
shall be the greatest amount for which he is eligible unless the appropriate
Commission concurs in his being granted benefits of a smaller amount.
(3) The appropriate Commission shall not concur under subsection (1)
or subsection (2) of this section in action taken on the ground that any person
who holds or has held the office of a judge of the Court of Appeal or of the
High Court or the Auditor-General or Attorney-General has been guilty of
misbehaviour unless he has been removed from office by reason of such
misbehaviour.
(4) In this section "the appropriate Commission" means—
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(a)
in the case of benefits for which any person may be eligible in
respect of the service in the public service of a person who, immediately
before he ceased to be a public officer, was subject to the disciplinary control
of the Judicial Service Commission or that have been granted in respect of
such service, the Judicial Service Commission;
(b)
in any other case, the Public Service Commission.
(5) In this section "pensions benefits" means any pensions,
compensation, gratuities or other like allowances for persons in respect of
their service as public officers (including service as public officers of the
former Protectorate of Bechuanaland) or for the widows, children, dependants
or personal representatives of such persons in respect of such service.
CHAPTER VIII
Finance (ss 117-124)
[Ch0000s117] 117. Consolidated Fund
All revenues or other moneys raised or received for the purposes of
the Government of Botswana (not being revenues or other moneys that are
payable by or under any law into some other fund established for a specific
purpose or that may by or under any law be retained by the department of
Government that received them for the purposes of defraying the expenses of
that department) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Fund.
[Ch0000s118] 118. Withdrawals from Consolidated Fund or other public
funds
(1) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund
except—
(a)
to meet expenditure that is charged upon the Fund by this
Constitution or by any Act of Parliament;
(b)
where the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an
Appropriation Act, by a supplementary estimate approved by resolution of the
National Assembly or by a law enacted in pursuance of section 120 of this
Constitution.
(2) No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of Botswana
other than the Consolidated Fund unless the issue of those moneys has been
authorized by or under a law.
(3) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund except
in the manner prescribed by Parliament.
(4) The deposit of any moneys forming part of the Consolidated Fund
with a bank or with the Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and
Administrations or the investment of any such moneys in securities in which,
under the law for the time being in force in Botswana, trustees are authorized
to invest, or the making of advances to such extent and in such
circumstances as may be prescribed by Parliament, shall not be regarded as
a withdrawal of those moneys from the Fund for the purposes of this section.
[Ch0000s119] 119. Authorization of expenditure
(1) The Minister for the time being responsible for finance shall cause
to be prepared and laid before the National Assembly, before or not later than
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30 days after the commencement of each financial year, estimates of the
revenues and expenditure of Botswana for that year.
(2) The heads of expenditure contained in the estimates for a financial
year (other than expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund by this
Constitution or any other law) shall be included in a Bill to be known as an
Appropriation Bill which shall be introduced into the Assembly to provide for
the issue from the Consolidated Fund of the sums necessary to meet that
expenditure and the appropriation of those sums for the purposes specified in
the said Bill.
(3) If in any financial year it is found—
(a)
that the amount appropriated by the Appropriation Act for the
purposes included in any head of expenditure is insufficient or that a need
has arisen for expenditure for a purpose for which no amount has been
appropriated by the Appropriation Act; or
(b)
that any moneys have been expended on any head of
expenditure in excess of the amount appropriated for the purposes included
in that head by the Appropriation Act or for a purpose for which no amount
has been appropriated by the Appropriation Act,
a supplementary estimate showing the sums required or spent shall be laid
before the National Assembly and the heads of expenditure shall be included
in a supplementary Appropriation Bill, or in a motion or motions approving
such expenditure, which shall be introduced or moved in the Assembly.
(4) Where any supplementary expenditure has been approved in a
financial year by a resolution of the National Assembly in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (3) of this section, a supplementary Appropriation Bill
shall be introduced in the National Assembly, not later than the end of the
financial year next following, providing for the appropriation of the sums so
approved.
[Ch0000s120] 120. Authorization of expenditure in advance of appropriation
Parliament may make provision under which, if the Appropriation Act in
respect of any financial year has not come into operation by the beginning of
that financial year, the President may authorize the withdrawal of moneys
from the Consolidated Fund for the purpose of meeting expenditure
necessary to carry on the services of the Government until the expiration of
four months from the beginning of that financial year or the coming into
operation of the Appropriation Act, whichever is the earlier.
[Ch0000s121] 121. Contingencies Fund
(1) Parliament may make provision for the establishment of a
Contingencies Fund and for authorizing the President, if satisfied that there
has arisen an urgent and unforeseen need for expenditure for which no other
provision exists, to make advances from that Fund to meet that need.
(2) Where any advance is made from the Contingencies Fund, a
supplementary estimate shall be laid before the National Assembly as soon
as possible for the purpose of replacing the amount so advanced.
[Ch0000s122] 122. Remuneration of certain officers
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(1) There shall be paid to the holders of the offices to which this
section applies such salaries and such allowances as may be prescribed by
Parliament.
(2) The salaries and any allowances payable to the holders of the
offices to which this section applies shall be a charge on the Consolidated
Fund.
(3) The salary payable to the holder of any office to which this section
applies and his terms of office, other than allowances, shall not be altered to
his disadvantage after his appointment.
(4) Where a person's salary or terms of office depend upon his option,
the salary or terms for which he opts shall, for the purposes of subsection (3)
of this section, be deemed to be more advantageous to him than any others
for which he might have opted.
(5) This section applies to the offices of judge of the Court of Appeal,
judge of the High Court, member of the Public Service Commission, member
of the Judicial Service Commission, member of the Delimitation Commission,
Auditor-General and Attorney-General.
[Ch0000s123] 123. Public debt
(1) There shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund all debt charges
for which Botswana is liable.
(2) For the purposes of this section debt charges include interest,
sinking fund charges, the repayment or amortization of debt, and all
expenditure in connection with the raising of loans on the security of the
revenues or the Consolidated Fund of the former Protectorate of
Bechuanaland or Botswana, and the service and redemption of debt thereby
created.
[Ch0000s124] 124. Auditor-General
(1) There shall be an Auditor-General, whose office shall be a public
office.
(2) The public accounts of Botswana and of all officers, courts and
authorities of the Government of Botswana shall be audited and reported on
by the Auditor-General and for that purpose the Auditor-General or any
person authorized by him in that behalf shall have access to all books,
records, reports and other documents relating to those accounts:
Provided that, if it is so provided by Parliament in the case of any body
corporate directly established by law, the accounts of that body corporate
shall be audited and reported on by such person as may be specified by or
under that law.
(3) The Auditor-General shall submit his reports to the Minister
responsible for finance, who shall cause them to be laid before the National
Assembly.
(4) The Auditor-General shall perform such other duties and exercise
such other powers in relation to the accounts of the Government or the
accounts of other public authorities or other bodies as may be prescribed by
or under any Act of Parliament.
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(5) In the exercise of his functions the Auditor-General shall not be
subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.
CHAPTER IX
Miscellaneous (ss 125-127)
[Ch0000s125] 125. Resignations
(1) Any person who is appointed or elected to any office established by
this Constitution may resign from that office by writing under his hand
addressed to the person or authority by whom he was appointed or elected:
Provided that in the case of a person who holds office as President his
resignation from that office shall be addressed to the Chief Justice, in the
case of a person who holds office as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the
National Assembly his resignation from that office shall be addressed to the
Assembly, in the case of an Elected or Specially Elected Member of the
Assembly his resignation shall be addressed to the Speaker, and in the case
of a Member of the House of Chiefs his resignation from that office shall be
addressed to the Chairman of the House.
(2) The resignation of any person from any office established by this
Constitution shall take effect on the date or at the time indicated in the writing
signifying the resignation or, if no such date or time is so indicated, at the time
the writing is received by the person or authority to whom it is addressed or
by any person authorized by that person or authority to receive it.
[Ch0000s126] 126. Reappointments and concurrent appointments
(1) Where any person has vacated any office established by this
Constitution, he may, if qualified, again be appointed or elected to hold that
office in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
(2) Where a power is conferred by this Constitution upon any person to
make any appointment to any office, a person may be appointed to that office
notwithstanding that some other person may be holding that office, when that
other person is on leave of absence pending the relinquishment of the office;
and where two or more persons are holding the same office by reason of an
appointment made in pursuance of this subsection, then, for the purposes of
any function conferred upon the holder of that office, the person last
appointed shall be deemed to be the sole holder of the office.
[Ch0000s127] 127. Interpretation
(1) In this Constitution unless the context otherwise requires—
"the Assembly" means the National Assembly;
"Botswana" means the territory that, on 29th September, 1966, was
comprised in the former Protectorate of Bechuanaland;
"Chief" and "Sub-Chief" have the meanings assigned to those
expressions in the Chieftainship Act;
"financial year" means the period of 12 months ending on 31st March
in any year or on such other day as Parliament may prescribe;
"the Gazette" means the Botswana Government Gazette;
"high judicial office" means the office of a judge of a court of unlimited
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in Botswana, a Commonwealth
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country or in any country outside the Commonwealth that may be prescribed
by Parliament or the office of judge of a court having jurisdiction in appeals
from such a court;
"the House" means the House of Chiefs;
"oath" includes affirmation;
"the oath of allegiance" means such oath of allegiance as may be
prescribed by law;
"public office" means, subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and
(3) of this section, an office of emolument in the public service;
"public officer" means a person holding or acting in any public office;
"the public service" means the civil service of the Government;
"session" means the sittings of the National Assembly beginning when
it first sits after the coming into operation of this Constitution or after
Parliament is prorogued or dissolved at any time and ending when Parliament
is prorogued or is dissolved without having been prorogued;
"sitting" means a period during which the National Assembly is sitting
without adjournment and includes any period during which it is in committee;
"subordinate court" means any court established for Botswana other
than—
(a)
the Court of Appeal;
2 of 2002, s. 9(a). (b)
the High Court;
2 of 2002, s. 9(b). (c)
a court martial; or
2 of 2002, s. 9(c). (d)
the Industrial Court.
(2) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires,
references to offices in the public service shall be construed as including
references to the offices of judges of the Court of Appeal and judges of the
High Court and the offices of members of all subordinate courts (being offices
the emoluments attaching to which, or any part of the emoluments attaching
to which, are paid directly out of moneys provided by Parliament).
(3) For the purposes of this Constitution a person shall not be
considered to be a public officer by reason only that he is in receipt of any
remuneration or allowance as the President, Vice-President, a Minister or
Assistant Minister, Speaker, Deputy Speaker or Member of the Assembly, a
Member of the House of Chiefs or a member of any Commission established
by this Constitution.
(4) For the purposes of this Constitution, a person shall not be
considered as holding a public office by reason only of the fact that he is in
receipt of a pension or other like allowance in respect of service under the
Government of Botswana or the former Protectorate of Bechuanaland.
(5) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, a
reference to the holder of an office by the term designating his office shall be
construed as including a reference to any person for the time being lawfully
acting in or performing the functions of that office:
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply to references to the
President or Vice-President in section 35, 36 or 39 of this Constitution.
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(6) In this Constitution, unless it is otherwise provided or required by
the context, a reference to the power to make appointments to any office shall
be construed as including a reference to the power to make appointments on
promotion and transfer and to confirm appointments and to the power to
appoint a person to act in or perform the functions of that office at any time
when the office is vacant or the holder thereof is unable (whether by reason of
absence or infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) to perform the
functions of that office.
(7) References in this Constitution to the power to remove a public
officer from his office shall be construed as including references to any power
conferred by any law to require or permit that officer to retire from the public
service:
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as
conferring on any person or authority power to require a judge of the Court of
Appeal or the High Court, the Auditor-General or the Attorney-General to
retire from the public service.
(8) Any provision in this Constitution that vests in any person or
authority power to remove any public officer from his office shall be without
prejudice to the power of any person or authority to abolish any office or to
any law providing for the compulsory retirement of public officers generally or
in any class of public officer on attaining an age specified therein.
(9) Where power is vested by this Constitution in any person or
authority to appoint any person to act in or perform the functions of any office
if the holder thereof is himself unable to perform those functions, no such
appointment shall be called in question on the ground that the holder of the
office was not unable to perform those functions.
(10) No provision of this Constitution that any person or authority shall
not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority in the
exercise of any functions under this Constitution shall be construed as
precluding a court of law from exercising jurisdiction in relation to any
question whether that person or authority has performed those functions in
accordance with this Constitution or any other law.
(11) Where any power is conferred by this Constitution to make any
Act, order, regulation or rule, or to give any direction or instruction, the power
shall be construed as including the power, exercisable in like manner to
amend or revoke any such Act, order, regulation, rule, direction or instruction.
(12) Any reference in this Constitution to a law made before 30th
September, 1966 shall be construed as a reference to that law as it had effect
on 29th September, 1966.
S.I. 51/1993. (13) The Cap. 01:04 Interpretation Act, 1889 shall apply,
with the necessary adaptations, for the purpose of interpreting this
Constitution and otherwise in relation thereto as it applies for the purpose of
interpreting and in relation to Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
SCHEDULE TO THE CONSTITUTION
ELECTION OF SPECIALLY ELECTED MEMBERS OF
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THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
(Section 58(2)(b))
1. (1) In this Schedule—
"by-election" means an election to fill a vacancy among the Specially
Elected Members occurring otherwise than upon a dissolution of Parliament;
"general election" means an election to fill the vacancies among the
Specially Elected Members occurring upon a dissolution of Parliament;
"the Speaker" means the Speaker of the National Assembly; and
"prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under paragraph 2 of
this Schedule.
(2) At any time when the office of Speaker is vacant or the holder of
that office is unable by reason of absence or illness to exercise the functions
vested in him by this Schedule those functions may be exercised by the
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly or, if there is no Deputy Speaker or
the Deputy Speaker is unable by reason of absence or illness to exercise
those functions, by such Member of the Assembly (not being the President or
Vice-President or a Minister or Assistant Minister) as the Assembly may elect
for that purpose.
2. Subject to the provisions of this Schedule the National Assembly may
make rules for the election of its Specially Elected Members.
3. Elections of Specially Elected Members shall be conducted by the Speaker
and, subject to the provisions of this Schedule and of any rules made under
paragraph 2 thereof, shall be conducted in such manner as he may direct.
4. (1) The President shall nominate four candidates for election in the case of
a general election and he shall nominate one candidate for election in the
case of a by-election.
(2) The names of the four candidates or, as the case may be, the
name of the one candidate nominated for election by the President under the
foregoing subparagraph shall be presented to the National Assembly in such
manner as may be prescribed, and any Elected Member of the Assembly
(other than the President if he is an Elected Member) shall thereupon be
entitled to nominate four candidates for election in the case of a general
election and one candidate for election in the case of a by-election.
(3) A list of the candidates nominated for election by the President and
the Elected Members of the National Assembly under the foregoing
provisions of this paragraph shall be prepared, and each Elected Member of
the Assembly shall be entitled to vote—
(a)
in the case of a general election, for four candidates; and
(b)
in the case of a by-election, for one candidate,
on the list so constituted.
(4) The vote of every Elected Member of the National Assembly shall
be given by ballot in such a manner as not to disclose how he has voted.
(5) An Elected Member of the National Assembly shall not cast more
than one vote for any one candidate.
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5. (1) The Speaker shall cause elections of Specially Elected Members to be
held—
(a)
in the case of a general election, as soon as practicable after
the holding of a general election of the Elected Members of the National
Assembly and before the Assembly first meets after that general election; and
(b)
in the case of a by-election, as soon as practicable after a
vacancy has occurred among the Specially Elected Members.
(2) A meeting of the Elected Members of the National Assembly that is
held for the purpose of a general election shall be summoned by the Speaker.
(3) No other business than the holding of a general election may be
transacted at any meeting of the Elected Members of the National Assembly
summoned under subparagraph (2) of this paragraph and such a meeting
shall not be regarded as a meeting of the Assembly for the purposes of any
other provision of this Constitution.
6. When the votes have been cast, whether at a general election or at a byelection, a list shall be prepared showing the persons for whom votes have
been cast in order according to the number of votes received by each of
them, the person or persons who received the highest number of votes being
placed first and those who received any lower number of votes being placed
in descending order.
7. In the case of a general election, and subject to the provisions of paragraph
9 of this Schedule, those persons shall be deemed to have been elected as
Specially Elected Members who stand in the first and each succeeding place
on the list until the number of persons to be elected as Specially Elected
Members has been completed.
8. In the case of a by-election, and subject to the provisions of paragraph 10
of this Schedule, the person who stands in the first place on the list shall be
deemed to have been elected.
9. Where, by reason of an equality of votes between them, the number of
candidates in any place on the list who would otherwise be deemed to have
been elected under paragraph 7 of this Schedule exceeds the number of
persons remaining to be elected as Specially Elected Members after the
persons in the preceding places have been elected, none of the candidates in
that place or in any succeeding place shall be deemed to have been elected
and a further election shall be held to fill the vacancies still remaining among
the Specially Elected Members; and the provisions of this Schedule shall
apply in relation to that further election as if it were a general election where
the total number of Specially Elected Members was equal to the number of
vacancies still remaining to be filled.
10. Where, in a by-election, two or more candidates equally receive the
highest number of votes, no candidates shall be deemed to have been
elected and a further by-election shall be held, in accordance with the
provisions of this Schedule, at which only those candidates who received the
highest number of votes in the original by-election may again stand as
candidates.
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